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ABSTRACT 
This thesis critically evaluates how the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement on 
refugees affects the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly in relation to the 
application of the principle of non-refoulement. Drawing upon the political theory of 
Arendt, the thesis investigates whether the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers are compromised during the readmission procedure. In seeking to address this 
issue, the thesis set out two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement falls short of guaranteeing “a right to have rights” for refugees, 
with notable limitations around the right to seek asylum, protection from refoulement and 
the availability of dignified living conditions as envisioned in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and other human rights instruments. The second hypothesis is that Turkey is 
not a safe country for refugees. These two hypotheses were tested during fieldwork 
undertaken in Turkey to explore the current situation of refugees and asylum seekers 
there. Alongside legal and doctrinal analysis, the thesis sets out the results of interviews 
conducted with representatives of NGOs, judges, lawyers, senior officials and experts in 
Turkey who shared their experiences and observations and threw light on the practical 
and legal difficulties that refugees experience in seeking to assert their fundamental 
human right in Turkey.  
The thesis argues that the two hypotheses are confirmed. First, the EU and Turkey 
Agreement on refugees fails to guarantee the fundamental rights of refugees because 
Turkey’s institutional and legal structures are simply not capable of hosting a large 
number of refugees. Furthermore, Turkey’s security concerns after the failed coup 
attempt in 2016 have resulted in an increased security-oriented approach and the risk of 
deportation of asylum seekers and refugees on the ground of public security and public 
order, resulting also in prolonged detention in inhuman conditions. Secondly, Turkey is 
not a safe third country for refugees since Turkey cannot provide effective protection to 
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refugees meaning that nearly three million refugees are struggling to access housing, 
health, education services and employment opportunities. The thesis suggests that this 
situation is a further form of violence against refugees and hinders their ability to claim 
and exercise their rights. Put simply, even though refugees are endowed with natural 
human rights they have no means of exercising those rights. This situation gives rise to 
the fundamental condition of “rightlessness” and reduces refugees to “bare humanity”.  
The thesis finds that the EU-Turkey ‘deal’ and its implementation provide important 
evidence to counter the suggestion that refugee protection in the region of origin is an 
effective solution to the refugee protection crisis. The thesis further casts doubt on the 
capacity of the Agreement to contribute to fair burden sharing between states. The thesis 
concludes that there is a need for further research to determine how protection in the 
region of origin could be facilitated without infringing the fundamental rights of refugees. 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis critically evaluates how the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement on 
refugees affects the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, particularly the principle of 
non-refoulement. Drawing upon the political theory of Arendt, the thesis investigates 
whether the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement prevents refugees from 
accessing their fundamental civil-political and socio-economic rights. With regard to the 
civil and political rights of refugees, the thesis considers whether refugees can access fair 
and effective asylum procedures and refugee status determination after their readmission 
to Turkey. It also assesses whether the Agreement triggers any human rights violations, 
such as unlawful deportations against the principle of non-refoulement or prolonged 
administrative detention and the availability of an effective remedy against these human 
rights violations. In relation to the social and economic rights of refugees, the thesis 
analyses whether Turkey provides dignified living conditions for refugees as envisioned 
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees1 such as access to 
accommodation, healthcare, education services and the labour market.  
The research project has two dimensions that are interrelated. The first concerns the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement (RA), which was signed on 16th December 20132 and 
came into force after ratification by the Turkish Parliament in June 2014. There was a 
three-year transition period for readmission of third-country nationals and stateless 
persons, which meant that the RA would not enter into force for third country nationals 
and stateless persons until June 2017. However, due to the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU 
and Turkey agreed to start the implementation of the RA for third-country nationals and 
stateless persons in June 2016.3 That said even though the planned new date has passed, 
the related provision has not come into force due to increasing political tension between 
the EU and Turkey. The Turkish Government suspended the implementation of the EU-
                                                 
1  Henceforth referred to as the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
2  Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the Readmission of Persons 
Residing without Authorisation. OJ L 134/3-27, 07.05.2014. 
3 The Republic of Turkey Ministry of EU Affairs, EU-Turkey Visa Liberalisation Dialogue, 
December 2015, p. 5. http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/stib/TR-ABVizeSerbestisi.pdf. 
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Turkey RA on 1st of June 2016, claiming that the EU had not kept its promise and had 
not started visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals.4  
The second dimension of the research project is related to the EU-Turkey Statement,5 
which was concluded in March 2016 to cope with increasing irregular migration and 
refugee flow into the European territory. It became an integral part of the EU-Turkey RA. 
It was the Syrian refugee crisis that was the main reason behind the new cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey. According to the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU will provide 
an extra € 3 bn of financial support to Turkey until the end of 2018 if Turkey continues 
to provide temporary protection to Syrian refugees and strengthens its borders to prevent 
Syrian refugees and other irregular migrants from crossing into the EU. The EU also 
established a very controversial resettlement scheme with Turkey known as the “one-to-
one mechanism”.6 According to the EU-Turkey Statement, “for every Syrian being 
returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to 
the EU”.7 The EU-Turkey Statement has been implemented for over 18 months and has 
affected three million people both in Turkey and Greece. Even though the Turkish 
government suspended the implementation of the EU-Turkey RA for third country 
nationals, the EU-Turkey Statement reactivated the Turkey-Greece Readmission 
Protocol8 and started readmission procedures for returning irregular migrants and rejected 
asylum seekers. Accordingly, the EU-Turkey Statement performed the same function as 
                                                 
4  AB Haber Brussels, EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement: Turkey Suspended Readmission 
Agreement, 5 June 2016, http://www.abhaber.com/turkiye-geri-kabul-anlasmasini-askiya-aldi/: 
Daily Sabah EU Affairs, Ankara Halts Readmission Agreement with EU, Disagrees on Anti-
Terrorism Laws, 6 June 2016, https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2016/06/06/ankara-halts-
readmission-agreement-with-eu-disagrees-on-anti-terrorism-laws.  
5  The EU-Turkey Statement, European Council of the European Union, Press Release, 18 March 
2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.  
6  Carrera, Sergio & Guild, Elspeth, EU-Turkey Plan for Handling Refugees is Fraught with Legal and 
Procedural Challenges, CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-
turkey-plan-handling-refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges. Peers, Steve, The Final 
EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment, 18 March 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html?m=1; 
Amnesty International, EU Turkey Summit: EU and Turkey Leaders Deal Death Blow to the Rights 
to Seek Asylum, 8 March 2016, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/eu-turkey-summit-
reaction/.  
7  The EU-Turkey Statement, European Council of the European Union, Press Release, 18 March 
2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.  
8  The Protocol for the Implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement Between the Government of the 
Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Hellenic Republic on Combating Crime, Especially 
Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Illegal Migration, OJ, 24.04.2003, No. 
24735.  
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the EU-Turkey RA, but it is only applicable between Turkey and Greece until the EU-
Turkey RA comes into force for third country nationals.  
It is noteworthy that at first, the researcher aimed to analyse the human rights impact of 
the EU-Turkey RA but the EU-Turkey Statement brought a different dimension into the 
thesis and the researcher broadened the scope of the study to include the EU-Turkey 
Statement in her research project. In the end, this research project encompasses both the 
EU-Turkey RA and Statement, as both constitute the basis of readmission procedures for 
third country nationals, especially refugees and asylum seekers. The researcher uses “the 
EU-Turkey Agreement on refugee issue” when referring to both agreements.  
This chapter begins with identifying the main research question, continues with an 
overview of the background that frames the study before explaining the rationale and 
significance of the thesis, the research methodology adopted and the structure of the 
thesis.  
2. The Main Research Question 
The thesis aims to answer the question ‘how does the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on refugee issue affect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees and 
specifically the principle of non-refoulement?’ A comprehensive answer to the main 
research question is premised on three different sub-questions.  
The first sub-question is ‘why is refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to their 
fundamental human rights problematic and does the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on refugees fall short of guaranteeing “a right to have rights”?’ Today this 
question has become very important because although refugees may have their rights 
protected in the abstract, everyday experiences of refugees and asylum seekers are very 
different. Despite some developments at international, regional and national levels, states 
have continued to construct many barriers to prevent asylum seekers and refugees from 
accessing their territory. Within these restrictive practices, readmission agreements with 
safe third country practices have become very significant instruments to contain refugees 
in the region of origin. This sub-question investigates the background to the contemporary 
refugee protection crisis and the continuing conflict between human rights and national 
sovereignty.  
The second sub-question is ‘what responsibilities does the EU-Turkey Agreement on the 
refugee issue bring for Turkey in terms of refugee protection?’ Answers to this sub-
15 
 
  
question aim to discover whether the EU-Turkey Agreement can be implemented 
successfully without infringing the principle of non-refoulement. This is very important 
for several reasons. First, Turkey has started to function as a safe third country or first 
country of asylum in accordance with EU law. This requires Turkey to respect the 
principle of non-refoulement and provide fair, effective and accessible refugee status 
determination. Secondly, this sub-question addresses whether readmitted refugees and 
asylum seekers are protected from deportation orders or prolonged detention in inhuman 
conditions and other human rights violations. 
The third sub-question is ‘what difficulties, if any, do refugees have in accessing their 
civil-political and socio-economic rights as a result of the implementation of the EU-
Turkey Statement?’ First, the researcher addresses the availability of civil and political 
rights for refugees and asylum seekers and whether they have access to fair and effective 
asylum procedures, legal assistance, translators and effective remedies against 
deportation and administrative detention decisions. Secondly, the researcher addresses 
the actual difficulties asylum seekers and refugees face in accessing their socio-economic 
rights including accommodation, education, health services and employment 
opportunities.  
Two hypotheses underpin this research: the first is that the EU-Turkey Agreement falls 
short of guaranteeing “a right to have rights” of refugees. The right to have rights of 
refugees is defined as the right to seek asylum, respect for the principle of non-
refoulement and access to the dignified living conditions as envisioned in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments.9 This first hypothesis is based 
on the fact that the EU-Turkey Agreement does not provide any safeguards or 
independent monitoring system against human rights infringements or violations. The 
deficiencies in asylum procedures both in Turkey and Greece pose a threat to the principle 
of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum. Whereas Greece can reject asylum 
seekers without allowing access to refugee status determination, Turkey is struggling to 
provide fair, accessible and efficient asylum procedures due to its institutional and legal 
deficiencies.10 In the end, it has triggered what might be described as chain refoulement 
                                                 
9  See Article 14(1) of the UDHR, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
10  Peers, Steve, The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment, 18 March 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html?m=1; 
Marx, Reinhard, Legal Opinion on the Admissibility under Union Law of the European Council’s 
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of asylum seekers and refugees to their country of origin. Furthermore, Turkey’s security 
concerns have increased considerably since the failed coup attempt in 2016.11 According 
to the new amendment to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), 
which was made by Decre 676 under the state of emergency, refugees and asylum seekers 
may be subjected to deportation orders if they are considered to be linked to a terrorist 
organisation.12 This security-oriented approach has increased the risk of deportation of 
asylum seekers and refugees on the ground of public security and public order. Against 
these deportation decisions, there is no effective remedy or independent monitoring 
system.13 
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is not a safe country for refugees because Turkey 
cannot provide effective protection to refugees. The fieldwork findings, which constitute 
a key part of this research, reveal that increasing refugee protection responsibility on 
Turkey has led to the downgrading of refugee protection standards. Due to the country’s 
weak institutional capacity, access to the basic living standards, reception conditions and 
longer-term integration facilities have become very problematic.14 Even though it is 
approaching six years since the first Syrian refugee entered Turkey, they are not able to 
get refugee status or citizenship status and are struggling to access their socio-economic 
rights, such as housing, education, health services and the labour market.15 The thesis 
                                                 
Plan to Treat Turkey like a “Safe Third State”, Commissioned by Pro Asyl, 14 March 2016, pp. 9-10 
https://www.proasyl.de/en/material/legal-opinion-on-the-admissibility-under-union-law-of-the-
european-councils-plan-to-treat-turkey-like-a-safe-third-state/. Roman, Emanuela & Baird, 
Theodore & Radcliffe, Talia, Statewatch Analysis, Why Turkey is not a “Safe Country”, February 
2016, pp. 18-19; Carrera, Sergio & Guild, Elspeth, EU-Turkey Plan for Handling Refugees is 
Fraught with Legal and Procedural Challenges, 10 March 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-
turkey-plan-handling-refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges.  
11  The Guardian, Turkey MPs Approve State of Emergency Bill Allowing Rule by Decree, 21 July 
2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/turkey-parliament-expected-to-pass-erdogan-
emergency-measures; Barbelet, Veronique, How the Failed Coup Affects Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 
25 July 2016, https://www.odi.org/comment/10427-how-failed-coup-affects-syrian-refugees-turkey.  
12  In accordance with Article 54(1)(b)(d) and newly added paragraph (k) of the LFIP, foreigners who 
are “leaders, members or supporters of a terrorist organisation or a benefit-oriented criminal 
organisation”; “pose a public order or public security or public health threat”, and “are assessed by 
international institutions and organisation as being related to a terrorist organization” will be subjected 
to deportation. 
13  Soykan, Cavidan, The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: The Rise of Walls of Shame, ECRE, 17 March 
2017, https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-by-cavidan-soykan-the-eu-turkey-deal-one-year-on-the-rise-of-
walls-of-shame/. 
14  See Chapter VI and VII Fieldwork Findings.  
15  Skribeland, Özlem-Gürakar, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices, Seeking 
Asylum in Turkey, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, 2016, p. 21. 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/noas-rapport-tyrkia-april-2016_0.pdf. ; 
Ineli-Ciğer, Meltem, How Well Protected are Syrians in Turkey? Open Democracy, 17 January 2017, 
17 
 
  
argues that the EU-Turkey Agreement allows a form of invisible violence to be 
perpetrated on stateless persons, refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey. It means that 
even though they have a right to seek asylum and access dignified living conditions in 
accordance with the international human rights, they are still living outside the “pale of 
law” 16 and “rightless”17 due to Turkey’s geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention 
and deficiencies in financial and institutional structures.18 
3. Background 
On the 2nd of September 2015, three-year-old Alan Kurdi, his five-year-old brother, 
mother, father and at least 12 other people boarded a small plastic inflatable boat. The 
boat capsized about five minutes after leaving Turkey and Alan, his brothers and mother 
died. Alan’s body was washed up on a Turkish beach, and he was pictured lying down in 
the sand, dressed in a red shirt, blue shorts and running shoes.19 Alan’s family was ethnic 
Kurds living in the Kobana area of Syria before the terrorist organisation called ISIS 
(Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) attacked them. When the violence in the city escalated, 
the family fled to Turkey along with tens of thousands of others. However, while Turkey’s 
open door policy gave them asylum, it did not give them refugee status, only temporary 
protection status. They had no money, no jobs and no prospects of a future in Turkey as 
a safe haven. Alan’s aunt, who was living in Canada, had sponsored the family using a 
“G5” private asylum application, but she could not complete the necessary administrative 
procedures due to the lack of their passports or official documents. The Canadian 
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immigration authorities rejected their asylum application. Alan’s family had tried twice 
to flee to Greece and it was on their third attempt that the deaths occurred.20 
The death of Alan Kurdi is the starting point of my thesis. A few days after Alan Kurdi’s 
death, the EU member states started negotiations with Turkey on the refugee issue and 
signed a Joint Action Plan on 15th October 2015, alleging that no more deaths would 
happen in the Aegean Sea.21 The boy’s death became the symbol of the tragedy of Syrian 
refugees and it resulted in an unprecedented expression of sympathy.22 As El-Enany 
explains: 
Aylan Kurdi’s light skin colour may have allowed white Europeans to humanise him 
and partake in large-scale charity giving, petition signing and demonstrations.23  
His death was shared endlessly on the social media and the #CouldBeMyChild hashtag 
became trendy on twitter.24 This tragic incident drew attention to the failure of Western 
countries to accept international humanitarian responsibility for refugees and it 
galvanized many questions: What are our moral obligations to refugees like Alan Kurdi 
who are forced to flea their homes in search of safety? How can we balance the 
humanitarian responsibilities towards refugees with contradictory political values such as 
national security and sovereignty?  
Today refugee protection is in deep crisis.25 While human rights abuses, wars and 
generalized conflicts force many people to flee their home countries, Western states are 
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not willing to take responsibility for refugees and seek ways to stem refugee flows.26 Even 
though states “trumpet” the importance of the right to seek asylum and the 1951 Refugee 
Convention,27 they have chosen to “clip its wings and reduce its scope as much as 
possible.”28 The death of Alan Kurdi is the result of these restrictive policies that 
undermine the fundamental right to seek asylum.29 Alan Kurdi is only the tip of the 
iceberg amongst the 3,771 people who died crossing the Mediterranean Sea in 2015.30 
Around the world, 65.3 million people live outside the formal nation-state protection, and 
no state acknowledges political or moral responsibility for this group. Nearly 86 per cent 
of the world’s refugees are hosted by developing countries without any prospect of 
durable solutions.31 Once they are displaced from their home countries, the majority of 
the world’s refugees are not offered permanent refugee status or any opportunity to 
integrate into a host community. They are kept separate and dependent on external 
assistance provided by international organisations.32 This prolonged exile represents a 
significant challenge to the human rights of refugees. In this prolonged exile, refugees 
find themselves in “a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo.”33 They find a secure 
place but remain in exile year after year without accessing their fundamental rights. Their 
economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled for years. A refugee in this 
situation cannot have an independent life but has to rely on external assistance.34 Despite 
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the gravity of the refugee problem, there is no current solution; less than one per cent of 
official refugees are resettled permanently in a new country.35  
This refugee protection dilemma is a consequence of the continuing conflict between the 
international humanitarian responsibility of states to help people who are in need of 
protection and the sovereign power of those states. This conflict is built into the logic of 
the international human rights and refugee law regime.36 Arendt’s political theory37 
highlights that a refugee protection crisis is made “permanent and insurmountable by the 
comprehensiveness of the nation-states system”38 because refugees cannot go elsewhere 
to set up a new community. Only a state can provide for the basic needs of individuals 
and protect them from harm. Without any membership status, the refugee finds himself 
excluded from humanity altogether.39 Arendt underlines that international law still 
affirms and upholds the principle of state sovereignty and is not able to solve the refugee 
problem.40 Other contemporary scholars reaffirm Arendt’s view on the rightless position 
of refugees. Agier, Aleinikoff and Benhabib emphasise that refugees are left outside of 
any membership status and forced to spend their entire life as a refugee because state-
centred international and human rights law do not guarantee attainment of citizenship 
status elsewhere.41 In that contemporary international order, as Benhabib states refugees 
and asylum seekers remain in the “murky domain between legality and illegality”.42  
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This continuing conflict between human rights and state sovereignty affects the 
fundamental rights of refugees under three main headings. First, the right to seek asylum 
is recognised by Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a 
fundamental human right, but the obligation to grant asylum continues to be “jealously 
guarded by states” as a sovereign privilege.43 As Arendt points out, the right of asylum 
has never become a law of nation states and has a somewhat “shadowy existence”.44 
Accordingly, emigration is a matter of human rights, but immigration remains a concern 
of state sovereignty.45 It is contradictory within universalistic human rights because when 
an individual has lost membership of her/his state, the international state system with its 
concept of human rights does not provide a membership status for the individual in 
another state.46 The international system assumes that all individuals will belong to a 
state. The irony is however that no state is actually offering membership to refugees 
within their jurisdiction to correct the current situation of refugees.47 The right to asylum 
and naturalisation are not guaranteed as fundamental human rights, and states cannot be 
forced to do so due to the principle of state sovereignty. Thus a refugee stays as a refugee 
with a "modicum of rights that form a sub-category of rights generally available to 
individuals via the institution of citizenship”.48 A refugee may never reach citizenship 
status but will remain a "quasi-citizen”.49 It is not surprising that millions of refugees 
around the world are living in camps without any status or a durable solution.50 Krasner 
describes this situation as “organised hypocrisy.”51 Aleinikoff states that the refugee 
problem has been created by states, but states fail to take responsibility for refugees and 
restore their situation.52 In this contradictory international state system, as Buzan 
describes,  
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The security of individuals is locked into an unbreakable paradigm in which it is partly 
dependent on, and partly threatened by the state.53  
The second negative consequence of the continuing conflict between state sovereignty 
and human rights is the deficiencies in the allocation of refugee responsibility between 
contracting states. The 1951 Refugee Convention only triggers the responsibility of states 
when asylum seekers reach the territory of states.54 Accordingly, states have no 
responsibility towards refugees who are living outside their territory. This provides states 
with an incentive to discourage or prevent asylum seekers from seeking protection on 
their territory.55 Thus, states are focusing on containment of refugees in the regions of 
origin under many headings, such as technical cooperation with third countries or 
readmission agreements with safe third countries.56  
Today under the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is impossible to share refugee 
responsibility fairly because there is no strongly institutionalized burden-sharing norm, 
and it is largely discretionary.57 States always prefer to benefit from “free riding” 
opportunities due to the absence of binding institutional mechanisms for burden sharing. 
Thus the refugee protection regime suffers from “collective action failure.”58 In Suhrke’s 
groundbreaking article, she argues that while states recognise the value of refugee 
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protection both for security and humanitarian reasons collectively, states’ optimum 
strategy is to “free ride” on other states’ contributions. Refugee protection has some 
important "public good" characteristics, if one state admits refugees, others benefit from 
the greater international order without admission of any refugees.59 She explains this 
situation with the theoretical analogy of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: 
There is a disjuncture between what is rational for an individual state acting in isolation 
and what would be a rational strategy for states acting collectively.60  
Betts61 challenges this thinking and argue that the Prisoner’s Dilemma partly 
misrepresents the reason for the collective action failure in the refugee protection regime. 
He suggests the “Suasion Game” instead of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and argues that States 
have asymmetrical power relations and use these power relations in refugee responsibility 
sharing. The Suasion game will arise when one player is stronger and has little interest in 
cooperation; the other is weaker and has a very little choice either “takes what is on offer” 
or “hurts itself more by not cooperating at all.”62 This game theory indicates that less 
developed countries bear the majority of the refugee burden and they cannot compel other 
countries to take more responsibility due to their weak position in international relations. 
The large refugee burden on the less developed countries over a long period of time 
suggest that the Suasion game truly explains the unfair refugee responsibility between the 
South and the North.  
As Gammeltoft and Betts point out, this unfair burden sharing has significant negative 
impacts on providing an effective, fair and accessible refugee protection regime.63 
Unfortunately, this approach has led to “protracted refugee situations” in which refugees 
often remain in confined camps or urban settlements in insecure border locations without 
access to their fundamental rights.64 In such circumstances, living conditions of refugees, 
especially in the less developed host countries, are very poor.65 As the situations of 
refugees have remained unresolved and increasingly protracted, host states perceive the 
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hosting of large number of refugees as an “unending burden” and they have started to 
undermine their fundamental responsibility of the principle of non-refoulement.66 As 
highlighted by Chimni,  
When the link between the two principles [of burden sharing and refugee protection] is 
snapped what you will witness is the devaluation of the core protection principles, in 
particular of non-refoulement. 67 
The third negative consequence is that despite the global applicability of the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the protection of refugees remains dependent on the individual 
sovereign states. As Haddad highlights, as human rights are cosmopolitan, the refugee is 
“an expression of positive law”.68 Thus, the actual protection afforded to refugees is 
ultimately dependent on individual sovereign states and their enforcement. If we take into 
account the enforceability of the rights, the 1951 Refugee Convention might not secure 
the rights of refugees. Although refugees are theoretically endowed with natural rights, 
they have no means of using their rights. They are caught by the so-called "possession-
paradox” of human rights. Refugees do not belong to any state and thus have no means 
of claiming their rights associated with membership of a political community.69 As 
Joppke explains states are free to prescribe the conditions under which the right of asylum 
is to be enjoyed. This gives states discretion to deny permission to work, confine refugees 
to certain areas, or even subject them to strict detention. States deliberately provide less 
attractive reception conditions to deter asylum seekers from coming to their territory.70 
Furthermore, rights provided to refugees vary according to host states’ social and 
economic conditions. For example, although social and economic rights are guaranteed 
under the Convention, there are great variations and great deficiencies especially in the 
conditions of refugees in the less developed countries. This specifically decreases the 
quality of protection afforded to refugees in the less developed countries and this will 
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result in “protection lite”, understood as the presence of formal protection but with a 
lower certainty and level of rights.71 This lower level of protection does not meet even 
the basic necessities of life effectively. As Phuong states “protection that is not effective 
is simply not protection.”72 Considering restrictive policies of states towards refugees and 
decreasing quality of protection of refugees, Tuitt argues that contrary to popular belief, 
refugee law is not motivated exclusively by humanitarian concerns: in fact, refugee law 
is both directly and indirectly targeted at reducing the overall cost of displacement by 
restricting the definition of refugee and the application of the concept to limited numbers. 
It effectively excludes from its scope the majority of the world’s displaced people and 
contains ‘costly’ refugees within their state of origin. She also highlights that states tend 
to shift their refugee responsibility on to other states, very often the ones least equipped 
to deal with them. She describes contemporary refugee protection as the “death of the 
refugee” concept.73  
Regarding these state-centred and burden-shifting tendencies of states at the international 
level, the EU has followed the same path and developed a common asylum policy to 
externalise its refugee protection regime. Although the EU has a rights based approach 
for assessing protection claims of asylum seekers within their jurisdiction, it has 
simultaneously established barriers that prevent asylum seekers from entering EU 
territory and triggering its protection obligations.74 To prevent irregular migration and 
refugee flows, the EU has adopted a new proactive migration regime, which focuses on 
populations instead of individuals75 and externalised migration policies under two main 
components. The first one is the exportation of classical migration control instruments to 
third countries outside the EU, such as strict border control measures to combat illegal 
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migration, smuggling and trafficking and strengthening migration management in transit 
countries. The second component of externalisation is to facilitate the return of irregular 
migrants and rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin or third countries. In this 
context, RAs have been seen as the main component of externalisation of refugee 
protection responsibility76 and used as a major tool to implement “a new security 
approach” in the neighbourhood.77 They are basically used as “an external protection 
fence” or “contention barrier” for the EU.78 By signing a RA with source and transit 
countries, the EU can transfer the management of border controls to third countries. If 
third countries fail to prevent irregular entry of migrants into the EU, they will have to 
take back migrants and asylum seekers on the basis of RAs. By doing so, third countries 
have become the border guards of the EU’s external borders.79  
Readmission agreements with safe third country practices are the main mechanism used 
by the EU for transferring their legal refugee protection responsibilities to other less 
developed states.80 Considering EU’s burden shifting tendency in its relations with 
neighbours, it is not surprising that the EU sought to secure its own external borders by 
strengthening its cooperation with Turkey due to its proximity to the conflict zones. Under 
the EU-Turkey RA, Turkey would stem the flow of irregular migrants, particularly 
asylum seekers and refugees, through an integrated border management, interception 
operation and visa restriction strategy against refugee producing countries.81 Turkey was 
also persuaded to develop a new refugee protection regime through the conditionality 
driven policy of the EU’s membership process and so started to take responsibility for all 
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refugees and asylum seekers within its own territory.82 Therefore, Turkey has been 
transformed from solely a transit country en route to the EU into “reluctant host” of 
millions of refugees and asylum seekers.83  
The Syrian refugee crisis has added a different dimension to the continuing cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey in managing the refugee flows. After facing an intensive 
refugee flow into its territory, the EU offered Turkey a new cooperation model in March 
2016. In a response to the solidarity crisis among the member states of the EU and 
increasing far right sentiments in many of them,84 the EU turned to Turkey in an 
atmosphere of panic to find a way to prevent new arrivals and facilitate their removal 
from Greece. On 18 March 2016, the 28 EU heads of state and the Turkish government 
signed the EU-Turkey Statement, better known today as the ‘refugee deal’. The refugee 
deal is that Turkey readmits all returning refugees and migrants and limits the departure 
of new ones while Greece must detain all new arrivals and return them to Turkey. There 
is no doubt that the EU-Turkey refugee deal aims to erect an invisible wall and buffer 
zone around its territory. Greece and Turkey are positioned as the internal and external 
buffer zones in this refugee deal. This exclusionary approach of the EU member states 
also aims to control rising far right sentiments at home through stopping the refugee flows 
into the EU territory. The EU-Turkey refugee deal signalled to the European populations 
this message: 
Refugees would not come knocking at their door because someone elsewhere-be it in 
Greece and Turkey-was doing the dirty job of gatekeeper.85 
                                                 
82 Kirişçi, Kemal, Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It? Edited by Paçacı Elitok, 
Seçil, & Straubhaar, Thomas, Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and 
Opportunities, Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2012, p. 73; Paçacı Elitok, Seçil, Turkish 
Migration Policy Over the Last Decade: A Gradual Shift Towards Better Management and Good 
Governance, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2013, 12(1), p. 170. 
83  Cherti, Myriam & Grant, Peter, The Myths of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in Morocco, Institute 
for Public Policy Research, London, June 2013, p. 65; Strik, Tineke, Countries of Transit: Meeting 
New Migration and Asylum Challenges, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Doc. 13867, 11 
September 2015, paras. 6-9; Düvell, Franck, Turkey’s Transition to an Immigration Country: A 
Paradigm Shift, Insight Turkey, 16(4), 2014, p. 95. 
84  Foster, Peter, The Rise of the Far-Right in Europe is not a False Alarm, The Telegraph, 19 May 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe-is-not-a-false-
alarm/; Christopoulos, Dimitris, Refugees are the Bogeyman: the Real Threat is the Far Right, Open 
Democracy, 9 November 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/dimitris-christopoulos/refugees-
are-bogeyman-real-threat-is-far-right.  
85  Christopoulos, 2016.  
28 
 
  
After the EU-Turkey refugee deal, the daily crossing from Turkey to Greece dropped by 
97 per cent.86 This significant reduction in border crossing was seen by the EU as a 
success story and they sought to replicate it with other transit countries87 but 
Christopoulos describes it as ‘cynical’ and argues that the EU is “legitimising 
xenophobia” and poisoning its future through undermining its values and moral 
grounds.88 
The EU-Turkey Statement is presented by the EU as a humanitarian act by reducing the 
tragic deaths of refugees in the sea through providing a dignified life for refugees in 
Turkey.89 The EU Commission claims that Turkey provides equivalent rights to 
conditional refugees and temporary protection status holders as for conventional refugees 
and Turkey’s geographical limitation does not constitute a barrier to be a safe third 
country for refugees.90 Thym also argues that the safe third country concept does not 
require full ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention as long as the actual practice in 
the country is consistent with the requirements of the Asylum Procedures Directive.91 
Turkey provides temporary protection to asylum seekers regardless of their country of 
origin and provides access to education and the labour market. Also, the EU-Turkey 
Statement is much more than burden shifting; because it contributes to an international 
solution by providing three billion euro for advancing the living conditions of more than 
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3 million refugees in Turkey and also extends resettlement opportunities for Syrians in 
Turkey.92 In tune with Thym, Hailbronner suggests that Turkey’s full ratification of the 
1951 Refugee Convention is not required to be a safe third country in accordance with 
Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive. Turkey must only meet in substance the 
material standards of the 1951 Refugee Convention.93  
Against these claims of the European Commission and other scholars, this thesis aims to 
uncover whether the EU-Turkey Agreement on the refugee issue provides safeguards 
against human rights violations and whether Turkey is a safe country for refugees. Now 
more than 18 months since the EU-Turkey Statement was agreed, there is little evidence 
of the alleged positive effects of the refugee deal in practice. Since Alan Kurdi's death, 
the dangers faced by those fleeing across the Mediterranean Sea have only worsened. In 
accordance with the UNHCR’s statistics, 5,143 people died or were missing in the 
Mediterranean in 2016 compared to the death of 3,771 people in 2015.94 These statistics 
support the arguments of Frelick & Kysel and Podkul that externalisation of migration 
policy is often “deceptively framed as …a life-saving humanitarian endeavour rather than 
a strategy of migration containment and control.”95 
The EU has two hidden strategies under its humanitarian approach: First, the refugee deal 
with Turkey helps the EU to realise its protection responsibility at lower cost by shifting 
its refugee protection responsibility to Turkey with limited resettlement opportunities and 
financial support. That view is also supported by Gammeltoft-Hansen, who argues that 
outsourcing refugee protection responsibility to less developed countries represents a 
move to achieve “a market mechanism of rights”, in which protection is realised at the 
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lowest possible cost.96 Second, as Lavanex and Hyndman and Mountz highlight, RAs 
with safe third country practices are burden-sharing games played by the EU for 
transferring their legal and humanitarian responsibilities to other less developed states.97 
In Betts’s Suasion Game, Turkey is a weak player that accepts the EU’s offer for burden 
sharing or “hurts itself more by not cooperating at all.”98 After the refugee deal, anyone 
who arrives irregularly on the Greek islands after 20 March 2016 is returned to Turkey 
on the ground of it being a safe country of asylum or first country of asylum. In 
accordance with inadmissibility procedures, the Greek asylum service only assesses 
whether Turkey is safe for the applicants on a case-by-case basis, but it does not assess 
the individual’s need of international protection. These procedures aim to deflect 
responsibility from Europe, which is one of the wealthiest continents in the world to 
Turkey, a country already hosting 3 million refugees.99  
There is much criticism by human rights organisations100 and scholars101 that the principle 
of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum has been undermined. Regarding access 
to fair and effective asylum procedures, Greece cannot provide this due to its institutional 
deficiencies.102 Asylum seekers are waiting at least 18 months in the hotspots without 
access to asylum procedures or dignified reception conditions.103 Refugees and asylum 
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seekers are stranded and it is hard to claim that the ‘refugee deal’ respects the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers. The reality on the ground is that even though the EU-Turkey 
Statement aims to “end (...) human suffering”, it is actually “prolonging and exacerbating 
suffering” of asylum seekers.104 Currently, nearly 60,000 people, including children and 
vulnerable categories of asylum seekers, are trapped in inhuman and rights abusive 
conditions in Greece.105 Despite the European Council's commitment to implement the 
relocation scheme that aims to share the responsibility of refugees landing on Greek 
islands, some member states' blunt refusal and the lack of mutual trust between them has 
left refugees and asylum seekers in a precarious position.106 Now Greece has turned into 
“a laboratory” of the EU for deterring irregular arrivals of asylum seekers and creating a 
fortress Europe.107  
At the same time, Turkey is left alone with more than 3 million stranded refugees. Even 
though the EU claims that Turkey is a safe third country for refugees in order to legitimise 
the return of refugees and asylum seekers, Turkey is struggling to provide them with 
“effective protection” in practice. The actual situation of refugees is very important for 
defining the consequences of the refugee deal. This thesis goes further in examining the 
legal and institutional deficiencies in Turkey and reveals the real consequences of the 
refugee deal on the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.  
4. The Rationale and Significance of the Study  
The rationale for this study emanated from the researcher’s desire to uncover the 
compatibility of the EU-Turkey Agreement with human rights and international refugee 
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law. Although human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch and Pro Asylum frequently publish reports and draw attention to the human rights 
aspects of the Agreement, there is no official report published by the EU considering its 
impact on human rights, especially its triggering effect on refoulement of refugees on 
border areas.108 The EU consistently ignores requests to set up a monitoring mechanism 
to observe the implementation of the refugee deal and its human rights consequences. 
This lack of any systemic monitoring on readmitted Syrians and other migrants has been 
officially expressed by the UNHCR which has complained about its difficulties in 
monitoring the fate of the readmitted migrants in refugee camps and removal centres.109 
Considering the deficiencies in the field, particularly no monitoring activity during the 
implementation of the agreement, this study aims to fill that gap by providing data from 
elite interviews with strategic participants who are working with refugees as lawyers, 
judges, civil servants, NGOs and international organisations in Turkey. The participants 
have shared their observations and experiences that confirm what refugees and asylum 
seekers are facing in their daily lives. This research will complement other research by 
providing a case study of the problems and experiences of refugees in Turkey.  
This research study will also provide important evidence to counter the suggestion that 
protection in the region of origin is an effective solution to the refugee crisis. The EU is 
presenting the EU-Turkey Agreement on refugees as a success story and looking to 
replicate it in other less developed countries with development aid or other incentives but 
this risks setting a dangerous precedent for the rest of the world.110 At the informal 
Summit held at La Valletta in February 2017, the European Council agreed on a Malta 
Declaration to develop new readmission agreements with transit countries. After the 
Malta Declaration, Italy and Libya signed a Memorandum of Understanding to stem 
migration flows. Giuffre describes this new migration partnership with Libya as a 
“Partnership from Bad to Worse” compared to the EU-Turkey Statement. She alleges that 
Libya is not a safe country for refugees as recognised by international courts, international 
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organisations, and NGOs. Libya is a far more unreliable partner than Turkey considering 
the weak political, economic and security situation in the country.111 There are many 
evidences that the cooperation between Italy and Libya violates the principle of non-
refoulement and put the life of asylum seekers in danger by limiting their access to 
humanitarian assistance and putting them in inhumane conditions in detention centres in 
Libya.112 In the context of these ongoing negotiations between the EU and other third 
countries, this study sheds light on the EU’s cooperation with transit countries on the 
refugee issue and discloses how these new agreements with transit countries may carry a 
high risk of human rights violations.  
In addition, the research project provides a deep analysis of Turkish asylum law, the 
ECtHR’s and the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC) jurisprudence concerning 
whether Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement and provides the right to an 
effective remedy against detention and deportation decisions of the Turkish government. 
This issue has become a very contentious one since Turkey’s derogation from the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in July 2016.113 Turkey’s list of derogations is clearly too 
long and includes all the provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, related to accessing 
effective remedy and safeguards against human rights violations which are important for 
Turkish citizens as well as refugees. After the declaration of a state of emergency in 2016, 
the Turkish government amended some of the provisions of the LFIP. These changes have 
given large discretion to the administrative authorities about the deportation of refugees 
and asylum seekers on the grounds of public order, public security and public health. 
Since Turkey's derogation from the ECHR and the ICCPR, asylum seekers and refugees 
cannot apply to the ECtHR. They can still apply to the TCC against deportation decisions 
but appeal procedure cannot suspend deportation orders if they are given on the ground 
of public security or public order. These provisions are important in my analysis of 
whether Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement.  
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5. Research Methodology 
In order to answer the main research question and sub-questions and test the two major 
hypotheses, the structure of this thesis consists of two parts presenting different phases of 
the research. The first phase was started in the UK and involved a literature review on 
international refugee protection and the European and Turkish asylum laws. A major 
focus was on the impact of European law on Turkish asylum law whilst analyzing the 
intricacies of different asylum policies. A detailed study was made on the EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement and Statement by critically analyzing scholars’ views and the 
reports of human rights organisations. The second phase of the research was completed 
in Turkey and involved interviews with key actors in the field to explore the real situation 
of refugees and asylum seekers after the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.  
The researcher adopted the political theory of Arendt as a theoretical framework and 
analysed her data collection from a human rights perspective. This methodological 
approach helped the researcher to assess the EU-Turkey Agreement from a fundamental 
human rights perspective and enables greater transparency and clarity to be brought to 
the arguments around the rightlessness of refugees.  
The thesis consists of different methods of research. The researcher adopted, to some 
extent, a doctrinal method, looking at the primary legal sources, cases and legislation. She 
then added a more empirical method, namely qualitative method, to see the practical sides 
of the EU-Turkey Agreement. This empirical method helped the researcher to 
demonstrate whether readmitted refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey have access to 
fair and effective asylum procedures and effective remedies against deportation decisions 
and administrative detention. The interviewees unexpectedly emphasized the significant 
importance of the social-economic condition of refugees in Turkey. Even though the 
researcher did not ask any direct question related to socio-economic condition, but asked 
whether Turkey is a safe third country for refugees, the majority of the respondents linked 
this question with the difficulties of refugees and asylum seekers in accessing their socio-
economic rights. This led to the categorization of the qualitative data in accessibility of 
refugees to their civil-political rights and socio-economic rights. These findings are 
presented in chapter VI and chapter VII respectively.  
The researcher also adopted a socio-legal perspective to move beyond legal texts, judicial 
decisions and secondary sources to look at the socio-politico-economic considerations 
that affect the enforcement of law and its impact on those refugees and asylum seekers. 
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This research method helped the researcher to develop a multidisciplinary approach and 
see how the law viewed in its social context works in reality. The researcher’s main 
interest was to investigate the gap between the law ‘on the books’ and the law in reality. 
The fieldwork findings show that even though the European Commission underlines what 
should be done on the part of Turkey, the law cannot work in practice as expected or 
hoped for. Rather, it is clearly evident that there are huge differences between what is 
promised to refugees in law and what is delivered in reality.  
Bradshaw explains what distinguishes socio-legal research from traditional legal research 
in two ways:  
First, socio-legal research considers the law and the process of law (law-making, legal 
procedure) beyond legal texts – socio-politico-economic considerations that surround 
and inform the enactment of laws, the operation of procedure, and the result of passage 
and enforcement of laws. Second in studying the context and result of law, socio-legal 
research moves beyond the academic, the judicial and the legislative office, chamber, 
library and committee room to gather data wherever appropriate to the problem.114 
This description provides a relatively clear answer to why this study adopted socio-legal 
research methodology instead of a more traditional or doctrinal legal research method. 
As outlined above, the research moved beyond the literature review to gathering data and 
carried out in-depth semi-structured interviews115 with different groups of role holders in 
Turkey. The data obtained from the fieldwork threw great light on the real situation of 
refugees in Turkey. Interviewees, who came from different backgrounds, gave their 
observations and experiences at first hand. This provided the researcher with “a yardstick 
against which to measure data collected through other methods”.116 This method provided 
the depth of understanding of the actual situation of refugees in Turkey and can “give a 
reader a feeling of ‘walking in the informants’ shoes’- seeing things from their points of 
view”.117 
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The interviews were carried out after getting ethical approval from the University of 
Sussex.118 The researcher conducted interviews with four groups of key participants to 
discuss the real effects of the EU-Turkey Agreement on refugees and asylum seekers. The 
interviews were conducted in Ankara and İstanbul during June-September 2016. The first 
group of interviewees were senior officials and experts, responsible for migration 
management in Turkey. The second group were judges and lawyers who deal with the 
cases of refugees and asylum seekers in Administrative Courts, the Council of State and 
the Turkish Constitutional Court. The third group were from non-governmental 
organisations, which work for refugees and asylum seekers. The researcher planned to 
interview 20 key participants, five in each group but due to the failed coup attempt and 
the declaration of a state of emergency in July 2016; she experienced difficulty in 
accessing participants, especially judges and senior officials. Two participants, one judge 
and one senior official, subsequently refused to participate in pre-arranged interviews. 
Therefore, the researcher interviewed 18 participants including five representatives of 
NGOs, four judges, five lawyers and four senior officials and experts. The researcher 
obtained information about their lived experiences and observations of problems 
occurring during the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.  
The researcher took notes during the interviews for backup purposes. The audio records 
of the interviews were locked in the researcher's file cabinet and access to these notes and 
recordings are only being available to the researcher. To comply with the agreement on 
confidentiality and anonymity, quotations used in the thesis are ascribed to generic names 
to assist the reader. The interviews lasted around one hour, depending on the availability 
of the participant and the issues being discussed. The interviews were semi-structured 
and Bryman’s “interview guide” was used, 
The researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, often 
referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how 
to reply. Questions may not be asked exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. 
Questions that are not included in the guide may be asked as the interviewer picks up 
on the interviewees’ replies.119  
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The researcher chose to use the semi-structured interview, as opposed to a structured 
interview, because it allowed her to explore the interviewees’ experiences and 
observations on refugees. Taylor and Bogdan describe these semi-structured qualitative 
interviewing as 
Repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher and informants directed 
towards understanding informants’ perspectives on their lives, experiences, or situations 
as expressed in their own words.120 
During the interviews, even though the researcher had prepared guiding questions, 
participants tended to lead with their thoughts about the EU-Turkey Statement and its 
negative impacts on refugees in Turkey. The questions were tailored to the particular 
participants and their specific roles in Turkey. For instance, questions directed towards 
lawyers and judges were about whether refugees and asylum seekers can access effective 
remedies against human rights violations. On the other hand, representatives from NGOs 
and international refugee organisations were asked whether the Turkish government 
provides sufficient protection to refugees in accordance with international and national 
law and how they evaluate the real situation of refugees in Turkey. The other group, 
senior officials and experts were asked how the fundamental living requirements of 
refugees are met during their stay in Turkey and whether there is any policy development 
for facilitating the integration of refugees into society. The researcher requested that she 
be permitted to record the interviews. Two of the respondents declined to give permission 
and notes only were made.  
Interviews were obtained through a combination of the researcher’s professional contacts 
and snowball sampling. Bryman describes this technique as, 
The researcher makes initial contact with a small group of people who are relevant to 
the research topic and then uses these to establish contact with others.121 
The researcher conducted her first interviews with senior officials and experts in the 
Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, where she had 
worked as a deputy and district governor for nearly 17 years before taking study leave. 
This facilitated the process of getting interviewees with senior officials and experts in 
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both public and university institutions. Also, being a senior official in the Ministry of 
Interior enabled the researcher to access judges, lawyers and international organisations.  
6. Thesis Plan 
The thesis is made up of eight chapters, which can be grouped into two sections.  
Section one consists of chapters I, II, III and IV, which provide an introduction followed 
by a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework, international and regional refugee 
protection regimes and their deficiencies concerning human rights protection.  
Chapter II constructs a theoretical framework that conceptualises the continuing conflict 
between human rights and state sovereignty. It offers a critical assessment of Arendt’s 
political theory and applies her arguments to the struggles of refugees and asylum seekers 
today in accessing their fundamental human rights. Arendt’s analysis on statelessness 
helps us to understand how states continue to exercise their sovereign power to exclude 
refugees and asylum seekers from their territory and contain them in their region of origin 
even though while officially acknowledging the importance of universal human rights 
and the right to seek asylum. The main argument here is that the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey ‘refugee deal’ provides clear evidence that both the EU and Turkey fall short 
of guaranteeing the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and leave them in a “rightless” 
or “precarious” position. Even though refugees by definition have lost their citizenship 
status, they cannot obtain citizenship or refugee status elsewhere. They are deprived of 
any “legal personhood” and left to “an ex gratia” act of the Turkish government.  
Chapter III evaluates the responsibility of states deriving from the prohibition of 
refoulement in the international and human rights law. Even though the principle of non-
refoulement has been extended beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention by developing 
human rights instruments, this extended scope of the principle has been undermined by 
states using deflective instruments. At the European level, readmission agreements, along 
with other deflective policies, such as the safe third country concept and accelerated 
border procedures, have all been developed to contain refugees in the region of origin and 
shift the European member states’ responsibilities towards third countries. The chapter 
identifies two main problems regarding the implementation of readmission agreements. 
First, readmission agreements do not provide any safeguards against refoulement and 
there is no monitoring during the implementation of readmission agreements. Second, 
readmission agreements shift the refugee burden on to third or transit countries and may 
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lead to the downgrading of refugee protection standards. This burden-shifting attempt 
fundamentally conflicts with the right to seek asylum and the essence of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which requests states to provide effective protection to refugees. Effective 
protection not only encompasses protection from refoulement but also includes providing 
dignified living standards to refugees.  
Chapter IV focuses on the EU-Turkey Agreement and explores its legal and political 
background. The chapter is divided into two parts. Part one explains why Turkey signed 
the RA with the EU and which incentives used by the EU to convince Turkey to readmit 
irregular migrants and refugees even though it would increase the burden on the country’s 
institutional capacity and financial resources. It addresses whether the EU and Turkey 
considered international human rights and refugee protection concerns when negotiating 
and concluding the RA. It explores why the EU needed further cooperation on the refugee 
issue under the EU-Turkey Statement and how this is affecting the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey RA. In the second part of the chapter, the researcher examines how the 
deficiencies of the Greek asylum system is leading to human rights infringements, such 
as difficulties in accessing refugee status, lack of an effective remedy against removal to 
Turkey and stranded refugees in detention or reception centres in Greece against Article 
3 of the ECHR. The chapter argues that the EU-Turkey RA has led to increases in the 
deportation of refugees without access to asylum determination procedures and 
entrapment of asylum seekers and refugees in Greece and in Turkey without any prospect 
of durable solutions.  
Section two of the thesis consists of chapters, V, VI and VII, which presents a detailed 
examination of Turkish asylum law and the human rights impact of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on refugees based on the fieldwork data, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the 
TCC and human rights reports.  
Chapter V turns to domestic asylum law to define what awaits asylum seekers and 
refugees after their readmission to Turkey. It looks at whether readmitted refugees and 
asylum seekers can avail themselves of effective protection. There is an analysis of three 
important provisions of Turkish asylum law related to readmitted refugees and asylum 
seekers. The first section evaluates whether non-European asylum seekers in Turkey can 
access fair and efficient asylum procedures. The second section evaluates the legal basis 
of administrative detention, the living conditions of detainees in removal centres and 
whether detainees can benefit from procedural safeguards, such as access to legal 
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assistance and translators. The third section analyses the legal grounds for deportation of 
foreigners, particularly asylum seekers and refugees. The chapter concludes that 
readmitted refugees and asylum seekers do not have access to fair and effective asylum 
procedures due to accelerated asylum procedures at the borders or removal centres and 
institutional deficiencies in the provinces of Turkey. Also, the implementation of the EU-
Turkey RA may trigger prolonged detention of asylum seekers in inhuman conditions as 
irregular migrants because Turkish asylum law gives great discretion to administrative 
authorities. Furthermore, there is a high risk that after readmission, asylum seekers and 
refugees may be subjected to deportation orders due to the loosely defined provision of 
the LFIP, which permits deportation of foreigners on grounds of “public order, public 
security or public health”. 
Chapters VI and VII continue to focus on domestic asylum law and analyse the fieldwork 
findings to reveal the actual problems that readmitted refugees and asylum seekers are 
facing in Turkey today. These problems are categorised under two main headings: the 
difficulties in accessing civil-political and socio-economic rights. The first category, civil 
and political rights are the main focus of chapter VI which takes the approach of Arendt's 
reflections on statelessness to analyse the statements of the interviewees about refugees 
and their rightless situation. The fieldwork findings highlight that Arendt's interpretation 
of statelessness is useful for understanding the precarious situations of refugees in 
Turkey. The chapter assesses the views of the respondents about the EU-Turkey 
Statement and the negative consequences of the lack of any legal status of refugees. The 
chapter concludes that Turkey is struggling to provide fair, efficient and accessible 
asylum procedures and people who are readmitted to Turkey under the EU-Turkey 
refugee deal might be detained in inhuman conditions and subjected to onwards 
refoulement without accessing any asylum procedures. 
Chapter VII explores the fieldwork findings and addresses the difficulties of refugees in 
accessing their socio-economic rights, including accommodation, healthcare, education 
services and labour markets. This categorization is based on the reinterpretation of 
Arendt’s account of “viva active” in her book Human Condition: “labour, work and 
action” section.122 The participants indicated that a large number of the refugee 
populations have continued their lives in dire conditions in designated satellite cities. 
                                                 
122  Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1958, p. 7.  
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Also, the new LFIP does not envisage any welfare and housing assistance during 
refugees’ stay in Turkey. The recent Regulation on work permits of foreigners under 
temporary protection,123 which facilitates Syrians’ access to the labour market, has not 
changed their real situation. Although the interviewees came from different backgrounds, 
the common perception about the safety of Turkey for refugees was negative. The 
participants overwhelmingly thought that Turkey does not provide effective protection 
for refugees and asylum seekers as envisioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
human rights law. Thus the chapter concludes that the EU-Turkey Statement is leading to 
a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
The findings of the previous chapters are then summarized in the concluding chapter VIII, 
which seeks to answer the question of how the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on the refugee issue affects the rights of refugees and especially the principle 
of non-refoulement. Even though the EU presents the refugee deal as a humanitarian act 
to reducing the tragic deaths of refugees in the sea through providing a dignified life for 
refugees in Turkey,124 the evidences suggest that the EU-Turkey Agreement is inadequate 
in providing safeguards against refoulement and dignified living condition in Turkey. 
Returning refugees carries a risk of refoulement or degrading treatment under 
international and human rights law. The respondents in the research interviews 
overwhelmingly agreed that asylum seekers and refugees are being deprived of any legal 
personhood. Their lack of legal status prevents their access to fundamental basic services, 
such as accommodation, education, health and employment. They are living in a 
precarious ‘rightless’ position. The fieldwork findings affirm Arendt’s observation that 
deprived of any political community, stateless persons or refugees are continually at risk 
of “becoming irrelevant to the world in that their actions and opinions no longer matter 
to anyone; it is as if they cease to exist.”125  
Having introduced the subject matter of the thesis in this chapter, the next chapter moves 
on to explore the theoretical framework of the study and presents with Arendt’s political 
                                                 
123  OGT, 15.01.2016 No: 29594. Article 5 of the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under 
Temporary Protection states that temporary protection seekers may apply for work permission after 
six months of their registration.  
124  Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Fifth Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-turkey Statement, COM (2017) 
2014 final, 2 March 2017. 
125  Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Revised Edition, Schocken Books: New York, 
2004, p. 376, cited by Hayden, 2010, p. 65.  
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theory and her ideas on the rightless position of refugees. It is these ideas, which provide 
the theoretical foundation, or lens through which the rights of refugees in Turkey are 
evaluated, and it is these ideas, which inspire the conclusion of the thesis.  
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CHAPTER II: Arendt’s Political Theory: The Sovereign Power of States and the 
Rightless Position of Refugees 
 
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to 
guarantee any rights whatsoever has been the calamity which has befallen ever-
increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man 
without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity 
itself expels him from humanity.1 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter constructs a theoretical framework to explain how the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Agreement falls short of guaranteeing “a right to have rights” to refugees and 
asylum seekers. It offers a critical assessment of Arendt’s political theory and rethinking 
her arguments on statelessness applies them to the struggles of refugees and asylum 
seekers in accessing their fundamental human rights today. Arendt’s theory on 
statelessness helps us to understand how states use their sovereign power to exclude 
refugees and asylum seekers from their territory whilst officially continuing to emphasise 
the importance of universal human rights and the right to seek asylum. In contrast to 
claims that globalisation undermines state’s sovereignty and international human rights 
law recognizes all people as the bearers of “inalienable rights”, refugees and asylum 
seekers are still living outside the pale of law and their “rightlessness” has become 
normalized in the contemporary international order.2  
The chapter presents the background to the current refugee protection crisis and explains 
the contradictory responses of states from a theoretical perspective. As seen in the current 
Syrian refugee crisis, the refugee protection system is not working. Even though the 
principle of universal human rights demands that all humans enjoy human rights 
protection without any exception, there is a huge gap between the promise and the 
experience of refugees and asylum seekers in practice. From the right to life, the right not 
                                                 
1  Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Third Edition, George Allen & Unwin Ltd: London, 
1966, p. 297. 
2  Hayden, Patrick, From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and Statelessness, 
Societies Without Borders, 3(2), 2008, p. 248.  
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to be detained arbitrarily and the right to healthcare and education3 there is evidence of 
violation. For Dembour and Tobias, human rights are part of the problem rather than the 
solution to the exclusion, marginalisation and inequality.4 Human rights law only 
provides legal grounds for the injustice faced by many migrants and asylum seekers. If 
we look states’ practices, we can see that even though human right abuses, wars and local 
conflicts force individuals to flee their home countries, nation states have implemented 
an array of restrictive measures without considering asylum seekers and their access to 
safety.5 Paradoxically these practices have been operated in a context in which states 
continue publicly to acknowledge legal responsibilities to refugees and “trumpet” the 
moral importance of universal values. As Gibney writes a “kind of schizophrenia” seems 
to pervade Western states’ responses to asylum seekers as great importance is attached to 
the principle of asylum but enormous efforts are made to ensure that asylum seekers never 
reach the territory of the state where they could receive its protection.6  
Within the context of restrictive immigration policies, states have developed many remote 
control mechanisms or exclusion methods such as intercepting migrants on the high seas 
and signing RAs with transit countries. Meanwhile, over the past decades, an invisible 
policy wall or buffer zone has been erected around the EU with RAs and safe third country 
practices.7 Designed to keep all uninvited migrants at bay whether refugees or economic 
workers, the reality is that “getting in is a greater challenge than “getting heard”.8 These 
practices have led to deflection of the protection responsibility to less developed 
countries. This extra-territorilazation of refugee protection has forced most refugees to 
remain in the less developed world within “right abusive and often literally life 
threatening” conditions. This raises an important question about the universality of 
                                                 
3  Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte & Tobias, Kelly, Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections 
on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, Routledge Taylor & Francis: New 
York, 2011, pp. 5-6. 
4  ibid. pp. 10-11.  
5  Hathaway, James C. & Neve, R. Alexander, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10, 
1997, p. 115.  
6  Gibney, Matthew J., The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, Liberal Democracy and the Response to 
Refugees, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, p. 2.  
7  Uçarer, M. Emek, Burden Shirking, Burden Shifting, and Burden Sharing in the Emergent European 
Asylum Regime, International Politics, 43, 2006, p. 226.  
8 Hyndman, Jennifer & Mountz, Alison, Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the 
Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, p. 250.  
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human rights.9 As Gammeltoft acknowledges despite the appearance of universality, the 
refugee protection regime still depends on nation states’ practices. Protection is not 
guaranteed in a global homogeneous space but undertaken by individual states in a 
patchwork of commitments. Within this framework, states have been very keen to 
develop mechanisms preventing asylum seekers even arriving in their territory.10 
Outsourcing and offshoring of refugee protection through readmission agreements can be 
seen as a strategy by states to “bypass” their responsibility towards refugees and asylum 
seekers but in the long run, it is not sustainable and ultimately undermines the very 
concept of asylum.11  
The EU-Turkey Agreement is the most symbolic case for understanding states’ 
exclusionary approaches towards refugees. This refugee deal has put many refugees and 
asylum seekers in a “rightless” or “precarious” situation in Turkey without considering 
inhuman living conditions and lack of legal status. Considering these contradictory 
responses of the EU, this chapter seeks to answer two questions: first what do universal 
human rights really mean in practice? And second do refugees and asylum seekers hold 
inalienable rights without any citizenship status?  
The first section of the chapter discusses the continuing conflict between human rights 
and state sovereignty with the use of contemporary literature. The second section 
examines Arendt’s political theory and how her view on statelessness is still valid in 
explaining the precarious situation of refugees and asylum seekers in the current refugee 
protection system. The last section uses Arendt’s political theory to understand the 
“rightless” position of refugees, who are unable to access European territory due to strict 
border controls and are forced to stay in Turkey in legal limbo. 
Hannah Arendt’s political theory is used to support my main argument that although 
international human rights law recognizes all people as the bearers of “inalienable rights” 
when these rights come into conflict with the rights of sovereign states over refugees and 
                                                 
9  Hathaway, James C., Why Refugee Law Still Matters, Melbourne International Law, 8(1), 2007, pp. 
89-90.  
10  Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Outsourcing Asylum: The Advent of Protection Lite, Edited by 
Bialasiewicz, Luiza, Critical Geopolitics: Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of 
European Space, Routledge: London, 2011, pp. 129-130.  
11  Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Access to Asylum, PhD Thesis, Aarhus University, May 2009, p. 
268; McConnachie, Kirsten, Refugee Protection and the Art of the Deal, Journal of Human Rights 
Practice, 2017, p. 1.  
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migrants, inalienable rights gain a “mythical status”.12 Although there is a claim that the 
international human rights regime is constraining state sovereignty, there is too much 
evidence to the contrary. As states increasing insist on maintaining their sovereignty over 
the determination of entry and expulsion13 Hirst and Grahame state,  
The state may have lost control over ideas, but it remains a controller of its borders and 
the movement of people across them. In this respect, despite the rhetoric of 
globalization, the bulk of the world’s population live in closed worlds, trapped by the 
lottery of their birth.14  
2. The Paradox of Human Rights: Universal Human Rights versus State Sovereignty 
Many refugee studies in the field have tended to portray refugees as an anomaly that is 
created by illiberal governance in contrast to the “normal” rooted citizen. However, in 
her pioneering work, Arendt, the political philosopher, challenges this commonly 
accepted assumption and describes refugees as “the most symptomatic group in 
contemporary politics”.15 She argues that stateless, refugees and asylum seekers should 
not be seen as an anomaly but as the by-product of the international state system. In line 
with Arendt, Haddad also argues that although international society assumes that states 
are practising liberal democracies and protecting their citizens, the reality is that nation 
states often fail to protect their citizens and produce refugees. Thus, the refugee issue 
highlights an inherent failure in the international state system.16 The existence of refugees 
is “an inevitable if unintended consequence of the international states system,” not the 
consequence of a breakdown in the system of separate nation-states.17 As long as there 
are political borders constructing separate nation-states and creating clear definitions of 
insiders and outsiders, there will be refugees.18 They are produced and put into their 
rightless position by the international state system. 
                                                 
12  Larking, Emma, Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights, Life Outside the Pale of the Law, 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: London, 2014, pp. 137-138. 
13  Joppke, Christian, Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and 
Britain, Comparative Political Studies, 30(3), 1997, pp. 260-261.  
14  ibid, p. 259. 
15  Arendt, 1966, p. 277.  
16  Haddad, Emma, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2008, pp. 3-7.  
17  ibid, pp. 1-2.  
18  Haddad, Emma, The Refugee: The Individual Between Sovereigns, Global Study, 17(3), July 2003, 
pp. 297-298. See other scholars in the same view; Soğuk, Nevzat, States and Strangers, Refugees and 
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Soguk further suggests that refugee is an “aberration of the proper subjectivity of 
citizenship”. Considering the broken relationship between citizen and nation state, a 
refugee protection regime aims to redefine a refugee’s relationship to any sovereignty so 
that s/he may again properly belong in another national space.19 Given the world’s 
division into territorial states, having lost the basic level of protection and citizenship 
from their country of origin, the individual finds herself/himself in the “no man’s land” 
of the international landscape. S/he disrupts the normal conditions of international society 
in terms of the citizen-state-territory hierarchy. To restore order in the international 
society, states should take responsibility for redefining the refugee’s relationship to any 
space of sovereignty.20 However, any attempts of national states at refugee protection are 
made in the interest of international and national orders, but not for humanitarian 
reasons.21 Refugees are seen as a threat to international orders and the sovereign power 
of national states. Within the international state system, an individual cannot be refused 
to stay without entry into another country. At the same time, the denial of protection by 
one host state directly shifts the responsibility to provide shelter to another.22 This is the 
most contentious aspect of the refugee protection problem that requires cooperation 
between nation states within the international state system. As Hoffman states,  
There is no way of isolating oneself from the effects of gross violations abroad: they 
breed refugees, exiles, and dissidents who come knocking at our doors —and we must 
choose between bolting the doors, thus increasing misery and violence outside, and 
opening them, at some cost to our own wellbeing.23  
From a normative point of view, refugee issues bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma 
at the heart of modern nation states: between the universality of human rights and norms, 
which apply to every human being on the one hand, and the sovereignty and self-
determination of the state on the other hand. Whereas the principles of human rights and 
                                                 
Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, State-Centred Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment, Michigan 
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19  Soğuk, 1999, pp. 11-14.  
20  Haddad, 2003, pp. 309-310.  
21  Haddad, Emma, Refugee Protection: A Clash of Values, The International Journal of Human Rights, 
7(3), 2010, p. 1.  
22  Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1992, p. 26; Lavenex, Sandra, The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human 
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Politics, Syracuse University Press: New York, 1981, p. 111, cited by Haddad, 2008, p. 3.  
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territorial sovereignty are conceptually complementary within a given national 
community, they turn out to be contradictory from an international perspective.24 In this 
contradictory situation, a refugee is defined very differently from universalistic and 
particularistic views.  
A universalistic view puts the interest of the individual prior to the potential host 
community. In this perspective, refugees are seen as individuals who have been violated 
in their human rights and who are in need of protection. Violations of human rights are 
not matter of state sovereignty but a common concern of a cosmopolitan community. In 
accordance with this view, the purpose of the state is not the pursuit of specific national 
interests but promoting the realisation of universal values.25 Caren, who is the strongest 
supporter of universalistic human rights, argues that borders should generally be open 
and that people should normally be free to leave their country of origin and settle in 
another country subject only to the sorts of constraints that bind current citizens in their 
new country. She argues that current restrictions of Western countries on immigration are 
not justifiable. Like feudal barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege.26 She 
describes citizenship in Western liberal democracies as “the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege —an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances”.27  
On the other hand, particularists put the rights of the community prior to the rights of 
refugees and defend constructing entrance policies into the sovereign territory of states. 
Accordingly, human rights only apply to citizens of the nation state. This leads to the 
exclusive control of a state over its territory.28 In sharp contrast to Caren, Walzer is 
concerned with the particularism of history, culture and membership instead of 
universalistic human rights principles. Walzer argues that the admission and exclusion of 
foreigners are at the core of being a community. Without them: 
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There could not be communities of character, historically stable, ongoing associations 
of men and women with some special commitment to one another and some special 
sense of their common life.29  
Walzer draws a parallel between “affluent and free countries” and “elite universities” and 
argues, as citizens of such a country, we have to decide whom we should admit in 
accordance with our own character.30 Walzer also admits that we have some 
responsibility towards refugees so long as the number of refugees is small and the cost to 
our own society is low. This obligation is, therefore, conditional. He defends the 
exclusionary behaviours of Western countries towards refugees, who come from different 
cultural and religious backgrounds stating that,  
When the numbers increases, we are forced to choose among the victims, we will look, 
rightfully, for some more direct connection with our way of life. If, on the other hand, 
there is no connection at all with particular victims, antipathy rather than affinity, there 
can’t be a requirement to choose them over other people equally in need.31  
When we look at Walzer’s assessment of the responsibility of states towards refugees, as 
Singer and Singer highlight,  
We find a striking match between what he recommends and what moderately liberal 
governments, prepared to heed at least some humanitarian sentiments, actually do.32 
Walzer’s analysis matches with the current policies of the EU, the USA and Australia. 
These countries’ admission policies are based on the idea that the right of a community 
takes precedence over the rights of refugees. For Walzer, if refugees have no political 
affinity with the receiving country, their claims cannot be accepted and are left to the ex 
gratia act of the receiving country. This forms the “orthodoxy” of current refugee 
protection policies of western states. Singer and Singer challenge this thinking and argue 
that Walzer offers no underlying theory for his assertion that the right of the community 
to determine its membership takes priority over the rights of refugees.33 Another 
challenge comes from Universalist theorists, Benhabib and Ignatieff. They argue that we 
                                                 
29  Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Blackwell: Oxford, 1983, 
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30  ibid, pp. 31-33.  
31  ibid, pp. 49-50.  
32  Singer, Peter & Singer, Reneta, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, Edited by Gibney, Mark, Open 
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are part of an interconnected global society and when people suffer in Syria, Afghanistan 
or other parts of the world as a result of the foreign policy decisions of the US or the EU 
countries, we are all complicit in that suffering. In fact, in many cases, Western countries’ 
failure of humanitarian interventions has been triggering this exodus. Thus, our moral 
obligations are the result of our transnational connectedness.34 Furthermore, Benhabib 
finds Walzer’s theory unjustifiable on ethical grounds and argues that we have a robust 
obligation to allow refugees into our community. We are justified in excluding refugees 
only if we are able to show good grounds for their exclusion. The reason for closing the 
door to potential refugees and asylum seekers “must be based on the grounds that ‘you 
would accept if you were in my situation and I were in yours’.”35 This criterion puts 
Benhabib in a different place from Walzer even if she opens the way to closing the door 
on defined ethical grounds.  
Both Universalist and particularist explanations of states’ responsibilities towards 
refugees are challenged by Gibney’s different theoretical perspective. He defines the 
boundaries of states’ responsibility towards refugees in the context of a “harm” principle. 
He stresses the importance of states as agents in the creation of the refugee problem. 
Claiming a causal link between states’ actions and the refugee status, Gibney affirms the 
existence of certain responsibilities owed by states to refugees by virtue of shared 
membership in a global society.36 He proposes a humanitarianism principle to circumvent 
the continuing conflict between state sovereignty and human rights in the contemporary 
world. However, Gibney draws attention to the conflicting structure of the liberal 
democratic states and the constraints faced by governments in today’s political 
environment37 where states follow the interests of their own citizens: 
The state emerges as an intractably particularistic agent, one informed by a rationale 
for action that has as its goals both the protecting of the security needs of its citizens 
and the ensuring of its own reproduction. It is by acting in pursuit of these ends that the 
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state derives and maintains its authority. Consequently, for the state to cater for the 
needs of outsiders would constitute a misuse of its authority, especially if the pursuit of 
the interests and needs of outsiders came at some cost to the interest of the citizenry 
over which it has charge.38 
Gibney’s resolution to resolve the conflict between the rights of citizens and the 
fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers is his humanitarian principle. In 
accordance with Gibney, states are only obliged to accept “as many refugees as they can 
without undermining the civil, political and, importantly, the social rights” of their 
citizens.39 Gibney’s humanitarianism principle provides a less comprehensive protection 
to refugees than universalistic theories and puts only a minimal responsibility on states.40 
He attempts to provide a normative prescription for the contemporary refugee protection 
crisis but he could not differentiate his humanitarianism principle from Walzer’s theory, 
which claims that states are obliged to accept as many refugees as they can without 
disturbing the cultural life of the community. Like Walzer Gibney argues that “states have 
an obligation to assist refugees when the costs of doing so are low41 but the cost of 
refugees to the host community is quite open to interpretation. The current Syrian refugee 
crisis reveals that many European member states have closed their borders arguing that 
they are “overwhelmed” by the cost of refugees. This raises the question is the 3 million 
refugees in Turkey with just over 76 million population too many? Are the 1 million 
refugees in the EU member states with 493 million populations too many?42 It is very 
difficult in practice to use Gibney’s humanitarianism principle because there is no 
monitoring mechanism or provision in the international refugee protection regime that 
obliges states to take their fair share of the refugee burden.  
The other weakness of the humanitarianism principle is that it does not see refugees as 
equal right holders but always puts the interest of citizens above that of the refugees. 
Refugee protection is seen as a form of charity instead of the obligation of states. Gibney 
also defends “closed borders” for controlling entry into state territory arguing that if there 
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was no restriction on a state’s territory, this could lead to inequality between states on a 
global scale because the burden of refugee responsibility would fall inequitably on 
specific states. He suggests resettlement of refugees from a country of origin or 
neighbouring country as the only politically available solution to reduce the expenditure 
on refugee determination systems. Resettlement programs may allow governments to 
manage their refugee commitments with greater predictability and less risk.43 Although 
the humanitarianism principle seems to provide an alternative way to overcome the 
contemporary refugee crisis, it will end up containing refugees in their region of origin 
or neighbouring countries. The implementation of the EU-Turkey refugee deal affirms 
that the promises of resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey into the EU member 
states remain on paper. The stark fact is that there is no incentive or obligation forcing 
member states to take significant numbers of refugees from Turkey, which is bearing the 
cost of hosting millions of refugees.  
3. The Collapse of the Right to Have Rights: Is Arendt’s Political Theory Still Valid? 
As seen above, no solution has been found to resolve the conflict between universalistic 
human rights and territorial sovereignty of nation states, which is inherent in the structure 
of the international state system. This contradictory nature of the nation state system is 
termed “Janus-faced” by Habermas.44 Today the increasing scope of displacement, the 
cost of hosting refugees and the blurred distinction between refugees and migrants leaves 
us with an inescapable dilemma: whether the right to have rights is the right of refugees 
and asylum seekers or only the right of citizens. What does universal human rights really 
mean in practice? Do refugees and asylum seekers hold inalienable rights as human 
beings without any country's citizenship?  
Jeremy Bentham dismissed the idea of “inalienable” or “natural” rights as “nonsense upon 
stilts”, arguing that the only real rights are the legal ones that are established and upheld 
by a government and system of law.45 Edmund Burke also attacked the idea of natural 
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rights and argued that rights proclaimed as universal do not pertain to human beings but 
pertain to citizens of a political community. The rights of man are “abstract principles” 
and without any citizenship status, individuals cannot do anything to protect or enforce 
their rights.46 The political theorist Hannah Arendt also acknowledged this during her 
exile as she pointed to the existence of a ‘right to have rights’ asserting: 
We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights … and a right to belong to 
some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had 
lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation.47  
She argues that the rights of man had been defined as “inalienable” but it turned out that 
“the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their 
minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them”.48 Therefore, the rights of man are 
not the rights of man but the rights of the citizen who already had rights. Individuals need 
to belong to a state both to ensure their protection and acquisition of their rights. Refugees 
who lose the protection of their state are deprived of a political community willing and 
able to guarantee their rights. Arendt reflects on the precarious situation of statelessness:  
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to 
guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-
increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man 
without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity.49  
This means that in the absence of a political community that could recognise and 
guarantee their rights, the stateless were deprived of legal personhood as well as a right 
to action, opinion, and speech. She asserts that the French Revolution, in declaring the 
rights of man and yet demanding national sovereignty, contained a contradiction, which 
ensured that human rights are protected and enforced only as national rights. The people 
and not the individual becomes the “image of man”.50 Ironically, the rights of man, 
therefore, become dependent upon, rather than independent of governments. Therefore, 
                                                 
46  Burke, Reflections, on the Revolution in France, cited by Gündoğdu, 2014, p. 27.  
47  Arendt, 1966, pp. 296-297.  
48  ibid, pp. 291-292. 
49  ibid, p. 297. 
50  ibid, p. 293. 
54 
 
  
“the Rights of Man, supposedly, inalienable, proved not to be enforceable” compared to 
the rights of citizens protected by their governments.51  
In a number of rich and thought-provoking texts, Arendt provides a critique of human 
rights and an analysis of the situation of “stateless” persons. For Arendt, there is no clear 
distinction between refugees and stateless persons because while refugees may not be de 
jure stateless persons, they are de facto stateless. She used the term "stateless" to refer 
not only to those who have formally lost their nationality but also to those who do not 
enjoy the normal rights of citizenship. Accordingly, Arendt points to refugees and asylum 
seekers when she uses “stateless”52 stating that: 
The stateless person, without right to residence and without the right to work, had of 
course constantly to transgress the law. He was liable to jail sentences without ever 
committing a crime.53  
A stateless person lacks any form of legal, social or economic protection because s/he is 
forced to live beyond the pale of law and is often seen as “the scum of the earth”. The 
stateless person is left “completely at the mercy of police”, who “did not worry too much 
about committing a few illegal acts in order to diminish the country’s burden of 
undésirables”.54 From Arendt’s perspective, stateless persons cannot claim and exercise 
the rights that one is entitled to by virtue of being human.  
Today perhaps more than ever before, we are living in a situation that Arendt wrote about 
statelessness.55 Her analysis is even more relevant in our globalizing world where it is 
becoming the “order of the day”.56 However, there are differences between the 
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contemporary landscape and the one Arendt observed. 57 When she wrote about 
statelessness, she was pointing to the “somewhat shadowy existence” of human rights 
and that they “never became law”.58 Since the end of the Second World War, international 
human rights law has been established in the international arena and there has been a shift 
from citizenship to legal personhood as the basis of the entitlement to rights. For example, 
the ICCPR states that human rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person”. 59 With the advent of international human rights law, individuals are recognised 
as human rights holders directly under international law. In accordance with this shifting 
approach, now States have international obligations to accord rights to all individuals 
within their jurisdiction regardless of their nationality or citizenship status.60 
In the light of these developments, some political theorists have advocated the emergence 
of ‘global' or ‘cosmopolitan' citizenship and allege that there has been a shift from 
citizenship to universal legal personhood as the basis of the entitlements of rights. This 
has resulted in migrants and refugees standing before the law and demanding education, 
healthcare, family unification and political participation as fundamental human rights.61 
Soysal highlights that the notion of human rights has become a pervasive element of the 
contemporary international order and citizenship emphasizes universal personhood rather 
than nationality. In Soysal account, “postnational citizenship confers upon every person 
the right and duty of participation regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that 
community”.62 Habermas also argues that our contemporary world is becoming 
cosmopolitan rather than national and he supports a revised version of Kant’s 
cosmopolitan law. He also argues that the individual is gradually acquiring “the status of 
a subject of international law and a cosmopolitan citizen”. Today, international human 
rights have steadily increased their weight and this has started to temper the sovereign 
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power of states.63 We can no longer say that the international order is exclusively 
determined by state sovereignty. 
However, these developments might give the misleading impression that the condition of 
rightlessness that Arendt described in her analysis has altogether disappeared from the 
contemporary landscape. Despite considerable developments at the international level, 
there is a serious gap between the rights enjoyed under international human rights law 
and the realities refugees and asylum seekers face in practice.64 International human rights 
law still upholds the sovereign power of states and leaves refugees without effective 
guarantees against violent border control or restrictive refugee protection policies of 
states. As many scholars have highlighted, Arendt’s analyses of statelessness still help 
our understanding of the contemporary refugee protection crisis.65 As Adelman wrote: 
“Arendt’s voice is one we can turn to as we grapple with the spread of statelessness in 
our day. Camps and pariahs are still with us”.66 
For Gündoğdu, Arendt’s view on the rightless position of refugees has found a new 
meaning within the contemporary context. 67 Considering recent changes in the field of 
human rights, rightlessness cannot be described as an absolute loss or lack of rights but 
instead indicates the precarious legal, political, and human standing of refugees and 
asylum seekers. The term “precarious” is used to highlight the vulnerability of the 
individual who is “dependent on the favours, privileges, or discretions of compassionate 
others”.68 According to Gündoğdu, border controls are justified as a legitimate act of 
sovereignty of states, but it “ends up creating division within humanity itself”. These 
restrictive migration policies have rendered the legal personhood of individuals irrelevant 
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and put them into an increasingly precarious position.69 Regarding exclusionary powers 
of sovereign states, refugees and asylum seekers still are subjected to numerous forms of 
violence and abusive treatment such as arbitrary detention and deportation, no access to 
asylum procedures, and confinement in inhuman conditions at reception centres. These 
problems are further complicated by the fact that most of the refugees and asylum seekers 
cannot access legal assistance effectively to challenge discrimination or abuse they are 
facing. In fact, they are very often hesitant to use their rights in fear of deportation.70 This 
evidence indicates that many refugees continue to live outside the protection of the law. 
Benhabib also underlines the continuing conflict between universal human rights and 
sovereignty at the heart of the contemporary international order.71 For her, the irony of 
current political developments is that while state sovereignty in economic and 
technological domains has been greatly eroded, nonetheless national borders still keep 
aliens and refugees out. She describes this situation in a very creative way: 
Old political structures may have waned but the new political forms of globalisation are 
not yet in sight. We are like travellers navigating an unknown terrain with the help of 
old maps, drawn at a different time and in response to different needs. While the terrain 
we are travelling on, the world-society of states, has changed our normative map has 
not.72  
She also argues that despite some developments in human rights instruments, “the 
condition of undocumented aliens, as well as refugees and asylum seekers…remains in 
that murky domain between legality and illegality”.73 It means that refugees find 
themselves outside the framework of state-people-territory with a precarious legal, 
political and human standing. Contrary to the claims of cosmopolitanism, the conflict 
between sovereignty and human rights has weakened in intensity but has by no means 
been eliminated. Within this context, she criticizes the EU’s policies for their 
discriminative approach towards refugees: 
The EU is caught in contradictory currents which move it toward norms of cosmopolitan 
justice in the treatment of those who are within its boundaries, while leading it to act in 
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accordance with outmoded Westphalian conceptions of unbridled sovereignty toward 
those who are on the outside. The negotiation between insider and outsider status has 
become tense and almost warlike.74 
Along with Benhabib, Joppke argues that considering the challenges to sovereignty and 
citizenship, current diagnosis of the decline of the national state is premature. States’ 
willingness and the capacity of states to control the determination of entry and expulsion 
are not declining.75 Also, he further argues that the claim of an international human rights 
regime constraining state sovereignty is wrong in two respects: First, “it is too pessimistic 
about nation-states drained of internal human rights principles; second, it is too optimistic 
about the effectiveness of the international human rights regime.”76 Contrary to the 
arguments that international human rights law restricts the sovereign power of states, such 
human rights constraints are more national than international. In the case of liberal states, 
the protection of human rights is embedded in national law and traditions. If liberal states 
accept unwanted immigration, then it is because of “self-limited rather than globally 
limited sovereignty”.77 Regarding increasing internal pressure of human rights law on 
nation states, states have started to see exclusion as the key element of their asylum 
policies. For example, safe third country practices with readmission agreements or 
interception operations at sea works discriminately against genuine refugees and 
economic migrants.78 For Joppke, these remote mechanisms are used to “neutralize” both 
international and domestic legal obligations without openly violating them. There are 
many clear evidences that prosperous countries continue to employ exclusionary policies 
or remote control mechanisms towards refugees and asylum seekers to abstain from their 
human rights responsibilities.79 
Along with Joppke, Hyndman and Mountz also highlight states’ exclusionary approaches 
towards refugees and asylum seekers. They state that the most pressing problem is the 
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loss of access to the territory of sovereign states that prevents asylum seekers from 
mobilise their rights. Contrary to the widespread use of the principle of “non-refoulement, 
they used “neo-refoulement” to describe a new form of exclusion mechanism that states 
have developed in the last three decades.80 The difference between the principle of non-
refoulement and neo-refoulement is based on the access of the asylum seeker to the 
territory of host state. The principle of non-refoulement protects the individual from 
forced return to their country of origin but it is only triggered when the individual reaches 
the territory of a sovereign country. If states want to circumvent their protection 
responsibility, they may take measures to stop refugees’ reaching their territory. This 
constitutes “neo-refoulement” and is described by Marchetti as “preventive refoulement." 
According to international law, no expulsion occurs in the territory of the state but the 
preventive operations can be carried out outside the national territory with the help of 
third countries.81 As Arendt had realised it is impossible to “get rid of refugees” or 
transform them into the host country. In that condition what is left when voluntary 
repatriation is impossible and refoulement is prohibited by international conventions? 
States are trying to solve the problem at the source through non-arrival policies: “no entry, 
no repatriation is needed.”82 
The main aim of the EU and Australian government today is to contain asylum seekers 
and other migrants in transit countries or regions of origin before they reach a sovereign 
territory in which they could make an asylum claim. 83 The protection of refugees has 
been shifted into transit countries through bilateral RAs that aim to prevent asylum 
seekers from ever landing on the territory of a signatory state to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Neo-refoulement represents a new invisible wall that has been erected 
around the EU. The RA with safe third country practices creates “a geographical game of 
hopscotch for asylum seekers, with fewer and fewer spaces through which to pass to make 
a refugee claim.” 84 The countries of the EU may argue that they observe their 
commitment to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, but access to the 
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rights and safeguards enshrined therein is increasingly limited. Respatialization of asylum 
is a deliberate political project buttressed by RAs and development funds that ensure 
cooperation of donor states and transit countries”.85 The ‘respatialization’ of asylum also 
advocates helping would be refugees at home before they leave their countries of origin.86 
Aleinikoff supported the claim of Hyndman and Mountz arguing that Western countries 
are much more interested in replacing “an exilic bias with a source-control bias”. These 
policies do appear more humanitarian as they aim to contain refugees in their region of 
origin or neighbouring countries but give little concern to the actual difficulties of 
refugees.87 
Italian philosopher, Agamben has followed the work of Arendt and reinterpreted her 
views on stateless persons. He claims that Arendt’s view is still valid in the contemporary 
international order because refugees are still subjected to a permanent state of exclusion 
from political life. He adopted Aristotle’s famous distinction between two forms of life. 
“Zoe”; where life is rooted in nature and is common with all living creatures and “bios”: 
“the good life”, which is understood as the political way of life. Agamben distinguishes 
political life and biopolitical life in his well-known book “Homo Sacer”.88 He claims that 
refugees are reduced to “naked life” which represents survival as animals without any 
political rights or citizenship. Refugee camps are used to contain refugees without access 
to any political and socio-economic rights.89 Agamben and Arendt both see refugees as a 
symbol of the systemic failure of the international system. Contrary to Benhabib, they 
both reject the assimilation of refugees into the old model of nation/territory/citizen 
triangle. They argue that humanitarian efforts cannot solve the refugee problem but only 
helps to continue the “naked life” of refugees. Both Arendt and Agamben are accused of 
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“arrogance” and “irrelevance” to the real life of refugees and their incredible effort to 
integrate with their new host community.90  
For Kesby, despite the changes brought by globalisation, international human rights law 
is still “notoriously” weak. The conflict between universalism of rights and the 
sovereignty of the nation state is obvious in our current international state system. 
Although as shown above some scholars claim that human rights are progressively 
“humanizing” international law and tempering the influence of sovereignty, this claim is 
largely true with respect to the lawful residents living within their borders but it has little 
bearing on the arena of refugee protection and migration. State sovereignty remains 
largely unfettered in respect to immigration and asylum issues. Human rights norms 
cannot erase territorial borders and the significance of citizenship. States continue to be 
principal guarantors of human rights and human rights can only be claimed at the national 
level. At present, this leaves non-citizens in a precarious position: they are recognised as 
the bearers of rights on the basis of humanity but at the national level, they are reduced 
to deportable aliens and denied recognition as the subject of rights. Thus, Kesby asserts, 
“Humanity is not the answer to the right to have rights but the site of its contestation”.91 
Nash has also drawn attention to the contradictory nature of universal human rights. She 
alleges that  
Far from inaugurating a new era of genuinely universal human rights, in some cases 
cosmopolitan law may even contribute to the creation of conditions in which 
fundamental human rights are violated.92 
 This is so evident in the cosmopolitan world and even in Europe that universal human 
rights have not resulted in the elimination of inequalities between citizens and non-
citizens. Adopting a sociological approach to rights, Nash claims that the application of 
human rights contributes to the creation and the multiplication of differences and 
inequalities between citizens and non-citizens, creating very different categories, 
including “super-citizens, marginal citizens, quasi-citizens, sub-citizens and un-
citizens”.93 Even though the legalization of human rights seems to make equal non-
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citizens, they do not enjoy the same legal and socio-economic rights as citizens. Today 
human rights for non-citizens are far from popular; Politicians seeking re-election are 
following populist policies to gain approval of their citizens rather than protecting non-
citizens. Judges are rarely trained in human rights law while the media is not keen to 
defend non-citizens’ rights. Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to create 
the political will to secure the equality of citizens and non-citizens. In addition, a 
cosmopolitan law is extraordinarily slow, complex and multilayered. The result is that 
the proliferation of citizenship statuses in relation to human rights has not achieved a 
breakthrough in the distinction between the citizen and non-citizen on which the nation-
state was founded.94 
4. The Relevance of Arendt’s Political Theory to the Refugee Protection Crisis: The 
EU-Turkey Agreement on Refugees 
This section seeks to answer the question why did the researcher choose to use Arendt’s 
political theory to explain the struggles of refugees in accessing their fundamental rights. 
As demonstrated above in Arendt’s political theory, human rights are bound up with the 
structures of the nation state and its form of citizenship. From this perspective, the 
inherent link between human rights and the nation state makes refugees’ and asylum 
seekers’ access to human rights problematic.  
Other theorists have sought a resolution of that conundrum. There are three different 
explanations about the rightless situation of refugees in the literature.95 The first lies in 
the structures of liberal democracies. According to Dembour and Tobias, the problem is 
not one of the nation states because not all states have at their core a nation that is 
exclusionary in its conception. The proponents of this view, especially Benhabib, argue 
that liberal democracies contain a constitutive dilemma at the heart of their structures. On 
the one hand, they have to respect the universal human rights principles without any 
distinction of membership status but on the other hand, liberal democracies have 
sovereign power of self-determination and set limits that lead to the exclusion of 
foreigners from entering their territory. This leads to boundaries and conceptual exclusion 
of refugees and asylum seekers in the name of the people within its jurisdiction.96 
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The second perspective argues that refugees and asylum seekers have lost their right to 
have rights, not so much because they have crossed an international border some time in 
their lifetime but because they are politically and socially marginalized.97 As Somers 
argues legal citizenship may have been necessary for securing individual rights but 
possessing formal nation state citizenship alone is an inadequate foundation for being 
recognised as a fully rights-bearing person. If the access of migrants and refugees to 
human rights is problematic, it is because the people we are talking about are 
predominantly poor and black, linked to a long history of political and economic 
exploitation.98  
The third perspective suggests that human rights are not meant to deliver the equal 
treatment and dignity they seem to promise. In fact, the protection available to the 
powerless under the guise of human rights constitutes a form of regulation rather than 
seriously challenging the status quo of current inequalities in the world. Human rights 
have been constructed by powerful states to continue their status quo.99 As Wolcher 
argues “No legal system is perfect” and mistakes are frequently made by law-doers but 
they “blinker their vision so as not to see law’s costs.”100 Human rights are therefore part 
of the problem rather than the solution to the exclusion, marginalisation and inequality 
faced by many refugees and asylum seekers in the contemporary refugee protection 
regime.101 
All these perspectives have underlined the same deficiencies that refugees and asylum 
seekers have problematic access to their fundamental human rights.102 All criticisms 
address the same idea that the universality of human rights is a flawed idea. For Donnelly, 
“the universality of human rights is a moral claim about the proper way to organise social 
and political relations in the contemporary world, not an historical or anthropological 
                                                 
97  Dembour & Tobias, 2011, p. 9.  
98  Somers, R. Margaret, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have 
Rights, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008, pp. 26-27.  
99  Dembour & Tobias, 2011, p. 11. 
100  Wolcher, E. Louis, Law’s Task: The Tragic Circle of Law, Justice and Human Suffering, Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2008, p. 11.  
101  Dembour & Tobias, 2011, p. 11.  
102  ibid. p. 11.  
64 
 
  
fact”.103 The answer to the question why the researcher chose to use Arendt’s political 
theory is related to how Arendt conceptualizes the rightless position of refugees and 
asylum seekers. Her interpretation of stateless persons and their struggles in accessing 
their fundamental rights provide a framework for the researcher to use in defining how 
the recent refugee agreement between the EU and Turkey affects refugees and their access 
to their fundamental human rights. Although other critical perspectives have focused on 
the reasons behind the rightless position of refugees and asylum seekers, Arendt focused 
on the harm of statelessness including both legal harm (the loss of citizenship) and an 
ontological harm, deprivation of fundamental human qualities. She defines the 
ontological deprivation in three interconnected dimensions: the loss of identity and 
reduction to merely human or bare life: a separation from the common realm of humanity 
and abandonment, finally loss of a person’s ability to speak and act in a meaningful 
way.104  
For Arendt, the deprivation of identity has led stateless or refugees to fall “outside the 
pale of law”105 and appear as “naked human beings”.106 This means that the stateless and 
refugees lose their political status and they cannot regain it. They appear to the outside 
world of human beings “without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, 
without a deed by which to identify and specify himself”.107 As Agier underlines, today 
refugees and the stateless “are certainly alive, but they no longer “exist”.108 Whatever 
their national identity, ethnicity or religion, their “social identity is now put in brackets 
for as long as they are confined to camps. They have only “bare lives” which depend on 
humanitarian aid. They spend months and years, sometimes their entire life cycle outside 
of any membership status.109  
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Refugee camps are often used to exclude refugees from the common public space. They 
are excluded physically, economically, socially and politically from their host 
community. They are denied social integration where they reside. Although it is morally 
problematic, sovereign states see refugee camps in the transit countries as the only 
solution to increasing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers without violating their 
universalistic human rights.110 
Arendt’s third dimension of ontological deprivation arises directly as a result of the first 
two dimensions: Being a refugee or stateless diminishes a person’s ability to speak and 
act in a meaningful way.111 For Arendt, the loss of membership in a political community 
is equivalent to the loss of all human rights and dignity. Arendt dismisses any theory that 
considers human rights as inalienable and possessed naturally because such rights cannot 
be exercised or protected outside the political community. In accordance with Arendt, 
“we are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strengths of our 
decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights”. 112  Deprived of a political 
community, stateless or refugees are continually at risk of “becoming irrelevant to the 
world in that their actions and opinions no longer matter to anyone; it is as if they cease 
to exist”.113  
The EU-Turkey RA is “the most emblematic case” that affirms the continuing relevance 
of Arendt’s arguments about the harm of statelessness including both the loss of 
citizenship and deprivation of fundamental human qualities. With the increasing Syrian 
refugee flow into the EU territory, the EU desperately needed “Turkey to serve as a 
migrant waiting room on its borders”.114 To reach its aims, the EU signed a refugee deal 
with Turkey and deployed huge resources to stop refugees and vulnerable migrants from 
reaching the EU by sealing the Aegean route. Since the refugee deal, many asylum 
seekers and refugees who arrived in Greece have been subjected to prolonged mandatory 
detention in inhuman conditions.115 These facilities are being used to break refugee’s 
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hopes to access a dignified life in Europe or forced them to return to Turkey. Recent 
reports about Greek hotspots have revealed that every asylum seekers, even vulnerable 
ones, are subjected to automatic detention under inadequate standards and without 
accessing asylum. The systemic use of safe third country concept has also been violating 
the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees under both international human 
rights and EU law.116  
The refugee deal created legal “holes of oblivion” according to Arendt. This means that 
signing a refugee deal with Turkey, the EU is deliberately creating sophisticated barriers 
to prevent asylum seekers’ access to its territory. Refugees and asylum seekers are 
“smuggled across borders by Western officials” collaborating with Turkey and are forced 
to stay in Turkey within “darkness” as they do not know their fate.117 The implementation 
of the EU-Turkey refugee deal has revealed that Turkey cannot guarantee the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers due to deficiencies in its refugee protection system. They 
are excluded from participation in the ordinary functioning of society. In many respects, 
their situation in Turkey is quite similar to the one that Arendt describes in her book, the 
Origins of Totalitarianism. “Internment camp…has become the routine solution for the 
domicile of the “displaced persons”118 and “the only practical substitute for a non-existent 
homeland”.119 Today, as described by Arendt, many refugees and asylum seekers are 
“liable to jail sentences without committing crime”120 and rarely can they access the 
protections guaranteed under the rule of law. This situation indicates that even though the 
RA is presented as the only technical solution or “lesser evil”121 to combat “illegal 
migration”, the acceptance of “lesser evil” has weakened the enforceability of universal 
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norms and standards of human rights without necessarily ignoring or denying their 
existence.122 
In addition, the EU-Turkey RA leaves refugees and asylum seekers in “a Kafkaesque 
legal vacuum” which reduces them to “non-persons, legal ghosts”.123 From Arendt’s 
perspective, it means that deprivation of civil-political and socio-economic rights 
undermines the possibilities of establishing a reliable and durable life for refugees and 
gives rise to a fundamental condition of “rightlessness”. As seen in the experience of 
Syrian refugees in Turkey, they are not able to get refugee status or any other legal status 
due to Turkey’s geographical limitation to 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, they are 
struggling to access their basic human rights such as accommodation, food, health and 
education services. The fieldwork findings in chapters VI and VII highlight that they are 
not seen as right holders but as “passive beneficiary”124 at the discretion of the Turkish 
government.  
Arendt’s political theory also offers a clear picture of how rightlessness constitutes the 
loss of action and the right to work.125 Asylum seekers and refugees stay rightless because 
they are forced to live in camps or urban areas that make it difficult to establish a relatively 
durable world with their own work. These forms of invisible violence hinder the efforts 
of asylum seekers and refugees to claim and exercise their human rights.126 In the “We 
Refugees”, Arendt reminded us that establishing a durable life is very important for 
refugees. She insists that the right to work is very important for human beings because it 
instills a “trust in reality of life.” By being able to work and pay for their daily needs, 
refugees do not have to depend on aid from host state or other international organizations. 
The dependency on aid agencies or host communities has led to the alienation of refugees 
from host communities and prevents them from settling as a normal member of human 
society. In Turkey, refugees have a right to work officially but they cannot use that right 
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due to bureaucratic obstacles, the high unemployment rate in the labour market or because 
of institutional deficiencies. The problems in exercising their right to work have been 
preventing refugees and asylum seekers from establishing a relatively durable life and 
thus amounts to their expulsion from the political community. Without belonging to a 
political community, they have nothing left but their “bare humanity.127  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to examine why refugees and asylum seekers find it so difficult to 
access their fundamental human rights. The researcher used the arguments put forward 
by Hannah Arendt to answer this question. According to Arendt’s political theory, human 
rights remain bound up with the nation state and citizenship status. This inherent link is 
problematic as when an individual loses that citizenship status they lose all the benefits 
that are attached to it. Arendt points out that human rights are only “enjoyed by citizens 
of the most prosperous and civilised countries.”128 Despite the claims of universal human 
rights, nation states can and still do exclude those who are not citizens from access to 
their fundamental human rights. The continuing conflict between human rights and state 
sovereignty cannot be overcome by globalisation. The EU-Turkey refugee deal is a 
reflection of this continuing conflict between human rights and state sovereignty. Even 
though the EU is presenting the refugee deal as a humanitarian action and success story 
in reducing the deadly journey of refugees to the EU territory, the deal aims to contain 
refugees in their region of origin. Whilst EU officials have been expressing condemnation 
of the US President Donald Trump’s permanent ban on Syrian refugees, the US and the 
EU differ only in rhetoric as in reality, the EU has been doing this under the guise of the 
RA with Turkey and other less developed countries. This is hypocrisy. The attitude of the 
EU affirms Gibney’s observation that  
Human right has evolved into something that it was never intended to become. Rather 
than being based firmly on universal principles and values, “human rights” has instead 
become parochial, territorial, and ultimately self-serving. Much worse, and in large part 
as a result of this approach, “human rights” has offered none of the protection that it 
promises or that its framers intended. 129 
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After constructing a theoretical framework, examining the debates about refugees’ rights 
and rightlesness and their link to the current RA between the EU and Turkey, it is time 
now to move on to evaluate the compatibility of the readmission agreements with the 
fundamental principle of non-refoulement, the right to seek asylum and the obligation to 
provide effective refugee protection within international refugee and human rights law.  
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CHAPTER III: Why are Readmission Agreements a Threat to the Principle of 
Non-Refoulement and the Right to Asylum? 
 
Refugee protection is a human rights issue, rather than principally an act of charity at 
the discretion of States.1 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses RAs and their compatibility with the principle of non-refoulement, 
the right to seek asylum and the effective protection of refugees. It draws attention to the 
contradictory responses of nation states towards refugees and asylum seekers. Even 
though the principle of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum are accepted as a 
fundamental human rights, refugees and asylum seekers still face barriers to their access 
to safe havens and even if they do gain access to safe countries, they are often subjected 
to a number of refugee “deals”, “swaps” or “bargains”.2 These political arrangements 
undermine the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers, especially the right to 
seek asylum.3  
Today the status of refugees and the consensus on the collective responsibility of the 
international community towards refugees are starting to lose their strength. Increases in 
forced and economic migration flows all around the world are affecting Western states, 
and they have started to see asylum seekers and refugees as a threat to their national 
solidarity, the economic well-being of their communities and their political self-
determination.4 In this environment, respecting the right to seek asylum and the principle 
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of non-refoulement have become a challenge for states.5 As Van Der Klaauw points out 
migration and asylum have been “married forcibly”6 and the line between migration 
control and refugee protection is “blurring”.7 Today as a consequence,  
Access to international protection has been made dependent not on the refugees’ need 
for protection, but on his or her own ability to enter clandestinely the territory of the 
targeted state.8  
This restrictive approach has also become more visible in the EU. Within an internal 
borderless Europe, uncontrolled floods of refugees have become a key issue for EU 
member states, and this is perceived as a threat to the security of the common area 
regarding increasing linkage with organized crime and terrorism.9 In this context, a 
European common asylum policy has been developed as “a reaction” to the opening up 
of internal borders, rather than providing protection for individuals. It is mainly concerned 
with the national interests of EU member states and preserving sovereign control over the 
entry of asylum seekers and refugees. Little attention has been paid to the issue of whether 
the European common asylum policy is compatible with the fundamental human rights 
of refugees. With this shift in perspective, the EU has started to redefine its fundamental 
principles against the background of the principles of an international refugee protection 
regime based on human rights, international solidarity, and collective responsibility.10 
In the framework of its common asylum policy, the EU has developed an external 
dimension to integrate third countries into its migration management. The EU Justice and 
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Home Affairs external dimension aims at extending its asylum and migration policies 
beyond its borders by incorporating third countries.11 These third countries are being 
supported financially and technically to contain refugee movements in their regions of 
origin and to strengthen border controls to the advantage of the EU. Instead of addressing 
the root causes, which lead people to leave their countries of origin, European policies 
have focused on stemming migration flows. From a member state’s perspective, the 
externalization of EU asylum policy is very logical because if engagement with third 
countries is successful, it will reduce the burden of control at their own borders and curtail 
further unwanted inflows.12 Zolberg describes the externalization of asylum policy as 
“remote control”, since its primary aim is to “shift the locus of control” further away from 
the common territory.13 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the principle of non-
refoulement, its scope and its de facto extension within the developing jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR. The principle of non-refoulement has been extended beyond the 1951 
Refugee Convention and puts a negative obligation on states not to send an asylum seeker 
back to face persecution or another third country where there is a threat of persecution, 
but some gaps in the 1951 Refugee Convention allow states to take the initiative and shift 
their responsibilities onto neighbouring countries and thus abstain from responsibilities 
under the refugee protection regime. Especially, safe third country practices along with 
readmission agreements put a huge burden on developing countries without taking into 
account their institutional and financial resources. In this section, the protection elsewhere 
notion and its alleged legal basis, Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, will be 
examined via a literature review. 
The second section critically analyses the compatibility of readmission agreements with 
the principle of refoulement looking through the common EU asylum policy on “safe 
third country” practices. The relationship between readmission agreements and “safe 
third country concepts” constitutes the fundamental basis of protection concerns, 
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especially the principle of non-refoulement. The “safe third country” concept in the 
context of EU common asylum policy and its possible effect on refugee protection 
regimes will be evaluated in the context of refugee protection and human rights 
instruments. Also, it is crucial to examine whether the existence of a readmission 
agreement may trigger the practice of border return against the principle of non-
refoulement. States have developed special border procedures for individuals 
apprehended at their borders or in international zones. Member states have significant 
discretion to define asylum procedures with fewer safeguards and accelerated 
determination. 
The last section evaluates the principle of effective protection, which constitutes the legal 
basis for transferring the responsibility for asylum seekers to third countries, in the light 
of international law and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. These criteria determined by the 
UNHCR expert roundtable and the EU Commission identify legal constraints, which are 
binding upon states wishing to return refugees and asylum seekers to third countries 
according to readmission agreements. These criteria will be used to evaluate if Turkey is 
a safe third country for refugees and asylum seekers transferred by EU member states 
according to a readmission agreement in chapters six and seven. 
This chapter argues that the implementation of readmission agreements violates the 
prohibition on refoulement, the right to seek asylum and results in “dilution of hard law 
commitments via soft law implementation”.14 Furthermore, these refugee agreements 
mainly aim to shift the refugee burden on to third countries and lead to downgrading 
refugee protection standards. These refugee protection approaches in the region of origin 
involve inhuman conditions and conflict with the principles of effective protection and 
dignified living conditions.  
2. The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Cornerstone of Refugee Protection 
Refugee protection is as old as “the history of mankind” but its legal codification goes 
back only to the middle of the twentieth century.15 The UN accepted the right to seek 
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asylum as a fundamental human right within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) in 1948. Accordingly, Article 14(1) of the UDHR recognizes that “everyone has 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Just a few 
years later, in 1951, the UN adopted the principle of non-refoulement in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Article 33(1) stipulates that:  
No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 
The principle of non-refoulement has been referred to as the cardinal and non-derogable 
principle of international refugee protection16 but it has an inevitable relationship with 
the right to seek asylum. The right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement 
constitute the fundamental legal basis of international refugee protection. They are 
universally accepted principles and have been described as the Magna Carta for 
refugees.17 National and international courts, most notably the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), always refer to these cornerstone principles in their jurisprudence 
regarding the fundamental human rights of refugees. Therefore, before examining the 
principle of non-refoulement, it is necessary to examine the right to seek asylum.  
2.1. The Right to Seek Asylum: A Mythical Status? 
Article 14 of the UDHR provides the right to seek asylum from persecution. It is the first 
established fundamental human rights instrument regarding refugee protection.18 It is 
known as the “chief” among other refugee protection instruments19 and strengthens the 
argument that the “refugee protection regime...has its origins in general principles of 
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human rights”.20 Nevertheless, Article 14 only provides the right to seek asylum, not the 
right to receive or be granted asylum. In other words, it does not impose a duty upon 
contracting states to grant asylum to refugees arriving at their borders.21 Although the 
proposed first version stated “everyone has the right to seek and to be granted asylum 
from persecution”, states avoided the implementation of such a substantive right and the 
final version underlined the importance of state sovereignty.22 Thus, refugee protection 
is highly dependent on the sovereign right of states to grant asylum rather than the right 
of refugees to be granted asylum.23 
Individuals may not able to claim a right to asylum under Article 14 of the UDHR, but 
states have a duty under international law not to prevent the individual’s right to seek 
asylum.24 As Gammeltoft-Hansen contends, there is no international, substantive right to 
be granted asylum, but it can be understood from the wording of Article 14 that the right 
to access an asylum process is established. Therefore, the international community and 
states should not prevent asylum seekers from accessing refugee status determination. 
This procedural right has been substantially supported by the binding principle of non-
refoulement, as enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.25 Therefore, 
when the right to seek asylum is coupled with Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
it gains more strength than before.26 
In this regard, states’ restrictive policies, such as rejection at the border, transit zones or 
border closures without giving an opportunity to claim asylum, undermine the right to 
seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.27 For instance, Hungary closed its 
borders to thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing from Syria and they were trapped in 
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Serbia.28 In that case, Hungary breached the principle of non-refoulement and the right to 
seek asylum by rejecting individuals at the frontier of the country without asking if they 
were seeking asylum.29 As the UNHCR has firmly stated,30  
Whenever refugees – or asylum seekers who may be refugees – are subjected, either 
directly or indirectly, to rejection, expulsion and return to territories where their life or 
freedom is threatened, [this is] in violations of the principle of non-refoulement. 
A UN sub-commission further confirmed that asylum seekers are continuously subjected 
to restrictive policies while trying to reach asylum states and escaping from persecution 
or human rights violations. Particularly, visa restrictions on refugee producing countries 
may be incompatible with the right to seek asylum.31 In this regard, EU member states’ 
visa restrictions on 132 states, including refugee-producing countries, such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, constitute a “serious threat to the personal 
mobility” of people.32 In response to the Syrian refugee crisis, the European Commission 
addressed external challenges to access to asylum procedures in the EU and its report 
suggested humanitarian visas with resettlement opportunities as a solution to ensure a 
more orderly arrival of people in need of international protection.33 Nevertheless, so far, 
no general solution has been found as EU member states rarely grant humanitarian visas 
only in exceptional situations. Taken as a whole, it explains why refugees are not able to 
“buy relatively cheap tickets to travel instead of paying smugglers a large amount of 
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money for unsafe journeys”.34 Thus, most asylum seekers suffer human rights violations, 
and many die on their way to the EU.35  
There is no doubt that the implementation of restrictive policies has blocked the asylum 
channel for people escaping from persecution and forcing them to use irregular 
channels.36 At the same time, such restrictive policies have fuelled the human smuggling 
industry and encouraged asylum seekers to go “underground” rather than approach 
competent authorities and submit a claim for refugee status.37 Nevertheless, their irregular 
position brings them within the scope of readmission agreements, although they are in 
genuine need of international protection. Readmission agreements as administrative 
instruments have been used for the forcible return of this group of asylum seekers as 
irregular migrants without considering their asylum claims. It is generally accepted that 
even though states have the right to regulate entry to their territory, they cannot use this 
right to deny the right to seek asylum. If states develop restrictive policies to abstain from 
their protection responsibilities to refugees, this definitely contravenes the spirit of the 
right to seek asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.38  
2.2. The Fundamental Status of the Principle of Non-Refoulement 
The principle of non-refoulement is vital, given the non-existence of the right to obtain 
asylum. In the absence of an individual right to be granted asylum, the principle of non-
refoulement is one of the few protections that asylum seekers can make use of.39 As a 
customary international law principle, non-refoulement is universally binding on all 
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states, irrespective of their consent to the 1951 Refugee Convention.40 While the principle 
does not oblige states to grant asylum, it guarantees that such persons must be allowed to 
stay, unless they are sent to a third country where they are safe from persecution rather 
than being returned to the country of persecution. Although a right to asylum would create 
a positive obligation, the prohibition of refoulement imposes a negative duty to refrain 
from certain actions.41 
The principle of non-refoulement represents a central limit on state sovereignty to decide 
on the entry and stay of persons escaping from persecution.42 Article 33 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention stipulates that no contracting state may expel or return a refugee to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom are threatened on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion in “any 
manner whatsoever”. In this regard, the expression “in any manner whatsoever” implies 
that the principle of non-refoulement does not only prohibit the return of an asylum seeker 
to their country of origin where they would be persecuted but also to another third country 
if there is a risk of persecution or refoulement to their country of origin. It means that 
transferring responsibility for an asylum seeker to another third country does not remove 
the obligation of a first country of asylum to respect the principle of non-refoulement, 
even though they have made an agreement.43 In the T.I. v. the United Kingdom case, the 
ECtHR ruled that 
Indirect removal…to [an] intermediary country, which is also a Contracting State, does 
not affect the responsibility of the United Kingdom to ensure that the applicant is not, 
as a result of its decision to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention.44  
If a State decides to expel an asylum seeker to a third country, it is still in principle under 
a duty to examine whether this might result in refoulement. To comply with this duty, the 
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state should consider the safety of the asylum seeker in the third country, in particular, 
the protection s/he will receive there against refoulement.45 It is worth noting here that in 
the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, the ECtHR ruled that if the third country does not 
provide asylum seekers with fair refugee status determination or basic subsistence living 
standards but leaves them in a destitute situation, a transfer of responsibility may invoke 
the responsibility of a state, no matter what agreements are made between the two states 
regarding an asylum seeker.46 
Furthermore, it is crucial to underline that the personal scope of Article 33(1) includes 
not only persons defined as recognized refugees within the meaning of Article 1(A)(2) of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention but also asylum seekers whose status has not been 
determined.47 It is widely accepted48 that the status of refugees is of a declaratory nature, 
and a status determination procedure according to the 1951 Refugee Convention does not 
have a constitutive effect. A person is a refugee the moment s/he meets the criteria of 
Article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which occurs when crossing the border of 
a country of persecution into the territory of another state. An asylum seeker receives 
“presumptive” or “prima facie” refugee status until the determination of her/his status 
discredits this claim. An asylum seeker is covered by the protection of Article 33(1) as if 
s/he is a refugee until a status determination discredits this claim.49 The UNHCR affirms 
that50 a proper interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement requires that asylum 
seekers who claim to be refugees should be admitted into a state’s territory until their 
status has been reliably assessed. Protection from refoulement is not limited to persons 
formally recognized as refugees; the principle of non-refoulement applies to all persons, 
irrespective of whether or not they have been officially recognized as refugees, and 
protects both refugees and asylum seekers.51  
Nevertheless, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not stipulate that states must determine 
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the status of persons claiming asylum. The Travaux Préparatoires confirm that the 1951 
Refugee Convention does not imply a positive obligation to determine the status of 
refugees. Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention requires a state to examine the 
merits of an asylum claim only if it wishes to deport asylum seekers to their country of 
origin without infringing the principle of non-refoulement. In other words, applying for 
asylum in a country does not guarantee that such an application must be decided or even 
examined on its merits. In this situation, states have two options in accordance with 
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. One is to allow an asylum seeker to stay 
in its territory without any status determination. Another is to deport the asylum seeker 
to a safe third country without any substantive examination of their asylum claim.52 
However, there is always a risk of indirect refoulement to the country of origin. The 
receiving country is responsible for sending an asylum seeker to a third country where 
there is always a risk of sending the asylum seeker back to persecution.  
However, the prohibition on refoulement is not absolute in all cases as Article 33(2) of 
the 1951 Convention stipulates that  
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in 
which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
This Article disregards the benefits of non-refoulement for a group of people, even though 
they satisfy the requirements set out in the refugee definition in Article 1(A)(2) of the 
1951 Refugee Convention. In contrast, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) provides protection against refoulement even if the asylum seeker has 
committed a serious crime or constitutes a danger to the community of that country.53 For 
this reason, the 1951 Refugee Convention stands in sharp contrast to human rights laws, 
such as the ECHR, the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the ICCPR.54 Furthermore, the wording 
of Article 33(2) is vague in two ways:55 First, it is not clear when a person is to be regarded 
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as a “danger to the security” or a “danger to the community” of a host country. Second, 
the phrases “reasonable grounds” and “particularly serious crime” are not very clear, 
giving much more discretion to states to exclude a person in need of protection and return 
him/her to the country of origin in which the individual’s life is under threat. 
2.3. De Facto Extension of the Principle of Non-Refoulement against Reluctant States 
Due to its narrow refugee definition, the 1951 Refugee Convention excludes the vast 
majority of asylum seekers who escaped from civil wars, natural disasters, general 
violence, military occupation and economic turmoil, since it only covers those persons 
whose migration is prompted by a fear of persecution in relation to civil and political 
rights. Indeed, in order to be eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention,56 an asylum seeker must be outside of her/his country, have a well-founded 
fear of persecution based on conventional grounds, namely race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or holding a particular political opinion, and be 
unwilling or unable to avail him/herself of the protection of the state in question. This 
means that the scope of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention is quite narrow 
when compared to other international instruments. 
It is for this reason that the context of the principle of non-refoulement was de facto 
extended beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention to include asylum seekers escaping for 
other humanitarian reasons.57 This informal extension of the principle of non-refoulement 
was accomplished by human rights instruments, such as the ECHR,58 CAT59 and the 
ICCPR.60 They impose an obligation on states not to return people demanding protection 
to countries where they would face serious human rights violations. In contrast to the 
1951 Refugee Convention, this de facto extension, in other words, complementary 
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protection is “non-discretionary” and protects all persons qua human beings, without 
distinguishing between refugees, migrants or according to any other legal status. In this 
respect, the principle of non-refoulement applies to every person within the territory of a 
state.61 Goodwill Gill evaluated the extension of the principle of non-refoulement over 
the years and states that although the 1951 Refugee Convention cannot meet the needs of 
the reality; non-refoulement was developed over the years to “deal with the humanitarian 
reality of refugee movements”.62 Regarding its de facto broadened scope, it is a most 
important avenue from which asylum seekers can benefit. In this regard, the ECHR as a 
regional fundamental human rights instrument has become the main avenue for refugees 
and asylum seekers seeking a remedy. Unlike other human rights instruments, e.g. CAT 
and ICCPR, it provides more effective protection against human rights violations. 
Therefore, in this section, the ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR will be 
examined.  
As one of the most important sources of human rights instruments, the ECHR has had a 
significant influence on the development of the principle of non-refoulement, which goes 
beyond Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Although the ECHR does not 
make any particular reference to asylum seekers and refugees, the ECHR applies to 
everyone, irrespective of her/his status or nationality, including rejected asylum seekers, 
provided they are present in the jurisdiction of a contracting state.63 Article 3 of the ECHR 
states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. Article 3 of the ECHR provides absolute and unconditional protection for 
asylum seekers who claim that they will suffer inhuman or degrading treatment if they 
are sent back to their country of origin.64  
The ECHR also complements the protection granted by the 1951 Refugee Convention.65 
For example, while Article 33(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention permits states to make 
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exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement in times of war or when an applicant has 
committed a serious crime, Article 3 of the ECHR does not permit any derogation or 
exception.66 Moreover, the ECHR envisages an appeal mechanism that does not exist in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. Thus, asylum seekers confronting state restrictions 
increasingly move towards the mechanisms foreseen by the ECHR.67 In fact, the EU’s 
restrictive policies vis-à-vis asylum seekers have led to an increase in the number of cases 
coming before the ECtHR since the 1990s.68 Lambert found out that relying on the 
ECtHR is the best option for rejected asylum seekers to appeal against their deportation 
compared to the ICCPR or CAT. The main reason for this is that the principle of non-
refoulement under the ECHR provides asylum seekers extensive protection from inhuman 
and degrading treatment whatever the source.69 
In this regard, the first landmark decision on Article 3 before the ECtHR was the Soering 
v. The United Kingdom case that related to the extradition of a suspected murderer to the 
United States of America, where he faced the risk of capital punishment and placement 
in a special prison wing known as “death row”. The Court unanimously held that, in the 
event of the Secretary of State’s decision to extradite the applicant to the USA being 
implemented, there would be a violation of Article 3.70 This is a crucial case for asylum 
seekers and refugees because it “unlocked the protective potential of Article 3 ECHR for 
asylum as well”.71 Article, as interpreted by the ECtHR, has developed obligations for 
contracting states similar to the principle of non-refoulement.72 
In later cases, the principles developed in the Soering case have also been applied to cases 
of deportation. In 1996, the ECtHR had to decide whether the UK would violate the 
ECHR by executing a deportation order for Mr Chahal to India. Mr Chahal was a Sikh 
separatist and accused of being a threat to the “public good for reasons of national security 
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and other reasons of a public nature, namely the international fight against terrorism”.73 
The ECtHR found by 12 votes to 7 that implementation of the deportation order would 
infringe Article 3 of the ECHR. The ECtHR considered the prohibition to be of an 
absolute character, applying even to states wishing to protect their community from 
terrorist attacks.74 A Court minority, however, held that the UK could legitimately weigh 
the interest of national security against the individual’s interest not to be ill-treated.75 The 
Chahal case poses a dilemma between state security and an individual’s human rights. In 
other words, the ECtHR had to make a choice between two risks: torture and terrorism. 
As seen in this case, the issue of refugee protection is situated in a conflict zone between 
universalism, which gives priority to the global realization of human rights, and 
particularism, which gives primacy to the interest of the community. The Court majority 
stood up for universalism while the minority opted for particularism.76 The Chahal case 
reveals that the protection against refoulement under Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute 
and wider than the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is clear that states are responsible for 
examining the conditions of the country of origin or another third country before sending 
back asylum seekers. Otherwise, they would infringe the principle of non-refoulement. 
Another de facto extension of the principle of non-refoulement has been the extension of 
state responsibility outside its territory by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In this regard, 
the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case77 was a watershed judgment of the ECtHR, and 
illustrates how a states’ responsibility is activated when they engage in extraterritorial 
action beyond their borders.78 Hirsi Jamaa and other applicants, all of Somali or Eritrean 
nationality, left Libya with the aim of reaching the Italian coast. They were intercepted 
on the high seas by the Italian Revenue Police, transferred to an Italian vessel and 
deported back to Tripoli in Libya. However, Italian officers did not accept the intercepted 
persons’ asylum applications in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention.79 
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Therefore, they applied to the ECtHR on 26 May 200980 and alleged that Italy had 
violated Articles 1, 3 and 13 of the ECHR, as well as Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Relying 
on Article 3, the applicants claimed that they were exposed to the risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment in Libya as a result of having been returned to Libya. 
The applicants also complained that they were in danger of subsequently being deported 
to their countries of origin using readmission agreements.81 The Court unanimously found 
that Italy was in violation of the human rights of the refugees because it had returned 
intercepted persons to Libya in the absence of any procedural safeguards against 
refoulement. Furthermore, the Court stated that Italy could not “evade its own 
responsibility by relying on its obligations arising out of bilateral agreements with 
Libya”.82 
The Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy case is one of the most important judgments of the 
ECtHR relating to the interception operations of states at sea. It was the first case in which 
the Court unanimously found an EU country to be in violation of the human rights of 
migrants and refugees intercepted on the high seas and returned to a third country in the 
absence of any procedural safeguards. This landmark judgment underlines the importance 
of ensuring access to protection for people at sea without any territorial limitation.83 To 
be effective, international protection must “encrypt not only guarantees of non-
refoulement, but also access to refugee determination procedures, both equipped with 
effective remedies”.84 In this case, the Court also found that precarious living conditions, 
lack of appropriate medical care and poor hygiene conditions as a result of asylum 
seekers’ irregular, marginal and isolated position in Libya constituted a breach of Article 
3.85 It can be concluded that the Court affirmed the importance of the socio-economic 
rights in the framework of Article 3 and under the principle of non-refoulement.  
The ECHR offers wider protection for asylum seekers, such as in the Chahal, Soering 
and Hirsi Jamaa cases, but does not lead to refugee status being obtained, because the 
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ECHR does not impose any duty upon the contracting states to grant asylum.86 Refugee 
status granted under the 1951 Refugee Convention still depends on states’ discretion. This 
confirms the allegation in Arendt’s political theory that international human rights still 
uphold the exclusive power of sovereign states even though that conflicts with the 
principles of the human rights.87  
Two categories of protection are provided under international refugee law and human 
rights instruments. On the one hand, under Article 1(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
there are individual refugees who are granted asylum because they have been persecuted 
on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social or 
political group. On the other hand, a large number of refugees do not strictly fulfil the 
criteria of Article 1(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Therefore, Article 3 of the ECHR 
offers complementary protection to such asylum seekers who cannot be sent back to their 
country of origin for humanitarian reasons. Thus, they can get “de facto” or “humanitarian 
refugee status”. However, these terms, de facto or humanitarian refugee status, are not 
interpreted uniformly by contracting states but on an ad hoc basis.88 This practice leaves 
a large number of asylum seekers in legal limbo for years. To solve this problem, the EU 
adopted the Qualification Directive of 201189 to harmonize member states’ different 
practices and interpretations. It offers “subsidiary protection” to those who have 
humanitarian refugee status and affords the same rights to subsidiary protection holders 
as refugees under Article 1(2)(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, the legal 
acceptance has not changed the real experience of these people. The rightless position of 
asylum seekers remains acute in practice.90 
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2.4. Bypassing Refugee Protection Responsibility: Developing Legal Grounds for 
Protection Elsewhere 
In theory international human rights offer an extensive protection to refugees and asylum 
seekers but the practice is paradoxical. In the case of refugee protection, states have 
developed protection elsewhere notions, in other words, safe third country91 practices to 
bypass their refugee protection responsibility. This safe third country practice constitutes 
the main legal basis of readmission agreements and it needs to be analysed before 
examining the EU-Turkey Agreement on the refugee issue. Safe third country practice is 
based on the idea that people who have fled from persecution, armed conflict or human 
rights violence should be able to seek asylum in territories that are as close as possible to 
their country of origin without making difficult, dangerous or costly journeys to remote 
and unfamiliar cultures.92 The improvisation of this legal instrument enables states to 
reject asylum seekers and refugees who have not come directly from their country of 
origin. This practice, unfortunately, has increased human suffering and left millions of 
people in legal limbo. In the past 20 years tightened border controls using safe third 
country practices has made access to Europe more difficult and resulted in the emergence 
of new routes, which are harder, longer and more dangerous.93 Safe third country practice 
mainly gives states an opportunity for rejecting asylum seeker’s claims and shifting 
refugee protection responsibility onto third countries without considering their lack of 
infrastructure or the social and economic deprivation of the individual refugees. Due to 
the increasing numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, this practice has been seen as an 
effective instrument to contain refugees in their region of origin.94  
Refugees are often returned to ‘safe third countries’ without any substantive examination 
of their claims on the ground that the third country is a safe one and where asylum seeker 
should have requested protection or the third country is a “first country of asylum”, 
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having already granted adequate protection.95 From a state’s perspective, asylum seekers 
and refugees are rational actors “acting as law consumers” who would like to select a 
country offering the highest level of protection.96 For this reason, states may refuse to 
examine asylum applications if asylum seekers have passed through another safe third 
country in which they could have sought protection or been granted protection before 
reaching the refusing state.97  
Contrary to this state perspective, the secondary movements of asylum seekers and 
refugees do not always aim for the highest level of protection. They are sometimes forced 
to leave the first country of asylum due to “the absence of educational and employment 
possibilities and non-availability of durable solutions”.98 Noll rightly argues that if the 
same material and procedural conditions are applied to asylum seekers and refugees, their 
secondary movements will not take place anymore. Nevertheless, EU member states have 
intensified their procedural policies to restrict the movements of asylum seekers, instead 
of intensifying the harmonization of refugee protection systems to eliminate differences 
in living conditions and durable solutions.99 This attitude shows states’ decreasing 
commitment to the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention and human rights protection.100 
With the safe third country practice,  
The principle of the responsible State has thus been turned upside down; expulsion to a 
third State is no longer the exception but the rule.101  
                                                 
95  Legomsky, Stephen H, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, International Journal of Refugee Law, 15(4), 2003, 
p. 567. 
96  Costello, 2005, pp. 37-38; Abell, 1999, pp. 61-62. 
97  Abell, 1999, pp. 61-62.  
98  UNHCR EXCOM Conclusions, No. 58 (XL), Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers Who Move 
in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, 13 October 
1989, para. b. 
99  Noll, 2000, p. 183. 
100  Byrne, Rosemary & Noll, Gregor & Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, Western European Asylum Policies for 
Export: The Transfer of Protection and Deflection Formulas to Central Europe and the Baltics, Edited 
by Byrne, Rosemary & Noll, Gregor & Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, New Asylum Countries?, Migration 
Control and Refugee Protection in an Enlarged European Union, Kluwer Law International: London, 
2002, pp. 27-28.  
101  Achermann, Alberto & Gattiker, Mario, Safe Third Countries: European Developments, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 7(1), 1995, p. 23.  
89 
 
  
In spite of its widespread practice, the legal basis of the safe third concept under 
international refugee law remains controversial. Some believe its basis is linked to the 
vague formula in Article 31(1) of 1951 Refugee Convention, which states that  
Contracting Parties shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly102 from a territory whether their life or 
freedom is threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or is present in their territory 
without authorization, provided that they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
From the wording of this provision, states argue that a refugee who does not come directly 
from a country where her/his life or freedom is threatened should be sent back to the first 
safe third country in which s/he could have applied for asylum or been granted protection. 
Therefore, the movements of an asylum seeker from her/his country of origin should end 
in the first safe country. In other words, under this interpretation of Article 31(1) of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, states claim that they have a right to refuse asylum seekers 
and refugees not arriving directly from their country of origin but having passed through 
a safe third country,103 since any secondary movement of asylum seekers is seen as 
migration rather than seeking protection.104  
In contrast, some believe that the safe third country concept does not have a legal basis 
under international and refugee law but it has “emerged from States’ national legislation 
and administrative practice”.105 Neither the text nor the legislative history of the 1951 
Refugee Convention imposes an obligation on asylum seekers to apply for asylum in the 
first safe country where they arrive.106 If the 1951 Refugee Convention had intended to 
impose a heavy duty on refugees in that regard, it would have stated it clearly in the 
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provisions of the Convention. Also, it would have imposed an obligation on the first 
country or state to readmit the refugee.107 The main aim of Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is to protect asylum seekers from penalties due to illegal entry as long as they 
present themselves to the authorities “without delay” and “show good cause” for their 
illegal entry or presence.108 More importantly, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not 
express any clear rules in the definition or exclusion of a refugee, as set out in Articles 
1(A) and 1(F), that a refugee who comes from a safe country should be excluded from 
being a refugee. The rules on the definition, exclusion and protection from penalization 
of refugees are quite separate from each other. Therefore, as Peers rightly points out,  
Refugees’ failure to satisfy this condition only permits States to prosecute them for 
breach of immigration law; it does not allow those states to exclude the refugees from 
persecution.109 
Moreover, at much the same time, Fortîn argues that states seek to resolve this lack of 
legal basis by the conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements between the member 
states and third countries. However, the obligations applying to States from the 1951 
Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments remain unchanged after the 
conclusion of bilateral readmission agreements.110 In fact, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’s acceptance of refugee status is only of a declaratory nature;111 in other 
words, a person is seen as a refugee as soon as s/he fulfils the criteria in accordance with 
Article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The recognition as a refugee does not make 
a person a refugee, rather it declares to her/him to be one. Therefore, there is no specific 
refugee status determination procedure envisaged in the 1951 Refugee Convention. For 
this reason, Fortîn argues that a person can exercise the right to seek asylum under the 
terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention in any contracting state without being limited to 
the first safe third country. Likewise, none of the internationally accepted principles 
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relating to asylum suggests that the right to seek asylum has to be exercised in any 
particular country.112 
It is a fact that although there is no clear rule that refugees always have to apply for asylum 
in the first safe country, the 1951 Refugee Convention’s vague term, “coming directly” 
in Article 31(1), provides states with a degree of flexibility to apply the safe third country 
concept.113 Nevertheless, restrictive interpretation of Article 31(1) by member states is 
being placed on refugees and asylum seekers against the spirit of the Article 31(1) by UK, 
Germany and Norway.114 This application of Article 31(1) can also impose a heavy 
burden on countries neighbouring conflict areas and cause tension between states in 
contrast to the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which refers to international 
cooperation to avoid refugees becoming a source of tension between states.  
3. The Erosion of the Fundamental Principle of Non-refoulement 
The scope of the principle of non-refoulement has been extended beyond the 1951 
Refugee Convention by the jurisprudence of the ECHR, but EU member states have 
adopted a wide range of restrictive policies to reduce the ability of asylum seekers to 
access EU territory and to abstain from their responsibility regarding the principle of non-
refoulement. Due to these practices, it is acknowledged that today, the most significant 
challenge facing asylum seekers is to access asylum.115 Byrne, Noll, and Vedsted-Hansen 
label these policies “deflection policies”, in which the main aim of states is to keep asylum 
seekers at a safe distance from their “territory and jurisdiction”.116 In this way, states’ 
obligations towards refugees are not entirely engaged as long as refugees do not managed 
to enter the territory of a EU member state.117 
These policies can be classified in two ways:118 non-arrival and non-admission policies. 
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The first group, non-arrival policies, consists of EU visa restrictions on refugee producing 
countries as well as norms complementing it, for example, carrier liability on carrier firms 
and pre-frontier training and assistance programmes for third countries. The second 
group, non-admission policies, has traditionally raised a legal barrier to entry into 
Europe.119 Readmission agreements coupled with the practice of a “safe third country” 
and “accelerated border procedures” constitute non-admission policies and aim to keep 
asylum seekers away from a procedural door.120 Readmission agreements do not refer 
explicitly to asylum seekers and refugees in their texts but, in practice, they are used to 
facilitate the deportation of an asylum seeker to a safe third country via the safe third 
country concept. States will readmit asylum seekers and refugees to third countries 
without making a distinction as unauthorized immigrants. They will be readmitted as 
nationals or third country nationals depending on whether readmission takes place to the 
country of origin or a third country.121  
A readmission agreement is signed on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, which 
means that all contracting states must readmit both their own nationals and third-country 
nationals in the same manner. However, in practice, the argument of reciprocity is 
“hypocritical”,122 since no one believes that there will be a flow of irregular migrants 
from the EU towards third countries and, at the end of the day, a readmission agreement 
will only force third countries to readmit third country nationals and stateless persons 
who pass through their territory alongside their own nationals. While admitting that one’s 
own nationals are accepted is a customary international rule,123 the existence of a general 
international law of obligation to readmit third country nationals is not accepted as a rule. 
There is no corresponding international legal obligation for states to admit non-nationals, 
even persons who have transited through the territory of a state en route to another 
destination.124 A readmission agreement establishes a legal basis, which is not present in 
international law and imposes an obligation on third countries to accept third-country 
nationals.  
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The first generation of readmission agreements aimed to control irregular movements of 
persons amongst member states of the European Economic Community (EEC). After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of borders in the East, EU member states signed 
second-generation readmission agreements with Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) to create a “buffer zone”125 or “cordon sanitaire”126 along the EU’s eastern 
border in the early 1990s. With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and later the 
Lisbon Treaty,127 the EU acquired the competence to sign readmission agreements with 
third countries, and the third generation of agreements began to be signed with third 
countries, which are seen as transit countries or source countries of migration. Although 
EU member states have maintained their competence regarding signing readmission 
agreements with third countries, the EU has harmonized the content of readmission 
agreements and formulated a standard agreement to be used by all member states or the 
EU itself.  
The need for the harmonization of bilateral readmission agreements emerged from the 
need for a comprehensive approach to migration and asylum at all stages. This 
comprehensive approach ranges from defining the root causes of irregular migration to 
enhancing the capacity of the countries of origin and transit and regions of origin within 
the field of human rights and the socio-economic structure. Nevertheless, so far, this 
comprehensive approach to migration management has not been implemented, and the 
overall implementation of EU readmission policy does not fundamentally depart from the 
one initially executed by member states. The fact is that readmission agreements, which 
have been presented as valuable instruments, were not as effective as expected in 
combating irregular migration.128 
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3.1. Do Readmission Agreements Conflict with the Principle of Non-Refoulement?  
Readmision agreements have been formulated as a consequence of the externalisation of 
migration policies. In contrast to an earlier generation of non-entrée policies, such as visa 
control, carrier sanctions and interception operations at sea,129 which have increasingly 
brought responsibility to member states, the EU has developed new forms of non-
admission policies to obstruct asylum seekers and refugees from reaching the territory of 
the EU.130 Through this new form of non-admission measures, such as readmission 
agreements with safe third country practices, the EU member states aim to avoid the duty 
of non-refoulement. They have resorted to strict deterrent measures to keep most refugees 
from accessing their jurisdiction.131 It is clear that readmission agreements through with 
transit countries have been leaving many asylum seekers and refugees in a rightless 
position. Even though the EU knows that transit countries cannot provide effective 
protection to increasing numbers of refugees, the EU has been using both soft and hard 
power to put pressure on third countries to readmit both irregular migrants132 and asylum 
seekers. This approach actively exacerbates the misdistribution of refugee protection 
responsibility133and triggers human rights violations.  
Readmission agreements have given rise to a series of concerns regarding the principle 
of non-refoulement. A general concern raised in the literature is that readmission 
agreements do not make any special reference to or separate provisions for asylum 
seekers and refugees, but states have used them to readmit asylum seekers and refugees 
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to third countries without making a distinction of irregular migrants. Also, readmission 
agreements have been concluded with refugee producing countries without taking into 
account the general safety of asylum seekers and refugees. These countries are generally 
not a party to international conventions relevant to refugee protection, or their actual 
practice does not match their legal framework.134 
Another important concern related to readmission agreements is that they have led to the 
expulsion of asylum seekers to alleged safe third countries without any substantive 
examination of asylum claims. In this way, readmission agreements are used as an 
instrument to reduce the numbers of asylum seekers within the asylum procedure.135 
However, there is no guarantee that a third country will accept an asylum seeker into its 
territory and provide access to refugee status determination. These agreements only 
promote the cooperation between member states and third countries; they do not provide 
a guarantee against the expulsion of asylum seekers and refugees to another third country 
or country of origin. Also, there is no monitoring system in place to ensure that 
readmission agreements do not violate the human rights of refugees and asylum seekers. 
Although forced migration should be monitored by member states in accordance with 
Article 8(6) of the Return Directive,136 member states deliberately ignore the monitoring 
system and do not check whether third countries give effective protection to refugees and 
asylum seekers subjected to a forced return process.  
The experience of readmission agreements also supports the argument that the 
implementation of readmission agreements infringes the principle of non-refoulement. 
The Turkey and Greece Readmission Agreement signed in 2003137 shows how 
readmission agreements have created a risk of refoulement of asylum seekers and 
refugees and constitute a significant obstacle to access to refugee protection. The 
evidences suggest that there have been continual deportations and push back operations 
have taken place between the two countries without respecting the principle of non-
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refoulement. In 2007, Greece deported Iraqi asylum seekers to Turkey on the basis of the 
readmission agreement without giving them any opportunity to express their protection 
needs.138 Also, 135 Iraqi asylum seekers were forcibly deported to Iraq after arriving in 
Turkey even though they expressed their wish to apply for asylum in Turkey. The 
UNHCR was extremely concerned about the safety of these people and stated that their 
deportations clearly violated the principle of non-refoulement.139 It is worrying that such 
deportations are not exceptional because informal border deportations and push back 
operations continually take place between Turkey and Greece.  
In the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case, the ECtHR drew attention to the risk of 
refoulement of asylum seekers by referencing the Turkey and Greece Readmission 
Agreement and concluded that:  
The risk of refoulement of asylum-seekers by the Greek authorities, be it indirectly, to 
Turkey, or directly to the country of origin, is a constant concern…Expulsions to Turkey 
are effected either at the unilateral initiative of the Greek authorities, at the border with 
Turkey, or in the framework of the readmission agreement between Greece and Turkey. 
It has been established that several of the people thus expelled were then sent back to 
Afghanistan by the Turkish authorities without their applications for asylum being 
considered.140 
The EU-Turkey RA141 has raised the same concerns regarding the past experience of the 
Turkey and Greece Readmission Agreement. The important point is that, after coming 
into force of the EU-Turkey Statement, Turkey has started to function as a “safe third 
country” or “first country of asylum” in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. In this context, Syrian refugees who have already entered the territory of the 
EU after having stayed in, or transited through Turkey, can be returned to Turkey with 
the help of this readmission agreement.142 In this regard, the EU-Turkey Agreement on 
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refugees imposes an enormous burden on Turkey and constitutes a serious threat to the 
fundamental rights of refugees.143 Currently, approximately 3 million Syrian refugees are 
being hosted in Turkey, waiting for resettlement in another country; but so far, according 
to the fifth report of the European Commission, only 8,268 people have been resettled 
into European Member states after the EU-Turkey Statement.144 Without an effective 
burden-sharing mechanism, the designation of Turkey as a safe third country or first 
country of asylum has resulted in stranded refugees and asylum seekers who are not able 
to go back to their country of origin; and because of Turkey’s refugee protection regime 
they will not find durable solutions or other refugee rights as stated in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  
Also, it is argued that an accelerated border procedure might pose a threat to the principle 
of non-refoulement because the time during which a person is allowed to physically to 
stay in the country of destination might be too short for her/him to lodge an asylum 
application. In the case of accelerated procedures, asylum seekers do not have a chance 
to apply for international protection.145 For instance, Article 7(4) of the EU and Turkey 
Readmission Agreement lays out an exceptional procedure, called the “accelerated 
border procedure”; if a person has been apprehended in the “border region” of an EU 
member state’s territory, extending inwards up to 20 kilometres, including seaports, 
customs zones and international airports. Under this procedure, readmission applications 
have to be submitted within three working days. Given this very short timeframe, it is not 
difficult to predict the adverse effects of readmission agreements on the right to seek 
asylum and the principle of non-refoulement.  
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3.1.1. Application of the Safe Third Country Practice by the EU 
Increasing asylum seeker applications forced the EU to develop a responsibility-sharing 
mechanism between member states and third countries under the Dublin III 
Regulations.146 According to Article 3(3) of those Regulations,  
Any Member State shall retain the right to send an applicant to a safe third country, 
subject to the rules and safeguards laid down in Asylum Procedures Directive 
2013/32/EU. 
Accordingly, if an asylum seeker is coming from, or has transited through any safe third 
country, member states may send her/him to another member state or non-European safe 
third country without examining her/his claim. In this context, an asylum seeker may be 
sent back and forth between member states and third countries without any substantial 
refugee status determination. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive147 offers three arrangements for the designation of non-
EU member states as safe third countries, namely, the concepts of the first country of 
asylum (Article 35), a safe country of origin (Article 36 and Annex II) and a safe third 
country (Article 38). Article 38 addresses the “safe third country” concept and this applies 
to any third country and any applicant who is seeking asylum. Article 35 lays down the 
“first country of asylum concept” and applies it to any third country as long as an 
applicant for asylum has already found a form of protection. Finally, according to Article 
36, which establishes the “safe country of origin” concept, an application may be 
subjected to an accelerated procedure if an asylum seeker comes from a non-refugee 
producing country.  
Article 33 of the Directive also enables member states to consider an application as 
inadmissible in the case of a safe third country and the first country of asylum concepts. 
Furthermore, Article 31(8)(b) of the Directive gives member states permission to apply 
an accelerated examination procedure in the case of a safe country of origin. In this regard, 
the first country of asylum, safe country of origin and safe third country concepts 
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constitute the main legal framework for transferring responsibility for examining asylum 
applications to a third country. These concepts also have a close link to readmission 
agreements on the basis of deportations of rejected asylum seekers to safe third countries.  
a. First Country of Asylum Concept 
Member states may apply the first country of asylum concept to those asylum seekers 
who have already been granted refugee status in that third country and they can still avail 
themselves of this protection or enjoy “sufficient protection” in that third country, 
including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement.148 In this context, member 
states may consider their application inadmissible and send them back to that third 
country without a substantive examination of their asylum claims.149 The Asylum 
Procedures Directive allows an asylum seeker to challenge the application of the first 
country of asylum concept to her/his particular circumstances150 but, nevertheless, there 
is no suspension effect that applies in the case of any appeal against such a decision based 
on the first country of asylum. Asylum seekers can only ask a court to permit them to 
remain pending the outcome. However, they can be sent back to the first country of 
asylum before the court decision is given.151 Therefore, this avenue is not sufficient to 
protect the rights of asylum seekers against refoulement. It is also against the right of an 
effective remedy according to Article 13 of the ECHR regarding the vulnerability of 
refugees and asylum seekers.  
The UNHCR has found acceptable the application of first country asylum as long as 
asylum seekers and refugees are protected against refoulement and permitted to remain 
there until a durable solution is found for them.152 Nevertheless, although the Asylum 
Procedures Directive refers to “sufficient protection” as a criterion for transferring 
responsibility for asylum seekers to another third country, there is no clear definition of 
what constitutes “sufficient protection”.153 The UNHCR has suggested replacing this term 
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with “effective protection”, but it was not accepted in the recasting process.154 According 
to the UNHCR,155 effective protection covers both the concept of non-refoulement and 
also treatment in accordance with “basic human rights standards” until a durable solution 
is found. Fundamental human rights standards include the social and economic elements 
of protection for the survival of refugees, such as access to shelter, employment and 
primary education as citizens of the host state, and relief until work is found.156  
Whereas the UNHCR has welcomed the application of the first country of asylum concept 
as long as the rights of asylum seekers are respected, most academic commentary 
regarding this concept has been overwhelmingly negative. Borchelt argues that the first 
country of asylum concept and the safe third country concept constitute fundamentally 
“flawed” practice and create the very real possibility of refoulement to the country of 
origin or through a third country to the country of origin. The lack of any communication 
between requesting and requested state may put asylum seekers into a position of legal 
uncertainty. Readmission agreements do not provide safeguards against refoulement and 
asylum seekers may be transferred to a third country as rejected asylum seekers on the 
ground of the first country of asylum concept or the safe third country concept without 
informing third country authorities. If it is not made clear to the authorities of the 
requested state that an asylum seeker made an asylum application which has not been 
decided in substance, there is a risk that such a case will be treated simply as an irregular 
migrant who can be returned to the country of origin. In this context, asylum seekers may 
thus fall under the third country’s readmission umbrella intended for irregular migrants. 
For this reason, the first country of asylum and safe third country practices must be 
                                                 
Refugee Protection System, Guarding Refugee Protection Standards in Regions of Origin, European 
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eradicated rather than being modified.157  
Legomsky does not totally reject the application of the safe third country practice, but he 
does not accept the distinction between the first country of asylum and the safe third 
country concepts. He states that the two concepts are quite different from each other in 
theory. One is for a person who has “actually received” protection while the other applies 
when a person “should have requested" protection elsewhere. But the two strategies 
“occupy two points on the same continuum”.158 In the context of returning an asylum 
seeker to a third country, a key issue is what the third country owes the asylum seeker 
now, instead of what happened in the past. Certainly, recent events can be seen as 
evidence of whether effective protection is now available, but it is not conclusive. The 
important thing is whether a safe third country provides effective protection and a durable 
solution for asylum seekers without infringing asylum seekers’ fundamental human rights 
and the principle of non-refoulement.159 Legomsky persistently uses the term effective 
protection to cover the requirements of the transferring state’s responsibility on the 
ground of the first country of asylum practice. 
Van Selm argues that the first country of asylum concept has negative aspects in third 
countries. The practice of the first country of asylum has led to “a kind of non-solidarity” 
by shifting the burden onto countries neighbouring the conflict areas rather than sharing 
the burden. Before applying the first country of asylum rule, a country’s economic, social 
and political capacity should be considered by requesting countries.160 The use of the first 
country of asylum concept allows the economically and politically strong countries to 
shift their responsibilities regarding refugee protection to less powerful ones.161 This 
inequitable distribution of the burden amongst states put dangerous pressure on third 
countries, which already have fragile asylum determination systems. It might reach such 
a level that the affected third states have to develop unduly harsh measures against 
refugees and asylum seekers.162 As a Turkish representative said in 1987, the first country 
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of asylum concept puts a huge financial burden on developing countries that are located 
near conflict zones and those countries might find themselves unable to continue to bear 
the burden, and so sometimes they will regard refoulement as the only possible solution. 
Moreover, he went further, saying that:  
If that should occur, they would not be the only ones at fault, since the responsibility 
for ensuring the conditions necessary for the observance of the non-refoulement 
principle rested with the international community as a whole.163 
b. The Safe Third Country Concept 
The safe third country concept developed out of the first country of asylum concept, but 
the scope of a safe third country is broader than a first country of asylum. It applies where 
an asylum seeker might have requested protection in a third state, which is safe, and able 
to offer protection in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention. Contrary to the first country 
of asylum, there is no stipulation that an asylum seeker has already been granted refugee 
status or another form of protection from the third country. Member states can reject an 
asylum application as inadmissible if there is a safe third country in which the applicant 
will not be at risk of persecution, refoulement or degrading treatment, and will have the 
possibility164 to apply for refugee status.165  
Member States have to adopt national “rules requiring a connection between the applicant 
and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable” to send the 
asylum seeker to the alleged safe third country.166 Regarding establishing a link between 
the applicant and a third country, member states has the initiative to define what kinds of 
links are required. Nevertheless, the Directive legitimizes member states’ questionable 
practices, which vary according to country and generally have a “lack of necessary detail” 
to establish a link between the applicant and the third country.167 
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The Asylum Procedures Directive gives asylum seekers an opportunity to rebut the 
application of the safe third country concept during a first instance examination on the 
grounds that the third country is not safe in her/his particular circumstances, and there is 
no substantial connection between her/him and the third country.168 This is a very 
important safeguard against refoulement, but member states’ practice in this area does not 
consistently match the legal framework, since the UNHCR report revealed that  
If the concept were applied in practice, national states’ authorities would not inform 
the applicant prior to the decision that they considered a certain safe third country for 
the applicant. This dramatically limits the applicant’s possibilities in practice to rebut 
the presumption at an early stage, or at all.169 
And, more importantly, some member states have omitted the personal interview in the 
case of a safe third country.170 Therefore, this clearly conflicts with the intention of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive regarding safeguards against the principle of non-
refoulement. 
The UNHCR is concerned with having clearly identifiable safeguards for transferring 
responsibility on the basis of the safe third country concept. It states that a destination 
country should “take into account the duration and nature of any sojourn of the asylum 
seeker in other countries” and “as far as possible” the asylum seeker’s preference 
regarding the country of asylum before being sent back to a third country.171 Also, the 
UNHCR warns states against refusing asylum seekers solely because asylum “could be 
sought from another State.” However, if an asylum seeker “already has a connection or 
close links” with a third country, then her/his transfer to that country would be “fair and 
reasonable”.172 
The safe third country practice also puts an enormous burden on neighbouring countries, 
which do not have enough infrastructures to deal with a large number of asylum seekers. 
For instance, Hungary’s 2015 safe third countries list illustrates the difficulties faced by 
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refugees and neighbouring countries.173 The list accepted Serbia as a safe third country, 
which enabled Hungary to dismiss asylum applications as inadmissible on the 
presumption that applicants transiting through such a state have had a genuine opportunity 
to seek and obtain protection. However, the problem was that the designation of Serbia, 
which was the transit point for approximately 99 per cent of around 86,000 persons who 
applied for asylum in Hungary, effectively enabled Hungary to refuse to examine almost 
all applications for international protection made on its territory. Such a designation also 
departs from previous pronouncements by UNHCR that Serbia’s asylum system has been 
unable to cope with the increases in numbers of asylum applications and so this does not 
offer genuine opportunities for those in need of international protection. Serbia should 
not be considered a “safe third country”.174 
c. Safe Country of Origin Concept 
The safe country of origin concept has been applied to countries, which are considered to 
be non-refugee-producing. If an asylum seeker comes from such a country, s/he will be 
returned to her/his country of origin without a substantive examination of her/his asylum 
claim. The safe country of origin concept is applied as long as an asylum seeker has the 
nationality of that country or is a stateless person but was formerly habitually resident 
there.175 The main aim of this concept is to reduce the number of economic migrants, who 
are seen as using the asylum system as an “immigration back door” to get into European 
countries. According to the Asylum Procedures Directive, member states may adopt a 
national list for the designation of safe countries of origin in accordance with the criteria 
in Annex I.176 However, national designations of safe countries of origin lists have led to 
increasingly different recognition rates in similar asylum applications.177 To achieve a 
fair, an equal and effective working asylum system, and to reduce secondary movements 
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of asylum seekers between member states, there is a need for a common list on the basis 
of the safe country of origin concept. 
However, there is a serious concern about this concept, in that it conflicts with the 
fundamental principles of international refugee law and human rights law. The first main 
weakness is that it has been interpreted and applied by some countries to abstain from 
their responsibilities contrary to the spirit of the 1951 Refugee Convention. For instance, 
application of the safe third country of origin concept either automatically excludes 
nationals of countries designated as safe countries of origin from obtaining refugee status 
in member states or raises a presumption of non-refugee status against asylum seekers’ 
claims, which they must rebut.178 This situation creates de facto a new geographical 
limitation on Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is not compatible 
with Article 42, which prohibits any reservation on Article 1(A)(2). Furthermore, the safe 
country of origin concept is in conflict with Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
which explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of country of origin since safe country 
of origin practice is used as a “toll of en bloc exclusion of nationally defined groups”.179 
and can “facilitate discrimination on the basis of nationality and country of origin”.180 To 
sum up, it constitutes a barrier to defining the nationality of asylum seekers to grant 
protection.181 
A second worrying feature of this concept is that asylum seekers are subjected to an 
accelerated procedure, which reduces the allocated time frame for each asylum 
applicant.182 Therefore, it undermines the quality of the refugee status determination 
process. For instance, some member states have a reduced accelerated asylum 
determination procedure of up to 48 hours.183 At the same time, the safe country of origin 
concept puts the burden on asylum seekers to rebut the presumption of a safe country of 
origin and an asylum seeker has to show valid reasons why a country is not safe in her/his 
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particular case.184 Along with the reduced time frame, the safe country of origin concept 
makes it impossible for an asylum seeker to rebut this presumption in practice.185 In that 
situation, an asylum seeker may be subjected to a readmission agreement as an irregular 
migrant and sent back to her/his country of origin without examining her/his asylum 
application in substance.  
The safe country of origin concept has also become a very important issue for the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement. After this agreement, the European Commission 
proposed Turkey along with six other countries as a safe country of origin in 2015.186 If 
the proposal is adopted, Turkish nationals will not be able to apply for asylum in EU 
member states. Once approved, the new package will allow member states to dismiss the 
asylum applications of any Turkish national as unfounded. Turkish nationals who would 
like to apply for asylum in Europe will have to rebut the presumption of the safety of 
Turkey with qualified material evidence. Turkish citizens who are apprehended in border 
regions or caught on an irregular basis will become the subject of readmission without 
any further procedures. So far, the EU has not yet approved the proposed common safe 
countries of origin list and Turkey is currently defined as a safe country of origin only by 
Bulgaria.187 
3.1.2. Accelerated Border Practices 
The EU Member States have developed special asylum procedures for people 
apprehended in border regions or international zones to determine quickly whether they 
are in need of international protection or not, in accordance with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Apprehended people are held in border regions, and if their asylum claims 
are evaluated as unfounded, they are returned promptly to their country of origin or to a 
transit country with the help of readmission agreements.188 These special procedures 
involve an accelerated border procedure, which is an exception to the safeguards provided 
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in the Return Directive189 and the non-suspensive effect of appeal procedures.  
In accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, member states can accelerate an 
asylum examination procedure if an asylum application is made at the border or in a 
transit zone.190 Also, the Return Directive gives permission to member states not to apply 
the special safeguards provided in the Return Directive to  
T hird country nationals who are subject to refusal of entry in accordance with Article 
13 of the Schengen Borders Code, or who are apprehended or intercepted by the 
competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the 
external borders of a Member States.191  
In this situation, member states are allowed to apply their return procedures,192 which 
provide fewer safeguards when compared to those provided in the Return Directive. 
During this process, asylum seekers and other irregular migrants are detained in the 
border region and interviewed by border authorities. Nevertheless, access to fair and 
efficient asylum procedures at the border zones is very problematic given the deficiencies 
in border and transit zones. For instance, a lack of educated border guards, a legal advisor 
or an interpreter may lead to the expulsion of asylum seekers without a substantive 
examination of their asylum claim. Problems also arise in the appeals procedure, since 
the Asylum Procedures Directive only permits applicants to remain in an asylum state 
until a judgment of the first instance court. Without an effective remedy, an accelerated 
border procedure carries a real risk of non-refoulement.  
In contrast to these deficiencies in procedural safeguards in frontier regions and 
international zones, the UNHCR’s advice states that asylum seekers should enjoy the 
same procedural safeguards and rights, regardless of whether the examination is 
prioritized, accelerated or conducted in a regular procedure. All applicants should be 
given the opportunity of a personal interview.193 At land borders, if there is an asylum 
application, it should be referred to the central authority responsible for asylum so that it 
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can interview the applicant and make a decision on the claim. Access to a legal advisor, 
interpreter, the UNHCR or a non-governmental organization (NGO) is also critical, both 
at the border and in an airport transit zones.194  
Readmission agreements with accelerated border procedures also facilitate a return 
process for asylum seekers without accessing asylum procedures. Readmission 
agreements provide that both third country nationals and citizens of the contracting states 
will be readmitted if apprehended while illegally crossing the border of the requesting 
state. If their unlawful presence is detected when they have already entered the territory 
of the requesting state, readmission may be executed in an accelerated procedure, and it 
will take place even in the absence of a formal reply to the readmission request. For 
instance, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement provides an accelerated procedure if a 
person has been apprehended in the “border region” of the requesting state’s territory, 
extending inwards up to 20 kilometres. Under the accelerated procedure, readmission 
applications have to be submitted within three working days. In the case of an accelerated 
procedure being applied, member states will not make any effort to return a third country 
national or stateless person to the country of origin.195 
Furthermore, other implemented readmission agreements indicate that member states 
may use accelerated border procedures with readmission agreements to expel asylum 
seekers without examining their asylum applications. For instance, Ukraine has long-
standing readmission agreements with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. If these countries 
apprehend irregular migrants or asylum seekers at their borders, they will be interviewed 
within 48 hours and readmitted to Ukraine in accordance with a readmission agreement. 
There is no genuine effort to identify whether individuals are actually in need of 
international protection. A Hungarian official interviewed by Human Rights Watch 
stated, “We just count them,” before returning them to their country.196 On another 
occasion, according to a Human Rights Watch Report, a group of nine Chinese migrants 
had crossed from Ukraine to Slovakia and travelled on foot to Poland. They were 
apprehended in Poland and detained for 25 days. During this period, they asked for 
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asylum, but they were not given an opportunity to apply for it. Despite their protests, they 
were deported to Ukraine and subjected to prolonged detention and sexual harassment.197 
4. Transferring Refugee Responsibility to Third Countries: Is There a Guarantee of 
“Effective Protection”? 
Today, the debate over refugee protection is more concerned with how refugee protection 
responsibility of western countries can be transferred to third countries instead of 
discussing what protection duties countries owe to refugees who are on their territory.198 
Although there is no clear legal basis for conditions for a safe return to third countries in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR Executive Committee’s conclusions, several 
commentators, national courts and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR have attempted to 
identify requirements for the transfer of asylum seekers to third countries without a 
substantive examination of their asylum claims.  
The EXCOM Conclusion has attempted to define the term “effective protection” on 
different occasions to provide guidance in cases of deportation of asylum seekers without 
consideration of the substance of their protection claims.199 A Lisbon Expert Roundtable 
report provides a comprehensive definition of effective protection and fundamental parts 
of it. It states that protection is only effective in a third country if an asylum seeker has 
no well-founded fear of persecution in that country; there is no risk that an asylum seeker 
will be sent by the third country to another country in which s/he would not receive 
effective protection; and where s/he had no access to means of substance that are 
sufficient to maintain an adequate standard of living. In addition, the third country must 
provide an asylum seeker with access to fair and efficient procedures for the 
determination of their refugee status, taking into account the vulnerabilities of asylum 
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seekers and comply with international refugee protection and basic human rights 
instruments in practice.200  
Similarly, the European Commission Communication has identified effective protection 
criteria for returning an asylum seeker to a third country:  
Physical security, a guarantee against refoulement, access to UNHCR asylum 
procedures or national procedures with sufficient safeguards, where this is required to 
access effective protection or durable solutions, and social-economic well-being, 
including, as a minimum, access to primary healthcare and primary education, as well 
as access to the labour market, or access to means of subsistence sufficient to maintain 
an adequate standard of living.201 
As seen in the two definitions above, besides physical security, the assurance of providing 
durable solutions and basic living standards have become the main concern of both the 
UNHCR and the European Commission. If refugees live below a certain subsistence level 
in the potential country of first asylum, then it cannot be concluded that they have 
obtained effective protection in the country concerned.202 This constitutes a 
comprehensive definition of effective protection, which puts emphasis not only on 
immediate physical safety but also on access to durable solutions, family unity and takes 
into account the specific vulnerabilities of refugees. The UNHCR’s definition can be used 
as a benchmark in decisions to return refugees to a safe third country. The UNHCR’s 
definition identifies legal constraints, which are binding upon states wishing to return 
refugees and asylum seekers who have travelled in an irregular manner from safe third 
countries.203 
In the joined cases of Adan, Subaskaran, and Aitseguer, the UK Court of Appeal also 
adopted a broad understanding of the principle of non-refoulement and expanded the 
states’ responsibilities beyond the physical safety of an asylum seeker against 
persecution. These cases related to transfers of asylum seekers from the UK to Germany 
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on the basis of the safe third country concept under the Dublin Convention. The issue 
concerned whether Germany and France qualified as safe third countries. The applicant 
claimed that a certain form of living standards under German law was below those in the 
1951 Refugee Convention. The Court stated that,  
In our judgment, the Secretary of State…is only concerned with the questions whether 
there exists a real risk that the third countries will refoule the putative refugee in breach 
of the (1951 Refugee) Convention. The Secretary of State is not concerned to see the 
claimant will or may enjoy the social rights to which we have referred if he is permitted 
to stay in the third country. We would not, however, exclude the possibility that such a 
claimant might in the third country be faced with so destitute an existence, if he were 
wholly excluded both from the right to work and from access to social provision, and 
possessed no other resources upon which he might call, that he would be driven to return 
to the country of feared persecution even though he had successfully claimed such rights 
of residence in the third country as are offered.204  
The fundamental basis of the UK Court of Appeal decision is that a lack of basic 
subsistence in a third country may force a refugee to return to a country of persecution, 
and therefore it amounts to de facto refoulement by the destination country.205 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence is also very important to illustrate the real meaning of 
effective protection. As mentioned previously, the landmark decision of the ECtHR in 
the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case is a good example to understand the basis of 
effective protection in the view of Article 3 of the ECHR. This case is very important 
because it was the first time the Court determined whether extreme material poverty in 
the third country could be an issue under Article 3 of the ECHR. The case originated in 
an application against the Belgium and Greece by an Afghan national, Mr M.S.S. He first 
entered the EU via Greece but he continued on his journey and applied for asylum in 
Belgium. Under the Dublin Regulations, Belgium deported the applicant to Greece as a 
safe third country. He alleged that his expulsion by the Belgian authorities under the 
Dublin Regulations had violated Article 3 of the ECHR.  
The Court ruled that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR because the 
Belgian authorities “knowingly exposed him to conditions of detention and living 
                                                 
204  R. v. Secretary for the Home Department, ex parte Adan; ex parte Subaskaran; ex parte Aitseguer, 
1999, 4 All ER 774, p. 27, cited by Coleman, 2009, pp. 246-247.  
205  Coleman, 2009, p. 247.  
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conditions that amounted to degrading treatment”.206 His living conditions were 
corroborated by the reports of international organizations and bodies to the ECtHR. These 
reports stated that asylum seekers were deprived of material support, and many of them 
lived in public spaces or abandoned houses with no support from the state.207 Also, at no 
time was the applicant given any information about the possibilities of accommodation. 
The Greek authorities gave a pink card to asylum seekers to obtain assistance and a 
temporary work permit but having a pink card did not seem to be of any benefit in actual 
practice because there were major bureaucratic obstacles to obtaining a temporary work 
permit. For example, to get a tax number the applicant had to prove that he had a 
permanent place of residence, which effectively excluded the homeless from the 
employment market.208  
The ECtHR underlined that,  
Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide 
everyone within their jurisdiction with a home. Nor does Article 3 entail any general 
obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain 
standard of living.209  
However, the obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to 
impoverished asylum seekers has now entered into law, with legislation from the  
European Union, namely the Reception Directive, providing that asylum seekers must 
have basic subsistence living standards. This provision binds the Greek authorities.210 In 
this respect, the Court stated that  
The Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as an 
asylum-seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the situation 
in which he has found himself for several months, living on the street, with no resources 
or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of providing for his essential 
needs.211 
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The ECtHR took a similar approach in the Trakhel v. Switzerland case to that which it 
adopted in its judgment in the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. The applicants, a married 
couple and their six children, were Afghan nationals who lived in Switzerland. They 
entered the EU from Italy and were subjected to the EURODAC identification procedure. 
The applicants subsequently travelled to Austria and later to Switzerland, where they 
applied for asylum. However, their application was refused on the ground that, according 
to the Dublin Regulations, it should have been dealt with by the Italian authorities. The 
Swiss authorities ordered the applicants’ removal to Italy. The applicants lodged an 
appeal against their deportation order and contended that their deportation from 
Switzerland would be in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the ECHR212 because 
living conditions in that country’s reception centre were unacceptable, particularly due to 
the lack of privacy and the climate of violence among the occupants.213 The ECtHR, 
taking into account the feasibility of the applicants’ allegations, put a responsibility on 
the Swiss authorities to obtain guarantees from their Italian counterparts that, on their 
arrival in Italy, the applicants would receive accommodation so that the family could stay 
together. However, in their written and oral observations, the Italian authorities had not 
provided any further details about the special circumstances of the issue. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that if the applicants were to be returned to Italy without having obtained 
such guarantees, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.214 
As seen in these two rulings of the ECtHR, effective protection should not only be equated 
with the absence of persecution and a threat of refoulement. Protection should also 
encompass the socio-economic conditions of asylum seekers in a third country. These 
need not be the same as high standard of living conditions, but refugees must be entitled 
to the same rights as aliens living in that country in accordance with Article 7 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention. States cannot knowingly return asylum seekers to third countries, 
which violate rights recognized in the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is important to 
consider whether a third country is able to provide basic living standards, which asylum 
seekers are entitled to get as soon as they enter the state territory to apply for asylum.215 
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States should take into account third countries’ capacity to provide basic living standards, 
reception conditions and longer-term integration facilities, including their absorption 
capacity.216 Also, formal effectiveness is not enough to regard a country as a safe. State’s 
actual practice should be the main indicator before returning asylum seekers to a third 
country.217  
Beyond the principle of non-refoulement, refugees are entitled to some fundamental 
rights according to their duration of stay in the asylum country and their legal status in 
accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. These basic fundamental human rights 
are evaluated as a bar for transferring the responsibility for asylum seekers to third 
countries as well. At the lowest level of attachment, an asylum seeker gains basic 
fundamental rights as soon as s/he comes within the jurisdiction of the country of asylum 
without being formally recognized as a refugee. This is categorized as “simple presence”. 
More rights are granted when the refugee’s attachment is strengthened according to being 
“physically present”, “lawfully present”, “lawfully staying” and “durable residence” 
within a state’s territory.218 
In this regard, based on Hathaway’s system of incremental entitlement, Battjes analyzes 
the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention to determine what rights apply to an 
asylum seeker who has not been granted refugee status formally but has “simply 
presence” in the territory of a state. He finds that Articles 31 and 33 apply to unrecognized 
refugees, i.e. asylum seekers. Articles 1(C), 5, 28, 32, 34 and 5 apply to recognized 
refugees. The other remaining provisions of the Convention do not define clearly whether 
they are appropriate for recognized refugees, asylum seekers or both. Battjes argues that 
reading these articles in conjunction with Article 1(A)(2), as well as the object or purpose 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, implies that they are applicable to asylum seekers 
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regardless of their recognition as refugees.219 To sum up, states are held responsible for 
their transfers to third countries, if asylum seekers and refugees are in lack of fundamental 
Conventional rights as described above in the third country.  
5. Conclusion 
The principle of non-refoulement constitutes the cornerstone of the international refugee 
protection regime and has been extended beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention by the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and other human rights instruments. Against these extended 
responsibilities of state authorities towards asylum seekers and refugees, sovereign states 
have changed their protection approach and developed restrictive policies to contain 
refugees and asylum seekers in their regions of origin in order to abstain from their 
responsibilities under international refugee protection regimes and human rights 
instruments. Readmission agreements along with other deflective policies, such as the 
safe third country concept and accelerated border procedures, have all been developed to 
shift member states’ responsibilities towards third countries, that are located near conflict 
zones. Given this situation, this chapter set out to determine the compatibility of 
readmission agreements with the principle of non-refoulement.  
It has identified three main problems regarding the implementation of readmission 
agreements. First, readmission agreements do not provide any safeguards against non-
refoulement or any monitoring systems during the implementation by contracting parties, 
showing their effects on asylum seekers and refugees. The gaps in the readmission 
agreements pose a threat to the principle of non-refoulement. States may reject asylum 
seekers and send them back to third countries without examining their asylum 
applications on the basis of the “safe third country concept” and without indicating that 
they are asylum seekers. Second, it is not difficult to predict that this increased burden on 
third transit countries may lead to a downgrading of the refugee protection standards 
because of third countries’ financial, economic and institutional deficiencies. Effective 
protection must encompass both protection from refoulement and access to basic living 
standards but deficiencies in third countries’ refugee protection systems might leave 
refugees in a precarious situation without access to basic living standards and durable 
solutions. Third, the refugee policies introduced by European member states are creating 
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ripple effects that risk undermining the international refugee protection regime, which 
depends on fair burden sharing principles. European member states, however, continue 
their burden shifting policies. In this situation, it is hard to ask transit countries to continue 
to host refugees on a large scale. Recent practices of less developed countries towards 
refugees shows that they are reluctant to host a large number of refugees anymore and 
wish to follow the EU’s strict attitudes and practices towards refugees.220 
There is, therefore, a definite need for a burden sharing agreement between the EU and 
transit third countries. Third countries cannot provide effective protection without 
reaching a consensus on a burden-sharing agreement with the EU. Without becoming a 
threat to the non-refoulement principle, there is an urgent need for member states and 
third countries to share this burden, according to their economic status, population and 
capacity, rather than laying the whole burden on the transit countries. The EU’s external 
dimension of migration policy should drop the conditionality driven part and attention 
must be directed towards improving the economic and political conditions of source 
countries. There is an urgent need for a reconceptualization of the migration issue based 
on human rights. Readmission agreements are only one instrument in the crisis of 
irregular migration; they alone will never solve the problem.221 
After analysing readmission agreements and their compatibility with the principle of non-
refoulement, the right to seek asylum and fundamental principles of effective refugee 
protection from the perspective of international human rights and refugee law, now it is 
time to turn to the EU-Turkey Agreement on Refugees. The next chapter examines its 
contradictory legal basis and its human rights considerations.  
                                                 
220  Hargrave, Karen & Pontuliano, Sara & Idris, Ahmed, Closing Borders, The Ripple Effects of 
Australian and European Refugee Policy: Case Studies from Indonesia, Kenya and Jordan, 
Humanitarian Policy Group, Working Paper, September 2016. 
221  Return and Readmission to Albania, The Experience of Selected EU Member States, International 
Organization for Migration: Tirana, August 2006, p. 122. 
117 
 
  
CHAPTER IV: The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement: A Challenge to Human 
Rights? 
 
The downfall of nations begins with the undermining of lawfulness, whether the laws 
are abused by the government in power, or the authority of their source becomes 
doubtful and questionable. In both instances, laws are no longer held valid. The result 
is that the nation, together with its “belief” in its own laws, loses its capacity for 
responsible political action; the people cease to be citizens in the full sense of the word.1 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the EU-Turkey Agreement on the refugee issue and its legal and 
political backgrounds. It is divided into two sections, the first explains why Turkey signed 
the RA with the EU and which incentives were used by the EU to convince Turkey to 
readmit irregular migrants and refugees. This section also considers why the EU and 
Turkey needed a new ‘refugee deal’ even though they had signed RA and what its legal 
status is. The second section explores what risks the EU-Turkey Statement carries in 
relation to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. 
In this chapter, it is argued that the EU-Turkey Statement opens a way of readmitting 
refugees to Turkey on the ground of “safe third country” and “first country of asylum” 
concepts. Although Greece has adopted a law to assign Turkey as a “safe third country” 
or “first country of asylum”, Turkey does not meet the criteria of either concept vis-à-vis 
the Asylum Procedures Directive. The refugee deal has led to entrapment of asylum 
seekers and refugees in Greece and Turkey in inhuman conditions and increased the risk 
of refoulement without access to asylum procedures. Given the lack of safeguards, the 
readmission process has left refugees and asylum seekers in legal limbo. Arendt describes 
this as “holes of oblivion”.2 It means that they do not know their fate but stay as refugees 
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for their whole life without access to any foreseeable solution. There are many clear 
indications that the EU intended to create this kind of space both in Turkey and in Greece 
while detaining victims in inhuman conditions and obstructing their access to safe havens.  
To substantiate my arguments, human rights reports of NGOs, leading jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and the reports of the European institutions will be analysed. 
2. The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and Its Controversial Link to the EU-
Turkey Statement  
In world politics today, there is a tug of war between national security and human rights. 
Migration has been increasingly framed as a danger to public safety, cultural identity, and 
labour markets. As the Special Rapporteur, François Crépeau, has underlined in his report 
the EU has seen irregular migration largely as a “security concern”. This approach 
fundamentally conflicts with a human rights approach that sees migrants as individuals 
and equal holders of human rights.3 Today, as a consequence of the securitization of the 
migration issue, the more measures are taken for security reasons; the less importance is 
given to human rights concerns.4  
The EU has adopted two distinct strategies to control migration flow into its territory. The 
first is the preventive strategy, which has sought to eliminate the factors encouraging 
migrants to travel to the EU. It addresses the root causes of migration through 
development assistance, trade, foreign investment, and supporting refugee protection in 
the source countries. The second strategy is the externalization of migration control, 
which seems “one of the most striking innovations” of the EU.5 In this context, the EU 
has started to transfer the management of border controls to third countries by signing 
bilateral agreements with source and transit countries. If third countries fail to prevent 
irregular entry of migrants into the EU, they will have to take back migrants and asylum 
seekers on the basis of RAs. By doing so third countries have become the border guards 
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of the EU’s external borders but this fails to offer a real solution to the increasing refugee 
crisis.6 As Emiliani describes it, the EU sees neighbouring states as service suppliers 
rather than real partners and uses “conditionality” to uphold its political realism instead 
of upholding the universal rights of refugees and asylum seekers.7 
The EU forces Turkey to develop integrated borders management, visa restrictions 
against refugee producing countries and a comprehensive asylum policy to take over the 
responsibility of refugees and asylum seekers on its territory.8 However, although the EU 
has forced Turkey to take responsibility for refugees and asylum seekers, its asylum law 
is not designed to host an increasing number of asylum seekers and refugees. Turkey’s 
asylum law only permits asylum seekers and refugees to stay temporarily rather than 
permanently. For national security reasons and to curb a mass influx into the region,9 
Turkey made a declaration in accordance with Article 1(B)(1) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention that the words “events occurring before 1 January 1951” in Article 1(A) were 
to be understood as “events occurring in Europe.10 For that reason, the geographical 
limitation led to Turkey maintaining a “two-tiered asylum policy” where the first tier 
applies to asylum seekers coming from Europe, called “Convention Refugees”, and the 
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second tier applies to asylum seekers coming from outside of Europe, called “Non-
Convention Refugees.”11 This two-tiered system has been protected under the LFIP and 
refugee status is only given to European refugees. 
The limitation that restricts Turkey's obligations under international law, unfortunately, 
places non-European asylum seekers in a vulnerable position. On this legal ground, 
Turkey only grants “conditional refugee” status to refugees originating from non-
European countries on a temporary basis. Therefore, this situation means non-European 
refugees have to move forward irregularly to find a durable solution.12 Even though the 
EU used Europanisation as a conditionality to encourage Turkey to lift geographical 
limitation, Turkey declared that the geographical limitation would only be lifted on 
condition that it would not encourage large-scale refugee flows to Turkey from the East, 
upon the completion of Turkey’s membership to the EU and setting up burden sharing 
mechanism between EU member states and Turkey.13  
Although Turkey refused to lift geographical limitation, the EU did not give up any 
chance of cooperation with Turkey and invited Turkey to begin the RA negotiations in 
2003, but it did not formally acknowledge this until March 2004. In 2007, the 
Commission offered to negotiate visa facilitation, on condition that Turkey signed the RA 
but Turkey did not respond to this offer due to the limited scope of the proposal. 
Moreover, the introduction to procedures different from Balkan Countries raised concern 
about unequal treatment to Turkey. The EU’s visa facilitation offer caused Turkish 
policymakers to wonder about Turkey’ status because visa facilitation was being used as 
an incentive for third country nationals, but not for a future member state which Turkey 
aspired to. Therefore, Turkish policymakers feared that the EU wanted to use Turkey as 
a buffer zone or dumping ground for irregular migrants but not for future membership.14 
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Turkish politicians partly refused to accept visa facilitation as an incentive for signing a 
RA and offered visa liberalization for concluding the RA. 
Turkey’s hesitation towards RA with the EU can be explained therefore in two ways. 
First, RA without foreseeable EU membership would result in major problems and 
adaptation costs. For instance, the EU required Turkey to be more active in controlling 
migration and to provide international protection to non-European asylum seekers and 
refugees. Providing international protection for refugees and establishing reception 
conditions and a structure for combatting irregular migration required a long-term 
political, institutional and financial commitment. The capacity of Turkey to shoulder such 
long-term commitments was very limited. These were the priorities for the EU, but not 
for Turkey.15 Turkish politicians also pointed out that the economic gap between Europe 
and the countries neighbouring Turkey was the main reason for irregular migration and 
could not be reduced through Turkish policy measures alone.16 The second reason behind 
the hesitation of Turkey in signing the RA can be found by analyzing the EU’s existing 
acquis in asylum policies and the position of Turkey as a transit country. Turkish 
politicians anticipate that if Turkey signed the RA and lifted geographical limitation; it 
would be functioning as a safe third country in the terms of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. In this regard, the EU could easily shift the responsibility for all refugees 
without taking into account the burden-sharing principle.17 In that situation, Turkey 
would start to function as a buffer zone or dumping ground for irregular migrants. The 
mistrust among Turkish officials towards European policies adversely affected the 
relationship between Turkey and the EU.18 
The negotiations with Turkey could not be concluded until the EU Council empowered 
the Commission to initiate a process allowing Turkish citizens to travel to the EU member 
states without a visa. For Turkey, visa liberalization was more achievable than EU 
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membership, and so the government accepted the risks associated with the RA, believing 
that the benefits of visa liberalization would outweigh the costs.19 Therefore, Turkey 
signed the RA with the EU on 16 December 2013 only after the Commission got 
permission to initiate negotiations of visa liberalization in parallel with the RA.20 The RA 
was ratified by the Turkish Parliament and came into force in June 2014.21 It would 
become applicable to third-country nationals22 and stateless persons after three years in 
2017. However, due to the Syrian refugee crisis, the EU and Turkey agreed to start 
implementation for third-country nationals and stateless persons in June 2016.23  
Currently, even though the planned date has passed, the RA has not come into force for 
third country nationals due to political tension between Turkey and the EU. It is only 
applicable to Turkey’s own nationals, stateless persons, and third-country nationals 
coming from those third countries with which Turkey has concluded RAs.24 Therefore, 
the EU member states, which have not concluded RAs with Turkey cannot return irregular 
migrants and rejected asylum seekers into Turkey until the problems between Turkey and 
the EU are solved.25 Now the EU-Turkey RA has been implemented for over one and half 
years with the help of the Turkey and Greece Readmission Protocol concluded in 2012 
between both parts.  
The EU-Turkey RA foresees lifting visa requirements for Turkish nationals that are 
travelling in the Schengen zone for a short period. For the visa liberalization to come into 
effect, Turkey is expected to fulfil 72 requirements including the establishment of 
migration and asylum systems in line with international standards, effective management 
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of borders, securing travel documents, establishing visa requirement against refugee 
producing countries and respecting the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees. On 
13 June 2017, the European Commission published the sixth report on the progress made 
by Turkey in fulfilling the requirements of its visa liberalization roadmap.26 Turkey 
fulfilled 65 of 72 requirements.27 Considering these 7 requirements of the EU from 
Turkey, there are indications from both contracting parts that definition of terrorism will 
become a major obstacle in front the coming into force of visa liberalization for Turkish 
nationals.28 
Why did Turkey sign the RA after such a long negotiations process and their stated fear 
that the EU would shift the responsibility of the refugee burden onto Turkey? The main 
reasons can perhaps be explained using Europeanization theories. According to external 
policy conditionality in Europeanization theory, the EU exerts influence on domestic 
policy in third countries by using conditionality in two ways: accession conditionality and 
policy conditionality. Accession conditionality applies to the candidate countries during 
their accession negotiations and it is the strongest and most effective form of 
conditionality. Policy conditionality applies to all third countries with the attachment of 
specific rewards in related policy areas. It may lead to increase in the level of compliance 
and transformation in domestic level in the shorter term and valuable for government 
actors with electoral concerns.29  
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However, in the case of Turkey, regarding the EU’s decreasing effect on Turkey as a 
candidate country, the EU had used visa liberalization as a policy conditionality to 
convince Turkey to sign the RA. According to policy conditionality, the adaptation of 
rule and values is only possible if it suits national interests. This is particularly visible in 
the RA negotiations between Turkey and the EU because the EU used visa liberalization 
as leverage to obtain the Turkish Government’s cooperation on readmission of irregular 
migrants and refugees.30 Even though the Turkish government has been waiting to get 
visa liberalization for Turkish nationals in a parallel with the coming into force of the EU-
Turkey RA, the visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals has not come into force. Thus, 
this unbalanced nature of the deal has shadowed the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
RA entirely and led to the deterioration in relations between the EU and Turkey.31 
2.1. The EU-Turkey Statement and the Implementation of the Turkey-EU 
Readmission Agreement 
The Syrian refugee crisis began in 2011 when millions of Syrians left their country to 
seek protection outside Syria. This refugee crisis has put an enormous responsibility on 
Turkey’s refugee protection system and Turkey has become the first country in the world 
to host that number of refugees. As of 2017, Turkey has been hosting over 3 million 
refugees and its absorption capacity has stretched to its limits. As the crisis intensifies, 
with no possible short-term solution on the horizon, large numbers of refugees are trying 
to get to Europe. During 2015, nearly 856.000 people crossed from Turkey to the Greek 
islands and the overwhelming majorities were from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.32 Only 
after hundreds of thousands of refugees had entered the EU territory, did the refugee 
problem attract the attention of the media and State governments. Increasing refugee 
flows into the EU through Greece, the closure of its border by the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and member states’ failure to fulfil their commitments to relocate 
refugees from Greece has led to considerable tension between member states and 
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institutions of the EU. Moreover, it has seen the Dublin Regulation come to a dead end 
due to the unfair distribution of refugees between member states. As stated by MPs of the 
European Parliament, the “inability” or “lack of political will” of the member states to 
take responsibility for the refugee crisis has forced the EU to “outsource” its refugee 
problems to Turkey.33 The EU has seen the cooperation with Turkey as an alternative way 
to respond to the refugee crisis.34 It offered Turkey a re-energized accession process, 
financial support on the welfare of Syrian refugees and accelerated visa liberalization for 
Turkish nationals to gain Turkey’s cooperation on the refugee issue.  
On 15 October 2015, the EU and Turkey concluded a Joint Action Plan35 to tackle the 
increasing flow of Syrian refugees into EU territory, bring order to migratory flows and 
stem the influx of irregular migration. The EU agreed to provide Turkey with €3 bn of 
financial support to cope with Syrian refugees needing temporary protection. The Joint 
Action Plan mainly focuses on two issues:  
i) Turkey will offer temporary protection to Syrian refugees. In return, the EU will 
mobilize funds “in the most flexible and rapid way possible”; 
ii) Turkey will strengthen border controls and prevent irregular migrants from crossing 
into the EU. In exchange, the EU will accelerate visa liberalization dialogue to facilitate 
visa requirements for Turkish nationals. 
The main weakness of the Joint Action Plan is that the first part of the Plan describes 
Syrians as seeking refuge, so they have to be supported in Turkey. The second part of the 
Plan characterizes the same people as irregular migrants, and therefore their irregular 
departure to the EU has to be prevented. This clearly shows “how the EU manipulates the 
migration crisis for political purposes”.36 As explained earlier, the EU uses visa 
liberalization as policy conditionality for guaranteeing Turkey’s cooperation on the 
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refugee issue but at the same time, the EU is outsourcing its international responsibilities 
of taking care of refugees to another third country.  
The Joint Action Plan was activated on 18 March 2016 under the EU-Turkey Statement37 
with new key elements.38 According to the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU will provide 
Turkey the extra € 3 bn of financial support until the end of 2018 to cope with Syrian 
refugees and accelerate Turkey’s accession negotiations. In turn, Turkey will continue to 
provide Syrian refugees temporary protection and strengthen its borders to prevent Syrian 
refugees from crossing into the EU. The EU has also established a very controversial 
resettlement scheme: “for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, 
another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU”. The exact scale of the 
resettlement will depend on how many Syrian refugees continue to reach the Greek 
islands. The swapping of irregular migrants and asylum seekers for resettlement of Syrian 
refugees is found “deeply ‘inimical’ to established European traditions”39 and “morally 
dubious”.40 Amnesty International also criticises the EU-Turkey Statement for its legal 
flaws. It states the EU-Turkey Statement  
…make(s) every resettlement place offered to a Syrian in the EU contingent upon 
another Syrian risking their life by embarking on the deadly sea route to Greece. 
Also, Head of Amnesty International’s Institutions Office, Iverna McGowan, argues that 
The idea of bartering refugees for refugees is not only dangerously dehumanising but 
also offers no sustainable long-term solution to the ongoing humanitarian crisis.41 
The EU-Turkey RA coupled with the EU-Turkey Statement has raised considerable 
concern related to protection of fundamental human rights and refugee protection. NGOs 
and scholars have heavily criticized the deal for infringement of the EU and international 
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refugee law.42 The EU’s deal with Turkey aims to deflect the burden of refugee protection 
and migration control mechanism on to Turkey by linking migration policy with a wide 
range of policy instruments, including financial aid, accession conditionality, trade and 
visa liberalization, In doing so, the EU is willing to utilize both its hard and soft powers 
to structure Turkey’s migration agenda.43 Nevertheless, the EU does not give enough 
attention to the real impact of such agreements, neither on the partner countries nor 
asylum seekers and refugees.44 European member states have framed refugees as a 
security problem and prioritized its national interests over individuals who are in need of 
international protection.45 In a similar way, the negotiations reveal that while Turkey has 
given the commitment to contain Syrian refugees and prevent them from crossing into 
the EU’s territory, it actually has ignored the possible effects of the deal on refugees. 
Turkey also follows its own national interests rather than taking account of the 
vulnerabilities of refugees.  
Regarding the urgency of the refugee issue, it is clear that Turkey’s bargaining power has 
increased greatly due to the refugee crisis. As Turkish Prime Minister Davutoğlu said on 
18 April 2016,  
I maintain my belief that, god willing, we will have the visa exemption in June. In the 
absence of that, then, of course, no one can expect Turkey to adhere to its 
commitments.46  
Again, in a press conference on 6 May 2016, Turkish President Erdoğan insisted that he 
would not change the definition of terrorism in Turkish law, which is one of the 72 key 
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requirements47 for visa liberalization. He gave a signal of the threat to cancel the EU-
Turkey Statement, saying, “We will go our way, you go yours”.48 Also, he claimed that 
current anti-terror laws are necessary tools in order to counter the threat of PKK and ISIS 
terrorism at home and abroad.49 At this stage, the Turkish government has not cancelled 
the refugee deal but the implementation of the EU-Turkey RA is still on a knife-edge.  
As Gammeltoft-Hansen50 pointed out there is a risk that the EU’s power relations with 
third countries on the refugee issue may take “hostage” of the EU itself. In order to ensure 
RAs and the establishment of control mechanisms by third countries, the EU has 
drastically changed its foreign priorities towards a range of strategic transit countries, 
including Turkey. As seen in the EU-Turkey cooperation arrangement, combating 
irregular migration and reducing secondary movements of refugees has only succeeded 
with the cooperation of Turkey and implementation of the EU-Turkey RA. In this regards, 
it can be said that Turkey is using its increasing bargaining power and threatening the EU 
to cancel the deal on the refugee issue.51 As the International Crisis Group report indicates 
that even though Turkey did not create the refugee crisis, Turkey has used refugees in its 
relations with the EU. While the deal has produced mutual benefits for both parties, “the 
promise to curb the flow to Europe…increased Ankara’s leverage and arguably rendered 
EU counterparts less vocal about human rights and rule of law issues”.52  
Greenhill in her theory of “coercive engineered migration” argues that cross-border 
movements can be deliberately created, manipulated or used by states or non-state actors 
in order to gain political advantages from target countries. It can be used by three kinds 
of challengers: “generators, agent provocauteurs and opportunitists.”53 In the case of the 
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EU-Turkey refugee deal, Turkey has no direct role in the creation of the crisis but as an 
opportunist player, it can “exploit the existence of outflows” generated by other players. 
Also, Turkey could threaten to close its borders and create a humanitarian crisis “unless 
targets take desired action and/ or side-payments”.54 Her theory of “coercive engineered 
migration” provides a comprehensive explanation of how migration can be used by third 
countries to gain relative strenght vis-à-vis their powerful counterparts and advantages in 
its relations with them. However, it is difficult to blame Turkey for using its opportunist 
position since as Greenhill underlines, the liberal states’ unethical behaviours have caused 
this situation and entrapped them.55 The Syrian refugee crisis acts as a catalyst in defining 
the EU’s member states position in this global refugee crisis. They have to choose to take 
refugees and bear the responsibility of taking on the real cost of refugees or face the 
hypocrisy consequences of not taking them. They have chosen not to take refugees 
whatever the cost and given priority to domestic political interests rather than ethical and 
moral values. Thus as Wizek points out they have left themselves open to the “blackmail” 
of Turkey.56 
The important question is how the EU-Turkey Statement affects the implementation of 
the EU-Turkey RA. The EU-Turkey RA is intended to expel irregular migrants who do 
not fulfil the entry and residence conditions of the country concerned.57 Its scope covers 
both nationals and non-nationals who transited through the territory of one of the 
contracting parties en route to the EU.58 In accordance with the EU-Turkey RA, Turkey 
will readmit, “upon application by a Member State”, all third-country nationals or 
stateless persons in an irregular situation in the territory of that member state. However, 
there is no mention of asylum seekers and refugees in the RA. The EU-Turkey Statement 
raises the question of whether asylum seekers and refugees may be readmitted to Turkey 
based on the implicit assumption that Turkey is a safe third country or first country of 
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asylum in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive. The answer to this question 
constitutes the fundamental basis of the EU-Turkey Statement and defines the legality of 
the return of asylum seekers and refugees to Turkey. This question will be addressed 
below with the help of scholars’, the UNHCR’s and NGOs’ views.  
2.1.1. Is Turkey a Safe Third Country? 
The EU-Turkey Statement states that  
Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or 
inadmissible in accordance with the (Asylum Procedures)…will be returned to 
Turkey.59  
This means that if an asylum application is deemed unfounded, it has been rejected after 
examining its merits. However, if an asylum application is inadmissible, then it means 
that it is rejected without examining its merits on the grounds that Turkey is either a “first 
country of asylum” or a “safe third country” and subjected to accelerated procedures. 
Therefore, this provision of the Statement implicitly opens a way to readmission of 
refugees and asylum seekers to Turkey. However, there has been a major debate between 
scholars, European institutions, UNHCR and NGOs as to whether Turkey can be 
considered to be a “safe third country” or “first country of asylum” in accordance with 
Asylum Procedures Directive and international law. 
There is no clearly stipulated general declaration about third country’s safety neither by 
member states nor by the EU. The safe third country designation is left to every member 
states’ discretion. Accordingly, if member states desire to accept Turkey as a safe third 
country in accordance with Article 38(1) of Asylum Procedures Directive, member states 
should check stated principles before doing so,  
a) Life and liberty are not threatened on grounds of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion; 
b) There is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU; 
c) The principle of non-refoulement in accordance with art. 33 of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention is respected;  
d) There is a prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture 
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and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is 
respected; and 
e) The possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive 
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 
In this crucial debate, the UNHCR referring to Article 38(1)(e) states, if Turkey is 
designated as a “safe third country” by member states,  
Turkey must allow, in accordance with rules laid down in national law, non-European 
nationals or stateless persons who had their place of habitual residence outside Europe 
to request refugee status and to have access to all rights conferred by the 1951 
Convention.60  
It means that Turkey should provide non-European asylum seekers a refugee status and 
all rights conferred by the 1951 Refugee Convention to be accepted as a safe third 
country.  
However, the Commission interprets the “safe third country” concept contrary to the 
UNHCR’s interpretation. It says,  
Asylum Procedures Directive requires that the possibility exists to receive protection in 
accordance with the Geneva Convention, but does not require that the safe third country 
has ratified that Convention without geographical reservation.61 
 The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, reaffirmed this 
interpretation saying, “sending refugees back to Turkey was legal and in line with the 
Geneva Convention.” Citing specific paragraphs of the Asylum Procedure Directive, he 
said  
Countries could refuse to consider refugee claims if there was a safe place to send them 
back to. As Greece had decided Turkey was a safe country, the returns policy was 
legal.62  
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The EU Commission report on progress by Turkey fulfilling the requirement of its visa 
liberalisation roadmap states that,  
Conditional refugees are granted a status that does not differ in practice from the one 
given to refugees covered under the “geographical limitation”, offering both groups 
work permits, social assistance and opportunities to integrate, in line with the approach 
in the EU Qualification Directive.63  
Accordingly, the Commission claims that Turkey provides equivalent rights to 
conditional refugees same as conventional refugees and Turkey’s geographical limitation 
does not constitute a barrier to be a safe third country. 
Like the Commission, Hailbronner and Thym argue that Turkey’s geographical limitation 
cannot be considered a barrier to being a safe third country. In accordance with Article 
38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Turkey will fulfil the requirement of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive if it provides the material obligations of the Convention including 
non-refoulement and providing equivalent protection to refugees.64 The European 
Stability Initiative also claims that Turkey effectively observes the prohibition of non-
refoulement in accordance with Article 4 of the LFIP and therefore “it sees no obstacle in 
treating Turkey as a “safe third country”.65 
On the other hand, the counter argument claims that Turkey should not be designated as 
a safe third country for refugees since Turkey’s geographical limitation and the country’s 
deficient asylum system has led to precarious situations for refugees. Peers states in his 
legal assessment of the EU-Turkey refugee deal that the safe third country concept 
requires Turkey to apply the 1951 Refugee Convention without geographical limitation. 
Although the European Commission and the Council claim that Turkey applies equivalent 
standards in practice, Peers does not support this claim. He argues that  
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Even if this latter interpretation is correct, whether Turkey does apply equivalent 
standards in practice might itself be open to question.66 
In the same manner, Marx and Roman & Baird & Radcliffe argue that asylum seekers 
and refugees face uncertainty regarding their legal situation in Turkey due to the country’s 
geographical limitation. According to Article 62 of the LFIP, non-European refugees are 
granted only a “conditional refugee status.” They are provided fewer rights than 1951 
Refugee Convention recommends in particular family reunification and Turkish 
citizenship.67 For instance, when Syrians arrived en masse they were at first received as 
“guest” and subjected to a temporary protection regime but they had no right to apply for 
refugee status and no access to refugee protection status in its full sense, as enshrined in 
the 1951 Refugee Convention. They have limited rights in the country compared to 
asylum seekers in the parallel procedure. Thus the rules and protection standards are 
different for Syrians or other third country nationals. Therefore, this has led to inequalities 
in access to protection and content of protection. As such, Syrians have a right to reside 
in the country but are denied the prospect of long-term legal integration. It is for this 
reasons that safe third country clause cannot be applied to Turkey.68 
Hathaway also defines three legal requirements for lawful removal of refugees and 
asylum seekers into Turkey. He argues that removals of asylum seekers will only be 
lawful under the 1951 Refugee Convention if these three criteria are met:69  
First, the destination state must be a state party to the Refugee Convention. Second, it 
must ensure that refugees are in fact recognized. And third, the destination state must, 
in fact, honour refugee rights (Arts. 2-34 of the Refugee Convention). 
It is hard to say that Turkey complies with the requirement of the first requirement. Under 
the geographical limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkey has no obligations 
towards non-European refugees. In this case, refugee protection responsibility cannot be 
shared with a country, which has no responsibility towards relevant refugee populations. 
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Second and third requirements are only being assessed while looking at the actual practice 
of the country. However, recent human rights reports about the real condition of refugees 
in Turkey indicate that Turkey cannot fulfil the requirements of being a safe third country 
for transferring responsibility of refugees.70 
Chetail also argues that the interpretation of the Commission on “safe third country” 
concept in relation to Turkey is not convincing on several points. The first is that even 
though Turkey is hosting a substantial number of refugees in its territory, there is a high 
risk that it may remove asylum seekers to a country where there is a danger of persecution, 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Second is whether Turkey really provides 
equivalent protection in practice.71 Unfortunately, the experiences of refugees in the field 
have shown that Turkey cannot provide equivalent protection to refugees in many areas 
due to its institutional deficiencies and the lack of legal protection.  
This is evident in the case of access to work permits. Although Turkey adopted the 
legislation72 to open the way for temporary protection beneficiaries to work legally after 
six months, so far only one per cent of the Syrian refugees in Turkey have been given 
permission to work legally despite the legislation.73 As a result, most of them work 
without work permits, which subjects them to a different kind of abuse and exploitation.74 
Similarly, the LFIP provides that all refugees, including temporary protection and 
conditional refugee status holders have access to elementary and secondary education in 
public schools for free. However, only one third of the children have enrolled in schools 
due to the language barrier and economic problems of their families.75 In the same way, 
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legal assistance is possible under the LFIP, but in practice, it is nearly impossible to 
access. The visit of a Parliamentary delegation to removal centres, which receive all 
people returned from Greece since the EU-Turkey deal, revealed that only three cases 
were filed out of the 416 people, who were subjected to deportation orders. The lack of 
capacity of the provincial bar associations actually makes legal assistance impossible for 
refugees and asylum seekers in removal centres.76 It seems that the EU Commission’s 
understanding of the safe third country concept is questionable in many areas of actual 
practice. Therefore, before Greece decides to send refugees to Turkey on the ground that 
it is a safe third country, the EU should establish a monitoring mechanism to observe the 
implementation of Turkish asylum law in actual practice.  
2.1.2. Turkey as a “First Country of Asylum” 
The most debated question on the EU-Turkey deal is whether asylum seekers who, have 
already been granted temporary protection or conditional refugee status in Turkey, can 
still avail themselves of this protection if they are returned from Greece to Turkey. In 
accordance with Article 35 of Asylum Procedures Directive, member states may consider 
an application for international protection as inadmissible if a country can be considered 
as a first country of asylum for the applicant. 
Article 35 establishes two options to be considered as a first country of asylum. First 
option a) establishes that a third country can be considered a first country of asylum on 
condition that an asylum seeker “has been recognized in that country as a refugee and he 
or she can still avail himself/herself of that protection”. This requirement is also used to 
establish whether a country is a safe third country. As discussed above, there is no 
common agreement among scholars on the designation of Turkey as a safe third country. 
It is argued that Turkey cannot provide the required conditions in accordance with option 
a) of Article 35 of Asylum Procedures Directive due to its geographical limitation.  
On the other hand, option b) may apply to a third country if an asylum seeker “enjoys 
sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non-
refoulement”. In the case of Turkey, “non-European asylum seekers can, at least access 
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an alternative form of protection under “conditional refugee status” or “subsidiary 
protection”. Moreover, asylum seekers originating from Syria have access to a different 
form of “temporary protection”. The main point is whether these forms of protection, 
which Turkey has provided to Syrian refugees and other nationalities on a temporary 
basis, could be considered as “sufficient protection”.77 Unfortunately, there is no 
agreement between scholars, NGOs, and the UNHCR on this issue either. 
The issue of Turkey’s acceptance as the first country of asylum is still in dispute but the 
Greek Parliament urgently adopted a new law to designate Turkey as a “first country of 
asylum” for asylum seekers and refugees using Article 35 option b).78 On this legal 
ground, Greece can return asylum seekers and refugees to Turkey on the ground of the 
“first country of asylum” concept. This means that if Syrian refugees apply for asylum in 
Greece, their asylum application will be found inadmissible and subjected to readmission 
procedure.  
In this debate, the UNHCR takes a cautious position rather than refusing immediately. It 
asks for some safeguards from the EU before designating Turkey as a first country of 
asylum for recognized temporary protection beneficiaries and conditional refugees. In 
accordance with UNHCR’s interpretation, sufficient protection covers both the concept 
of non-refoulement and also treatment in accordance with “basic human rights standards” 
until a durable solution is found for asylum seekers. Fundamental human rights standards 
include the social and economic elements of protection for the survival of refugees, such 
as access to shelter, employment, healthcare and primary education as citizens of the host 
state, and relief until work is found.79 In the case of Syrian asylum seekers in Greece 
being returned to Turkey on the ground of the first country of asylum concept, UNHCR 
states that sufficient protection requires that protection in the first country of asylum is 
effective and available in law and practice. Therefore, the UNHCR underlines that there 
is a need for clarification on 
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How Syrians can apply for or re-avail themselves of temporary protection under the 
Temporary Protection Regulation in Turkey. However, Syrians cannot be recognized 
and granted refugee status within Turkey in accordance with the 1951 Convention. 
Furthermore, Article 35(b) of the Asylum Procedures Directive implies that the 
individual concerned must have enjoyed protection and not merely be available to him 
or her.80 
To allay these doubts, Turkey amended its Temporary Protection Regulation to provide 
assurance that Syrian nationals returning under the EU-Turkey Statement may request 
and be granted temporary protection, covering both previously registered and non-
registered Syrians in Turkey.81 In addition to these legislative changes, Turkey has 
provided assurances by letter to the EU that all returned Syrians will be granted temporary 
protection upon return. Also, the Turkish government gave assurances that returning non-
Syrian refugees in need of international protection who are returned from Greece to 
Turkey will be able to apply for asylum, have their applications processed promptly, 
receive protection and be protected from refoulement.82 These assurances by the Turkish 
government attempt to address the legal concerns raised by the NGOs that Turkey does 
not respect the principle of non-refoulement and deports readmitted refugees and asylum 
seekers illegally. 
Although Turkey gives these assurances that Syrian and non-Syrian refugees will not to 
sent back to their country of origin and will be provided temporary protection, there is 
still doubt amongst scholars, European Parliamentary, and NGOs. Statewatch criticizes 
heavily the Turkish government’s assurances in an unpublished letter saying,  
If this ‘letter’ addresses the legal concern about the EU-Turkey ‘dodgy deal’ why has it 
not been published? Does it commit Turkey to fully signing up the Geneva Convention? 
If not it is worthless. First, we had the EU-Turkey deal in a ‘Statement’...and now an 
unpublished ‘letter’ neither of which are legally binding. In their desperate haste to shut 
the borders the EU is neglecting the basic tenets of lawful decision-making.83 
                                                 
80  UNHCR, Legal Considerations on the Return of Asylum Seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey 
as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in tackling the migration Crisis Under the Safe Third Country 
and First Country of Asylum Concept, 23 March 2016, pp. 3-5.  
81  Temporary Protection Regulation no. 2014/6883 and the Regulation no. 2016/8722 Amending the 
Temporary Protection Regulation.  
82  European Commission Press Release, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement- Questions and 
Answers. 
83  Statewatch, Refugee Crisis: EU-Turkey “dodgy deal”: Legal Concerns Met? 28 April 2016. 
138 
 
  
The Parliamentary Assembly report states that the sending country should obtain 
confirmation from a third country that it would provide international protection, 
minimum economic, social, and cultural rights to readmitted irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers. If a third country could not fulfil these conditions, the sending country 
should refrain from requesting readmission. The rapporteur, Strik, is of the opinion that 
it is contrary to human dignity of asylum seekers and refugees to have them removed to 
a country which is not their country of origin and in which they are likely to be denied 
their access to basic rights such as housing, healthcare, primary education, work and 
social welfare.84 In the recent groundbreaking judgment of Supreme Court of Hungary 
on the application of the safe third country concept states,  
The fact that asylum system of a third country is overburdened may render this country 
incapable to respect the rights of asylum seekers. Such a third country shall not be 
regarded as safe for asylum seekers.85  
According to Carrera and Guild, the Turkey and EU deal poses a fundamental challenge 
to the human rights of migrants. Although Turkey is a signatory of the ECHR, the ECtHR 
has filed many judgments against Turkey for its violation of the prohibition on torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment of refugees. Also, the ECtHR in the case M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece held that returning a person to a state where s/he lives in destitution 
constitutes inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR. They argue 
that the situation of refugees in Turkey is unsatisfactory for receiving social benefits, 
education, and health and permission to work. Therefore, readmission of refugees and 
asylum seekers to Turkey is likely to constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.86 
Considering these arguments, Turkey’s designation as a first country of asylum for 
refugees is consistent with EU law on the basis of Article 35 option b). However, there is 
some question as to whether Turkey provides sufficient protection for refugees or not. 
Regarding the lack of institutional capacity and refugee protection practices of Turkey, 
the designation of Turkey as a first country of asylum and returning refugees to Turkey 
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is itself either refoulement or degrading treatment under international human right and 
refugee law.87 Moreover, the Asylum Procedures Directive allows an asylum seeker to 
challenge the application of the first country of asylum concept to her/his particular 
circumstances,88 but there is no suspensive effect that applies in the case of any appeal 
against such a decision based on the first country of asylum. Asylum seekers can only ask 
a court to permit them to remain pending the outcome. However, they can be sent back 
to the first country of asylum before the court decision is given.89 Therefore, this avenue 
is not sufficient to protect the rights of asylum seekers against refoulement. Moreover, it 
is absolutely against the right of an effective remedy according to Article 13 of the ECHR 
regarding the vulnerability of refugees and asylum seekers. To prevent refoulement of 
refugees, Greece has to conduct a case-by-case assessment, taking into account special 
situations of every individual applicant whether s/he enjoys sufficient protection in 
Turkey and gives each applicant a right to challenge the decision of the administrative 
authority before the court with suspensive effect.  
2.2. What is the Legal Status of the EU-Turkey Statement and How Can It Be 
Challenged before the Courts? 
The legal nature of the EU-Turkey Statement is crucial because as Strik underlines in her 
report, the EU-Turkey Agreement “exceeds the limits of what is permissible under 
European and international law and even on paper, it raises many serious questions of 
compatibility with basic norms on refugees’ and migrants’ rights”.90 If the Statement is a 
treaty and of binding nature, it can be challenged before both the national and 
international courts but there is again no consensus amongst scholars on its status.  
Peers argues that the EU-Turkey Statement is not defined as a treaty in the meaning of 
Article 218 TFEU, but a politically binding joint declaration and therefore, cannot be 
legally challenged in the courts.91 Babickâ appears to share that view with Peers and 
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argues that the Statement is only a joint declaration and cannot be challenged directly in 
the courts. She suggests that if its implementation conflicts with the rights of refugees in 
practice, then it can be challenged in national courts.92 
The counter argument of Den Heijer and Spijkerboer is that the EU-Turkey Statement is 
legally binding on both parties and a treaty in the meaning of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. The question of whether a text is a treaty does not depend on form 
but on whether the parties intended to bind themselves and that is clearly the case with 
the EU-Turkey Statement.93 There is the commitment on the part of Turkey to accept 
returned migrants and asylum seekers and a commitment on the part of the EU to accept 
the resettlement of one Syrian for everyone Syrian returned to Turkey. Also, the Greek 
Parliament has passed a law allowing asylum seekers arriving in the country to be 
returned to Turkey from Greece. All these point that “both parties intended to bind 
themselves and therefore, it is a treaty”.94Accordingly, it can be challenged in courts. 
Gatti also agrees that the EU-Turkey Statement contains legally binding commitments, 
for example, a one to one deal and financial assistance to Turkey. There is also 
widespread agreement that the Statement was intentionally formulated in such an 
ambiguous way because the European Council wished to mask the agreement as a non-
binding instrument to avoid the procedures for the negotiation of international 
agreements. It is also possible that European member states intended to hide the binding 
nature of the statement to avoid consulting the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. Considering certain elements of the Statement it constitutes a unique 
international agreement.95  
The ruling of the General Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on 
28 February 2017 has not ended the controversy. Surprisingly, the CJEU decided that it 
had no competence to look into the question of the legality of the deal under Article 262 
TFEU because neither the EU Council nor any institutions of the EU had decided to 
                                                 
92  Babickâ, Karolina, EU-Turkey Deal Seems to be Schizophrenic, 22 March 2016, 
http://www.migrationonline.cz/en/eu-turkey-deal-seems-to-be-schizophrenic.  
93  De Heijer, Maarten & Spijkerboer, Thomas, Is the EU-Turkey Refugee and Migration Deal a 
Treaty?, EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/is-eu-turkey-
refugee-and-migration-deal.html?m=1. 
94  ibid. 
95  Gatti, Mauro, The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty that Violates Democracy (Part 1 of 2), Blog of 
the European Journal of International Law, 18 April 2016, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-eu-turkey-
statement-a-treaty-that-violates-democracy-part-1-of-2/.  
141 
 
  
conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government. This refugee deal was only 
negotiated and signed by the Head of State and Government of the Member States and 
the Turkish government.96 After this judgment, three asylum seekers have lodged an 
appeal to the CJEU on 21 April 2017. The case is still pending.97  
The “hyper-formalistic reading of the Court” leaves migrants and refugees “at the mercy 
of whatever consequences the deal leads to”. No regard was given to the principle of non-
refoulement, the right to asylum and the prohibition of collective expulsion as envisioned 
in the international and EU law. It feeds legal uncertainty, increases the risk of violations 
and leads to “dilution of legal obligations by bypassing of democratic checks and 
balances.98 It is very interesting that although the EU Institutions have publicly claimed 
the ownership of the Statement and actively contributed to its implementation, the same 
institutions rejected ownership of the Statement before the Court. By denying ownership 
of the Statement in the Court, the EU institutions circumvented the democratic and 
judicial checks and balances as laid down in the EU treaties. This attitude of the EU has 
more far-reaching implications for its future because it undermines the legitimacy of the 
EU’s responses to the refugee crisis, reduces its credibility as a reliable partner on the 
international stage and jeopardises its treaty-based framework that aims to ensure the rule 
of law.99  
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3. An Analysis of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement and the EU-Turkey 
Statement Concerning Human Rights  
The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement indicates that the European member 
states have used every opportunity to stop refugees from reaching its territory and to avoid 
responsibility. To achieve this, the EU adopted three main strategies; “criminalising 
migrants”, “militarising border control” and “outsourcing the problem to non-EU states”. 
This allows them to pretend that there is not refugee protection problem100 in spite of the 
universal human right to protection. As Dembour emphasises even though migrants and 
refugees are entitled to human rights, they are vulnerable to being subjected to violations 
of human rights such as detention, inhuman treatment and unlawful deportations. This 
view indicates that human rights are inherently defective in ensuring the protection of 
refugees and asylum seekers.101  
Considering the negotiation and implementation process, it is not surprising that neither 
the EU nor the Turkish part of the agreement mention refugee protection or the Turkish 
government’s capacity to provide protection for readmitted refugees and asylum 
seekers.102 The negotiating partners only looked after their own interests and migrants 
and refugees were not be properly considered.103 Human rights activists, Roland-Goselin 
and Fotiadis, describe the EU as masquerading its “cynicism” as realism offering the 
refugee deal as an the only solution to the high numbers of asylum seekers and migrants 
arriving in Greece.104  
This section of the chapter focuses on the risk of the EU-Turkey Statement carries for the 
fundamental human rights of refugees and asylum seekers considering the problems in 
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accessing refugee status determination, lack of effective remedies and monitoring 
systems and stranded refugees without foreseeable solutions.  
3.1. Problems in Access to Refugee Status Determination and Lack of Effective 
Remedy Against Removal to Turkey 
The main weakness of the EU-Turkey RA is that it contains a high risk of deportation of 
asylum seekers and refugees without access to refugee status determination or an effective 
remedy against removal. The Statement makes clear that all irregular migrants crossing 
from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey. In accordance with the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, if an irregular migrant does not apply for asylum, s/he will 
be subjected to return procedure in accordance with the Return Directive. However, if an 
irregular migrant applies for asylum in Greece, s/he is initially channelled into 
admissibility tests and the fast-track asylum procedure. This combination of 
inadmissibility tests and fast-track procedure greatly reduce the chance of asylum seekers 
having their asylum claims considered on their merits before being returned to Turkey.105 
The reports on the situation of refugees in Greece by NGOs and the European 
Commission reaffirm this situation stating that the increasing refugee burden on Greek 
authorities has made it difficult to deal with the individual assessment of applications and 
has led to deficiencies in practice. According to the observation of the Italian lawyers’ 
group, ASGI, in the camps,  
The possibility of submitting request for international protection is undoubtedly 
prevented. Migrants arriving from Syria, Iraq and from other states…are not given the 
chance to ask for international protection and hence remain at risk of repatriation.106  
The European Commission recognised the same deficiencies in its report on 10 February 
2016. It stated,  
Further efforts still need to be made by Greece to ensure that its asylum system is 
functioning in full alignment with the requirements of law, “reception capacity for 
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asylum seekers in Greece took place but it is not yet sufficient”, and “many asylum 
seekers are currently not provided with the necessary free legal aid to enable them to 
pursue an appeal against a first instance asylum decision.107  
It is not surprising that the EU-Turkey deal can lead to deportation of asylum seekers 
without examining their asylum claims and conflicts with the principle of non-
refoulement, the ban on collective expulsion in Article 19(1) of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 of the ECHR and Article 13 of the 
ECHR.108 These anticipations were confirmed in the first implementation of the EU-
Turkey deal when asylum seekers were deported without access to refugee status 
determination. The director of UNHCR’s Europe Bureau, Cochetel, confirmed that 13 
Afghan and Congolese asylum seekers who reached the Greek island after 20 March 2016 
were deported back to Turkey without being allowed to apply for asylum formally due to 
administrative chaos on the island.109 It was reported that following their readmission to 
Turkey, the 13 asylum seekers were placed in detention and waiting for their deportation 
in Pehlivanköy. The Turkish Government refused to allow the UNHCR Commissioner to 
visit them.110 
In addition to insufficient Greek asylum practice, Greece has recently adopted a new 
law111 to set up very short time limits for asylum applications and appeals against 
administrative removal decision. This new Law makes it extremely difficult for asylum 
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seekers to access asylum determination.112 Article 60(4) of the new law gives asylum 
seekers only one day for the preparation of their interview.113 Accelerated border 
procedures have also reduced appeal procedures against removal decisions. According to 
the new Law, there are only three days for a decision on appeal. Furthermore, there is no 
automatic suspension of removal decision, which means that the applicants must apply to 
a judge in order to remain in Greece during their appeal.114 The new law is not compatible 
with Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which requires an automatic 
suspensive effect on appeals against inadmissibility decisions based on the “safe third 
country” concept. This means that if Greece decides to remove refugees and asylum 
seekers to Turkey, it should give them the right to seek remedy with automatic suspensive 
effect in accordance with Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.  
Furthermore, the Greek government has widened Assisted Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration (AVRR) programmes to include asylum seekers whose asylum applications 
were found inadmissible or rejected on their merits. Although financial assistance was 
given to migrants who no longer wish to stay in Greece, under this new AVRR 
programme, financial assistance is now being given to rejected asylum seekers if they do 
not go to court for appeal. As 1,000 euro financial assistance is now available, the new 
AVRR programme may put pressure on rejected asylum seekers not to exercise their right 
to appeal and they may choose to take the money. Fifteen NGOs signed a joint declaration 
against this new policy for jeopardizing the right to an effective remedy. The declaration 
underlined that the new AVRR programme aims to limit the steps in the appeal process 
and facilitate fast removal of asylum seekers without using their right to an effective 
remedy. It contradicts the fundamental rights of asylum seekers that they can exercise 
their rights to an appeal without foregoing the opportunity to seek AVRR at any point 
and after the asylum process”.115 
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In addition to these new measures that the Greek government has adopted since the EU-
Turkey Statement, further interception operations in the Aegean Sea are resulting in 
deportation without access to asylum determination procedure. With the help of NATO 
and Frontex, asylum seekers and refugees are being intercepted in the international sea or 
Turkish waters without any access to asylum determination procedure. So far, Turkey has 
blocked the exit of irregular migrants and asylum seekers since 18 March 2016 and these 
interception operations have resulted in a huge drop of daily crossings from 2,500 to just 
43, notwithstanding human rights concerns.116 If people are intercepted in Greek waters 
or apprehended at the borders of Greece, the Asylum Procedures Directive applies. 
However, the Directive does not refer to international or Turkish waters so there is no 
clear statement on what will happen to asylum seekers if they are intercepted by Frontex 
or NATO in these waters. The critical question is whether they have been given a chance 
to apply for asylum consistent with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.117  
Moreno-Lax argues that although these interception operations have been presented as 
rescue, they apparently first rescue the people from death at sea but after rescuing them, 
return survivors to third countries or home countries without giving a chance to apply for 
asylum.118 The NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, affirmed this in his talk in the 
European Parliament:  
When we rescue those people, what we agreed with Turkey at a ministerial level…that 
if those people came from Turkey then we could return them to Turkey.119 
The statement indicates that states have tried to circumvent its refugee protection 
responsibility through border controls or rescue operations. This constitutes misuse of 
states’ sovereign power and bad faith in the implementation of its international protection 
obligations.120 
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These increasing interception operations at sea contradict the principle of non-
refoulement. Even though NATO ships intercept asylum seekers and refugees on the high 
seas, member states are bound by the principle of non-refoulement. It means that if asylum 
seekers and refugees are intercepted by member states on the high seas, they must be 
given an opportunity to apply for asylum before sending them back to Turkey. Also, those 
who have applied for asylum should be given an effective remedy before a court to 
challenge a negative decision of administrative authority, including access to a legal 
advisor, translation and stay until the court decides.121 However, the practice shows that 
the NATO action has not given asylum seekers an opportunity to ask for asylum and has 
returned migrants to Turkey. This violates the principle of non-refoulement and the right 
to seek asylum even though it happens in the form of search and rescue. Therefore, the 
NATO actions are in violation of international law binding on NATO states.122  
Interception operations with strict border controls also have brought a crucial question as 
to whether refugee deals with interception operations and strict border controls conflict 
with the right to leave. Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR declares that “everyone 
shall be free to leave any country, including his own”. Hathaway argues that an individual 
is entitled to decide for himself where to seek protection as a refugee and thus,  
Undifferentiated efforts to deter groups known to include refugees — for example, 
NATO action “against smugglers”, to the extent it precludes refugees from reaching a 
state party — are in breach of the Refugee Convention.123 
However, contrary to Hathaway, Hailbronner suggests that there is no freedom of choice 
where to seek protection. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide a right of 
admission to those who have not yet reached a border where entry may be requested for 
the purpose of international protection. Even the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the Hirsi 
case cannot be interpreted as a right to admission to the EU for the purpose of filing an 
asylum claim. For this reason, the EU cooperation with Turkey, which aims to reduce 
refugee crossings via border controls and interception operations, does not breach the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the right to leave.124 
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From my point of view, it is hard to share the view of Hailbronner because these 
interception operations have taken away the only chance of asylum seekers to access 
international protection and have undermined the essence of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. However, it is very difficult to prove these interception operations and 
challenge them before the Courts.  
As seen in the case of Turkey, the Turkish government has conducted these interception 
operations along its border and intercepted asylum seekers before leaving the country’s 
territory. The EU is financially supporting Turkey to set up its border security mechanism 
and interception operations alongside its border. In this regards, Turkey has introduced 
penalties for irregular exit from its territory and established patrols to prevent exit. While 
the EU has been supporting Turkey’s interception operations with donations of assets and 
financial support, it actually stays away itself from responsibility for intercepted refugees 
as illustrated before in Hirsi Jamaa case by the ECtHR. As Peers points out these 
interception operations by Turkey using assets donated by member states does not bring 
member states’ responsibility within the scope of the ECHR.125 These practices of 
member states have shown us once again that international human rights remain 
inadequate to protect an individual against the sovereign power of states.  
3.2. The Monitoring Mechanism and Suspension Clause Against the Risk of 
Refoulement 
Some NGOs, the UNHCR, and the European Parliamentary Assembly have sought a 
greater emphasis on human rights in RAs because they carry a risk of violating the right 
to seek asylum, the principle of non-refoulement and other fundamental human rights. 
People subjected to forced return procedures are especially vulnerable and are not always 
informed properly in their own language about their rights. Lack of monitoring also 
causes concerns, especially given the cost and negative implications of RAs with transit 
countries. This can lead to further deportations without considering human rights reports 
of requested countries,126 arbitrary detention and treatment against human dignity.  
                                                 
125  Peers, Steve, The Future of the Schengen System, Swedish Institute for European Studies, report no. 
6, November 2013, p. 106.  
126  Trauner, Florian & Kruse, Imke & Zeilinger, Bernhard, Values Versus Security in the External 
Dimension of EU Migration Policy: A Case Study on the EC Readmission Agreement with Russia, 
Edited by Noutcheva, Gergana & Pomorska, Karolina & Bosse, Giselle, The EU and Its Neighbours: 
values vs. Security in European Foreign Policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012, p. 
23. 
149 
 
  
Considering the human rights consequences for individuals, the EU Commission 
recommended a monitoring system and suspension clause in every RA to prevent serious 
human rights violations.127 Monitoring is seen as necessary to oversee the entire removal 
procedure from start to finish. Independent monitoring systems with the participation of 
NGOs and Parliamentary delegations should be established to monitor the human rights’ 
impact of RAs on readmitted refugees and asylum seekers. Scholars128 and NGOs129 have 
always supported independent, neutral, transparent and effective monitoring systems and 
suspension clauses for the implementation of RAs without infringing the rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers. However, member states always take into account the 
effectiveness of return rather than considering the rights of returnees and they do not 
provide any mechanism for monitoring its effect on readmitted persons.  
If we turn to the EU-Turkey RA, it puts responsibility on Turkey to readmit both irregular 
migrants and refugees but it does not set up any monitoring system to consider its effects 
on refugees and asylum seekers.130 Although it establishes a Joint Committee for 
monitoring its technical implementation, it has no power for monitoring its human rights 
implications.131 Even if one of the contracting parties violates the international refugee 
protection regime, there is no suspension clause in the agreement. The only conditionality 
used by the EU in the implementation process against Turkey is visa liberalization.132 
There is evidence to support human rights concern that lack of post-return monitoring 
mechanism in the RA process has triggered violations of the fundamental rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers. Human rights reports published by many NGOs allege that 
Turkish border authorities have deported or turned away Syrian refugees at the border 
with the direct use of force and detention. Amnesty International published a report called 
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“Europe’s Gatekeeper: Unlawful detention and deportation of refugees from Turkey”. 133 
The report was based on face-to-face and telephone interviews with more than 50 
refugees and asylum seekers who had been detained or deported from Turkey. The report 
examines the unlawful detention and deportation of refugees and asylum seekers in 
Turkey who had attempted to cross irregularly to the EU during and after the signing of 
the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. It alleged that the former favourable and humanitarian 
approach of the Turkish authorities towards refugees and asylum seekers in the country 
had dramatically changed due to EU’s pressure on the country to stop refugees and 
irregular migration crossing to the EU.134  
A recent report of Amnesty International repeated the same allegations that the EU-
Turkey deal had “disastrous knock-on effects on Turkey’s own policies” towards Syrian 
refugees and that Turkey has forced a large number of refugees to return to Syria after 
the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in 2015. Many of the returned refugees appear to be 
unregistered. Also, the increasingly restrictive border policies are a radical change from 
the more generous and “open-gate policy” of the Turkish authorities during the first five 
years of the Syrian crisis. Previously, Syrian residents with passports had been able to 
enter at regular border gates but after the EU-Turkey statement,  
Turkey has introduced visa requirement for Syrians arriving by air, sealed its land 
border with Syria for all but those in need of emergency medical care, and shot at some 
of those attempting to cross it irregularly.135 
In line with Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch reports in 2015 states that 
Turkish authorities arrested Syrian asylum seekers after they crossed the border and 
detained them in military facilities overnight and then returned them to Syria. Turkish 
authorities closed its two official border crossings to almost all Syrians after the EU-
Turkey Joint Action Plan and only allowed some people with urgent medical needs to 
cross. Syrians still continued to reach Turkey through smuggling routes but Turkey has 
stepped up enforcement forces at the border crossing points. About 25.000 people had 
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wanted to cross Turkish borders but they were being stopped by Turkish border 
authorities “firing warning shots and using water cannon”.136 
Marx claims that Turkey does not respect the principle of non-refoulement, which 
prohibits both returning refugees to their country of origin and turning them away at the 
border gates. Although Turkey guarantees the principle of non-refoulement in Article 4 
of the LFIP,137 it does not contain any prohibition of turning refugees away at the 
border.138 Therefore, Turkey does not respect the principle of non-refoulement in 
accordance with international law.139 There is common agreement among scholars that 
rejection at the frontier of a country without access to refugee status determination also 
constitutes a breach of the principle of non-refoulement.140 As regards rejection or non-
admittance at the frontier, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not provide a right to 
asylum but this does not mean that states are free to reject people at the frontier without 
any restriction, including those with a well-founded fear of persecution. It means that 
states must find another option if they are not prepared to grant asylum to persons who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution without infringing the principle of non-
refoulement. These include sending them to a safe third country or providing temporary 
protection.141 
Therefore, the principle of non-refoulement applies the moment an asylum seeker 
presents herself/himself for entry, either within a State or at its border.142 The UNHCR 
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supports this view, reaffirming that “(c) the fundamental importance of the observance of 
the principle of non-refoulement – both at the border and within the territory of a 
State…”.143 Therefore, lack of legislation guaranteeing access to asylum at the border 
points and a monitoring system may lead to deportation of refugees or other serious 
human rights infringements. Turkey has provided a proper asylum law and basic 
safeguards for persons seeking international protection but  
There is an ongoing gap in regards to any significant level of monitoring presence along 
Turkey’s long land borders in the south and east. Practices of border security authorities 
take place largely outside the critical gaze of independent monitoring actors such as 
NGOs and UNHCR.144  
In such a context, it is difficult to monitor Turkey’s conformity with the principle of non-
refoulement and international law.  
3.3. Stranded Refugees in Greece and Turkey and Article 3 of the ECHR  
Refugees and asylum seekers have been stranded both in Greece and Turkey. If we look 
at the Greek side, the EU-Turkey Agreement has changed the rules for everyone arriving 
irregularly on the Greek islands after midnight on 19 March 2016. In accordance with the 
new Law in Greece (Law 4375/2016), all new irregular arrivals are detained in Greece 
and subjected to a two-step process; first step is that the individual concerned must pass 
an admissibility assessment on the ground of safe third country or first country of asylum 
concepts; second step is that the asylum application will be considered on its merits. 
However, this double examination procedure puts an enormous and disproportionate 
bureaucratic burden on Greek authorities. Nearly 60,000 people have been stranded in 
Greece in dire circumstances while waiting the outcome of their asylum application. They 
are often waiting as long as 12 months in reception centres without accessing dignified 
living conditions or asylum procedures.145 The implementation of the EU-Turkey deal 
shows that Greece is functioning as an inner buffer states or gatekeeper within the 
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European territory.146 Contrary to the claim of the European Commission; the refugee 
deal “has not been a success story, but a horror story, with terrible consequences for 
people’s lives and health”.147 Individuals who are under constant threat of being 
readmitted to Turkey are suffering from rising levels of trauma and depression.148 
On the other hand, the legal uncertainty about the EU-Turkey Statement put many 
refugees and asylum seekers in legal limbo. According to the new law in Greece, all 
international protection applications are deemed admissible or inadmissible after their 
interviews. If the Greek Asylum Service deems an applicant as inadmissible, s/he will be 
given the right to appeal. In this regard, if the Greek Appeal Committee approves the 
decision of the Greek Asylum Service, the individual will be deported to Turkey. 
However, the Greek Appeal Committee overturned 390 out of 393 decisions of the Greek 
Asylum Service on admissibility arguing that Turkey does not qualify as a safe third 
country.149 In these cases, the Committee acknowledged that protection from refoulement 
is established in Article 4 of the LFIP but there is still a serious risk of non-fulfilment of 
this criterion in practice. So the Committee distinguished between law in the book and 
law in action recalling the incidents of violent rejection at the borders and deportations to 
Syria.150 Furthermore, the Committee finds that Turkey cannot provide equivalent 
protection to Syrians provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention. The Committee notes 
that the temporary protection guarantees legal stay to Syrians in Turkey but the possibility 
of long-term integration is excluded. The facilitation to naturalization of refugees as 
envisaged in Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention is not satisfied in the LFIP. Thus, 
the Greek Appeal Committees did not find Turkey as a safe third country and blocked the 
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return of rejected asylum seekers on the ground of inadmissibility criteria.151  
However, the European Commission did not welcome the decisions of the Greek Appeal 
Committee, which stopped the return of rejected asylum seekers to Turkey and put 
pressure on Greece to change the structure of the Appeal Committees. One month after 
the first decision of the Appeal Committees, following allegations of lack of objectivity 
of their members, the Greek Parliament amended the composition of the Appeal 
Committees on June 2016 in a fast-track legislative procedure.152 Now the Committee’s 
approach has fundamentally changed and the recognition rate of international protection 
on inadmissibility decisions has decreased dramatically. The recent figures indicate that 
the Committee has approved nearly all decisions of the Greek Asylum Service on 
inadmissibility decisions and this has quickened the removal process of individuals to 
Turkey.153  
Furthermore, the Greek Council of State made a groundbreaking decision on 22 
September 2017 about the forcible return of two Syrians to Turkey on grounds of safe 
third country concept. The Court decision is very important because it could set a 
dangerous precedent for the future return of asylum seekers who are stranded on the 
Greek islands. In this case, the Greek Council of State rejected two Syrians’ appeals 
declaring that the decisions of the Greek Appeal Committee that Turkey is a safe third 
country for the two applicants is reasonable. The Council of State also decided not to 
refer the cases to the European Court of Justice to determine whether Turkey can be 
considered a “safe third country”.154 This decision of the Greek Council of State puts the 
lives of asylum seekers and refugees at risk by approving the inadmissibility decision of 
the Greek Asylum Service and the Greek Appeal Committees.  
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If we turn to Turkey, the EU-Turkey RA has serious consequences for Turkey as a hosting 
country. It is a fact the EU explicitly assumes that every country can sign a RA with other 
neighbouring migrant sending and transit countries to send back third-country nationals. 
Nevertheless, there is no “universal system of readmission agreements”.155 Every 
contracting state has to persuade other third countries to send back their nationals and 
other third-country nationals. Therefore, the transfer of third-country nationals to their 
country of origin depends on Turkey’s ability to sign readmission agreements with 
countries of origin.156 In this regard, Turkey has signed RAs with various source and 
transit countries over the last 10 years including Greece,157 Syria,158 Ukraine,159 
Kyrgyzstan,160 Romania,161 Russia,162 Belarus,163 Moldova164 and Pakistan.165 However, 
migrant sending countries’ unstable situations make it difficult for Turkey to return 
readmitted third-country nationals to their countries of origin, resulting in these migrants 
either staying in Turkey under limited and severe conditions or reattempting to enter the 
EU. In addition, Turkey cannot persuade Middle East, Asian and African countries to 
sign readmission agreements.166 Turkey lacks political leverage to persuade the countries 
of origin in its region. Unlike the EU, Turkey does not have incentives and political power 
over these countries of origin to persuade them to readmit non-nationals or their own 
nationals.  
As a result, it is difficult for Turkey to achieve a more effective return policy than that of 
the EU.167 This situation is corroborated by the fact that of the readmitted migrants under 
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the Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol, only 10% of irregular migrants could be sent 
back to their country of origin.168 Without effective assistance in returning third-country 
nationals to their countries of origin and integration concerns, the increasing numbers of 
readmitted persons from member states into Turkey might create a “readmission trap” in 
the long term.169 Consequently, the EU-Turkey RA may lead to third country nationals 
facing the risk of being stranded in Turkey.170 During the visit of the United Nations 
General Assembly Human Rights Council’s rapporteur, François Crépeau, to Turkey, it 
was found that there were a large number of apprehended migrants in detention centres, 
called removal centres in the new LFIP, including families and children. It is a widespread 
practice that irregular migrants can be detained for lengthy periods because some 
nationals cannot be returned to their own country due to a lack of diplomatic relations. 
This is especially the case with many Afghan and Iranian nationals.171 As pointed out in 
the report of Amnesty International “many persons cannot be deported because no 
readmission agreement exists with their country of origin or because the required 
resources for the deportation are not available”.172  
4. Conclusion 
In summary, Turkey does not fulfil the requirements either of a “safe third country” or a 
“first country of asylum” concepts in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
The EU- Turkey Statement implicitly opens a way to readmit refugees and asylum seekers 
to Turkey on the basis of “safe third country” or “first country of asylum”, however, the 
implementation of the Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol demonstrates that the EU-
Turkey RA raises many human rights violation issues, particularly the principle of non-
refoulement. Although the EU Commission argues that Turkey provides sufficient 
protection to non-European refugees as well as European refugees, Turkey still continues 
to apply “geographical limitation” to the 1951 Refugee Convention and only provides 
temporary protection for non-European refugees, raising long-term integration concerns. 
On the other hand, even though Turkey has adopted new regulations to provide sufficient 
                                                 
168  United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council Report, p. 15. 
169  Return and Readmission to Albania, The Experience of Selected EU Member States, International 
Organization for Migration: Tirana, August 2006, p. 30. 
170  Strik, Tineke, Readmission Agreements: A Mechanism for Return Irregular Migrants, Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 12168, 17 March 2010, p. 15. 
171  Crépeau, 2012, p. 20. 
172  Amnesty International, Stranded Refugees in Turkey Denied Protection, April 2009, p. 27.  
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protection to non-European refugees, it has no effect in practice due to the increasing 
refugee burden on the country’s institutions and economy. 
There is no doubt that the EU-Turkey RA contains a high risk of deportation for asylum 
seekers and refugees without accessing refugee status determination. The human rights 
reports have shown that Greek authorities have deported asylum seekers and refugees to 
Turkey without given the chance to ask for asylum. After readmission of refugees, Turkey 
has been deporting non-Syrian refugees to their country of origin based on the assumption 
that all readmitted peoples had an opportunity to ask for asylum in Greece. Furthermore, 
Turkey has changed its generous and “open-gate” policy towards Syrian refugees and 
closed its borders to them after the EU-Turkey Statement. There is a lack of a monitoring 
system and suspension clause in the EU-Turkey RA, which increases unlawful 
deportations and leads to infringement of the principle of non-refoulement. 
Moreover, the EU-Turkey RA does not offer any sustainable solution to the ongoing 
refugee crisis. The swapping of asylum seekers for Syrian refugees is not enough to 
provide asylum seekers a humanitarian way to access asylum. Also, the EU’s financial 
support to Turkey is conditioned on reduction in the number of arrivals on Greek territory. 
Both of these certainly conflict with the EU’s unconditional duty to open the humanitarian 
pathways and burden sharing principles of international refugee law. Both the EU and 
Turkey should put aside their interests and take into account the vulnerabilities of 
refugees. It is crucial to provide them with basic conditions for a dignified life without 
getting into destitution. To this end, the EU should ensure that Turkey’s institutions 
provide the large number of refugees with a dignified life, proper reception conditions, 
access to economic, social and cultural rights in practice before commencing readmission 
of refugees to Turkey. 
After analyzing the political and legal background of the EU-Turkey RA and Statement 
and the risks they create for refugees and asylum seekers in practice, the next chapter will 
explain Turkish asylum law and investigate critically how the EU-Turkey Agreement on 
the refugee affects Turkey’s delivery of its human rights obligations. 
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CHAPTER V: The Effects of the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement on 
Turkey’s Delivery of Human Rights Obligations 
 
It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside its jails. A nation 
should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones. 
Nelson Mandela  
1. Introduction 
The EU-Turkey Statement poses new challenges for Turkey’s delivery of human rights 
obligations and refugee protection responsibility. This chapter evaluates what awaits 
asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey after their readmission. As discussed in chapter 
IV, the Greek Council of State ruled that Turkey is a safe third country in accordance 
with the Asylum Procedures Directive.1 This decision of the Council of State sets a 
dangerous precedent for future returning asylum seekers who are stranded on the Greek 
islands under the EU-Turkey Statement.2 By September 2017, only 1,896 migrants had 
been readmitted to Turkey since 4 April 20163 but this low readmission figure is mainly 
related to the unclear legal status of the EU-Turkey Statement and its incompatibility with 
international human rights and the EU law. Since coming into force, the EU-Turkey 
Statement has been challenged before the CJEU, Greek Appeal Committees and the 
Greek Council of State by rejected asylum seekers, whose claims have been found 
inadmissible on ground of safe third country concept and these cases have blocked their 
readmission to Turkey. However, the recent decisions of the Greek Appeal Committees 
and the Council of State may now quicken readmission of asylum seekers and refugees 
to Turkey.  
                                                 
1 Asylum Information Database, Greece: The Ruling of the Council of State on the Asylum Procedure 
Post EU-Turkey Deal, 4 October 2017, http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-10-2017/greece-
ruling-council-state-asylum-procedure-post-eu-turkey-deal.  
2 Amnesty International, Greece: Court Decisions Pave Way for First Forcible Returns of Asylum 
Seekers under EU-Turkey Deal, 22 September 2017, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/greece-court-decisions-pave-way-for-first-
forcible-returns-of-asylum-seekers-under-eu-turkey-deal/. : Refugee Law Clinics Abroad, Greek 
Council of State Approves Forced Returns to Turkey-RLCA Fears Massive Removals to Turkey, 25 
September 2017, https://refugeelawclinicsabroad.org/2017/09/25/rlca-fears-massive-removals-to-
turkey/.  
3  European Commission Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, COM (2017) 470, 6.9.2017, p. 5.  
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This chapter provides a comprehensive assessment of Turkey’s asylum law and is divided 
into three sections. First, it evaluates whether readmitted Syrian and non-Syrian refugees 
and asylum seekers have the opportunity to access fair and efficient asylum procedures. 
Second, it examines whether readmitted asylum seekers and refugees are subjected to 
detention and whether they can apply for asylum from detention centres. The third section 
elaborates whether asylum seekers and refugees are returned to their country of origin 
after their readmission to Turkey and if so on what grounds.  
In conclusion of the chapter, the researcher argues that even though Turkey is considered 
as a safe third country for refugees, it is still struggling to provide efficient and fair asylum 
procedures to asylum seekers. Furthermore, the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement triggers prolonged detention of asylum seekers in inhuman conditions. Finally, 
there is a risk that asylum seekers and refugees will be deported on the basis of “public 
order, public security or public health” grounds. To substantiate the arguments put 
forward in the chapter, human rights reports of the European institutions, NGOs, leading 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and Turkish jurisprudence will be used. 
2. Readmitted Non-European Asylum Seekers 
This section provides an overview of the legal status of non-European asylum seekers in 
Turkish asylum law and critically evaluates their opportunity to access international 
refugee protection.  
2.1. The Legal Status of non-European Asylum Seekers 
Turkish asylum law has changed with the adoption of the LFIP on 11 April 2013. The 
purpose of the LFIP was to regulate the entry, stay and exit of foreigners from Turkey 
and to determine the scope and implementation for the international protection that will 
be provided to foreigners who seek protection from Turkey.4 It is based on the principles 
of the international human rights, refugee law and the EU’s common asylum law but 
unfortunately it also incorporates many controversial elements of the EU asylum law,5 
which have harmful effects on the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, such as 
accelerated asylum procedures, detention of asylum seekers during their pending asylum 
                                                 
4  Article 1 of the LFIP.  
5  Tokuzlu, Lami Bertan, Burden-Sharing Games for Asylum Seekers between Turkey and the 
European Union, European University Institute, Florence Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, EUI Working Paper RSCAS, May 2010, p. 1.  
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applications and fast-track deportations of irregular migrants. These controversial 
policies have increased the risk of refoulement in the new member states of the EU and 
neighbour countries. In fact, the same adverse effects of the EU’s strict policies have been 
experiencing in Turkey.6 
The LFIP recognises two distinct categories of protection: international protection status, 
which is available upon an individual assessment of asylum seekers and temporary 
protection status, which can be provided to a group in mass-arrival situations. Regarding 
the first category of protection, the LFIP provides three different statuses for international 
protection seekers, namely “refugee”, “conditional refugee” and “subsidiary protection”. 
A refugee is defined in Article 61 of the LFIP in conformity with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and it is only available to the person, who comes from European countries. 
Conditional refugee status is defined in Article 62 of the LFIP in the same way as refugees 
but it is only given to non-European refugees. The difference between a refugee and 
conditional refugee status comes from Turkey’s geographical limitation under the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Conditional refugee status is a temporary and lesser type of 
protection that is provided pending their expected resettlement by the UNHCR in other 
countries. Like “asylum seeker” status under Article 62 of the LFIP, conditional refugees 
are only allowed to reside temporarily in Turkey until they are resettled to a third country. 
However, due to the refugee crisis, the chance of resettlement to another third country 
has become almost impossible for conditional refugees and they have to wait many years 
to be resettled in another third country.7 This long period of waiting makes non-European 
refugees vulnerable to human traffickers,8 and they have attempted to reach the EU 
territory even risking their own and their families’ lives. 
The LFIP has extended international protection to those who are neither refugee nor 
conditional refugee, but they are unable to return to their country where they would be 
faced with the death penalty, or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
                                                 
6  Baklavacıoğlu, Nurcan Ozgur, Building Fortress Turkey: Europeanization of Asylum Policy in 
Turkey, The Romanian Journal of European Studies, No. 7-8, Special issue, 2009, p. 114; Kibar, 
Esra Dardağan, An Overview and Discussion of the New Turkish Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection, Perceptions, Autumn, 18(3), 2013, p. 125. 
7 Soykan, Cavidan, The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in Turkey, Oxford 
Monitor of Forced Migration, 2(2), 2012, p. 39; European Commission Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Third Report on 
Relocation and Resettlement, 18.05.2016, 360 (final), pp. 8-9.  
8  Soykan, 2012, pp. 44-45. 
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or a serious threat due to violence in international or nationwide-armed conflicts. It is a 
major step concerning the protection provided to large groups of asylum-seekers against 
refoulement.9 This is also compatible with the ECtHR ruling and Article 3 of the ECHR, 
which imposes an obligation on States not to deport a person to another country, where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that s/he would face a real risk of 
being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.10 However, 
the LFIP does not define the procedure for how and who investigates the situation of an 
applicant making a decision on subsidiary protection. The ECtHR in the Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey case ruled that an independent body should scrupulously examine the 
threat of torture or inhuman treatment against each applicant.11 Nevertheless, the LFIP 
did not establish an independent body for assessing the situation of an applicant in her/his 
own country.  
The second category of protection, temporary protection, is defined in Article 91 of the 
LFIP and provides “temporary protection” status for foreigners who are forced to leave 
their country of origin en masse to find protection. The Syrians in Turkey first became 
part of the country’s temporary protection system as guests on an ad hoc basis after their 
first arrival in 2011 because at that time Turkey had not any legislation regulating this 
area. With the coming into force of the LFIP on April 2014 and adoption of the Temporary 
Protection Regulation (TPR) on October 2014,12 the legal basis for hosting large numbers 
of Syrian refugees was established after three years. However, there is no limitation on 
how long temporary protection will last. The Turkish Council of Ministers has full 
discretion on extension or termination of the temporary protection of Syrians.13 It was 
                                                 
9 Erkem, Nalan, Abdolkhani ve Karimnia/Türkiye Kararının Uygulanması İzlenme Raporu 
(Monitoring Report of Turkey and the Implementation of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey Case), 
İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu & Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti, (Human Rights Joint Platform & 
German Federal Republic), Mart 2013, p. 11. 
http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/files/03_Abdolkhani_Karimnia_Rapor_TR.pdf.  
10 Plender, Richard & Mole, Nuala, “Beyond the Geneva Convention: Constructing a de facto Right of 
Asylum from International Human Rights Instruments”, Edited by Nicholson, Frances & Twomey, 
Patrick M., Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1999, p. 86. 
11 Erkem, 2013, p. 11. 
12 OGT, 22.10.2014, No: 29153. 
13  Article 91 of the LFIP states, “Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners…”. The Article 
does not put an obligation on Turkish authorities to provide temporary protection but gives large 
discretion to them. However, this large discretion on whether temporary protection will be provided 
or not should be compatible with the responsibility of Turkey under international, refugee and human 
rights law. See Kaya, İbrahim & Eren, Esra Yılmaz, Türkiye’de Suriyelilerin Hukuki Durumu Arada 
Kalanların Hakları ve Yükümlülükleri (The Legal Situation of Syrians in Turkey: The Rights and 
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decided at the early stage that the arrivals would not be considered on an individual basis 
for international protection. Thus Syrians are barred from applying for international 
protection under Turkish asylum law. Accordingly, they cannot gain conditional refugee 
status and they do not have a right to apply for resettlement into another safe third country 
by the UNHCR. So far, the EU has only offered Turkey 72.000 places for resettlement of 
Syrian refugees under the “one to one” deal with the EU-Turkey Statement as mentioned 
in chapter IV to control the increasing irregular entry of the Syrian refugees into the EU 
territory. Considering there are nearly 3 million Syrian temporary protection holders in 
Turkey, this very limited chance of resettlement into an EU country and temporary status 
of Syrians without a chance of gaining even conditional refugee status puts them in a 
desperate position and real legal limbo. 
The LFIP does not provide permanent residence permit to refugees while foreigners who 
have continuously resided in Turkey for at least eight years are eligible. For conditional 
refugee status and temporary protection holders, it means that one of these categories 
cannot apply for Turkish citizenship even though they fulfil the eight-year residency 
requirement for Turkish citizenship available to foreigners. This element of Turkish 
asylum law conflicts with the Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which requires 
States to facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. The extreme 
uncertainty puts asylum seekers and refugees in a precarious situation, and it is a major 
push-factor which is contributing to many of them taking the dangerous journeys to 
Europe.14 
Also, contrary to the argument of the EU Commission15 that Turkey offers equivalent 
rights to conditional refugees as to European refugees, the LFIP offers a lesser set of 
rights and entitlements to conditional refugees than to refugee status holders. The 
differences between refugee and conditional refugee can be explained in three ways. First, 
although family unification has been permitted for refugee status holders, conditional 
refugees are not entitled to apply for family unification.16 Second, conditional refugees 
                                                 
Responsibilities of Stranded Refugees), SETA Report, 55, 2015, pp. 47-48. 
14  Skribeland, Özlem Gürakar, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices, Seeking 
Asylum in Turkey, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, 2016, p. 21. 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/noas-rapport-tyrkia-april-2016_0.pdf.  
15  European Commission, Report on Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of Its Visa 
Liberalization Roadmap, COM (2014) 646, 20.10.2014, p. 17.  
16  Article 34 of the LFIP. 
163 
 
  
are required to reside in a particular province and report to authorities in weekly periods 
due to public security and public order concerns17 while refugees are not required to reside 
in any defined area.18 Baklavacioglu suggests that these restrictions on free movement 
and residence are very problematic in the long term since it is obvious that this obstructs 
self reliance of the refugees economically and leaves them to the “the mercy of the local 
society.19 The United Nations Human Rights Report states that this “satellite-city” system 
makes it difficult for asylum-seekers to find a job to sustain their life. This often leads to 
asylum-seekers leaving the “satellite city” for other places even risking losing their 
refugee status or to attempt to cross the border irregularly into Europe.20 Lastly, with 
respect to access to the labour market, conditional refugees may apply for a work permit 
after six months following the registration of an international protection claim although 
refugees can access the labour market without waiting six months. They have an 
automatic right to work along with obtaining refugee status.21  
For these reasons, Turkey is struggling to provide equal protection to temporary 
protection status holders as envisaged in the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is clear that 
temporary protection status constitutes a barrier to the integration of refugees into the 
Turkish community which involves family unification, a long-term residence permit and 
the facilitation of Turkish citizenship.22 It also requires personal autonomy without any 
restriction on the freedom of movement within national borders and the right to work 
without any restriction to achieve self-reliance.23 The evidence suggests that the 
integration of a large number of refugees cannot be achieved in Turkey in the near future, 
particularly without EU member states sharing the burden. So refugees and asylum 
seekers continue to look for a solution in the EU territory in spite of the dangers. 
                                                 
17  Article 71 of the LFIP provides that “Administrative obligations may be imposed on applicants, such 
as to reside in designated reception and accommodation centres, a specific location or province, as 
well as to report to the authorities in the form and at intervals as requested”. This practice is called as 
a “satellite-city” system.  
18  Article 82 of the LFIP. 
19  Baklavacıoğlu, 2009, p. 114. 
20 Crépeau, François, United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council Report, Twenty–third 
Session, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Report of the Special Rapporteur On the Human 
Rights of Migrants, Agenda Item 3, Mission to Turkey, 22-29 June 2012, p. 15. 
21  Article 89(4)(a-b) of the LFIP. 
22  As stated in Article 34 of the Refugee Convention states should “facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees”. 
23  Article 17 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
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2.2. Access to the Asylum Procedure After Readmission of Refugees  
Syrian nationals and non-Syrian nationals are subjected to slightly different readmission 
procedure. As of August 2017, 214 Syrian nationals have been readmitted to Turkey 
according to the DGMM statistics.24 Syrians are returned from the Greek islands by plane 
and are placed in Düziçi Temporary Accommodation Camp until their temporary 
protection status is reinstated. After this procedure is completed, they are released from 
the camp and settled in a province of Turkey or, if they prefer, they stay in the camp.25 
On the other hand, once non-Syrian nationals are returned from the Greek islands to 
Turkey by boat, they are subjected to administrative detention in the Pehlivanköy 
Removal Centre until their removal process is completed. As of August 2017, 1,092 non-
Syrian nationals were readmitted to Turkey of whom 580 were Pakistan nationals.26 So 
far 57 returned non-Syrians have applied for asylum but only two have been granted 
refugee status, nine were rejected, 831 who did not apply for refugee status have been 
returned to their country of origin and 39 applications were pending.27 This low level of 
asylum applications from non-Syrian nationals raises the question whether Turkey 
provides a fair and effective legal framework for asylum seekers asking for asylum, 
information and legal assistance as defined in the LFIP. The significant differences in the 
readmission procedure between Syrian nationals and non-Syrian nationals also invite 
investigation.  
2.2.1. Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
With the coming into force of the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU Commission put pressure 
on Turkey to provide an assurance that all readmitted Syrians will be granted temporary 
protection after their return to Turkey. According to Article 12 of the previous Temporary 
Protection Regulation (TPR), temporary protection status holders who left Turkey for a 
third country in either an irregular or regular manner lost their temporary protection 
status. They would have also been banned from re-entry into Turkey. During negotiations 
                                                 
24  Republic of Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, Return Statistics 
Since 4 April 2016, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/return-statistics_915_1024_10104_icerik.  
25  European Commission Fifth Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, COM (2017) 204, 2.3.2017, pp. 5-6.  
26  Republic of Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, Return Statistics 
2016.  
27  European Commission Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, COM (2017) 470 final, 6.9. 2017, pp. 5-6.  
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prior to the agreed EU-Turkey Statement, the EU used visa liberalisation as a 
conditionality28 and put pressure on Turkey to change the provision of the TPR. Turkey 
had to amend Article 12 of the previous TPR and clarified that Syrian nationals might 
request and be granted protection upon their return to Turkey and this covered both 
previously registered and non-registered Syrians.29 The pressure by the EU on Turkey to 
amend the TPR can be explained in two ways. First, the EU wanted to shift the 
responsibility for Syrian refugees on to Turkey. Second, if the EU did not obtain 
assurances from Turkey to accept Syrian refugees and asylum seekers, the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey RA may infringe the principle of non-refoulement and 
thus the EU would be responsible for refoulement cases of Syrians as a first sending 
country in accordance with international law and the EU law. Against many criticisms 
from NGOs, the EU has established that Turkey is a safe country for refugees respecting 
the principle of non-refoulement when hosting readmitted Syrian refugees in its territory.  
Nevertheless, this amendment has not convinced NGOs30 and some scholars,31 who have 
found this assurance of the Turkish government meaningless without lifting geographical 
limitation to the 1951 Refugee Convention. It is alleged by two NGOs, Mülteci-Der and 
Pro Asyl, that the amendment to the TPR does not guarantee any automatic re-access to 
temporary protection for Syrians. Turkish authorities still have discretion not to accept 
them as temporary protection seekers. Also, these assurances do not prevent the informal 
deportation of Syrians. Syrian asylum seekers may be forced to live in the reception 
camps or removal centres against their wishes, and this situation would make them feel 
obliged to ask for a voluntary return to Syria.32 A recent report of Amnesty International 
shares the same view stating that the EU-Turkey deal has “disastrous knock-on effects on 
                                                 
28  EU Commission First Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, COM (2016) 231 final, Brussels, 20.04.2016, p. 4.  
29  Temporary Protection Regulation no 2014/6883 and the Regulation no 2016/8722 Amending the 
Temporary Protection Regulation.  
30  Statewatch, Refugee Crisis: EU-Turkey “dodgy deal”: Legal Concerns Met? 28 April 2016. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/apr/eu-med-crisis-news-dodgy-deal.htm.; Report from 
GUE/NGL Delegation to Turkey, What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans Should Seen During Their 
Visit to Turkey, May 2-4 2016, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/ep-GUENGL-report-
refugees-Turkey-deal.pdf. 
31  Marx, Reinhard, Legal Opinion on the Admissibility under Union Law of the European Council’s 
Plan to Treat Turkey like a “Safe Third State” Commissioned by Pro Asyl, 14 March 2016, pp. 18-
19; Roman, Emanuela & Baird, Theodore & Radcliffe, Talia, Statewatch Analysis, Why Turkey is 
not a “Safe Country”, February 2016, pp. 18-19. 
32  Mülteci-Der and Pro-Asyl, Observation on the Situation of Refugees in Turkey, 22 April 2016, p. 6.  
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Turkey’s own policies” towards Syrian refugees and Turkey has forced large numbers to 
return to Syria informally since the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan in 2015. Many of those 
returned refugees appear to be unregistered. In addition, Turkey has adopted increasingly 
restrictive border policies and changed its previous generous and “open-gate policy” since 
the deal.33 Human Rights Watch reported in 2015 that Turkish authorities arrested Syrian 
asylum seekers after they crossed the border and detained them in military facilities 
overnight and then returned them to Syria.34  
The previous Greek Appeal Committee on readmission of Syrian refugees to Turkey 
shared the same doubtful perspective affirming that Turkey still did not meet international 
protection standards and could not be considered as a safe third country. It decided that 
readmitting Syrian refugees from Greek islands to Turkey was unlawful in accordance 
with international refugee law and the EU law because “the temporary protection offered 
by Turkey to the applicant, as a Syrian citizen, did not offer him rights equivalent to those 
required by the Geneva Convention” or comply with the principle of non-refoulement”.35 
This decision of the Greek Appeal Committee put the EU-Turkey refugee deal further 
into uncertainty. The consequence of the Greek Appeal Committee’s decision was that 
the EU Council put pressure on the Greek government to “review the composition and 
role of the Appeal Committees”.36 The Greek authorities agreed to amend its legislation37 
and changed the composition of the Appeal Committee, which is responsible for 
examining asylum claims and appeals of asylum seekers. Since then, the Greek Appeal 
Committee’s approach has changed and they have started to approve inadmissibility 
decision of the Greek Asylum Service ruling that Turkey is a safe third country for Syrian 
nationals and provides sufficient protection as envisioned in the 1951 Refugee 
                                                 
33  Amnesty International, Turkey: Illegal Mass Return of Syrian Refuges Expose Fatal Flaws in the 
EU-Turkey Deal, 1 April 2016.  
34  Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Syrians Pushed Back at the Border, 23 November 2015. 
35  The Guardian, Syrian Refugee Wins Appeal Against Forced Return to Turkey, 20 May 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/syrian-refugee-wins-appeal-against-forced-
return-to-turkey. 
36  New Europe, EU Council: Why Greece Should Consider Turkey Safe for Syrian Refugees, 16 June 
2016, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-council-greece-consider-turkey-safe-syrian-refugees/.  
37  European Commission Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council, Second Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of 
the EU-Turkey Statement, 349, 15.06.2016, p. 4.  
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Convention.38 This attitude of the EU demonstrates that it will put into force the EU-
Turkey Statement whatever the cost to the human rights of refugees.  
2.2.2. Non-Syrian Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
The risk of refoulement for non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers who have been or 
will be readmitted to Turkey may be even greater than for Syrian refugees. According to 
the LFIP, if foreigners “breach the terms and conditions for legal entry into or exit from 
Turkey”, they will be subjected to a removal decision and deported immediately.39 Even 
if they are registered asylum seekers or granted refugee statuses from the UNHCR, their 
asylum claims are considered as withdrawn, and they will be subjected to a deportation 
decision.40 Considering the legal status of readmitted refugees and asylum seekers in 
Turkey, the EU Commission have requested assurances from Turkey not to send back 
non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers to their country of origin. Turkey has made a 
written declaration to the EU Commission that all returned non-Syrians refugees and 
asylum seekers will enjoy protection from refoulement in line with international 
standards.41 Turkey has also allowed the EU to monitor the situation of readmitted Syrian 
and non-Syrian refugees and asylum seekers regularly. Recently Turkey and the UNHCR 
concluded an agreement to monitor the implementation of international protection 
procedures and standards; particularly in removal centres and reception centres.42 
However, this has not happened so far.43 
Although Turkish government gave assurance to the EU to respect the principle of non-
refoulement for non-Syrians asylum seekers and refugees in a written declaration, it is 
very important to clarify that it does not have a binding effect in Turkish national law. 
Only international treaties have a binding effect in Turkish national law after approval of 
the Turkish Parliament. Therefore, as discussed in chapter IV with the legal status of the 
EU-Turkey Statement, the declaration of the Turkish government is seen merely as a 
                                                 
38  Greece Overhauls Appeals to Speed Up Returns to Turkey, 20 June 2016, 
https://newsthatmoves.org/en/greece-overhauls-appeals-to-speed-up-returns-to-turkey/.  
39  Article 54(1)(h) of the LFIP.  
40  Article 54(i) of the LFIP 
41  EU Commission Second Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, COM (2016) 349, Brussels, 15.06.2016, p. 5.  
42  ibid.  
43  Letter from the UNHCR, Response to Query Related to UNHCR’s Observation of Syrians 
Readmitted to Turkey, 23 December 2016, https://statewatch.org/news/2017/jan/unhcr-letter-access-
syrians-returned-turkey-to-greece-23-12-16.pdf.  
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statement, and it cannot be legally challenged before the courts. Also, recent statements 
of the Turkish authorities have conflicted with this assurance. On April 4, 2016, when the 
first group of 220 people was readmitted to Turkey, Mustafa Toprak, the governor of 
İzmir explicitly stated that re-admitted non-Syrians would be immediately transferred to 
Kırıkkale Removal Centre. After then, 
In accordance with international law, they would be either re-admitted if Turkish 
government has a readmission agreement with their countries of origin or if there is no 
such agreement, then they would be returned to their countries with travel documents.44  
Furthermore, the report based on the visit of three members of the EU Parliament to 
removal centres received testimonies of refugees highlighting that people deported from 
Greece have had no opportunity to ask for asylum in Turkey. All those interviewed 
claimed that they were not given an opportunity to ask for asylum, neither in Greece nor 
Turkey. It is a worrying issue that Turkish authorities told the delegation that “all people 
being returned to Turkey had the opportunity to request asylum in Greece. They are not 
in need of international protection”. The representative of the DGMM also told the 
delegation that the aim was to “ensure deportation of all those being returned from 
Greece, 100 per cent if possible. This is the spirit of the readmission agreement”.45 
Considering this increased risk of refoulement after readmission procedure, three 
Pakistani nationals, staying in Greece but subject to readmission between Greece and 
Turkey, applied to the ECtHR for annulment of the EU-Turkey Statement. They argued, 
inter alia, that 
This act rendered them at risk of refoulement to Turkey or ‘chain refoulement’ to 
Pakistan or Afghanistan.46  
In support of their request, the applicants put forward a number of pleas against the EU-
Turkey Statement. The most important one was based on “invalidity on the grounds of 
                                                 
44  Statement to the Press by İzmir Governor Mustafa Toprak, Dikili, April 4, 2016, published on the 
official web page of İzmir Governorship on 6 April 2016, http://www.izmir.gov.tr/0096. 
45  Report from GUE/NGL Delegation to Turkey, What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans Should Seen 
During Their Visit to Turkey, May 2-4 2016, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/ep-
GUENGL-report-refugees-Turkey-deal.pdf.  
46  Council of the European Union Information Note, 7 June 2016, Brussels, 9897/16, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jun/eu-council-turkey-agreement-challenges-9897-16.pdf. 
See Cases T-192/16 NF v European Council, T-193/16 NF v European Council and T-257/16 NF v 
European Council.  
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being based on the unlawful conclusive assumption that Turkey is a safe country”.47 The 
applicants also applied for interim suspensive measures to stop their deportations from 
Greece to Turkey. This is a very important case because it is the first time the EU-Turkey 
Statement has been challenged by asylum seekers before the ECtHR. If the Court finds 
the application admissible, it will examine the legality of the EU-Turkey Statement, and 
this could fundamentally affect the implementation of the EU-Turkey RA.  
3. “Unwelcome Guests”: Detention of Readmitted Asylum Seekers as Irregular 
Migrants 
This section examines the legal basis of administrative detention and its application to 
readmitted asylum seekers and refugees. It explores whether they can access asylum 
procedures from removal centres, have dignified living conditions and procedural 
safeguards against refoulement including legal assistance and effective remedies.  
3.1. The Legal Basis of Administrative Detention 
Today member states have many provisions in their asylum laws, which are leading to de 
facto deprivation of asylum seekers’ liberty in their reception centres. The states use 
administrative detention to enforce immigration and deter future arrivals of asylum 
seekers.48 Irregular arrivals are seen as an “anomaly for Western liberal democracies in 
the context and development of citizenship discourse, constitutionalism and human 
rights”.49 Nearly all asylum seekers or irregular arrivals are subjected to administrative 
detention because they breach state’s territorial sovereignty.50 The Council of Europe’s 
Committee on the Prevention of Torture suggest that conditions in these centres may be 
worse than those of prison establishments.51 Many asylum seekers and irregular migrants 
                                                 
47  ibid.  
48  Wilsher, Daniel, The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to Immigration Control: 
International and Constitutional Law Perspectives, International & Law Quarterly, 53(4), October 
2004, pp. 897-900; Cornelisse, Galina, Immigration Detention and Human Rights: Rethinking 
Territorial Sovereignty, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2010, pp. 1-4; Mouzourakis, Minos, 
The Reception of Asylum Seekers in Europe: Failing Common Standards, ECRE, 20 April 2016, 
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-reception-of-asylum-seekers-in-europe-failing-common-
standards/. 
49  Cornelisse, 2010, p. 4.  
50  O’niens, Helen, No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for Administrative 
Convenience, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2008, p. 152.  
51  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Visit reports: Poland CPT/ınf (2006) 11, para. 59; Greece CPT/Inf (2006) 41; Ireland CPT/Inf (2006) 
para. 40; Germany CPT/Inf (2007) para. 49, cited by O’niens, 2008, p. 151.  
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have found detention conditions as “harsh and punitive” despite seeking asylum and 
migration cannot be considered as a criminal act.52 The detention of asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants has been increasingly encouraged, financed and promoted by the EU 
in the new EU member states and neighbouring countries, especially Turkey as a means 
of ensuring that irregular migrants are stopped before entering the EU.53  
However, this widespread practice of states to systematically detain irregular migrants 
and asylum seekers on arrival in their national territory without considering less coercive 
measures conflicts with the international refugee and human rights law.54 Article 32(2) 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention only permits states to detain asylum seekers in necessary 
situations.55 In this regard, Hathaway, Grahl-Madsen and Goodwin-Gill argue that 
detention can be applied in order to define the identity of the asylum seeker pending an 
asylum application but it is limited by the requirement of necessity.56 Hathaway argues 
that once the asylum seeker has complied with the procedural requirements of refugee 
status determination, any further detention would constitute a penalty, which goes against 
Article 32(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.57 Also, Article 26 of that Convention 
establishes a freedom of movement that applies to those “lawfully” in the territory. While 
Article 26 clearly applies to recognized refugees, there is some debate as to whether it 
applies to asylum seekers too. Hathaway claims that Article 26 should also apply to 
asylum seekers whose applications have been presented.58 He argues that presence of 
individuals become lawful when they apply for asylum. In this view, asylum seekers 
                                                 
52  Crépeau, François, United Nations General Assembly Report on the Human Rights of Migrants, 
Human Rights Council Twenty-ninth Session, 8 May 2015, A/HRC/29/36, para. 42. 
53  ibid, para. 50; Jesuit Refugee Service, Administrative Detention of Asylum Seekers and Illegally 
Staying Third Country Nationals in the 10 New Member States of the EU, October 2007, pp. 130-
131. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed755c92.html.  
54  Fordham, Michael, Immigration Detention and the Rule of Law, Safeguarding Principles, Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2013, p. 1; Tuitt, 
Patricia, The Law’s Construction of the Refugee Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997, p. xx., 
cited by O’niens, 2008, p. 154; Balfe, Lord Richard, Administrative Detention in Council of Europe 
Member States-Legal Limits and Possible Alternative Measures, Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights, AS/Jur, 18, 2016, pp. 8-9.  
55  Article 32(2) of the Refugee Convention states, “The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a 
reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States 
reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary”. 
56  Hathaway, James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2005, pp. 410-418; Grahl-Madsen, Atle, The Status of Refugees in International Law, 
Sijhoff: Leiden, 171, p. 148, cited by O’niens, 2008, p. 152; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The 
Refugee in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 463.  
57  Hathaway, 2005, pp. 410-418.  
58  ibid, pp. 173-175.  
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should enjoy the right to free movement once they formally apply for asylum. The 
movement of asylum seekers may be only restricted under the same conditions as are 
applicable to foreigners in the same circumstances.59  
Furthermore, states’ widespread practice of detaining asylum seekers conflicts with the 
developing human rights approach. Accordingly, Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR only 
permits detention of the individual in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law if 
states aim to prevent “an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom 
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”. This means that states 
can apply administrative detention to prevent the unauthorised entry of foreigners or 
pending deportation of foreigners as part of its sovereign power to control migration flow 
into its territory.60 But, this sovereign power of states is not limitless and administrative 
detention can only be applied when necessary, proportional and consistent with the 
human rights law.61 Also, Article 12(3) of the ICCPR underlines the same approach and 
it only permits detention on condition that meets these criteria, are authorised by law; are 
reasonable and necessary in all circumstances and finally subject to periodic review and 
judicial review. Field and Edwards state that consideration of non-custodial alternatives 
is a pre-requisite of these necessity criteria.62 Regrettably, states use administrative 
detention as a deterrent measure to stop asylum seekers from seeking asylum and 
effectively criminalising migration although both international refugee and human rights 
law prohibit it.63 
In the case of Turkey, the legal basis of administrative detention and procedural 
safeguards against arbitrary detention had always been problematic before the LFIP. The 
ECtHR found Turkey’s systematic violations of Article 5 of the ECHR in many cases64 
                                                 
59  Article 26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
60  Wilsher, 2004, p. 900.  
61  ibid, p. 897; Landgren, Karin, Comments on the UNHCR Position on Detention of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers, 1998, p. 146. 
62  Field, Ophelia & Edwards, Alice, Alternatives to Detention of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, 
UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, POLAS/2006, 3 April 2006, paras.70.  
63  Tuitt, Patricia, The Law’s Construction of the Refugee Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997, p. 
xx., cited by O’niens, 2008, p. 154.  
64  Dbouba v. Turkey, Application no. 15916/09, 13 July 2010, para. 50; Tehrani and Others v. 
Turkey, Applications nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08, 13 April 2010, para. 73; Z.N.S. v. Turkey, 
Application no. 21896/08, 19 January 2010, para. 56; Ranjbar and Others v. Turkey, Application 
no. 37040/07, 13 April 2010, para. 41; Charahili v. Turkey, Application no. 46605/07, 13 April 
2010, para. 66; Alipour and Hosseinzadgan v. Turkey, Applications nos. 6909/08, 12792/08, 
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due to lack of a legal framework, prolonged detention and no effective remedies against 
administrative detention. For the first time, the ECtHR, in the Abdolkhani and Karimnia 
v. Turkey case in 2009, made an important judgment that the Turkish administrative 
detention system had no legal basis, stating:65  
In the absence of clear legal provisions establishing the procedure for ordering and 
extending detention with a view to deportation and setting time-limits for such 
detention, the deprivation of liberty to which the applicants were subjected was not 
circumscribed by adequate safeguards against arbitrariness…The national system failed 
to protect the applicants from arbitrary detention and, consequently, their detention 
cannot be considered ‘lawful’ for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention.  
The Court also ruled that the administrative courts had failed to examine rigorously the 
reason for the detention decisions. For this reason, it cannot be considered as an effective 
remedy for securing individuals’ liberty and security in accordance with Article 5 of the 
ECHR. In many cases, although applicants had applied to Administrative Court to uphold 
their detention decision after taking an interim measure from the ECtHR on their 
deportation from Turkey, the Administrative Court did not uphold the detention decision 
due to public security and public order concerns. Without examining whether national 
security and public order concerns had a serious basis, the Administrative Courts decided 
to permit the continuation of detention until the ECtHR’s final judgments. Thus many 
asylum seekers and refugees have been held in detention centres for nearly two years on 
the grounds of national security and public order concerns until the finalization of the 
judgment of the ECtHR.66  
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With the effects of many judgments of the ECtHR and the Europeanization process, the 
legal basis of administrative detention has been adopted by the LFIP in a very detailed 
manner.67 Accordingly, the LFIP establishes two categories of grounds for administrative 
detention. The first category is only applied to asylum seekers during their pending 
application in exceptional situations.68 The period of administrative detention should not 
exceed 30 days. The second category can be applied to irregular migrants for pending 
deportation.69 The duration of the administrative detention should not exceed six months 
but in some cases, this period might be extended for a maximum of six months if there is 
an administrative requirement. 
Although the LFIP provides legal grounds for administrative detention in a detailed 
manner, these grounds leave extensive discretion to the Turkish authorities. Specifically, 
detention of asylum seekers and migrants on the basis of “public order and public security 
threat” may lead to arbitrary detention decisions.70 Also, the LFIP introduces “breached 
the rules of entry into and exit from Turkey” and “have used false or fabricated 
documents” as legal grounds for detention of irregular migrants. Regarding Turkey’s 
transit country role, this means that almost every person may be detained under this 
provision of the LFIP. Under the EU-Turkey RA, readmitted irregular migrants may fall 
within the scope of this provision except they apply for asylum in Turkey. It should be 
noted that  
These extensive formulations are prone to misuse in Turkey and can lead to arbitrary 
detention decisions, particularly prolonged detention of asylum seekers as irregular 
                                                 
67  Ekşi, İdari Gözetim, pp. 50-51.  
68  See these exceptional situations at Article 68 of the LFIP; i) for the purpose of determination of the 
identity or nationality in case there is serious doubt as to the accuracy of the information provided; ii) 
for the purpose of being withheld from entering into Turkey in breach of terms and conditions of entry 
at the border gates; iii) when it would not be possible to identify the elements of the grounds for their 
application unless subjected to administrative detention; iv) when the person poses a serious public 
order or public security threat.  
69  The Second category of administrative detention is only applicable for those who i) bear the risk of 
absconding or disappearing; ii) breached the rules of entry into and exit from to Turkey; iii) have used 
false or fabricated documents; iv) have not left Turkey after the expiry of the period granted to them 
to leave, without an acceptable excuse; or, v) pose a threat to public order, public security or public 
health in accordance with Article 57(2) of the LFIP.  
70  Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Refugee and Advocacy and Support Program, Unwelcome Guest: The 
Detention of Refugees in Turkey’s ‘Foreigners’ Guesthouses, November 2007, p. 1.  
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migrants considering that administrative detention under the LFIP is not subject to 
automatic judicial review.71  
In fact, Turkey’s treatment is not unique. Turkey followed the EU’s restrictive approach 
while adopting its new asylum law. In the same way, the Return Directive allows member 
states to detain asylum seekers and migrants within the national borders on the ground of 
“public order” and “national security” or “breaching the rules of entry”.72 
The UN General Assembly Human Rights Council draws attention to these same 
deficiencies.73 It alleges that the scope of administrative detention determined under the 
LFIP is more extensive, and there is a risk that it goes too far and may be applied de facto 
to all migrants in irregular situations in Turkey. During the visit of the Rapporteur 
François Crépeau to detention centres, he found that there were a large number of 
apprehended migrants in the detention centre (called removal centres in the LFIP) 
including families and children. It is a widespread practice that irregular migrants may be 
detained for lengthy periods because some nationals cannot be returned to their country 
of origin due to lack of diplomatic relations. In particular, many Afghan and Iranian 
nationals cannot be returned to their country of origin, as they do not currently accept the 
return of their own nationals.74 Also, in accordance with the LFIP,  
Foreigners to be removed shall cover their own travel costs. In cases where foreigners 
are unable to cover such costs, the full or remaining cost of travel shall be met from the 
budget of the Directorate General.75  
This provision has left many irregular migrants in a desperate position due to lack of 
financial resources to buy tickets and where the budget of the Ministry of Interior is 
insufficient to cover migrants’ journey costs. This provision conflicts with the 1951 
Refugee Convention, ECHR, and ICCPR because the detention of the individual in the 
                                                 
71  Skribeland, 2016, p. 32. 
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absence of deportation proceedings is against both the rights of refugees and human 
rights.  
The LFIP has provided two different times for maximum duration of detention. In the 
first case international protection seekers can only be held in removal centres for up to 30 
days. In the second case, irregular migrants can only be held in removal centres for up to 
six months. However, if the removal cannot be completed because of the foreigner’s 
failure to cooperate, this period may be extended for a further six months.76 Therefore, 
the maximum duration of administrative detention cannot exceed twelve months. The 
requirement for administrative detention will be assessed monthly or sooner if necessary 
on a case-by-case basis by governorates. If administrative detention terminates, these 
foreigners may be required to comply with certain administrative obligations such as to 
reside at a given address and report to the authorities in the determined periods.77 The 
detainee or her/his legal representative or lawyer will be notified of all aspects of the 
detention decision together with its reasons. If the detainee does not have a lawyer, then 
s/he or her/his legal representative will be informed about the consequences of the 
decision, the appeal procedure and the time limit for appeal.78  
However, in practice, the administrative authorities do not respect time limitations on 
administrative detention.79 For instance, if an asylum seeker applies for international 
protection after being detained, the transition from one detention regime to another is not 
made automatically. If the detention decision is taken on the grounds of breaching the 
rules of entry and exit in accordance with Article 57(2) of the LFIP this allows detention 
for up to 12 months. But if the applicant applies for asylum then, detention regime should 
be changed from Article 57(2) to Article 68, which only gives detention for up to 30 days. 
Unfortunately, governorates fail to change the legal status of a person and assume that 
Article 57(2) of the LFIP is still valid as the basis of detention. Therefore, governorates 
fail to observe the very different procedural safeguards required by Article 68 of the LFIP 
and in most cases, the time limits of 30 days is exceeded. This practice constitutes a 
deliberate violation of the LFIP.  
                                                 
76  Article 57(3) of the LFIP. 
77  Article 57(4) of the LFIP. 
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Also, detention decisions are not subject to automatic judicial review but detainees or 
their legal representatives or lawyers can challenge the decision in the Criminal Court. In 
this regard, a detainee can appeal to the Criminal Court as long as the administrative 
detention is continuous80 but such an appeal will not suspend the decision. A judge in the 
Criminal Court will finalize the assessment within five days, and the judgment of the 
Criminal Court will be final.81 This is potentially problematic because the final character 
of the judgment conflicts with Article 13 of the ECHR for preventing effective remedy.82 
Furthermore, it is my opinion that the administrative detention of foreigners is not an 
arrest under the Turkish criminal law but it is an administrative act issued by the 
governorates. Therefore, the competent court for challenging such decisions should be an 
administrative court83 and not a criminal court.84 
Furthermore, as secondary legislation, the TPR contains a “hidden” provision that seems 
to unlawfully allow arbitrary detention. Article 8(3) of the TPR states that those who are 
excluded from temporary protection may, until their removal, be accommodated, for 
humanitarian reasons, in a special section of temporary accommodation centres or in 
other places determined by the provincial authorities “without an administrative detention 
decision” under the LFIP. Despite the use of the word “accommodation”, this provision 
relates to an informal type of detention. This type of arbitrary deprivation of liberty would 
be in clear breach of the LFIP and the Turkish Constitution, as well as the ECHR and 
other obligations of Turkey under international law.85 I strongly argue that if 
accommodation of a person in a temporary accommodation centre restricts the movement 
of a person, it will be equal to detention and so violates the responsibility of the Turkish 
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government leading to the arbitrary detention of a person without an administrative 
detention decision.  
A special Representative of the Council of State, Tomas Boček’s visit in 2016 to the 
Temporary Accommodation in Düziçi confirmed that this accommodation centre was 
being used as a de facto detention camp for readmitted Syrians. Although the authorities 
insisted that those residing in the Temporary Accommodation centre were free to leave 
at any time, refugees in this camp are not allowed to leave the camp of their own volition 
and are regularly denied communication with anyone outside the camp.86 The UNHCR 
representative in Athens also complained that the Düziçi Temporary Accommodation 
Centre is “a closed facility” and the UNHCR does not have “unhindered and predictable 
access”.87 The de facto detention camp and detention of readmitted Syrian nationals who 
are under the temporary protection regime has no justification in Turkish asylum law but 
it is violating both the principles of Turkish asylum law and international refugee law.  
3.2. Living Conditions in Removal Centres 
With the developing cooperation with the EU on reducing irregular migration flow into 
EU territory, the administrative detention capacity of Turkey has considerably increased 
due to both the financial assistance and encouragement of the EU. According to the 
statistics of the Ministry of Interior, Turkey had only 18 removal centres with a capacity 
of 6,670 before signing the EU-Turkey RA. However, by June 2016 the detention 
capacity of Turkey had doubled with 22 removal centres and a capacity to hold 14,020. 
In addition, there were 10 additional removal centres under construction and due to be 
finished in 2017. It was projected that by the end of 2017 Turkey will have a capacity of 
17, 240 in removal centres.88 Besides these new builds, the EU and Turkey recently 
decided to convert one reception centre with a capacity of 750 into a removal centre. 
Currently, Turkey has only one reception centre with a capacity to hold 750, available to 
accommodate vulnerable refugees, including women and children. It has, however, 22 
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removal centres with a capacity of 14, 020. It is notable that these removal centres have 
also been built in a highly securitized and militaristic style, with almost no possibilities 
for detainees to enjoy even the minimum human rights guarantees.89 This reflects the 
securitized approach of the EU’s migration policy and its effect on Turkish migration 
policy. 
The living conditions of removal centres were very poor before the LFIP.90 At that time, 
foreigners for whom a deportation order had been issued were kept in refugee guesthouses 
or police and gendarmerie centres during the deportation process under 1983 Refugee 
Guesthouse Regulation.91 But, in most cases, Turkey was in violation of Article 3 of the 
ECHR due to the living conditions of their detention centres. There was insufficient 
personal space (the recommended minimum area is 4 m² per person), lack of outdoor 
exercise and recreational activities, little natural light, inadequate medical assistance, 
basic sanitary and hygiene requirements, no special care or arrangements for disables, 
etc.  
In this regard, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey case is very famous. In this case, two 
detainees complained that the conditions of their detention in the police headquarters 
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. They 
alleged that the conditions at the police headquarters were very poor and they were not 
allowed to make or receive telephone calls and any indoor or outdoor activities. The 
ECtHR stated that  
…holding forty-two people in an area of 70 square metres, even for a duration as short 
as one day, constituted severe overcrowding. This state of affairs in itself raises an issue 
under Article 3 of the Convention…the conditions of detention at the Hasköy police 
headquarters amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.92 
 In another instance, in Tehrani and Others v. Turkey case, ECtHR ruled that  
…Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position, and the authorities are under a duty 
to protect them. Under Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person 
is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that 
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the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress 
or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in 
detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the individual's health 
and well-being are adequately secured…the overcrowding was so severe as to justify of 
itself a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.93  
Currently, even though the LFIP requires many safeguards and improvement in living 
conditions of removal centres, the conditions still do not meet the required standards of 
the international law.94 On September 2017, the ECtHR rendered a new important 
judgment on living conditions in the Kumkapı removal centre in Khaldarov v. Turkey 
case. The ECtHR concluded that  
…the conditions of the applicant’s detention at Kumkapı Removal Centre caused the 
applicant distress which exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in 
detention and attained the threshold of degrading treatment prescribed by Article 3.95 
This recent judgment of the ECtHR highlighted that the living conditions of the removal 
centres in Turkey are still failing to meet international standards.  
The physical conditions of detention centres were also subjected to the Reports of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CPT) in 2011 and 2015. These Reports underlined that physical 
conditions of detention centres were very poor and overcrowded. Immigration detainees 
were not provided with any outdoor activities of at least one hour per day. Furthermore, 
the particular needs of children and families were not taken into account during their 
detention period although they must be segregated from other detainees. The Committee 
found the conditions of removal centres insufficient and called the Turkish government 
to make necessary improvements.96  
                                                 
93  Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, paras. 83-84. Similarly see Yarashonen v. Turkey, paras. 80-81; 
Asalya v. Turkey, paras. 53-54; Aliev v. Turkey, para. 87; T. and A. v. Turkey, para. 98; Musaev 
v. Turkey, para. 60. 
94  Özbek, Nimet, AİHM Kararları Işığında YUKK’nda İdari Gözetimin Uygulandığı Mekanlar 
Hakkında Ortak Sorunlar (Common Problems on Removal Centres in the LFIP in the Light of the 
ECtHR Jurisprudence), Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, (The Journal of the Union of Turkish Bar 
Associations), 118, 2015, p. 45. 
95  Khaldarov v. Turkey, Application no. 23619/11, 5 September 2017, para. 31.  
96  Report to the Turkish Government on the Visit to Turkey Carried Out by the CPT Committee from 4 
to 17 June 2009, CPT/Inf (2011)13, pp. 28-30; Report to the Turkish Government on the Visit to 
Turkey Carried Out by the CPT Committee from 9 to 21 June 2013, CPT/Inf . (2015)6, p. 21: Report 
to the Turkish Government on the Visit to Turkey Carried Out By the CPT Committee from 16 to 23 
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The National Human Rights Institution of Turkey, which is an independent administrative 
authority for investigations of human rights violations, also found the same deficiencies 
as the CPT. Although the Turkish Government promised to remedy these deficiencies to 
the CPT Committee, it was evident in the 2015 Report of the National Human Rights 
Institution of Turkey that living conditions of detainees had not much changed and still 
failed to meet international standards. Detainees are still living in very crowded spaces 
under the required 4 m² per person by international criteria. Furthermore, detainees cannot 
access outdoor activities for weeks and months due to the limited space.97  
Besides living conditions, ill-treatment against detainees was also investigated by the 
National Human Rights Institution of Turkey in 2015. The suspected death of Lütfullah 
Tacik, an 18 years old detainee in Van removal centre, had been reported in the media. 
Although a doctor’s report indicated that he died from leukaemia, it was alleged that his 
sudden death was caused by ill treatment by a police officer. However, the lack of a 
surveillance camera record on the removal centre, no doctor’s report on his health 
situation before his death and the suspicious disappearance of the witnesses from the 
removal centre one day before the arrival of the National Human Rights Institution of 
Turkey prevented the Committee from establishing the real reason for the death of the 
detainee. However, the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey found the removal 
centres authorities responsible for not taking necessary measures to ensure the 
supervision of the physical and psychological wellbeing of the detainee.98 
Poor living conditions of the removal centres have also been brought before the Turkish 
Constitutional Court (TCC) by individual detainees. On December 2015, in a very 
landmark case,99 a Syrian detainee complained about the living conditions in İstanbul 
Kumkapi Removal Centre. The claim was that the conditions were so poor denying 
                                                 
June 2015, CPT/ Inf (2017) 32, 17 October 2017, pp. 4-6.  
97  The National Human Rights Institutions of Turkey, Report on İstanbul Removal Centre, 
06.11.2015, pp. 20-25.  
98  The National Human Rights Institution of Turkey, Report on the Death of the Lütfullah Tacik and 
Van Removal Centre, 18.12.2014, pp. 53-56: Görendağ, Volkan, Yabancıların Temsil Sorununun 
Cezasızlık Kültürüne Katkısı: Lütfillah Tacik Davası Örneği (The Contribution of the Problem of 
Representation of Foreigners to the Impunity Cultural Model: Lütfillah Tajik Case), Amnesty 
International, 02 Haziran 2017, https://amnesty.org.tr/icerik/yabancilarin-temsil-sorununun-
cezasizlik-kulturune-katkisilutfillah-tacik-davasi-ornegi: Aktan, Irfan, Afgan Çocuğun Ölümü (The 
Death of Afghan Child), Gazete Duvar (Journal of Duvar), 20 Kasım 2017, 
https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2017/11/20/afgan-cocugun-olumu/.  
99  The TCC, K.A., Application No. 2014/13044, 11 November 2015. OGT, 17 December 2015, No: 
29565. 
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human dignity and breaching one’s physical and spiritual integrity. Personal freedom and 
security were also breached due to prolonged detention (of 8 months and 10 days) and 
that there was no effective remedy concerning the circumstances the detainee was in. The 
TCC states that the Criminal Courts to which appeals are made against administrative 
detention orders solely review the legality of these orders but they do not examine the 
“appropriateness” of detention circumstances in regard to human dignity. It has found a 
breach of Article 17 of the Constitution100 and the right to effective remedy which is 
guaranteed by Article 40 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the ECHR. Furthermore, 
in this judgment the TCC, by taking the 2015 Report of the National Human Rights 
Institution of Turkey into account, found that the detention conditions in the Kumkapi 
Removal Centre breached Article 17 of the Constitution due to their incompatibility with 
human dignity. Each detainee in the Centre had only 3 m² per person living area although 
it should be 4 m² at least. There was very limited access to fresh air and the applicant had 
been detained in those conditions for more than 8 months. In the end, the TCC has found 
in breach of Article 19 of the Constitution (right to personal liberty and security) since 
the applicant had been detained between 25/04/2014 – 28/04/2014 in Kumkapi Removal 
Centre without a detention order and without respecting the procedural guarantees set 
forth for administrative detention in Article 57 of the LFIP. In addition, the Court decided 
on compensation of 10.000 Turkish liras101 for non-pecuniary damages. 
On June 2016, the TCC rendered a new important judgment on living conditions in 
removal centres involving women detainee.102 According to the judgment, AS, who was 
a pregnant woman with Russian citizenship was kept under administrative detention for 
18 days, between 03.01.2014-20.01.2014. She claimed that the lights in the centre were 
constantly on, it was overcrowded and extremely noisy; people were smoking inside and 
she was denied access to fresh air and could not participate in social activities. Hygiene 
was inadequate, food was insufficient and detainees were kept in; all the windows and 
doors were iron fenced like prisons. Although she was pregnant she was seen by a doctor 
only once a week and denied the diet which is required due to her special condition. As a 
result, she made a claim under Article 17 of the Constitution that prohibits torture, 
                                                 
100  Article 17(3) of the Turkish Constitution states that “No one shall be subjected to torture or 
maltreatment; no one shall be subjected to penalties or treatment incompatible with human dignity”. 
101  Equivalent to 2.000 Pound. 
102  The TCC, A.S. Application No. 2014/2841, 09 June 2016.  
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inhuman or degrading treatment and treatment incompatible with human dignity. Having 
fully examined the national and international reports on Kumkapı Removal Centre, the 
TCC found a breach of Article 17 of the Constitution because the centre was overcrowded 
with less than 3 m² per person, common spaces were insufficient, there was very limited 
access to fresh air and the detention of a pregnant woman under these conditions was 
clearly against Article 17 of the Constitution. According to the TCC due to the inadequate 
conditions of the detention centre, where the applicant was kept while waiting for 
deportation, the “right to effective remedy” which is guaranteed by Article 40 of the 
Constitution is also breached. The TCC highlighted that  
There is no effective administrative or judicial remedy which is capable of providing a 
solution in theory and practice and which gives a reasonable success opportunity in 
protecting the legal values guaranteed by Article 17(3) of the Constitution in regard to 
the applicant who was kept under detention in the Removal Centre.  
The TCC decided that the applicant should be compensated by 15,000 Turkish liras103 for 
non-pecuniary damages. 
A further decision delivered on April 2016 related to a pregnant Russian Federation 
citizen Albina Kıyamova104 who claimed that, during her admission to the İstanbul 
Kumkapı Removal Centre on 11.11.2011, she was searched naked due to the prejudice 
that she was involved in prostitution, and this was a breach of Article 17 of the 
Constitution which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment incompatible with 
human dignity. According to the TCC, 
The applicant had a defendable claim about the breach of Article 17 of the Constitution 
and in this case, the State is under a requirement to conduct a comprehensive and 
effective investigation, which is capable of finding the persons who are responsible for 
punishing them.  
The TCC reached this conclusion by taking into account her age, gender, nationality, 
pregnancy and the fragility of the applicant and stated that she was in a very difficult 
position to prove her claim against the state agents under whose control she was. In the 
light of the conditions of the present case, the TCC found that the claims of the applicant 
                                                 
103  Equivalent to 3.000 Pound. 
104  The TCC, Albina Kıyamova. Application No. 2013/3187, 14 April 2016.  
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were not investigated in “an effective manner” and decided on 5,000 TL105 as 
compensation to be paid to the applicant for non-pecuniary damages suffered. The cases 
confirm that physical problems and ill treatment continue in removal centres and that 
women especially suffer. For this reason, the relevant authorities of removal centres 
should take the necessary measures immediately to ensure human dignity.  
These judgments of the TCC on living conditions in removal centres are important 
because they make clear that the conditions of the removal centres must be made 
compatible with human rights and internationally acceptable standards immediately. The 
judgments have also revealed that there is still no effective legal remedy against 
administrative detention orders in Turkish law. It is necessary to amend the LFIP to this 
end in order not to breach the ECHR. Otherwise, the ECtHR will decide on compensation. 
Finally, the TCC has underlined the importance of the procedural guarantees for 
administrative detention as outlined in Article 57 of LFIP and request that the 
administrative authorities put into effect these procedural safeguards. These landmark 
judgments demonstrate that the TCC acts as the ECtHR at the national level by making 
references to relevant international treaties and judgments of the ECtHR guaranteeing 
human rights and personal security of the individual.  
3.3. Procedural Safeguards against Arbitrary Detention 
3.3.1. Can Detainees Apply for Asylum from Removal Centres? 
The LFIP gives discretion to the public authorities to detain persons without 
distinguishing them as asylum seekers or migrants. For that reason, it is often difficult to 
access fair asylum procedures in the removal centres. Under the LFIP,106 asylum 
application should be evaluated under the accelerated procedure in cases where the 
applicant “has been placed under administrative detention pending removal” and  
An applicant whose application is evaluated under accelerated procedure shall be 
interviewed no later than three days as of the date of application. The [assessment of 
the] application shall be finalised no later than five days after the interview.107  
                                                 
105  Equivalent to 1.000 Pound. 
106  Article 79(1) of the LFIP.  
107  Article 79(2) of the LFIP.  
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The LFIP abolishes the right of the applicant to appeal to the International Protection 
Assessment Commission in the case of the accelerated procedures. Therefore, the 
applicant only goes to judicial appeal against negative decisions of the administrative 
authority.108 Because of the very short time for interview and appeal, applicants are often 
unable to access any legal assistance. Detainees are not properly informed about their 
rights and how to ask for free legal assistance and appeal against the detention decision.109  
NGOs and the EU’s institutions have reported serious violations in accessing asylum at 
removal centres. François Crépeau, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants and Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights of Council of Europe, 
found that asylum seekers faced significant barriers during applying for asylum while in 
detention.110 The same problems had been reported by the UNHCR before the ECtHR in 
the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey.111 The representative of the UNHCR 
alleged that Turkish authorities  
…tended to refuse to grant temporary residence permits: …applications by persons 
whose claims were considered by the authorities to be in “bad faith”, such as those 
submitted when arrested for lack of legal status in Turkey; applications by persons 
applying for asylum at international airports; …and applications by those whose stay in 
Turkey was considered to be a threat to national security.  
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Committee visited 
Edirne Removal Centre in 2014 and reported that the percentage of the asylum 
applications from removal centres was incredibly low. Although the large numbers of 
irregular migrants apprehended on the border and the number of detainees had increased 
considerably, the number of asylum applications had stayed stable. Only 2 apprehended 
immigrants out of 7,596 in 2009; 4 persons apprehended immigrants out of 22,664 in 
2011; 168 apprehended immigrants out of 17,448 in 2012; 171 apprehended immigrants 
out of 16,383 in 2013 and 99 apprehended immigrants out of 6,090 in 2014 had applied 
for asylum from Edirne Removal Centres.112 Even though the LFIP provides the 
                                                 
108  Article 80 of the LFIP.  
109  Mülteci-Der and Pro-Asyl, Observation on the Situation of Refugees in Turkey, 22 April 2016, p. 8. 
110  Crépeau, Twenty–third Session, 2013, p. 20; Hammarberg, Thomas, Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe, Human E-Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Com 
DH(2009)31, Original version, Strasbourg, 1 October 2009, pp. 10-11.  
111  Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, para. 103.  
112  Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Committee Report on Illegal 
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necessary infrastructure for detainees to access asylum application from removal centres, 
there are deficiencies in legal assistance, interpreters and literature explaining the rights 
of detainees. These deficiencies have created a major barrier.  
Amnesty International’s report prepared in 2015 shows the challenges asylum seekers are 
actually facing in the removal centres. The report alleged that since the EU-Turkey deal, 
Turkish authorities have apprehended people trying to or suspected of planning to cross 
to Greece. Based on many interviews the report stated that after apprehension there is 
prolonged and unlawful detention of asylum seekers. Some of asylum seekers and 
refugees have stayed in isolated detention centres in the south or east of the country, not 
accessible to the outside world. No reasons are given for their detention, and some have 
faced ill treatment. Furthermore, it is alleged that refugees and asylum seekers faced 
“incommunicado detention”.113 This means that asylum seekers and refugees have been 
cut off from the outside world, with all phones confiscated and visits from lawyers and 
family members denied.114 This practice is contrary to the LFIP, which stipulates that 
family members and lawyers must be given access to detainees.115  
According to the Amnesty International Report in 2009, asylum seekers who can apply 
for refugee status while in detention are not given access to a procedure equal to that 
applicable to persons who apply from outside of detention. Legal assistance is not 
accessible in practice.116 The recent European Commission report shows that 1,896 
migrants were readmitted to Turkey between April 2016 and September 2017. Only 57 
(3%) applied for asylum in Turkey: two have been granted refugee status, 39 applications 
are pending and nine have received a negative decision.117 This low level of asylum 
application confirms that applying for asylum from a removal centre is more difficult than 
applying from outside due to arbitrary obstacles of officials. According to a Turkish 
                                                 
Migration in Edirne, Term 24, Legislation Year 5, 2014, pp. 3-5.  
113  Amnesty International, Fear and Fences: Europe’s Approach to Keeping Refugees at Bay, 
November 2015, pp. 56-65. 
114  Amnesty International, Europe’s Gatekeeper: Unlawful Detention and Deportation of Refugees 
from Turkey, December 2015, p. 6. 
115  Article 59(1)(b) and 68(8) of the LFIP.  
116  Amnesty International, Stranded Refugees in Turkey Denied Protection, April 2009, p. 24. 
117  European Commission Report to the European Parliament, the European Council and The Council, 
Com (2017) 470 final, Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, 6th of September 2017, p. 5.  
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lawyer, the chance of applying for asylum from removal centre is “based on pure luck”. 
Even lawyers and NGOs may not be succesful on lodging their clients’ applications.118 
Soykan argues that access to asylum from detention centres is much more difficult than 
for those who enter the country with their passports and approach the authorities as soon 
as possible with the intention of seeking asylum. She alleges that the Turkish asylum 
system tries to minimise the number of asylum applications because of the limited 
chances of resettlement of non-European refugees into third countries. The Turkish 
asylum system works to defer or deter asylum seekers through both informal and formal 
mechanisms. At the informal level, illegal forcible returns deter the arrival of asylum 
seekers onto the Turkish territory. On the other hand, prolonged administrative detention 
with its inhuman conditions works as a formal mechanism for deterring and deferring 
potential asylum seekers.119 
3.3.2. Can Detainees Access to Legal Assistance and an Effective Remedy? 
Asylum seekers and refugees, who do not have the financial means to pay a lawyer can 
benefit from state-funded legal aid in accordance with the LFIP.120 However, access to 
legal assistance is not automatic or effective when it is provided. There are still ongoing 
practical obstacles and institutional deficiencies. First, the actual availability of lawyers 
for the majority of international protection applicants is significantly limited by a shortage 
of resources and expertise.121 The Turkish Bar Association has insufficient financial 
resources to develop a dedicated operational capacity to extend its services to asylum 
seekers and migrants who cannot afford to pay a lawyer. The Bar Association requested 
that the government establish a separate fund and taking into account the numbers of 
international protection applicants they could give legal asisstance to122 but so far the 
government has not agreed. Also, the lack of specialised lawyers in asylum and 
                                                 
118  Ulusoy, Orçun & Battjes, Hemme, Situation of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to 
Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement, Vrije University Migration Law Series, No. 15, 2017, p. 6.  
119  Soykan, 2012, p. 43.  
120  Article 81 of the LFIP.  
121  Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 2015, p. 43; 
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immigration law constitutes another barrier to effective legal assistance. There is a very 
few lawyers who choose to specialise in refugee law because this field is not perceived 
as an income earning practice.123 The level of financial compensation afforded to lawyers 
within the state-funded Legal Aid Scheme is modest and only attracts young lawyers at 
the early stage of their professional careers. Furthermore, it is very difficult for legal aid 
lawyers to ask the Turkish Bar Association to cover any side expenses such as 
interpreting, translations or expert consultations. As a result, there are insufficient 
incentives for legal aid lawyers to dedicate time and effort into asylum cases.124 
Second, irregular migrants generally do not have any documents to prove their identity. 
The experiences of most asylum seekers and refugees shows that they cannot authorise 
lawyers with “power of attorney” due to not having a passport, identity card, or other 
official documents. If there is no “power of attorney”, lawyers cannot access their clients 
at detention centres or their files.125 In order to address this issue, the Turkish Union of 
Notaries published a communique explicitly reiterating that all new forms of “residence 
permits”, “stateless person identity cards” and “international protection registration 
documents” given by the Ministry of Interior to international protection seekers is 
accepted as an identity card by the notaries to produce power of attorney. The 
communique has only partially helped to address the barriers faced by refugees and 
asylum seekers in obtaining the power of attorney. The challenges facing migrants, who 
are apprehended over an irregular entry to or exit from Turkey remain unresolved. Those, 
who are detained in removal centres pending deportation are not given any form of 
identity documents and arbitrarily denied access to international protection.126 These 
people still have problems with obtaining “power of attorney”.  
Furthermore, even if lawyers submit a “power of attorney” to examine files of refugees 
and asylum seekers in removal centres, administrative authorities attempt to prevent their 
demands by making excuses. For examine to access the files of their clients, lawyers have 
                                                 
123  Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 2015, p. 43.  
124  ibid, p. 44.  
125  Human Rights Centre for Turkish Bar Association Report, 2016, pp. 45-47; Kaytaz, 2015, pp. 
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126  Refugee Rights Turkey, Barriers to the Right to Effective Legal Remedy: The Problem Faced by 
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to submit a petition to the DGMM Offices, but these petitions are not replied to for a long 
time. In some cases, lawyers are not given access to see their clients or their files for 
security reasons.127 If an asylum seeker or refugee is detained as a suspected terrorist, 
they will have been isolated from other detainees and any communications with their 
lawyers will be restricted.128 In such cases, lawyers cannot defend their clients in court 
proceedings.129 Furthermore, in some cases, migrants who faced human rights violations 
in removal centres cannot complain and ask for effective remedy due to the deficiencies 
in legal assistance. They are subjected to fast-track deportation and prevented from re-
entry into Turkey for five years.130 Therefore many complaints about human rights 
violations are not transferred to judicial authorities and remain unheard.  
Third, a significant lack of interpreters hampers legal assistance and lawyers’ work on 
behalf of their clients. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Right 
Investigation Committee Report revealed that detainees have difficulty in expressing 
themselves to their lawyers due to lack of interpreters.131 The Turkish Bar Association 
has emphasised the same problem that lawyers face communication problems with their 
clients in removal centres, reception and accommodation centres due to a poor translation 
service.132 Also, the communication between the lawyer and client is also negatively 
affected by the shortage of private rooms in removal centres. There are no special rooms 
in the centres were lawyers can interview their clients in private. The lawyer can only 
speak with their clients in the corridor. This practice undermines the Advocacy Law in 
Turkey.133  
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4. The Risk of Deportation of Readmitted Asylum Seekers 
Since the EU-Turkey Statement came into force, irregular migrants and asylum seekers, 
who have been transited through Turkey and reached Greece are subjected to readmission 
procedures. Even though international protection claims are examined individually in 
Greece, due to the increasing burden on the country and deficiencies in the Greek Asylum 
Service, many of them are returned to Turkey without accessing asylum procedures and 
effective remedy. This section considers whether Turkey is a safe country for those 
readmitted migrants and asylum seekers and whether Turkish authorities use its sovereign 
power within the rule of law and human rights law when ordering the deportation of 
foreigners. Finally, how, if at all, this power is monitored and controlled, especially when 
deportation orders are on the grounds of “public order or public security or public health”.  
4.1. The Legal Basis of the Deportation Decisions in Turkish Asylum Law 
The Turkish Constitution provides valuable safeguards for foreigners against deportation 
orders. Article 16 of the Turkish Constitution guarantees that fundamental rights of 
foreigners are only restricted by law in accordance with international law. This means 
that the reasons for deportation orders should be enshrined by the law and consistent with 
international and human rights law.134 
Turkish asylum law also provides some safeguards against arbitrary deportation orders 
and regulates the deportation of foreigners in two categories. The first category of 
deportation decision is based on 13 reasons135 such as peoples who breach the terms and 
conditions for legal entry into or exit from Turkey” or “pose a public order or public 
security or public health threat” or “submit untrue information and documents during the 
entry, and visa and residence permit irregularities will be subjected to deportation. 
Nevertheless, the grounds for justifying deportation of foreigners lack “clarity and 
precision”136 and gives priority to public security concerns with a large discretionary 
power of the public authorities.137 Administrative authorities issue deportation orders as 
                                                 
134  See Article 19 of the Turkish Constitution: “Everyone has the right to personal liberty and security. 
No one shall be deprived of his/her liberty except in the following cases where procedure and 
conditions are prescribed by law…arrest or detention of a person who enters or attempts to enter 
illegally into the country or for whom a deportation or extradition order has been issued”.  
135  Article 54(1) of the LFIP.  
136  Kibar, An Overview, 2013, p. 119.  
137  Bayraktaroğlu Özçelik, 2013, pp. 227-228; Kibar, An Overview, 2013, p. 126.  
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a preventive administrative act, either upon instruction of the DGMM or ex officio by 
governorates.138  
The second category is applied to asylum seekers or refugees,  
When there are serious reasons to believe that they pose a threat to the national security 
of Turkey or if they have been convicted upon a final decision for an offence 
constituting a public order threat.139  
As seen in the expression of this provision, the LFIP requires “serious reasons” for 
deportation of an asylum seeker or refugee. Compared to the first category of deportation 
reasons, it provides more safeguards and less discretionary power to public authorities It 
seems to be in line with Article 32 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which only allows 
deportation of refugees and asylum seekers on the basis of national security and public 
order.  
In addition, the LFIP provides extra safeguards against the deportation of foreigners, who 
cannot gain a refugee status but are in exceptional situations.140 The LFIP stops the 
deportation process if there are “serious indications” that concerned persons would be 
subjected to the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in 
the country to which they would be deported.141 The term “serious indication” is a 
positive development regarding its scope and is in harmony with the ECtHR 
judgments.142 The assessment of the persons’ situation will be made on a case-by-case 
basis, and those foreigners may be asked to reside in a given address and report to 
authorities as requested.143 Accordingly, foreigners under the above circumstances can 
obtain a humanitarian residence permit for one year.144 With this provision, Turkey 
creates a category of “non-deportable” persons, which is compatible with the absolute 
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character of the Article 3 of the ECHR. It is a “manifestation” of the principle of non-
refoulement.145  
However, there are still problems in actual practice. Recent judgements of the ECtHR 
and the TCC reveal that public authorities have still applied for the deportation of 
foreigners on the grounds of public security and public order without assessing whether 
the individual concerned may face inhuman, degrading treatment if deported back to their 
country of origin. The reason for this unlawful deportation can be explained by the 
vagueness of Article 55 of the LFIP because the LFIP provides no explanations of who 
and how to assess the “serious indications” to stop the deportation process. The ECtHR 
in the Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey case ruled that an independent body should 
scrupulously investigate the situation of individuals whether there are “serious 
indications” to believe that s/he will be subjected to “death penalty, torture, and inhuman 
or degrading treatment”. Unfortunately, the LFIP did not envisage an independent body 
for assessing the situation of applicants.146 
The important point is whether foreigners can avail themselves of effective protection 
against deportation decisions. The LFIP does not provide for an automatic judicial review 
on the deportation decisions unless the foreigner goes for an appeal. This provides fewer 
guarantees for foreigners compared to the EU Reception Directive. In accordance with 
the latter if administrative authorities order deportation of foreigners, member states will 
provide “a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the deportation to be conducted ex 
officio and/or at the request of the applicant”.147 It is interesting that although the LFIP 
was inspired by the EU common asylum law, it does not provide an automatic judicial 
review of deportation decisions. The researcher suggests that policymakers deliberately 
skipped automatic judicial review so as not to delay deportations of irregular migrants.  
A more recent but important problem is Turkey’s increasing security concern after many 
terrorist attacks in the metropolitan cities and the failed coup attempt in 2016. With the 
increasing security concern in the country, the Turkish government has changed its 
generous approach towards refugees and amended some of the provisions of the LFIP. In 
accordance with Article 54(1)(b)(d) and the newly added paragraph (k), foreigners who 
                                                 
145 Elçin, 2015, p. 48 
146 Erkem, 2013, p. 11. 
147  Article 9(3) of the Reception Directive. 
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are “leaders, members or supporters of a terrorist organisation or a benefit oriented 
criminal organisation”; “pose a public order or public security or public health threat”, 
and “are assessed by international institutions and organisation as being related to the 
terrorist organization” will be subjected to deportation. These deportation grounds have 
given great discretion to the administrative authorities. However, the LFIP does not 
establish any procedural criteria for how administrative authorities should decide whether 
the foreigner constitute a threat to public security. With the recent amendment to Article 
53 of the LFIP, foreigners can be deported with the decision of administrative authorities 
without any judicial control mechanism. Before the amendment, administrative 
authorities could take the deportation decisions on the ground of public order or public 
security, but foreigners could go to the Administrative Court against this deportation 
order. During appeal procedures, the claimant could stay in Turkey and the deportation 
decision was suspended until the final verdict of the Court.  
Now foreigners can appeal but they cannot stay until the completion of the appeal 
procedure. With this amendment, asylum seekers and refugees can only use individual 
application avenues by applying to the TCC and the ECtHR to stop the execution of an 
unlawful deportation decisions. This may trigger many new cases before the ECtHR. It 
is very clear that these new amendments put refugees and asylum seekers in a more 
vulnerable position than before.148 From now on, administrative authorities can use these 
three paragraphs of Article 54 to deport foreigners without showing any concrete 
evidence or valid reason before the Court. Also, with new added paragraph into Article 
54(2), international protection applicants or status holders who are assessed inside 
paragraph b), d) and k) of Article 54(1) can be deported at any time during the proceedings 
of their applications. Turkey can deport asylum seekers and refugees with the decision of 
administrative authorities without giving a chance to challenge the decision of deportation 
before the Court. There is no doubt that the new amendment is clearly against the 
principle of non-refoulement and jurisprudence of the ECtHR.  
                                                 
148  Görendağ, Volkan, 676 Sayılı KHK İle Mülteci Hukukun Temel İlkeleri Askıya Alınıyor (The 
Fundamental Principles of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection is Suspended with the 
Decree-Law numbered 676) 3 Kasım 2016, 
http://www.multeci.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=378%3A676-sayl-khk-
ile-muelteci-hukukunun-temel-ilkeleri-askya-alnyor&catid=31%3Agenel&Itemid=1&lang=tr. 
Retrieved on 10 November 2016.  
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4.2. Effective Remedy against Deportation Decisions 
In Turkish jurisprudence, it is acknowledged that deportation orders fall under state 
sovereignty,149 but that does not mean that deportation orders are exempt from judicial 
review. A foreigner may appeal against a deportation decision to the administrative court 
within 15 days of the date of notification. It is noteworthy that it is a general rule of 
Turkish law that bringing an action to the Turkish Council of State (TCS), which is the 
highest administrative court, or to any administrative court does not prevent the execution 
of the administrative act150 unless otherwise specified in the law. Before the LFIP, appeal 
against a deportation decision had no suspensive effect on removal orders. For instance, 
prior to the LFIP in the Asalya v. Turkey case, the ECtHR expressly stated that  
Judicial review in deportation cases in Turkey could not be regarded as an effective 
remedy, since an application for the quashing of a deportation order did not have an 
automatic suspensive effect, thus exposing any person in the applicant’s position to the 
risk of deportation at any moment without a prior independent examination of his 
claims.151  
Therefore, in most cases, the ECtHR, taking into account the lack of automatic suspense 
effect in Turkish Law, issued an interim measure pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court152 against the Turkish Government, in the interests of the parties and the proper 
conduct of the proceedings before the Court, that the applicant should not be deported to 
the country concerned.153  
However, although the ECtHR issued an interim measure pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules 
of Court against the Turkish government, there are some cases that even these interim 
measures cannot stop deportation. An example is found in the Mamatkulov and Askarov 
                                                 
149  See. The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 1993/3535, JN: 1995/4616, Date: 19.10.1995; The TCS, Tenth 
Division, RN: 1997/6513, JN: 2000/128, Date: 20.01.2000. 
150  Article 27(1) of the Law on Procedure of Administrative Justice. 
151  Asalya v. Turkey, Application No. 43875/09, 15 April 2014. Similarly see “…the notion of an 
effective remedy under Article 13 requires …(ii) a remedy with automatic suspensive effect.” 
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, para. 108; Dbouba v. Turkey, para. 44; Tehrani and Others 
v. Turkey, Applications nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 42616/08, 13 April 2010, paras. 62 and 64-67. 
152  ECtHR, Rules of Court, 1 June 2015, Strasbourg. 
153  See Jabari v. Turkey, para. 6; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, para. 3; Asalya v. Turkey, 
para. 26; M.B. and Others v. Turkey, para. 3; Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, para. 3; Z.N.S. v. 
Turkey, para. 3; Ranjbar and Others v. Turkey, para. 4; Alipour and Hosseinzadgan v. Turkey, 
para. 3; Athary v. Turkey, para. 2; Moghaddas v. Turkey, para. 2. 
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v. Turkey case.154 The applicants, Mamatkulov and Askarov, both suspected of a terrorist 
attack on the President of Uzbekistan, alleged that if they were extradited to Uzbekistan 
from Turkey, they would be tortured. On their application to the ECtHR, the Court, on 
18 March 1999, issued an interim measure to Turkey, indicating that it was desirable in 
the interest of the parties and for the smooth progress of the proceedings before the Court 
not to extradite the applicants to Uzbekistan until the Court had an opportunity to examine 
the application further at its forthcoming session on 23 March 1999. However, in breach 
of the interim measure, and in violation of Article 34 of the ECHR, Turkey handed the 
applicants over to Uzbekistan on 27 March 1999.155 Moreover, a court in Uzbekistan 
found the applicants guilty and sentenced them to 20 and 11 years of imprisonment, 
respectively.156 It is sad that Askarov died from torture just before his release from 
prison.157 
After many judgements of the ECtHR against Turkey, the LFIP brought an exception to 
a general rule of Turkish law by stating that an appeal to the administrative court has a 
“suspense effect” and without prejudice to the foreigner’s consent, s/he cannot be 
deported until completion of the appeal procedure.158 This is entirely consistent with the 
ECtHR rulings and it provides an effective remedy against premature deportation 
decisions. Accordingly, the applicant may go to the Administrative Court against a 
deportation decision within 15 days, and the judgment of the Administrative Court is 
final. After exhausting the administrative court process, there is only one avenue for a 
foreigner in Turkish jurisdiction. The TCC operates as a higher court of last resort above 
the administrative court’s final judgments on deportation orders given by the Ministry of 
Interior or Governorates. Also, the Court uses the “precautionary measure” in order to 
safeguard foreigner’s fundamental rights and freedoms. However, it is important to note 
that “individual application” to the TCC does not stop deportation orders. Deportation 
orders can only be stopped if the TCC decides precautionary measures.  
                                                 
154  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Application No. 46827/99 and 46951/99, 4 February 2005. 
155  ibid, paras. 24-27. 
156  ibid, para. 32. 
157  http://www.ihh.org.tr/ru/main/news/0/uzbek-extradited-by-turkey-dies-from-torture-/54 (7 February 
2016) 
158  Article 53(3) of the LFIP; Erten, Rıfat, Yabancılar ve Uluslarararsı Koruma Kanunu Hakkında Genel 
Değerlendirme (A General Overview of Foreigners and International Protection Act), Gazi 
Universitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi (Gazi University Law Faculty Journal), 19(1), 2015, p. 32. 
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The individual application avenue for foreigners has become a new protection avenue in 
Turkish law since 23rd September 2012. Since then the TCC has contributed to the 
development of case law against deportation orders. The TCC reviews whether there is a 
serious, actual and personal danger towards the life or material or moral integrity of the 
applicant, in the light of the circumstances where the facts are known. It also views the 
general situation of the origin country. After that, the Court reaches a conclusion that 
either accepts159 or dismisses160 the precautionary measure request. By doing so, the TCC 
gives reference to relevant ECtHR judgments.  
Also, TCC touches upon the notion of the “protection of the family” and “to ensure the 
children’s best interests” in its judgments. In this context, according to TCC, if an 
applicant is deported to Afghanistan, he will have to live separately from his wife and 
five children who live in Turkey, so his family unity would deteriorate. This reason would 
constitute a grave danger to the “moral integrity” of the applicant. Using this logic, the 
Court ruled that the precautionary measure demanded by the applicant must be 
accepted.161 This and other judgments show that the humanitarian approach of the TCC 
is fully compliant with the ECtHR jurisprudence. The TCC’s approach is more liberal 
and supports human rights issues more than the administrative court judgments. It can be 
said that the establishment of an individual application avenue is a promising start 
regarding the role of the Court as a model of consistency through its jurisprudence.  
                                                 
159  See the TCC, R.B., Application no. 2013/9673, 30 December 2013; The TCC, K.A., Application no. 
2014/19101, 10 December 2014; The TCC, I.M. and Z.M., Application no. 2015/2037, 19 February 
2015; The TCC, A.A.A.A. and J.A.A.A., Application no. 2015/3941, 27 March 2015; The TCC, 
D.M., Application no. 2015/4176, 17 March 2015; The TCC, Mohammad Abdul Khaliq, 
Application no. 2015/6721, 14 May 2015; The TCC, R.M., Application no. 2015/19133, 16 
December 2015; The TCC, Azizjon Hikmatov, Application no. 2015/18582, 15 December 2015; 
The TCC, A.A.K., Application no. 2015/17761, 02 December 2015; The TCC, M.A., Application no. 
2016/220, 20 January 2016. 
160  See the TCC, Enedjan Narmetova, Application no. 2013/6782, 06 September 2013; The TCC, 
Oksana Chicheishvili, Application no. 2014/19023, 05 December 2014; The TCC, A.D., Application 
no. 2014/19506, 25 December 2014; The TCC, M.S.S., Application no. 2014/19690, 31 December 
2014; The TCC, A.K.K., Application no. 2015/757, 20 January 2015; The TCC, Julia Anikeeva, 
Application no. 2015/4459, 17 March 2015; The TCC, Solmaz Mamedova, Application no. 
2015/6724, 20 May 2015; The TCC, Mir Ahmed, Application no. 2015/8021, 20 May 2015; The 
TCC, Pidram Haydari, Application no. 2015/8096, 21 May 2015; The TCC, R.N., Application no. 
2015/9291, 04 June 2015; The TCC, Olga Dogot, Application No. 2015/11252, 10 July 2015; The 
TCC, Mahira Karaja, Application No. 2015/18203, 01 December 2015. 
161  The TCC, Abdolghafoor Rezaei, Application No. 2015/17762, 01 December 2015. See more the 
TCC, Uthman Deya Ud Deen Eberle, Application No. 2015/16437, 10 November 2015. 
196 
 
  
Although the LFIP provides more safeguards in accessing effective remedies against 
deportation decisions than the previous law, four deficiencies can be identified. First of 
all, the LFIP introduces accelerated appeal procedures against the deportation decisions. 
It states  
Foreigners may appeal against the removal decision to the administrative court within 
fifteen days as of the date of notification…Such appeals shall be decided upon within 
fifteen days. The decision of the court on the appeal shall be final.162  
This provision is problematic in two ways. First, this very restricted time limitation for 
appeal against a deportation decision may hinder access to an effective remedy. As a rule, 
Article 7(1) of the Law on Procedure of Administrative Justice sets a time limit to apply 
to administrative courts within 60 days unless otherwise specified in the particular laws. 
Certainly, the LFIP is a specific law but in any event, the 15 days remain very short. 
Second, the decision of the administrative court is final and against the Administrative 
Court’s judgment, foreigners are not allowed to go to appeal although Turkish citizens 
can appeal to either the Regional Administrative Courts or the TCS. Considering the 
vulnerabilities of refugees and asylum seekers, they must have a right to challenge 
deportation orders before the Regional Administrative Courts or TCS.163 In this regard, 
Kibar argues that accelerated appeal procedures have a paralysing effect on the 
development of case law164 and trigger fast-track deportations. This consideration also 
found a voice in the Turkish Parliamentary Human Rights Commission Report during the 
discussion on the draft version of the LFIP. The Committee warned that the activating of 
a deportation decision without any control of a superior court might hinder the form of 
legal precedence in the long term and increase the application to the ECtHR and the 
TCC.165 The reports of the Turkish Bar Association have also observed the same problems 
in actual practice during the implementation of the LFIP. They state that the judges of the 
administrative courts have not sufficient knowledge on the LFIP because unfortunately, 
the implementation of the law has been started without giving any training to judges. For 
this reason, there are huge interpretation differences between courts in practice. The final 
                                                 
162  Article 53(3) of the LFIP. 
163  Erkem, 2013, p. 12. 
164  Kibar, An Overview, 2013, p. 125.  
165  Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Human Rights, European Union Harmonization and Affairs 
Investigation Committees’ Report on the Draft Law of the Foreigners and International Protection, 
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character of the Administrative court judgments has exacerbated the situation in many 
cases, and it has led to infringements of individual’s liberty and security, their right to 
effective remedy and the principle of non-refoulement.166 
Thirdly, the individual application avenue to the TCC is the last resort of the individual 
to halt their imminent deportation but an individual’s complaint to the TCC does not have 
a suspensive effect on deportation decisions. Thus individuals subjected to deportation 
orders must request a separate interim measure from the TCC. This does not provide an 
effective remedy in imminent refoulement situations in accordance with the ECtHR’s 
established case law. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the case of Al Hanchi v Bosnia-
Herzegovina167 verified this deficiency saying individual complaint procedures without 
suspension did not fulfil the Article 13 of the ECHR standards in imminent refoulement 
cases. In fact, it is alleged by the reports of the ECRE that the ECtHR has accepted the 
applicants’ claim subject to deportation decision in Turkey as admissible and granted an 
urgent interim measure to halt the deportation of the applicant despite the fact that the 
applicant did not use the individual application avenue to the TCC prior to the ECtHR 
Rule 39 request.168 
Lastly, the LFIP does not provide free legal assistance to individuals who are subjected 
to deportation decisions. It is very significant that the LFIP provides international 
protection seekers free legal assistance during their appeal procedures on the rejection of 
their application and detention decisions but the same Law has declined to provide free 
legal assistance to foreigners subjected to deportation decisions. The policy makers 
explain this situation with their budgetary concerns. They argue that Turkey’s transit role 
on the roads of migration flow will increase their expenditure on legal assistance, 
particularly with the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.169 Turkish NGOs 
working on refugee issues confirm that finance does create a barrier to accessing effective 
remedies for persons who have no means to pay a private lawyer to go to appeal against 
                                                 
166  Human Rights Centre for Turkish Bar Association Report, 2016, p. 33; Yılmazoğlu, 2015, p. 
911. 
167  Al Hanchi v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application no. 48205/09, 15 November 2011. 
168  Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 2015, pp. 41-
42.  
169  Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Report on the Draft Law of the Foreigners and International 
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the deportation decision and recommended that legal assistance should be provided.170  
4.3. The Turkish and European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence on 
Deportation of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Before the LFIP came into force in 2014, Article 19 of the (repealed) Law on Residence 
and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (No. 5683)171 provided unfettered discretion to the 
Ministry of Interior on deportation of foreigners and international protection seekers. 
However, the TCS rightly pointed out in many cases the Ministry of Interior could not 
use this power unless the reason(s) for deportation or problems caused by the stay of the 
foreigner in Turkey vis-à-vis general security were clearly identified.172 Therefore, the 
administrative courts and the TCS found that deportation orders were not in accordance 
with the law in many cases.173 Both the administrative courts and the TCS attributed 
considerable importance to the principle of non-refoulement and the resettlement of 
asylum seekers in third countries.174 
Nevertheless, some vague terms can now be found in the LFIP. In accordance with Article 
54(1)(d) of the LFIP, a foreigner can be deported for posing a threat to “public order, 
public security or public health”. Also, asylum seekers and refugees can be deported 
“when there are serious reasons to believe that they pose a threat to national security of 
Turkey”.175 There are many examples where state authorities fail to assess whether the 
                                                 
170  İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumder İçin Dayanışma Derneği (The Association on Human Rights and 
Solidarity for Oppressed People), Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında 
Değişiklik Önerileri (Suggestions on the Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection), 
23.05.2012, p. 5.  
171  OGT, 24.07.1950, No: 7564. The Law of 5683, however, was repealed by the LFIP in 2014. Article 
19 states “Foreigners whose stay in Turkey is considered to be contrary to public security and political 
and administrative requirements by the Ministry of Interior shall be invited to leave the country within 
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172  The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2003/111, JN: 2006/6142, Date: 30.10.2006.  
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Tenth Division, RN: 2012/2243, JN: 2013/1296, Date: 18.02.2013; The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 
2010/9468, JN: 2014/7772, Date: 16.12.2014. 
174  The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2005/3660, JN: 2007/6541, Date: 28.12.2007; The TCS, Tenth 
Division, RN: 2009/3924, JN: 2013/9506, Date: 30.12.2013; The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 
2009/13445, JN: 2013/9513, Date: 30.12.2013. 
175  Article 54(2) of the LFIP. 
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person concerned faces the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or risk 
in the country to which they will be deported.  
To verify this argument, three judgments of the TCC and two judgements of the ECtHR 
on deportation decisions will be examined. 
4.3.1. Turkish Jurisprudence on Deportation of Asylum Seekers and Refugees  
The following two cases are selected because administrative authorities and 
administrative courts did not take into account the special situation of asylum seekers and 
refugees even though the LFIP creates a group of people as non-deportable under Article 
55. The first example is related to an Iranian applicant, who was subjected to a deportation 
order. In this case, although the applicant gained conditional refugee status and was 
waiting for his resettlement into another safe third country, the Ministry of Interior 
ordered his deportation on the ground of public order or public security. The applicant 
made an individual application to the TCC after exhausting all legal channels asking for 
an interim measure against the deportation order claiming that if deported, he would face 
torture and inhuman treatment in his country. The TCC granted an interim measure and 
suspended the execution of the deportation order accepting that the applicant did face the 
possibility of inhuman treatment if deported and the risk of losing his right, granted by 
the UNHCR, to be relocated in a safe third country.176 
The second example concerned an Afghan applicant, who was subjected to a deportation 
order for breaching his weekly signature obligation on three consecutive occasions and 
breaching the terms and conditions for legal entry into or exit from Turkey. In this case, 
the applicant made an application to the TCC asking for an interim measure against the 
deportation order claiming that if he were deported, he would be persecuted due to his 
political opinions and religion. The Court granted an interim measure and suspended the 
execution of the deportation order on the ground that there is a serious risk to the life and 
spiritual existence of the applicant in Afghanistan if he was deported. Here the principle 
of non-refoulement was being invoked.177 
                                                 
176  The TCC, A.A.K., Application No. 2015/117761, 02 December 2015. See another similar examples: 
The TCC, Azizjon Hikmatov, Application No. 2015/18582, 12 December 2015; The TCC, K.A., 
Application no. 2014/13044, 11 November 2015.  
177  The TCC, Mohammad Abdul Khaliq, Application No. 2015/6721, 14 May 2015. See another 
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The third example is related to an Algerian applicant who was apprehended by the police 
for not having a passport and breaching the terms and conditions for legal entry into or 
exit from Turkey. The applicant claimed that he came to Syria for political reasons and 
then fled to Turkey due to the civil unrest in Syria, but he could not take his passport and 
other official documents due to the unstable situation in Syria. After his apprehension, he 
applied for asylum but the Ministry of Interior notified him that his application was 
rejected, and he could challenge this decision within 72 hours. He made an asylum 
application to the UNHCR, but the deportation order had been issued before a decision 
was reached. The applicant claimed that, if he was deported, he would face torture and 
inhuman treatment in his country and also his family union would be destroyed because 
his partner and children were living in Turkey as conditional refugees. The TCC 
considered that the threat to his life and risk of his material and spiritual integrity was 
serious and, therefore, issued an interim measure.178  
4.3.2. The ECtHR’s Jurisprudence on Deportation of Asylum Seekers and Refugees 
Two judgements of the ECtHR on deportation decisions are examined below. The first 
case is related to repeated deportation of four families of Uzbek nationals, and 25 Uzbek 
conditional refugees to Iran on the ground of national security and public order. The 
applicants had been invited to police headquarters for distribution of food and school 
stationery, but they were forcibly deported to Iran on the same day without being notified 
of the reasons for their deportations or given any opportunity to appeal against the 
deportation decision. A week later the applicants re-entered Turkey illegally, but police 
officers deported them to Iran once again. According to the applicants, they had to walk 
between villages close to the Iranian-Turkey border for 10 days in winter conditions with 
their children. They asked for help from Iranian gendarmerie, but they first detained them 
and subsequently deported them back to Turkey.179 The applicants complained that their 
repeated deportations to Iran even though they were recognised refugees by the UNHCR 
had violated their rights guaranteed in Article 3 and 13 of the ECHR. They further claimed 
Turkish authorities did not notify the reasons for their deportations and they had not 
obtained any guarantee from the Iranian authorities that they would be admitted to Iran. 
                                                 
178  The TCC, Rida Boudraa, Application No. 2013/9673, 21 January 2015.  
179  Ghorbanov and Others v. Turkey, paras. 11-16. 
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They were simply removed to Iranian territory by Turkish police officers, rather than 
handed over to the Iranian authorities.180 
The ECtHR requested from the Turkish government  
Whether Iran had guaranteed admission of the applicants prior to their deportation; 
whether a deportation order had been issued for their deportation and whether the 
applicants had been notified of such a deportation order. 
The Turkish government failed to respond to the Court’s questions, and there were also 
no documents in the case file to show that a formal deportation order had been notified 
to the applicants. The Court concluded that  
The applicants-refugees recognised by the UNHCR- were illegally deported to Iran…in 
the absence of a legal procedure providing safeguards against unlawful deportation, and 
without a guarantee from the Iranian authorities that the applicants would be admitted 
to Iran. The Court is also particularly struck by the fact that the applicants’ removal 
...was not even officially recorded by the Turkish authorities.181  
The Court found the violation of Article 3, 5(1) and 5(2) of the ECHR. The Court also 
stated,  
The national authorities considered some of the applicants to be dangerous for national 
security could not justify their removal in such circumstances.182 
The deportation of the four Uzbek families on the ground of public order or public 
security shows only the tip of the iceberg of informal deportations at the eastern borders 
of Turkey. This incident was heavily criticised by the NGOs and they applied to the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey to start a public investigation to find the officers in charge 
of this unlawful deportations and to share this with the public.183 It was the first time that 
the Turkish Parliament established a sub-Committee to investigate the deportation of 
Uzbek families but also general problems in migration and asylum practices. The 
Committee invited security forces, experts from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 
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Ministry of the Interior and NGOs dealing with human rights and refugee issues. The 
senior officers from the Security Department and experts from Ministries emphasised the 
security aspects of the issues and claimed that Uzbek families were on the terrorist list of 
the USA and the EU. Hosting Uzbek families as refugees in Turkey may “disrupt the 
country’s diplomatic relations” with Russia and also its reputation in the international 
arena for hosting terrorist groups within its territory.184 
On the other hand, NGOs claimed that Turkey was generally deporting asylum seekers 
before registration on an irregular basis. They also claimed that Turkey deports registered 
refugees unlawfully so as not to disrupt its relations with neighbouring countries. They 
also emphasised that the biggest problems in Turkey was the deportation of migrants 
without accessing asylum procedures. The deportation of the Uzbek families is the only 
one example that the media helped to expose but there are many other cases and desperate 
situations.185 After a comprehensive study in the field and discussions with experts, the 
Report of the Human Right Committee concluded that Turkey should respect the principle 
of non-refoulement and the right to seek asylum. Therefore, all irregular migrants 
apprehended on Turkey’s borders and detained migrants should be informed about their 
right to asylum and their procedural rights.186 However, no specific action was taken 
against the officials responsible for the deportation of the Uzbek families. The Committee 
shared its report with comprehensive suggestions but without any monitoring activity to 
follow the implementation of its suggestions in practice. 
The second landmark case is related to deportation of a Palestinian applicant because of 
involvement in a terrorist act. The applicant, who was severely injured in a missile attack 
and became paraplegic after this incident was taken to Turkey by a humanitarian 
organisation to obtain better medical care,. The Ministry of Interior issued him with a 
long-term residence permit after his marriage with a Turkish national. However, he was 
then subjected to a deportation decision on the ground of national security reasons. After 
the deportation order, the applicant was first detained in Istanbul Kumkapi Removal 
Centre, where “he was denied some of the minimal necessities for civilised life”.187 For 
                                                 
184  Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Committee Report on the Investigation of 
Problems of the Refugees and Illegal Migrants in Turkey, 2008, pp. 42-43. 
185  ibid, p. 166 and pp. 99-123. 
186  ibid, pp. 304-305. 
187  Asalya v. Turkey, para. 53. 
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instance, the applicant had to sleep on a table, could not go to the toilet without any 
assistance and could not continue his treatment. The applicant requested the ECtHR to 
issue an interim measure to halt his imminent deportation from Turkey. The Court 
rendered an interim measure and also stated that the applicant was being subjected to 
degrading treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the ECHR considering the conditions 
of the detention centres. 
Also the Court was particularly struck by the fact that Ankara Administrative Court, 
which was responsible for reviewing the deportation decision, actually did not  
…carry out a genuine inquiry into the allegations of the State authorities on the basis of 
information provided to it, such as by way of verifying the relevant factual 
circumstances and assessing whether genuine national security concerns were truly at 
stake. The domestic court’s absolute silence on these matters raises the suspicion that it 
took the authorities’ assertions at face value, rather than subjecting them to a rigorous 
scrutiny.188  
The Court noted that the administrative court failed to assess whether the deportation of 
the applicant would interfere with his family life and whether such interference would 
strike a balance between competing interests, namely the public interests in protecting 
national security and the applicant’s interest in protecting his family life. The Court 
concluded that the applicant did not have an effective remedy about his complaint under 
Article 8 of the ECHR, where the issues at stake were thoroughly examined in 
proceedings, and therefore there had been a violation of Article 13 of the ECHR in 
conjunction with Article 8.189  
These cases once again demonstrated that deportation decisions applied by the 
administrative authorities have often been flawed. The LFIP, which regulates appeal 
procedures against deportation decisions, should be amended and automatic judicial 
review of the deportation decisions should be adopted to reduce arbitrary deportation 
decisions of administrative authorities. In addition to the automatic judicial review, there 
should be an independent authority to rigorous investigate whether there is sufficient 
evidence that the person subject to a deportation decision would be subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment in her/his country of origin.  
                                                 
188  ibid, para. 117. 
189  ibid, paras. 116-119. 
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5. Conclusion  
The evidence above shows that the EU-Turkey Statement has brought many challenges 
to Turkey’s delivery of human rights. Three main challenges have been identified. First, 
readmitted asylum seekers and refugees have been struggling to access effective asylum 
procedures and durable solutions in Turkey. Although Turkey provided assurances to the 
EU that non-European refugees would not be sent back to their country of origin and 
would be given the same equal rights as European refugees after readmission to Turkey, 
the LFIP does not provide permanent residence permits, citizenship after living a 
specified period of time in the country, family unification or free movement within the 
territory of the country. Therefore, these legal limitations constitute a serious barrier to 
the integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Turkey’s asylum legislation has left large 
numbers of people in legal limbo and forced them to look for durable solutions in the EU, 
even risking their lives. 
The other challenging aspect of the EU-Turkey RA is related to Turkey’s increasing 
tendency to detain asylum seekers and irregular migrants on the grounds of loosely 
defined reasons; including “public order and public security” or “breaching the rules of 
entry into or exit from to Turkey”. The recent experiences of Turkey have also shown 
that almost all readmitted refugees and asylum seekers may be subjected to administrative 
detention and living conditions of the removal centres which do not meet international 
standards. Turkey has systematically violated Article 3, 5 and 13 of the ECHR in many 
cases due to the prolonged detention in inhuman living conditions. Furthermore, recent 
judgments of the TCC and the ECtHR have underlined that there is still no effective 
administrative or judicial remedy against poor living conditions in the removal centres.  
Lastly, the EU-Turkey RA contains a high risk of deportation of asylum seekers and 
refugees as irregular migrants without access to asylum procedures and effective remedy. 
Turkey’s increasing security-oriented policies towards foreigners can trigger deportation 
of genuine asylum seekers to their country of origin without trying for a balance between 
public security and the right to life. Unfortunately, there are many examples where 
administrative authorities have failed to scrupulously investigate the special situation of 
individuals and have ordered deportation of even registered refugees for posing a threat 
to public order, public security and public health. Furthermore, the judgments of the 
ECtHR and the TCC have revealed that administrative courts fail to carry out genuine 
investigations into whether the reasons for deportation decisions are based on factual 
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circumstances and whether such decisions strike a balance between public interest and 
the applicant’s interest. Turkey’s increasing security-oriented policies are triggering the 
deportation of refugees and asylum seekers to their country of origin on grounds of public 
security and public order without balancing the rights to life and the security of the public.  
All this evidence confirms that we are not far from Arendt’s argument that refugees find 
themselves in a fundamental condition of rightlessness due to their dependence on the 
goodwill or generosity of nation states.190 It is very clear that the EU-Turkey Statement 
left refugees and asylum seekers to the generosity of the Turkish government. The 
Statement did not mention anything regarding the fundamental rights of refugees and 
Turkey’s responsibility towards them but only mentioned the resettlement plan and 
financial assistance due to Turkey. Thus, this refugee deal reduces the capacity of asylum 
seekers and refugees to access and to enjoy even their most fundamental basic rights, such 
as the right to seek asylum and the right to an effective remedy against human rights 
violations. The fieldwork findings indicate that refugees are exposed to the 
overwhelmingly coercive power of states through detention and deportation orders on 
many occasions. Even though they are considered within the privileged pale framework 
of law and can avail themselves of an effective remedy against unlawful acts of 
administrative authorities, they are routinely denied their access to judicial review due in 
part to deficiencies in legal assistance and interpreters but also to the hostile attitudes of 
state agents.  
Given the precarious situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey, it is 
recommended that Turkey strengthen its institutional capacity and legal safeguards to 
cope with large numbers of irregular migrants and refugees to avoid violating the 
principles of non-refoulement. Establishing an independent monitoring body to assess the 
special situation of asylum seekers and refugees subjected to deportation and detention 
decisions could reduce infringements of the principle of non-refoulement and human 
rights violations. Furthermore, Turkey should adopt an automatic judicial review of 
contested administrative detention and deportation decisions. An automatic judicial 
review would give foreigners equal rights as citizens and considerably decrease the 
imbalance of power between public authorities and foreigners. Besides establishing an 
                                                 
190  Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Third Edition, George Allen & Unwin Ltd: London, 
1966, p. 283. 
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automatic judicial review, providing an effective legal assistance system to support 
asylum seekers and refugees would also help to increase appeals before the Courts and to 
decrease human rights infringements against asylum seekers and refugees. For this 
reason, the Turkish government should allocate a separate budget to the Turkish Bar 
Association. 
Having examined the effects of the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement on 
Turkey’s delivery of human rights obligations, the next chapter analyses the original 
interview data generated by my fieldwork. The fieldwork data provides further evidence 
upon which to assess whether refugees and asylum seekers can access their civil and 
political rights in practice.  
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CHAPTER VI: Fieldwork Findings: The Impact of the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement on the Civil and Political Rights of Refugees 
 
Hell is no longer a religious belief or a fantasy, but something as real as houses and 
stones and trees. Apparently, nobody wants to know that contemporary history has 
created a new kind of human beings-the kind that are put in concentration camps by 
their foes and in internment camps by their friends.1 
 
1. Introduction 
Turkey has been hosting more than 3 million refugees and asylum seekers over the last 
six years. Although Turkey’s outstanding effort deserves to be applauded by the 
international community, it is clear that there are serious deficiencies in its refugee 
protection system. Considering Turkey’s capacity, the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
RA carried many challenges for the principle of non-refoulement and the fundamental 
rights of refugees as envisioned by the 1951 Refugee Convention and other human rights 
instruments. To explore the real situation of readmitted refugees and asylum seekers, the 
researcher conducted interviews with 18 key actors including five representatives of 
NGOs, four judges, five lawyers and four senior officials and experts.2 The data drawn 
from the fieldwork has thrown great light on the real situation of refugees in Turkey both 
confirming the findings of other researchers and giving a picture of the situation in 2016. 
The participants addressed the serious problems that refugees and asylum seekers are 
facing in Turkey. These problems can be divided into two categories namely access to 
civil-political rights and access to socio-economic rights. The first category is the main 
focus of this chapter which builds on Arendt's reflections on statelessness in its analyses 
of the responses of the participants about refugees and their situation in Turkey. As 
Arendt highlighted, the deficiencies in accessing civil and political rights leave many 
refugees and asylum seekers in a “rightless” position. They have “no right whatsoever 
and live under the threat of deportation”.3 Arendt argues that every individual should be 
                                                 
1  Arendt, Hannah, We Refugees, Edited by Robinson, Marc, Altogether Elsewhere, Writers on Exile, 
Faber and Faber: Boston, 1943, p. 111.  
2  See Chapter I for a discussion of the methodology used in the research and for the way in which the 
participants are identified.  
3  Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Third Edition, George Allen & Unwin Ltd: London, 
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recognised as a subject of law and claim their fundamental human rights as part of the 
global community. However, the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to access and 
enjoy their fundamental rights depends on their legal status. The current situation of 
refugees in Turkey supports Arendt's interpretation on statelessness and the precarious 
situations of refugees.  
The statements of the interviewees indicate that refugees can live outside any legal status 
for years without gaining refugee status or citizenship status and this lack of legal status 
has been affecting their access to fundamental human rights. They are subjected to the 
coercive power of the state authorities through detention and deportation decisions but 
they cannot avail themselves of effective remedies due to complex legislative procedures, 
lack of translators or legal assistants. They, therefore, fall outside the rule of law. The 
fieldwork findings support my argument that Turkey is not a safe third country for 
refugees and asylum seekers and the EU-Turkey Statement is leading to a breach of 
Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
2. Perception of the Participants about the EU-Turkey Agreement on Refugees 
The fieldwork first sought to establish how the participants evaluate the EU-Turkey 
Statement. Except for one participant, there was agreement that the EU-Turkey Statement 
aims to stop the refugee and irregular migration flow into the EU territory but it has 
neglected the humanitarian side of the issue. As E14 said,  
The EU aims to use Turkey as a cheap hotel for refugees…there is no benefit for 
refugees. 
He thought that Turkey had to accept the EU’s offer to gain some advantages from the 
EU and get out from the stifling position in its international relationships. On the other 
hand, the EU also desperately needs Turkey to stop refugee flow. He alleges,  
The Agreement had been signed between two losers. None of them care about refugees 
and their rights but only use them as a bargaining chip. Turkey has consistently used 
refugees for threatening the EU saying if you do not give visa liberalisation for Turkish 
citizens, we will open the border gates and release all of them…Also, the EU wants to 
                                                 
1966, p. 283. 
4  I will use abbreviations to protect participants’ anonymity. “E” refers to “expert” in the migration and 
refugee areas. I will add numbers E1 and E2 to distinguish experts. E1 works as a Vice Director of a 
Migration Research Centre of a prominent University.  
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stop refugee flow by signing an agreement with Turkey whatever the cost even though 
this refugee deal is not compatible with human rights…There is hypocrisy. 
In line with E1’s argument, NGO15 also expressed the same concerns in his interview 
stating: 
When I look at the content of the EU-Turkey RA, I can see the EU’s two-faced 
behaviour…There is no way to stop migration flow without ending the reasons behind 
it; wars, economic instability and unfair income distribution…The EU is now building 
a wall to redirect migration and refugee flow into another country. This approach 
especially shows the EU’s two-faced approach and conflicts with its human rights 
centred perspective. 
Considering the unfair refugee burden on Turkey, he criticised the hypocritical approach 
of the European member states during the Syrian refugee crisis. He stated that even 
though the EU has a population of more than 500 million and a gross domestic product 
per capita of about 27, 000 dollars, it took only 1 million refugees, which constitutes less 
than 0.2 per cent of the EU’s population. In contrast, Turkey has a population of 75 
million and a GDP per capita of 9,000 dollars but it has been hosting more than 3 million 
refugees, which is equal to 3.5 % of its population. It is very contradictory that although 
EU countries are far more prosperous than Turkey, they are still looking for ways to shift 
its responsibility to Turkey. This is against the moral values the EU has defended for 
years and the principle of fair sharing of refugee responsibility.  
E26 also harshly criticised the EU-Turkey Statement from a human rights approach and 
commented on its serious consequences for refugees and asylum seekers. She said,  
The EU insisted Turkey sign it from the start of 2011. From the outset, it knew that the 
EU-Turkey RA would violate human rights but it just ignored it. I think that the EU-
Turkey RA is a historic disaster. If this continues in this way, it will trigger many human 
rights violations both in Turkey and in Greece.  
Furthermore, E2 underlined the negative impacts of Turkey’s generous refugee policy on 
the country’s security. She alleged that this open door policy makes Turkey a haven for 
                                                 
5  This was taken from the interview with the President of an NGO, which provides legal assistance to 
refugees and asylum seekers. He is also working as a lawyer. I numbered the participant as NGO1. 
6  This was taken from the interview with a university lecturer who is specialised on the EU-Turkey 
RA.  
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terrorists. Now Turkey is not safe even for its own citizens. Turkey is fighting inside and 
outside against terrorists. 
It should be admitted that E2's view connecting refugees with the security of the country 
is not unique in Turkish public policy. Especially after terrorist attacks happened in 
metropolitan cities in Turkey, this view has become prevalent and it triggered some 
restrictive policies towards refugees and asylum seekers. Following the failed coup 
attempt in 2016 the Turkish government changed some provisions of the LFIP related to 
deportation of international protection seekers on the grounds of public security and 
public order. As stated in chapter V, this approach has criminalised asylum seekers and 
refugees and makes their stay in Turkey more difficult than before. 
Contrary to other interviewees, NGO27 has positioned himself in favour of the EU-
Turkey RA saying: 
The EU-Turkey RA has been criticised by many human rights organisations and NGOs 
but if we look at refugee movements last year, especially deaths in the Aegean Sea, I 
can say that the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey was inevitable. Turkey was 
an indispensable partner of the EU in resolving the refugee crisis…If we did not sign 
this agreement with the EU, we would definitely talk of more deaths of refugees in the 
Aegean Sea. I believe that the EU-Turkey RA could produce some benefits for refugees.  
NGO2 also underlined the importance of working close with EU member states and that 
if both contracting parties cooperate on refugee issue effectively, it will improve living 
conditions of refugees in Turkey. However, the tensions on a political level have always 
been hampering the dialogue. 
The interviewees overwhelmingly emphasised that the EU’s demands are unfair and 
inconsistent with its human rights approach. The EU wants to use Turkey as a “gatekeeper 
to Europe” or “guardian of Fortress Europe”. To reach its aim, the EU uses membership 
and visa liberalisation as a carrot to “make good use of Turkey”.8 This refugee deal has 
“unveiled a paradox of a EU that has spent several decades preaching its own standards 
to neighbouring countries” but now it has been using this legal framework to contain or 
                                                 
7  This was taken from the interview with the President of the NGO, Journalist and former spokesperson 
of the UNHCR.  
8  Tolay, Juliette, Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s Immigration Policies, 
Edited by Paçacı Elitok, Seçil & Straubhaar, Thomas, Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, 
Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg University Press: Hamburg, 2012, p. 54.  
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readmit refugees to Turkey.9 Turkish participants are well aware of this contradictory 
nature of the EU migration and asylum policies and thus they heavily criticised the EU-
Turkey RA for being unethical.  
The interviewees also criticised Turkey for using refugees as a “bargaining chip” against 
the EU. During the negotiation of the refugee deal, Turkey was well aware of its upper 
hand and gained valuable bargaining leverage over the EU on a variety of issues. In 
accordance with leaked minutes of a meeting between the EU and Turkey, the President 
of Turkey said,  
We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime…so how will you deal with 
refugees if you don’ t get a deal? Kill the refugees?10 
 Concerning Turkey’s increasing negotiation power, Turkey uses mass migration as a 
weapon to reach its demands. As an opportunist player, Turkey has no direct role in the 
creation of the migration crisis but simply exploits the existence of the refugee flow 
generated by others.11 Accordingly, the evidence in the bargaining process of the EU-
Turkey Statement shows that refugee protection responsibility has been shared between 
sovereign powers in accordance with their power relations.12 However, it is so distressing 
that both parts followed their national interests in the negotiations but they have neglected 
refugees and their precarious situation. As Spain’s socialist opposition leader’s 
description, the EU-Turkey refugee deal is the “pact of shame” from human rights 
perspective.13 
3. The Precarious Legal Standing of Refugees  
In the fieldwork, the participants were asked whether Turkey is a safe third country 
concerning refugee protection. The participants answered this question by looking at a 
different dimension of the subject. Drawing from the participants’ views, this section 
                                                 
9  Collet, Elizabeth, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Policy Institute, March 
2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal. 
10  Greenhill, Kelly, Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the 
European Migration Crisis, European Law Journal, 22(3), May 2016, p. 327.  
11  ibid, pp. 325-332.  
12  ibid. pp. 325-332; Snyder, Jack, Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism, Edited by 
Betts, Alexander & Loescher, Gil, Refugees in International Relations, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2004, pp. 53-57.  
13  Spain’s Sanchez Wants EU-Turkey ‘Pact of Shame’ Altered, Politico, 31.11.2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/sanchez-rajoy-turkey-eu-deal-refugees-migration-crisis-illegal-pact-
of-shame/.  
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considers whether Turkey provides an efficient and accessible refugee protection regime 
to readmitted migrants who are seeking international protection and respects the principle 
of non-refoulement in practice.  
3.1. No Legal Status: “Bare Humanity” 
Despite the generous humanitarian approach of the Turkish government, integration of 
refugees remains problematic within Turkish asylum law.14 In the current legal 
framework, conditional refugees and temporary protection beneficiaries cannot gain 
Turkish citizenship as other foreigners can even if they fulfil the long-term residence 
requirement.15 There is no provision in the Turkish asylum law about gaining citizenship 
except through marriage to a Turkish citizen or being a child of a spouse married to a 
Turkish citizen. Furthermore, Article 25 of the Temporary Protection Regulation openly 
excludes the temporary protection beneficiaries from applying for Turkish citizenship.16 
Accordingly, although granting citizenship is the most durable long-term solution to end 
refugee status of the individual in refugee law, there is no option of naturalisation in 
Turkish asylum law unless the Turkish Parliament alters the law. Accordingly, refugee 
children who are born in camps or a satellite city cannot gain their country of origin's 
citizenship or Turkish citizenship and they can only obtain a temporary ID card. These 
newborns remain as stateless.17  
Turkish asylum law also does not provide refugee status but only temporary protection, 
conditional refugee or subsidiary protection status. Article 11 of the Temporary 
Protection Regulation18 cannot provide temporary protection beneficiaries access to 
refugee status even after the temporary protection ends. Accordingly, Syrian refugees are 
living under temporary protection status for nearly six years but they do not know what 
will happen if their temporary protection status ends. This extreme uncertainty puts 
asylum seekers and refugees in a precarious situation, and it is assessed as a major push 
                                                 
14  Skribeland, Özlem Gürakar, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices, Seeking 
Asylum in Turkey, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, 2016, p. 21. 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/noas-rapport-tyrkia-april-2016_0.pdf.  
15  Article 11 of the Turkish Citizenship Law requires foreigners to be resident in Turkey “without 
interruption for five years before applying for Turkish citizenship”. 
16  Article 25 of the Temporary Protection states that “the period of stay in Turkey under Temporary 
Protection shall not be added to required total period to reside in Turkey to apply for citizenship”. 
17  Cagaptay, Soner & Menekse, Bilge, The Impact of Syria’s Refugees on Southern Turkey, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 130, July 2014, pp. 9-10. 
18 OGT, 22.10.2014, No: 29153. 
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factor.19 Considering prolonged stay of refugees under temporary status, Hathaway and 
Costello suggest that it is very vital to define a maximum time limit for temporary 
protection to eliminate uncertainty and provide a dignified life for refugees. Although the 
1951 Refugee Convention does not envisage any time limit for temporary protection, 
Hathaway and Costello suggest a period of five years as the maximum time limit for 
temporary protection.20 In another article, Hathaway and Neve suggest that refugee-
hosting states should determine an optimum time limit for temporary protection in 
accordance with two main elements: “revitalization” of the capacity of hosting states and 
“the physiological needs of refugees”.21 Given the displaced Syrian refugee population in 
Turkey for six years, it is recommended that it is essential to clarify when temporary 
protection beneficiaries can have access to full permanent residency permit or citizenship 
status. Granting permanent residence is one of the most effective ways that the states can 
facilitate the integration of refugees as required by Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. It would facilitate their access to their fundamental rights and reduce their 
feeling of insecurity.22 Furthermore, the Turkish government should remove the barrier 
to naturalisation after five years or more. This would reduce their rightless position and 
their integration into Turkish community may revive its economy.23 
During my interviews with the participants, were asked whether the Turkish Government 
facilitates the integration of refugees into the Turkish community and how they evaluate 
the situation of refugees in the long term in Turkey. Participants overwhelmingly stated 
that temporary protection status or conditional refugee status constitutes the main obstacle 
to the integration of refugees into the Turkish community. Integration requires a long-
term residence permit with the facilitation of Turkish citizenship24 but because of security 
                                                 
19  Skribeland, 2016, p. 21; Ineli-Ciğer, Meltem, How Well Protected are Syrians in Turkey? Open 
Democracy, 17 January 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-
hope/meltem-ineli-ciger/how-well-protected-are-syrians-in-turkey.  
20  Costillo, M. Angel & Hathaway, James C., Temporary Protection, Refuge: Canada’s Journal on 
Refugees, 15(1), 1996, p. 11.  
21  Hathaway, James C. & Neve, R. Alexander, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A 
Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10, 
1997, p. 182.  
22  Şimşek, Doğuş & Çorabatır, Metin, Challenges and Opportunities of Refugee Integration in Turkey, 
Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, December 2016, pp. 98-99.  
23  Al-Omar, Saleem, Turkey is Missing Out on an Opportunity to Integrate Syrian Refugees and Revive 
Its Economy, Atlantic Council, 19 May 2017, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/turkey-is-missing-out-on-an-opportunity-to-
integrate-syrian-refugees-and-revive-its-economy.  
24  As stated in Article 34 of the Refugee Convention states should “facilitate the assimilation and 
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concerns after the failed coup and fragile social acceptance of refugees, it will not happen 
in the near future.  
NGO2 underlined temporary status of refugees under Turkish asylum law and its negative 
effects on establishing a durable life for refugees. He said, 
Turkish asylum system does not provide a permanent status to refugees. Thus refugees 
cannot see their future in Turkey. Even though they establish their own work or go to 
university, they are not entitled to get long-term residence permits or citizenship at the 
end. We should ask ourselves this question: How do we ordinary people plan our life? 
Refugees also have a right to plan their life or their children’s life as we do. If they do 
not have any legal status, how can they foresee their future? For this reason, Turkey is 
not a safe third country for refugees. 
NGO1 also underlined Turkey’s humanitarian assistance to refugees in his interview,  
Turkey’s standpoint towards refugees is mainly based on a humanitarian foundation. 
Since the beginning, the government’s priority has always been providing them with a 
shelter and food for their survival. Turkey does not foresee any integration policies. 
E1 complained about the approach of the DGMM, which deliberately ignores integration 
of refugees into Turkish community: 
Turkey has never had integration policies towards Syrian refugees and other refugees. 
Turkey thought very simply: Assad regime in Syria would end in a very short time and 
all Syrians would go back to their country. Thus, the authorities did not need any 
integration policies, such as education, eliminating cultural differences and other 
welfare policies. In the first two years, Turkish authorities even did not register them. 
After two years, the UNHCR insisted Turkey did register them. So, Turkey's policy 
based on their return failed. After five and half years, Turkish authorities started to 
realise that they will not go back to their countries. So far the word, ‘integration’ has 
not been deliberately used by the DGMM. If they start to use this word, they have to 
admit that refugees will stay in Turkey. 
Even though there are many deficiencies in integration attempts of refugees into Turkish 
community, it is a very welcoming development that President Erdoğan made in his 
statement about granting citizenship status to Syrians25 in 2016. Even though his 
                                                 
naturalisation of refugees”. 
25  The Telegraph, Turkey Plans to Offer Citizenship to Syrian Refugees, 3 July 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/03/turkey-plans-to-offer-citizenship-to-syrian-refugees/. 
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statement was welcomed by refugees and refugee organisations, it has not found support 
in Turkish society. The news spread quickly on the social media and the hashtag 
#IDon'tWantSyrianInMyCountry (#ÜlkemdeSuriyeliİstemiyorum) became a trending 
topic worldwide.26 There was a growing concern amongst the opposition parties that 
refugees would be used as a political instrument by the government in the future 
elections.27 Also, the religious background of Syrian refugees, who are overwhelmingly 
Suni Arabs, makes the issue very complex. Also, Kurdish nationalists and secularists 
worry that political leaders will use refugees to transform the national identity, cultural 
and political values and thus they have a concern that the long-term refugee settlement 
may end up with their marginalisation in their home towns.28 Some of the tough 
nationalists have also disliked Syrian refugees and accuse them being “traitors”. One of 
the 20 years old Turkish citizens expressed his dislike with the following words:29 
People are curious to know why the Syrians came to Turkey. If I were them I wouldn’t 
leave my country. I would stay home and fight back against the enemy to protect my 
homeland. Syrians are cowards, that is why they left their country. They are traitors. 
Recently this kind of discourse has become common among Turkish citizens and a 
popular conservative-pious-Muslim poet, İsmet Özel, supported his view in his speech 
saying, 
Syrians who came to Turkey are traitors.30 
After these unexpected criticisms, the President had to change his statement and said that 
only some refugees who contribute to the Turkish community may be granted Turkish 
citizenship. However, this statement of the President fundamentally conflicts with 
refugee protection regime and human rights law. The discussions about granting 
                                                 
26  Europe Report, Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, International Crisis Group, 
Report No: 241, 30 November 2016, p. 23.  
27  Kılıç, Taner, Türkiye’de Mülteci Hukuku Uygulamaları, Geri Kabul Süreci, (The Asylum Law 
Practice of Turkey: Readmission Process), Birikim Dergisi, Ağustos-Eylül, 2016, pp. 69-70. 
28  Europe Report, Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, International Crisis Group, 
Report No: 241, 30 November 2016, p. 15; Kaya, Ayhan, Syrian Refugee and Cultural Intimacy in 
İstanbul: “I Feel Safe Here”, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, RSCAS 2016/59, 2016, p. 1.  
29  This quotation was taken from Kaya, Ayhan, Syrian Refugee and Cultural Intimacy in İstanbul: “I 
Feel Safe Here”, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
RSCAS 2016/59, 2016, p. 19. 
30  Özel, İsmet see the following video recorded on 16 December 2016 
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citizenship to Syrians maintains its vitality and importance but the failed coup attempt 
overshadowed it and so far there has been no policy explanation from the Turkish 
government. It should be underlined that giving citizenship status to refugees is seen as a 
very positive step from the view of a rights-based approach but concerning reactions; it 
would jeopardise the very fragile social acceptance within Turkish society.31 
E1 underlined the fragile situation of refugees in satellite cities due to increasing hostility 
and violent attacks towards refugees after the President's declaration about granting 
citizenship to Syrians: 
When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan shared his government’s preparation about granting 
citizenship to Syrian refugees, it had led to many attacks against Syrian refugees and 
their workspaces. Unfortunately, due to lack of transparency, public authorities did not 
prosecute these incidents and also they did not launch any criminal investigations 
against concerned suspects. I met many refugees, who had lost all their belongings 
during these incidents. 
E1 also shared his concern if the government grants citizenship to Syrians:  
As far as I am concerned, granting citizenship to Syrians is very absurd. If Turkey grants 
them citizenship, no cooperation with international organisations will be left. This only 
adds another three million poor people into Turkish population. Nobody wants 
that…Furthermore, Turkey has still applied the geographical limitation of 1951 Refugee 
Convention to avoid becoming a buffer zone for non-European refugees. If we grant 
citizenship to Syrians now, then every irregular migrant will think that if we head to 
Turkey, we would take our chance to reach the EU but if not, then we would stay in 
Turkey. After some time, the Turkish government would grant us citizenship like 
Syrians. At that time Turkey will have turned into to a refugee heaven. 
Another interviewee, NGO3,32 also assessed the importance of granting citizenship to 
Syrian refugees and he warned about the fragility of the issue. He also suggested:  
                                                 
31  Erdoğan, Murat & Kavukçuer, Yudum & Çetinkaya, Tuğçe, Development in Turkey: The Refugee 
Crisis & The Media, Freedom Research Association, Liberal Perspective Analysis, 5, April 2017, p. 
12; Csicsmann, Lâszló, The Syrian Refugee Crisis Reconsidered: The Role of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement, Corvinus Journal of International Affairs, 1(1), 2016, p, 95; Kılıç, 2016, p. 69.  
32  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the coordinator of the NGO. 
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Granting citizenship to Syrian refugees would meet with terrible resistance by the 
Turkish community and opposition parties. Without preparing the society, these 
political discourses will open the door to new attempts of lynching against refugees. 
NGO2 focused on the deficiencies in adopting durable solutions at the governmental 
level: 
There is no strategic planning at the governmental level about the long-term integration 
of refugees. Only some decisions are taken like patchwork but it seriously affects 
refugees’ life and the cooperation between the EU and Turkey. In Turkey, the refugee 
issue has been completely dropped from the agenda of the government after the failed 
coup attempt on 15th of July 2016. To overcome these shortcomings in practice, more 
transparent policies need to be created by the Turkish government. 
Considering the participants’ view on granting citizenship to refugees, it is very clear that 
neither Turkish community nor Turkish politicians are ready for it.  
The research study on “Syrians in Turkey: “Social Acceptance and Integration” which 
was conducted in three border cities and three non-border cities in Turkey with 144 in-
depth interviews (72 with Syrians and 72 with local people) reaffirmed the fragile social 
acceptance within the Turkish community and rising hostility towards refugees. This 
provides significant data about refugees' relations with Turkish society, future 
expectations of Syrians and the level of “social acceptance” in Turkey. Although all 
participants in the research evaluate Turkey's open door policy towards Syrians as a 
humanitarian act and they thought that it is right to help them on moral grounds, nearly 
all of them say that they want to Syrians to return to their country. Nearly 80 per cent of 
the Turkish participants opposed granting citizenship to Syrians and they do not want 
Turkey to take more refugees. They demand that refugees are not allowed to stay in cities 
but should only stay in camps far from cities. The research suggests that Turkish citizens 
see refugees as an economic burden on country's resources. This complaint is more 
related to the intensive refugee existence in the metropolitan cities. Nearly 90 % of 
Syrians are living outside the camps and this has led to inevitable social-economic and 
political interaction with the Turkish community.33  
                                                 
33  Erdoğan, Murat, Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research, Hacettepe 
University Migration and Politics Research Centre (HUGO), November 2014; Erdoğan, Murat, 
Perceptions of Syrians in Turkey, Commentary, Insight Turkey, 16(4), 2014, p. 69.  
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As Kirişçi and Elman describe, the majority of the Turkish community feel that their 
hospitality comes to near of the limits. Their acceptance towards refugees is declining 
and if the Turkish government grants more rights to Syrian refugees, the hostility may 
grow and explode in an unexpected way.34 Limited job opportunities, especially in low 
paid jobs are a major issue. It is estimated that 400,000 refugees work informally in 
Turkey and this is very problematic given the high unemployment rate of 11.2 per cent.35  
Resentment towards refugees has been observed in the language of the Turkish media. 
The very well known columnist, Ertuğrul Özkök, wrote in his column headlined “Friend 
Know Your Place If You Are A Guest” in Hürriyet Newspaper.36 This is the most striking 
example that Turkish community only sees refugees as a “guests”. Thus, even in very 
small incidents, they are reminded of their “guest” status and they are subjected to 
marginalisation, exclusion and harassment. Unfortunately, no strategic plan, which 
encourages interactive integration, has been made by the Turkish authorities to reduce 
this increasing hostility towards refugees.37 This situation affirms Chimni's foresight that 
when the international community fails to share the refugee responsibility fairly, it may 
lead to downgrading the core principles of refugee protection regime in the refugee-
hosting communities. This increasing burden on hosting countries may end up with the 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement38 and downgrading the living condition of 
refugees.  
3.2. Struggles in Accessing Asylum Procedures 
One of the aims of the fieldwork was to determine whether readmitted refugees and 
asylum seekers have the opportunity to apply for asylum. The participants’ responses 
indicate that the deficiencies in bureaucratic procedures both in Greece and in Turkey 
                                                 
34  Kirişçi, Kemal, Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality, Brookings, 
May 2014, pp. 1-3; Elman, Pinar, From Blame Game to Cooperation: EU-Turkey Response to the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Policy Paper, No. 34(136), 
October 2015, p. 7.  
35  Erdoğan & Kavukçuer & Çetinkaya, 2017, p. 9.  
36  Özkök, Ertuğrul, “Friend Know Your Place If You Are A Guest” (Arkadaş Misafirsen Misafirliğini 
Bil), Hürrriyet Gazetesi, 27 Temmuz 2012, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arkadas-misafirsen-
misafirligini-bil-21077508. 
37  Kılıç, Taner, Türkiye’de Mülteci Hukuku Uygulamaları, Geri Kabul Süreci, (The Asylum Law 
Practice of Turkey: Readmission Process), Birikim Dergisi, Ağustos-Eylül, 2016, p. 67. 
38  Chimni, B.S. The Principle of Burden Sharing: Some Reflections, Presentation to the Summer School 
in Forced Migration, University of Oxford, July 1999, p. 7; Betts, Alexander & Milner, James, The 
Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The Position of African States, Working Paper No. 36, 
University of Oxford, 2006, p. 32.  
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have hindered asylum seekers from using their right to seek asylum. The responses of the 
participants verified the recent reports of the human rights organisations that despite 
significant financial and human resources support from the EU to Greece, the Greek 
asylum system is still unable to ensure efficient access to quality asylum procedures for 
all.39 The systemic use of the safe third country concept in the admissibility procedures 
is also undermining the effectiveness of procedural safeguards and access to the asylum 
procedures.40 This deficiency in asylum procedures in Greece has led many asylum 
seekers to find themselves in Turkey without having been given a chance to apply for 
asylum in Greece.  
Because of these deficiencies in the Greek Asylum Service, Turkey should provide fair 
and accessible asylum procedures for readmitted persons under the EU-Turkey Statement 
to prevent further removal and chain refoulement. My interviewees overwhelmingly 
highlighted that Turkey’s new asylum policy provides some safeguards to asylum seekers 
but many challenging issues are still hampering the right to seek asylum in practice. The 
first challenge is related to the negative approach of the governmental authorities to the 
readmission procedure. As L141 emphasised in his interview,  
The EU-Turkey RA fueled many discussions in the Turkish Parliament and the main 
opposition party, Republican People’s Party (CHP), accused the Government of signing 
the agreement with the EU without considering national interests. Against these 
accusations, the government defended itself stating that the EU-Turkey RA will not be 
a burden on Turkey and every readmitted migrant will be sent back to their country of 
origin on the same day of readmission to Turkey. What I have experienced in the field 
indicates that Turkey will try to send back all readmitted migrants to their country of 
origin and there is no chance to apply for asylum for readmitted migrants in Turkey. 
                                                 
39  Amnesty International, A Blue Print for Despair, Human Rights Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal, 
January 2017, p. 11.  
40  ECRE, The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece, 2017, p. 34, 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf.; Lovertt, 
Asleigh & Whelan, Claire & Rendón, Renata, The Reality of the EU-Turkey Statement: How Greece 
has Become a Testing Ground for Policies that Erode Protection for Refugees, Publishers: 
International Rescue Committee & Norwegian Refugee Council and Oxfam Joint Agency, Briefing 
Note, 17 March 2017, p. 2; Sklerapis, Dimitris, The Greek Response to the Migration Challenge: 
2015-2017, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 16 March 2017, p. 4.  
41  This was taken from the interview with the lawyer and a Chairman of the NGO in Turkey. I will use 
abbreviations to protect participants’ anonymity. “L” refers to “lawyer” in the migration and refugee 
studies. If there is more than one participant in the same position, I will add numbers like L1 and L2 
for two lawyers. 
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The second problem is related to procedural safeguards for accessing asylum application. 
Although the LFIP provides some safeguards, it does not work effectively in practice due 
to institutional deficiencies. Thus, many readmitted asylum seekers have been deported 
to their country of origin without applying for asylum as soon as they arrive in Turkey. 
L1 shared his experience as a lawyer after the EU-Turkey refugee deal on 18th March 
2016. He witnessed readmission of five Congolese nationals without accessing asylum 
procedures in Greece under the EU-Turkey refugee deal. After their readmission to 
Turkey, they asked for asylum in Turkey, but Turkish authorities refused their 
applications without taking any official application from them. After their second attempt 
to apply for asylum in written form, the authorities said,  
‘You have no right to apply for asylum because you were readmitted from Greece, you 
should have asked for asylum there’…As soon as I was informed about their situation I 
went to see them in Kırklareli Removal Centre. I studied their file as their lawyer, and 
I realised that they signed the notice of deportation decision without knowing what they 
had signed. Although they cannot speak any word of English but, only French, the 
deportation notice was written in English and notified to them in English…After 
examination of the file, I found out that they missed the required time to apply to the 
Court for annulment of the deportation decision. Since people who are subjected to 
deportation decision should go to Administrative Court within 15 days after notification 
of deportation order in accordance with LFIP. To halt the deportation decision, I opened 
the case alleging that administrative authority did not notify my clients about their 
deportation orders in their language. 
After L1’s allegation before the Court, the Director of Provincial Migration Management 
in Kırklareli brought a French translator from another city and took asylum applications 
of these five Congolese asylum seekers in their language. Three of them were released 
from the removal centre after their asylum applications were accepted. The other two 
were also released after five months detention in Kayseri Removal Centre. However, 
there is no doubt that without L1’s involvement, these five Congolese asylum seekers 
would have been deported to their country of origins. He said,  
I think these Congolese asylum seekers were the luckiest group, who accessed their 
lawyer and had a chance to apply for asylum. 
As exemplified in the above case, procedural and administrative deficiencies in removal 
centres have made it difficult for readmitted migrants to get access to asylum procedures 
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before their deportation takes place. NGO3 highlighted some of the difficulties in 
applying for asylum from removal centres. He said, 
Non-Syrian refugees have a weak chance to access asylum procedures from removal 
centre. There is no possibility that they will be released. If somebody is held in a 
removal centre, they will automatically be removed to their country of origin. As far as 
I know, all readmitted non-Syrian refugees had been sent to Kırklareli Removal Centre 
and we did not know what happened to them after their detention. No government 
agencies have made any statement about them so far.  
NGO3's statement also highlights that non-Syrian asylum seekers face a high risk of 
refoulement. This problem originates from Turkey and the EU’s discriminative approach 
towards refugees. After the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU asked Turkey to guarantee that 
Syrian refugees would not be refoule after their readmission procedure. As stated in 
chapter V, Turkey amended its Temporary Protection Directive and provides a legal 
ground to reactivate or examines asylum claims of Syrian refugees after their readmission 
to Turkey. Unfortunately, the EU did not ask for any legal guarantee for non-Syrian 
refugees and Turkey only wrote a letter that gives non-Syrians a chance to ask for asylum 
when they are readmitted to Turkey. This has no binding effect on Turkish law. Therefore, 
non-Syrian refugees are subjected to fast-track removal procedure without asking for 
asylum after their readmission to Turkey. If there is no readmission agreement between 
Turkey and refugees’ country of origin, they are just sent back to their country with travel 
documents obtained from their consulates in Turkey.  
L1 and NGO442 expressed their concerns about misinformation or no information given 
to readmitted migrants about asylum procedures at the removal centres. They said that 
asylum application procedure is not transparent and detained migrants are not properly 
informed about their rights. They do not know how to apply for asylum at removal centres 
or to ask for free legal assistance when they are subjected to a deportation order, detention 
or their asylum application is rejected. Also, L1 explained:  
In some cases, the staffs deliberately misinform detainees. They said that if they applied 
for asylum, they would be detained for months. These attitudes discourage people from 
applying for asylum. 
                                                 
42  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Member of the Human Right 
Association and the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), Research Assistant at 
the University. 
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L243 also complained about administrative authorities’ neglectful behaviours towards 
asylum seekers. He said,  
Turkey does not respect the principle of non-refoulement. I advised my clients to apply 
for asylum at the Provincial Migration Management, but they did not take his asylum 
application. After my insistence, they were obliged to take my client’s asylum claim. 
Also, I witnessed many times that the administrative authorities did not want to take the 
application of detainees, who are subjected to deportation orders. For example, an 
asylum seeker asks for asylum, but the authorities do not reply or ignore her/his request. 
I thought that after transferring of the Migration Management from police department 
to civil authority, it would become more civilised and leave behind its security-based 
approach. But so far what my observation is that the previous approach has not changed 
in practice. In fact, we admitted that the security-based approach has gained weight in 
civil bureaucracy due to increasing terrorist attacks in Turkey, stemming from ISIS and 
PKK. 
NGO1 highlighted negative behaviours of administrative authorities towards asylum 
seekers and procedural deficiencies at the airports and border zones. There is no 
monitoring body to ensure that Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement. He 
witnessed unlawful deportation of an Uzbekistan national although his lawyer had helped 
him to apply for asylum. He says,  
After his lawyer left the airport, the police officer tore his asylum application in front 
of his eyes and said, “Who can save you now?” Unfortunately, such things frequently 
happen at borders and airports. If lawyers are engaged with asylum applications, the 
administrative authorities will develop very hostile approaches towards asylum seekers. 
NGO1 called the head of the airport police many times to stop the deportation of his client 
due to his particular situation. Unfortunately, the head of the airport police refused his 
client’s asylum application stating,  
“There is no official asylum application in our hand. We cannot do anything without his 
individual asylum application”. After my insistence, the head of the airport police said, 
“There was nothing you could do to stop his deportation to Uzbekistan”. 
As NGO1 underlined in his interview, this case is very common in Turkish practice. There 
are many unheard cases that asylum seekers are being sent back to their country of origin 
                                                 
43  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is a lawyer and Vice President of the Non-
Governmental Organisation.  
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without claiming asylum. Unfortunately, there is a general prejudgment towards irregular 
migrants amongst police officers. If someone is caught by the police without any valid 
passport, they will be seen as fraudulent and returned to their country on the first flight 
even though they would like to apply for asylum. Thus, many refoulement cases happen 
at the airports and border zones. However, there is no evidence because no application or 
registration is taken before their removal to their country of origin. For NGO1,  
These kinds of refoulement cases are even more dangerous than pushing back boats in 
the sea. Although people in the sea have a chance to survive with their life vest, these 
people do not have a chance to survive in their countries after their readmission to the 
oppressive governments. For example, if any Uzbekistan or Tajikistan nationals is 
readmitted to their countries, they would face the death penalty or ill-treatment in their 
countries of origin even they did nothing wrong. 
Considering these participants' claims and evidences it is difficult to say that individuals 
who are seeking international protection can access their fundamental right to seek 
asylum. A recent leaked letter of the UNHCR complained that Turkey does not 
“systematically” share the legal status and whereabouts of readmitted Syrians, and it is 
making monitoring more problematic.  
Vincent Cochetel, who oversees the UNHCR's European operations, said:  
Despite its best efforts, the UNHCR has not been able to contact the majority of the 
others. We thought we had permission but we were not given access. For us, that is an 
important aspect of the safeguards.44  
3.3. No Guarantee Against Refoulement: Deportations of Refugees on the Ground of 
Public Security and Public Order 
After assessing the availability of fair and effective asylum application procedures, the 
most important point is whether Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement. The 
fieldwork findings indicate that Turkey has developed more securitized and restrictive 
policies towards refugees after the EU-Turkey Statement.45 This change from an open-
                                                 
44  EU Observer, UN Struggles to Monitor Fate of Readmitted Syrians in Turkey, 18 January 2017, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/136591. Accessed online on 18 March 2017.  
45  The Report of the Amnesty International reaffirmed this finding that Turkish authorities’ 
humanitarian and generous approach towards refugees and asylum seekers had changed with the 
opening of negotiations of the EU-Turkey Statement. See Amnesty International, Unlawful 
Detention and Deportation of Refugees from Turkey, December 2015, p. 12. 
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door policy to a more security-oriented approach can be explained with Turkey's 
increasing refugee burden, geographical proximity to the conflict zones and increasing 
internal security concerns.46 Especially many terrorist attacks happening in metropolitan 
cities have become a major factor in changing the generous approach of the Turkish 
government towards refugees. 
The interviewees, especially lawyers and judges are well aware of this securitized 
approach of the administrative authorities and highlighted the increasing deportation of 
international protection seekers on the ground of public security. I asked the participants 
whether there is an increased risk of deportation of asylum seekers and refugees. The 
judges agreed there was an increase in deportations of foreigners on the grounds of public 
security and public order. Even at the Constitutional Court level, rapporteur judge J147 
asserted that nearly 80 per cent of their workload was related to deportation decision of 
foreigners for public security and public order reasons. In addition, the Ministry of 
Interior’s declaration on entry bans on foreigners confirmed these allegations that there 
is an increasing public concern related to foreigners living in Turkey. This is supported 
by recent statistics that 47.000 foreigners were subjected to an entry ban in accordance 
with Article 9 of the LFIP. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior deported 3.000 foreigners 
for being suspected of being terrorists under general security codes, so-called G87 or Ç-
114.48 The widespread use of entry bans and deportation of foreign nationals or 
international protection seekers, who are residing in Turkey, constitute a serious threat to 
the principle of non-refoulement.  
I asked interviewees whether these deportations of persons on the ground of public 
security or public order conflicts with the principle of non-refoulement. L2 found these 
deportations unlawful and against the principle of non-refoulement. He argued,  
Article 54(2) and 64 of the LFIP gives administrative authorities a wide range of 
discretion to declare some of the foreigners as an undesirable person or terrorist without 
                                                 
46  Kılıç, Taner, Türkiye’de Mülteci Hukuku Uygulamaları, Geri Kabul Süreci, (The Asylum Law 
Practice of Turkey: Readmission Process), Birikim Dergisi, Ağustos-Eylül, 2016, pp. 66-67. 
47  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Rapporteur Judge at the Turkish 
Constitutional Court. I will use some abbreviations to protect participants’ anonymity. “J” refers to 
“judge” in the Court. If there is more than one participant in the same position, I will add numbers 
like J1 and J2 for two judges. 
48  Haber Turk, The Minister of Interior M. Ala: Entry Ban on 47.000 Foreigners, 5 February 2016, 
http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1191518-icisleri-bakani-ala-37-bin-kisiye-giris-yasagi. 
Retrieved on 22 March 2017.  
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conducting any criminal proceedings. For this reason, this provision absolutely violates 
the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence and the principle of non-
refoulement. There are many examples that asylum seekers and refugees are subjected 
to deportation orders for being suspected of being terrorists without any serious pieces 
of evidence. Unfortunately, recent terror attacks happening in many metropolitan cities 
of Turkey have exacerbated these security-oriented practices, and the DGMM has 
positioned itself as a guardian of the country rather than protecting the rights of 
individuals, especially refugees. 
L349 underlines the same concerns and said that Turkey has been accused of allowing 
foreigner fighters to pass into the Syrian international arena. Thus Turkey has recently 
adopted very strict security oriented perspective and started to see every foreigner as a 
prime suspect of being a member of ISIS. This security-based approach has victimised 
and labelled many foreigners as terrorists. He also underlined the increasing pressure of 
the governmental authorities on NGO’s helping asylum seekers and refugees on a 
voluntary basis:  
Yesterday I had spoken with the Director of İstanbul Migration Management and he 
was accusing me of helping terrorists. He threatened me saying, “We are now in a state 
of emergency. If any of them you helped are terrorists, you will be persecuted due to 
trying to overthrow the constitutional order.” It is not easy to help people who are 
accused of being a terrorist in this climate. So far, many of asylum seekers' claims were 
rejected due to public security concerns and I annulled many cases in the Administrative 
Courts in these matters… What I learned during this process is that if somebody were 
suspected of being a terrorist, the DGMM would reject his or her application for asylum. 
The expert only writes a note on the file saying, “International protection was rejected 
due to public security concern”.  
L3 also argues that it is not a legal action to refuse the application of asylum seekers 
without considering their claims on public security grounds. Article 4 of the LFIP 
provides absolute protection from refoulement without any exception and there is no 
exception for security reasons. This security-oriented perspective is totally against the 
international protection regime. Every individual case should be examined in context and 
                                                 
49  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is Lawyer and Members of the Refugee 
Rights of Turkey. 
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in accordance with Article 61, 62 and 63 of the LFIP. Unfortunately, there is no individual 
assessment in actual practice.  
L3 also criticised the Turkish government's widespread practice of entry bans on 
foreigners. In accordance with the LFIP, an entry ban can only be put on foreigners in 
two conditions; Firstly, it may be put on aliens who are subjected to deportation orders 
due to committing a serious crime. Secondly, foreigners who are already outside the 
country and seen as a threat to the security of the country can be banned from entering 
the country. However, currently, the practice of Turkish authorities is conflicting with the 
LFIP. Foreigners, who have been living in Turkey with residence permits and not 
committing any crime, are now subjected to entry ban using G87 code and deportation 
orders. L3 said,  
The standard rule is upside down…I think the entry ban on international protection 
seekers is entirely arbitrary because the LFIP does not give permission to the public 
authority to put an entry ban on foreigners who have already been living legally in the 
country. It is not logical. 
NGO1 referred to the same problems in his interview. He said that Turkey is using these 
deportation decisions as evidence of its fight against ISIS in the international arena. 
Unfortunately, these deportation decisions have led to many human rights infringements. 
Many residence permit holders have been subjected to G87 code and deported to their 
country of origin. These deportation decisions are mainly based on ‘national security’ and 
‘public order’ without any substantive examination of whether the concerned person is a 
real threat to national security or public order. The information stems from different 
national intelligence units, for example, Egypt, Israel, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Russia. 
He shared some of his experiences in the field:  
Even 64 year’s old women or 8-month-old babies are sometimes subjected to G87 code. 
We have filed many cases against these arbitrary decisions…however, without any 
support of civil organisations, individuals cannot do anything against this kind of 
arbitrary decisions. Turkish administrative authorities consider every foreigner as a 
potential terrorist and this security-oriented perspective conflicts with the international 
responsibilities of Turkey towards refugees. 
L2 narrated his experience about the practice of an entry ban on his client. He said,  
I brought three cases against G87 codes in Ankara Administrative Courts. One of them 
was related to a Chechen national, who came to Turkey five years ago. After Russian 
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intelligence units accusing him of belonging to an ISIS terrorist group in Syria or 
international fighters, the DGMM put G87 code on him. He learnt this when he went to 
the Director of Provincial Migration Management to extend his residence permit. 
Against this accusation, he submitted his hospital documents as a proof before the Court 
that he was under care at the hospital due to a traffic accident at that time. What I learned 
from this case was that the DGMM generally put entry ban on foreigners using Turkish 
intelligence reports. However, these reports are gathered from different intelligence 
units but they are not based on concrete pieces of evidence. Unfortunately, Russia is 
using its relations to put pressure on its political dissidents in Turkey.  
According to the experiences of lawyers, judges and NGOs, the deportation decisions are 
often based on collected information from different intelligence units, but they are not 
based on concrete criminal evidence. Considering the position of political dissidents in 
Turkey, relying on the information served by the country of origin definitely conflicts 
with the principles of the international refugee protection regime. It is very well known 
that some countries may produce false reports to put pressure on political dissidents 
fleeing from their country. Also, the common practice shows that when individuals 
challenge these administrative decisions before the Administrative Courts or TCC, the 
DGMM cannot submit any substantial evidence to the Court. The judges I interviewed 
brought up this issue. For instance, Judge J250 complained about the lack of necessary 
information about claimants and deportation reasons in the file. She said,  
Although the DGMM alleges that the concerned person has become a threat to national 
security due to connection with ISIS and other terrorist organisations, we cannot find 
any evidence in the file. Also, the quality of interviews is very poor because they are 
generally taken by police officers or unqualified persons. In these situations, we do not 
want to reach a verdict without seeing reports of the intelligence unit or other evidences. 
The Court investigates the claimant’s special situation from the intelligence units and 
different channels but sometimes we do not receive any information, or it takes longer 
than 15 days. It is problematic because the LFIP requires the Court to decide upon 
deportation decision within 15 days but collecting all the necessary information takes 
more than six months. 
                                                 
50  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Head Judge at the Administrative 
Court. 
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Ankara 1. Administrative Court applied to the Constitutional Court for annulment of 15 
days of time limitation for judicial review under Article 80(d) of the LFIP. The 
Administrative Court alleged that it is very difficult to render a decision within 15 days 
considering the complexity of the issues and difficulties in collecting enough information 
from different units. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court rejected51 the claim of the 
Administrative Court although the Administrative Court had explained its reasons very 
clearly. The Constitutional Court affirmed that the cases related to international 
protection applications should be concluded in a fast and efficient manner considering 
both public and foreigner’s interest. From a human rights perspective, the closer analysis 
of the Court's verdict reveals that this interpretation definitely reflects the securitized 
approach of administrative authorities and does not see refugees and asylum seekers as 
equal right holders before the law. Even though Turkish citizens can go to appeal in 60 
days, the Court found 15 days enough for asylum seekers and refugees who are vulnerable 
both economically and socially and have no idea how to go to the Court. This approach 
reflects Arendt's criticism about the mythical position of the universalistic human rights 
in the contemporary world. Even though the 1951 Refugee Convention and related human 
rights provide a basis for refugee protection, in fact, refugees mainly depend on the 
generosity or goodwill of national states. The decision of the Court reveals the continuing 
relevance of Arendt's arguments about the rightlessness position of refugees and asylum 
seekers. The ruling of the Court poses a challenging question about the legal persona of 
individuals who have lost their citizenship and are forced into a position of "bare 
humanity" to claim any rights. 
The judge participants also gave some insights about the approach of the Courts towards 
asylum seekers as individuals who are looking for a dignified life. It is significant that 
there are differences between the approach of the Administrative Court and the Turkish 
Constitution Court towards asylum seekers and refugees. For instance, judge, J2, of the 
Administrative Court highlighted security-oriented approach of the Court on deportations 
of asylum seekers and refugees stating:  
When the Court cannot see any pieces of evidence in the file, but the DGMM alleges 
that the concerned person is a terrorist, considering last terrorist attacks in Turkey, we 
have expanded the sovereign power of the state at the expense of individual's liberty. 
                                                 
51  The TCC, RN: 2016/29, JN: 2016/134, Date: 14.07.2016, OGT. 23.09.2016, no. 29836. 
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The Court thought that if any foreigner would become a threat to public security in 
Turkey, the foreigner could go to another country to ask for asylum but not in Turkey. 
This approach has prevented many international protection seekers from entering into 
Turkey without considering enough evidence on the ground of public security. This 
statement of the J2 reveals that even though there is no concrete evidence in the file about 
the criminality of the individual, the asylum seekers might face deportation or an entry 
ban due to the excessive power of the State. Considering the “rightless” and precarious 
legal standing of an asylum seeker, this approach prevents them claiming their 
fundamental right to seek asylum and reduce them “bare humanity” without any civil and 
political rights. 
Contrary to the perspective of the Administrative Courts, Rapporteur judge, J152 in the 
TCC, explains the current perspective of the TCC concerning deportation cases and the 
Court’s stance in the conflict situation between the right to life and security of the country. 
He stated 
The TCC has a very reflexive and right-based approach in asylum cases…For example, 
sometimes refugees and asylum seekers could face deportation decisions due to public 
security reasons. In these cases, the Court looks at whether the claimant would face the 
death penalty or torture in her/his country of origin if s/he were deported. The rights of 
individuals always come first compared to public security or public order. 
Rapporteur judge, J1 also mentioned about the TCC’s changing approach after January 
2016 on interim measure decisions. Before that date, the TCC did not give automatic 
interim measure decisions on deportation of foreigners but this led to some unlawful 
deportation of asylum seekers while awaiting the decision of the TCC. Once, an Afghan 
national was deported to his country of origin by the DGMM without waiting for the 
decision of the TCC. Also, in another case, a Chechnya national was deported to Russia 
two hours before the TCC’s interim measure decision. Thus, the TCC changed its 
procedure in January 2016 and started to give interim measure decision within 48 hours 
after the application of the claimants. This has prevented many violations of human rights 
and non-refoulement cases. It has also prevented claimants from going to the ECtHR. 
This approach reflects the TCC's human right-based approach. It imitated the structure of 
                                                 
52  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Rapporteur Judge at the Turkish 
Constitutional Court. 
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the ECtHR and aims to reduce the files going to the ECtHR as an individual application 
avenue. Its human rights approach has been subjected to many criticisms by the 
governments so far. However, its human rights centred approach is very promising for 
asylum seekers and refugees who are subjected to deportation or arbitrary power of the 
state authorities. 
It is worthy of note that after my fieldwork study, some of the provisions of the LFIP 
changed in 2016. As mentioned in chapter V, these provisions restricted some procedural 
guarantees against deportation decisions on the ground of public security reasons. Since 
then, foreigners can be deported to their country of origin after 15 days of the DGMM 
decision without effectively challenging this decision. This new amendment should be 
considered within the debate whether Turkey is a safe country for refugees. I think it is a 
very important indicator of the ineffectiveness of Turkey's refugee protection system. The 
deportation of asylum seekers on the ground of largely undefined public security reasons 
may constitute the main threat to the principle of non-refoulement and Turkey’s safety 
for refugees.  
3.4. Detention in Inhuman Conditions: Punishment Without Crime 
The EU-Turkey refugee deal has triggered the detention of many individuals who are 
being held in one of the border provinces or readmitted to Turkey.53 Turkey's removal 
centre capacity has been increased considerably since the EU-Turkey RA. Considering 
the increasing capacity of the removal centres and the pressure of the EU on Turkey to 
reduce irregular crossing of refugees and migrants, the condition of the removal centres 
and safeguards against arbitrary administrative detention has become very important. To 
find out more about the real condition of detainees at the removal centres, I asked my 
participants their experiences and observations about whether detainees access to their 
basic necessities and challenge the administrative detention if inhuman conditions apply. 
The participants, especially lawyers and NGOs emphasised that prolonged detention and 
inhuman conditions were characteristic of removal centres. Although the LFIP provides 
alternatives to administrative detention, including residence in satellite cities, some 
asylum seekers are still detained in inhuman conditions for long periods of time without 
access to their lawyers. Kumkapı Removal centre is the largest and located in İstanbul 
                                                 
53  Amnesty International, Unlawful Detention and Deportation of Refugees from Turkey, December 
2015, pp. 4-7.  
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but it is known for its poor conditions and infringements of human rights. As shown in 
the recent judgments of the TCC54 and the ECtHR,55 even after the adoption of the LFIP, 
living condition at Kumkapı have not improved. So far, the TCC and the ECtHR have 
rendered many judgments due to inhuman conditions in removal centres where conditions 
are still equal to inhuman conditions as envisaged in Article 3 of the ECHR.  
I asked E356, the General Director of Migration Management, about the situation in the 
Kumkapı removal centre and his plan for the future. Even though there have been many 
negative decisions of the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR about inhuman conditions, 
there is no plan of the Migration Management to replace it. The Director referred to 
continued attempts to find land outside İstanbul to build a new centre but these attempts 
have not reached any success yet. 
Aşkale removal centre is also well known for its poor treatment of detainees although it 
is a very new and “luxurious” removal centre. It is designed for detainees who are 
suspected of being terrorists. As L3 underlines,  
The DGMM has been sending all foreigners, who are suspected of being terrorists. So, 
both civil servants and security forces have developed prejudgment towards detainees 
in Aşkale removal centre. Thus staff working in this centre treats detainees as criminals. 
Some of the migrants are subjected to solitary confinement. I went to Aşkale several 
times to see my clients. Even though I have a warrant of attorney, the Director of Aşkale 
Removal Centre would not allow me to speak with my clients. 
L2 also narrated his experience with his clients, who had been detained in Aşkale. He 
said,  
One of my clients was subjected to cell punishment during the winter season at Aşkale. 
My client was deliberately kept in a freezing and small room for ten days. At that time 
it was December…I asked the TCC for interim measure about administrative detention 
due to inhuman conditions of the removal centre. After prosecutor's investigation, my 
client was removed from the cell and put into another common room with other 
detainees. But the Director of the Removal Centre threatened my client and pressured 
                                                 
54  The TCC, K.A., Application No. 2014/13044, 11 November 2015. OGT, 17 December 2015, No: 
29565; The TCC, A.S. Application No. 2014/2841, 09 June 2016; The TCC, Albina Kıyamova. 
Application No. 2013/3187, 14 April 2016.  
55  Khaldarov v. Turkey, Application no. 23619/11, 5 September 2017, para. 31.  
56  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Director of the Migration 
Management. 
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him to say at the Court, ‘I certainly was not subjected to any ill-treatment, I have no 
complaints against anyone’. My client said to the Court what the Director said to him 
before because he was afraid of being sent to his country of origin. 
After the transfer of his client to another removal centre, L2 opened a case against the 
Director of the Removal Centre. However, the Criminal Court could not find any 
evidence of ill-treatment or torture on the body of the detainee, and in the end, it closed 
the case without giving any punishment to the Director of the Removal Centre. 
Unfortunately, it has become a regular situation in Turkey that the mistreatment towards 
detainees incurs no punishment in practice. This encourages ill treatment towards 
detainees. 
Lawyers and experts also allege that there is an increase in violence towards detainees at 
removal centre. L557 says,  
I think there is an increase in violence at the removal centres. This is very critical… The 
civil administration has caused this increase after demilitarisation of removal centres. 
Before the transfer of removal centre into the DGMM, these removal centres had been 
controlled by the police until 2014. During this period, we witnessed many human rights 
infringements. Some of the detainees were subjected to torture and ill treatment. 
Although we were waiting for some improvements after these centres' transfer into the 
DGMM, unfortunately, we could not see considerable improvements in conditions of 
removal centres and administrative authorities’ approach. 
He gave two reasons for the increasing violence against migrants in the removal centres: 
One was the lack of institutional capacity of the DGMM and two was no monitoring 
system in the removal centres. In fact, the DGMM has continued to recruit police officers 
due to lack of qualified personnel. Also, there is no independent monitoring body to 
observe human rights infringements. The Human Rights Institution of Turkey was 
replaced with the Human Rights and Equality Institution but it has not functioned very 
well due to political interference. The Ombudsman also has not functioned very well from 
the start. 
NGO1 expressed the same concern in his interview. He said,  
                                                 
57  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the lawyer and an expert in Migration 
and Human Rights Law and former rapporteur of the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey. 
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I have to admit that we have been facing more difficulties and human rights violations 
in removal centres than before. At least police officers had work experience and 
followed the instruction of their supervisor, but now civil officers do not have any work 
experience and any work discipline at all. 
NGO3 also complained about the deficiency of a civil monitoring authority to observe 
whether refugees have access to their fundamental rights, such as health and free legal 
advice. He said,  
So far the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey had monitoring duty but Human 
Rights Institution of Turkey was closed recently. The Institution was replaced with 
Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey. However, in contrast to the previous 
structure of the Institution, all members were appointed by the Government as a 
government officer. The problem is how this institution can pursue an effective 
monitoring if the institution is not independent of the government control. 
L3 and NGO1 complained about restricted communication of detainees with their 
families and lawyers. L3 said,  
Some removal centres removed payphones to make difficult the communication of 
migrant detainees with outside world.  
Although there is no restriction on lawyer's access to their clients in the law, the practice 
works very differently. The DGMM has brought a new accreditation system, and lawyers 
have to obtain the permission of the DGMM in advance to speak with their client 
detainees. Unfortunately, restrictive approaches of administrative authorities have 
triggered more human rights violations in practice.  
NGO1 also complained about problems in accessing his client in his interview:  
When I tried to access my client, the Director of the Removal Centre said to me ‘Are 
you a terrorist? Why are you defending these terrorists?’…Although we are NGOs 
working voluntarily and have very close connection with the Government officers and 
high level bureaucrats, I have been facing great difficulties in accessing my clients. I 
cannot imagine this is happening to other lawyers. God gives them patience…without 
changing this restrictive approach, the conditions of detainees could not be improved 
very much. Since even senior officials and staff have seen them as a terrorist and treat 
them in accordance to this. 
It is of concern that as explained in chapter V, the LFIP does not provide an effective 
remedy against the conditions of removal centres. The Criminal Courts only assesses the 
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legality of the administrative detention decisions but cannot examine the living conditions 
at removal centres whether there is inhuman conditions or torture or ill treatment of 
detainees. The TCC has recognised this deficiency and lack of an effective remedy and 
has started to accept this kind of application at a first instance court. Considering this 
deficiency, J1, Rapporteur Judge at the Turkish Constitutional Court suggested;  
The LFIP should be amended to give migrants the right to go to the Criminal Court 
against inhuman conditions of removal centre. 
Considering the problems identified by the interviewees, it is surprising that there are not 
more cases challenging inhuman conditions of removal centres before the TCC or the 
ECtHR. This can only be explainable with the struggles that detainees have in accessing 
free legal advisors and other procedural safeguards. Given the very limited cases before 
courts, we cannot say that Turkey is a safe third country for refugees. All the evidence 
from my fieldwork points to Turkey failing to provide proper living conditions at removal 
centres for readmitted migrants and asylum seekers. There is no doubt that the EU-Turkey 
RA has been the cause of many human rights violations but these also occur because of 
the precarious legal position of refugees.  
4. Rightlessness: No Effective Remedy against Human Rights Infringements 
Effective remedies against human rights infringements are very important for providing 
a safe and a dignified life for asylum seekers and refugees who have been forced to live 
in Turkey. Turkey's adoption of the LFIP gave considerable procedural safeguards for 
asylum seekers and refugees, but this has not been effectively applied in practice yet. As 
NGO3 expressed in his interview,  
The EU’s acceptance of Turkey as a safe third country regarding Turkey’s written 
legislation without considering problems in practice is a shortsighted and impetuous 
approach and conflicts with moral values and international human rights laws. This 
perspective is entirely wrong, and it ignores sociologic, economic and political 
dimensions of the subject. 
L5 also underlined the same problems with the implementation of the LFIP in practice 
saying, 
 I took part in the preparation of the LFIP and I know that it had been prepared with 
good intentions, but it does not work very well in practice. The problem is not the LFIP, 
but it is related to Turkey's capacity. Turkey's institutional capacity is not enough to 
implement the Law. There are not sufficient human resources educated in this area. For 
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example, Law Faculties do not teach Migration and Asylum Law in their 
curriculum...Even the judges in this area are not qualified. They have been looking at 
such cases for the first time in their professional life…there is a big gap in the level of 
consistency between the court decisions…So, in this situation, it is not very surprising 
to see human rights infringements both at administrative and judicial levels. 
The interviewees also highlighted that refugees do not feel safe in Turkey. Even if they 
become the victim of an incident, they cannot go to Court or sue the person or take action 
due to being afraid of being deported to their country of origin. Turkey's recent 
deportation orders and entry bans on foreigners are playing a major role in the creation 
of this fear. NGO3 commented on his experience of this issue;  
Nearly sixty-four refugee women came to our Kilis office to complain about sexual 
harassment. We gave them free legal assistance about what actions should be taken 
during this process. We also told them the risks that they might face during their judicial 
proceeding…63 of them abstained from taking legal action before the court due to fear 
of being deported to their country of origin. Only one woman had filed a case due to her 
pregnancy. 
NGO1 also complained about lack of effective remedies. He said,  
Even if refugees go to the police to complain about any infringements of their rights, 
the police do not take their complaints seriously and investigate them. Furthermore, the 
involvement of foreign nationals in any incidents could be considered the reason for a 
deportation decision even if the foreigner is the victim of the incident. I experienced on 
many occasions that security forces do not look at whether the foreigner is a victim of 
an incident or a criminal. The involvement in any incident is enough for their 
deportation on the ground of public security. 
He also narrated his experience with a Syrian refugee, who was subjected to ill treatment 
by a soldier. In this case, the soldier raped the Syrian girl when she was trying to cross 
the Turkish border with her father. The Syrian girl's father had witnessed his daughter's 
assault. NGO1 said,  
We convinced the girl and her father to report this sexual harassment and opened a case 
at the Military Court but the public prosecution office refused the case…After the 
refusal of the Military Court, we opened the case in the Criminal Court. Unfortunately, 
the judicial authorities were late in collecting evidence from the girl's body. The Court 
took some samples from the girl after seven days and sent to the Forensic Pathology 
Institution, but the Institution could not reach a conclusion with the evidence due to the 
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delays in collecting samples. I am so regretful that we worked very hard to convince the 
family to take this issue but judicial authorities’ neglectful behaviours hampered the 
legal process and the truth did not come out. As a result the soldier, who was accused 
of sexual assault towards the refugee woman, did not face any penalty. 
L2 also gave an example of the suspicious death of a young Syrian refugee, who had died 
while being detained at the Aşkale removal centre in 2015. In this case, he was accused 
of participating in a protest and being a member of an illegal organisation. After his 
suspicious death, the Directorate of the removal centre claimed that he committed suicide 
in his cell but his lawyer spoke to the media, asking “how a young man, 1.8 meters tall, 
who was very happy that he would be released soon, could hang himself from a bunk bed 
and die”.58 His lawyer was not allowed to see the cell he died in or to speak with other 
detainees who might have had some idea about his death. L2 highlighted the ignorance 
and failure to act of the public authorities to investigate these suspicious deaths: 
It is very interesting that the Parliamentary Human Rights Investigation Committee had 
visited Aşkale removal centre after the incident, but it had not published its report. 
Unfortunately, no actions were taken against unlawful behaviours of public servants 
and this has strengthened their impunity. 
4.1. Difficulties in Accessing Free Legal Advisors and Translators 
Article 81(2) of the LFIP provides free legal assistance in cases where “the applicant and 
international protection beneficiary is unable to afford the attorney’s fee for their judicial 
appeals.” As explained in chapter V, the LFIP would like to establish a “check and 
balance”59 system for providing a free legal advisor to international protection seekers. 
In doing this, it is aimed to limit the power of the administrative authority by an effective 
judicial control mechanism. Thus, accessing legal advice has become a really important 
safeguard for scrutinising administrative authority's activities. However, the interview 
with lawyers, NGOs and experts has revealed that although these safeguards are all 
present in theory, the actual practice is deficient.  
                                                 
58  Bianet, http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/170800-1-80-boyundaki-dervis-kendini-atkiyla-
ranzaya-nasil-asar. Retrieved on 1st of November 2016; Görendağ, Volkan, Yabancıların Temsil 
Sorununun Cezasızlık Kültürüne Katkısı: Lütfillah Tacik Davası Örneği (The Contribution of the 
Problem of Representation of Foreigners to the Impunity Cultural Model: Lütfillah Tajik Case), 
Amnesty International, 02 Haziran 2017, https://amnesty.org.tr/icerik/yabancilarin-temsil-
sorununun-cezasizlik-kulturune-katkisilutfillah-tacik-davasi-ornegi.  
59  Kılıç, 2016, p. 63.  
237 
 
  
NGO3 complained about the capacity of the Bar Association in providing legal advisors. 
He argued that although the LFIP provides detainee’s access to the legal advisor during 
their appeal procedures, the allocated fund to the Turkish Bar Association does not even 
meet Turkish citizens’ demand. The Ministry of Justice requested a bigger budget for 
supporting the Turkish Bar Association, but there is no positive reply yet. L460 also 
underlined the same problems,  
The Turkish Bar Association has been providing legal assistance, but it depends on their 
capacity. In some of the little cities, the Bar Association has not enough funds or 
personnel to provide free legal advisors. 
And also NGO4 repeated the same problems,  
The Turkish Bar Association is providing free legal assistance to refugees and asylum 
seekers, but it is not enough due to its lack of funding and experienced lawyers in 
refugee law. This is contradicting Article 6 of the ECHR, which protects the right to a 
fair trial. In accordance with this provision, access to legal representation and free 
assistance of an interpreter is a fundamental part of the right to a fair trial. 
L2 brought a different aspect to the issue. He alleged that although the LFIP gives the 
Turkish Bar Association the responsibility to provide a free legal advisor to international 
protection seekers, it has not worked in practice because the lawyers are afraid of losing 
their income. Also, the DGMM has not supported a free legal advisor system. In fact, we 
suggested both the Bar Associations and the DGMM put the telephone numbers of the 
Bar Association where detainees can easily see and reach by phone but neither of them is 
enthusiastic about this. The DGMM is deliberately neglecting the idea of free legal 
advisors. They think that if they facilitate access to a free legal advisor, it might obstruct 
the deportation process of irregular migrants. The Bar Association also does not want to 
take their files because they think it would increase the demand for lawyers and education 
programs on asylum issues. 
NGO3 and NGO1 emphasized administrative authorities’ resistance and restrictions as 
primary barriers to accessing and benefitting from legal advisors. NGO3 said,  
                                                 
60  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the lawyer at the UNHCR Turkey 
Office. 
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Administrative authorities do not give permission to lawyers to speak with their 
detainees in removal centres. The administrative authorities generally have used 
arbitrary power against detainees, but there is nothing to do in this unbalanced power. 
According to NGO1, the main problem is that lawyers have been facing many 
bureaucratic obstacles in getting permission from administrative authorities to access 
their clients. Although the LFIP provides an opportunity for detainees to access their 
lawyers, in practice, it is nearly impossible for lawyers to access their clients in removal 
centres. Lawyers can only see their clients after getting the permission of the Directorate 
of Provincial Migration Management in removal centres. NGO1 also compares the 
condition of removal centres with prisons and said,  
It is very surprising that access to prisons is easier than access to removal centres. Even 
criminals’ conditions are better than detainees in removal centres. For example, 
prisoners can have access to open air and sports activities on a daily basis, and their 
lawyers can see them easily. In contrast, some removal centres, especially Erzurum 
Aşkale, are like maximum-security prisons, no access is allowed. 
The other problem is related to the representation of refugees by their lawyers. Turkish 
law faculties do not teach migration and refugee law. Lawyers generally have no idea 
about international and refugee law. J2 shared her experience once at Court, 
Some of the lawyers came to the Court without knowing anything about the refugee law 
and their files. Once, the foreigner complained about his lawyer’s lack of competence 
and asked the Court to change his lawyer. I said to him ‘you can request from the Bar 
Association, but the court cannot dismiss the lawyer. 
L3 complained about deficiencies in translation services. He said,  
There is no translation service available in removal centres. As a lawyer, I cannot 
communicate with my clients due to language barriers. Thus, sometimes I call my 
friends to translate my clients' statements to me. This is a very difficult situation for 
lawyers. The translator is very important for asylum seekers since they have to apply 
for asylum in two different languages: first in their own language, second in Turkish. 
Unfortunately, if they do not know Turkish and there is no available translator, they 
cannot apply for asylum in removal centre. 
Also, L1 experienced the same problems in many cases. He underlined that  
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Detainees are not informed properly in their language. For example, when I checked my 
Congolese clients' files, I saw an information note about their rights in Turkish, but they 
do not know Turkish, but just French. 
4.2. Difficulties in Getting a Power of Attorney  
As discussed in chapter V, foreigners have to fulfil some procedural requirements to 
benefiting from a legal advisor. For instance, Turkish law requires individuals to take 
power of attorney from a notary to allow a lawyer to follow their case before the courts. 
It is a procedural issue, but it is a very fundamental issue for foreigners who cannot pursue 
their own cases before the Court because of their unfamiliarity with the Turkish judicial 
system and language barriers. Judge J2 underlined the fundamental procedural 
deficiencies in getting a power of attorney. She said,  
Some asylum seekers came to Turkey by illegal ways without any valid passport or ID. 
Thus, they cannot prove their identity to a public notary to obtain a power of attorney. 
After seeing problems in practice, the DGMM has started to provide international 
protection seekers with an identity card to facilitate their access to lawyers. Although 
this decisive step has solved some of the problems, the other part has continued. 
Although some asylum seekers can access identity cards after their asylum application, 
some of them have to wait until their asylum application is accepted. In these cases, 
they cannot get a power of attorney from the public notary. We took this issue to the 
Constitution Court alleging that Article 76(2) of the LFIP conflicts with Article 36 of 
the Constitution61, which gives the individual a right to benefit from a fair trial before 
the Court. 
However, the Constitutional Court recently found the issue out of its competence and 
rejected the case.62 It said that the issue is related to the Code of Civil Procedure and 
Notary Public Law, and it is not related to the LFIP. Thus, the problem remained 
unresolved at the Constitution level, but it will lead to another case in the future. 
J3,63 Rapporteur Judge at the Turkish Council of State, has also highlighted the same 
issue. He said,  
                                                 
61  “Everyone has the right of litigation either as plaintiff or defendant and the right to a fair trial before 
the courts through legitimate means and procedures”. 
62  The TCC, RN: 2016/29, JN: 2016/134, Date, 14.07.2016, OGT. 23.09.2016, no. 29836. 
63  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is Rapporteur Judge at the Turkish Council 
of State.  
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The Council of State does not accept the cases, which do not have the warrant of 
attorney. If the concerned claimant cannot provide the warrant of attorney, the Council 
of State have to decide that the procedural necessities of the case are not being 
completed successfully, and thus we will shelve the case without deciding on its 
substance. So far the Council of State has received 60 cases, which had no power of 
attorney in the file. 
Also, L4, a lawyer at the UNHCR, said,  
Unfortunately, there are still problems in getting a power of attorney for 
detainees…Without an ID card, it is impossible to get a power of attorney from a notary. 
Considering problems of asylum seekers to obtain a power of attorney, some of the 
courts have developed an alternative procedural way for helping refugees and asylum 
seekers. They have started to accept cases without a power of attorney… This method 
has been developed by the initiative of the judges, but the LFIP does not provide any 
solution. Now, only Antalya, Ankara and İstanbul Administrative Courts follow this 
method, there is no uniformity. Lawyers are still complaining about the problems of 
getting a power of attorney to file a case. Also, lawyers are still facing difficulties in 
accessing their clients in removal centres. The administrative authorities do not give 
permission to lawyers without a power of attorney but in fact, they cannot get a power 
of attorney without seeing their client. There is a vicious circle. 
 Regarding these problems, NGO4 also suggests that 
Considering refugees' and asylum seekers' condition is of paramount urgency, state 
authority should modify its common rules to consider the vulnerability of asylum 
seekers. From the human rights perspective, the rule of the state should be equitable and 
fair for all individuals without differentiating refugees and asylum seekers from its 
citizens. We should change our approach. 
All judges I interviewed also confirmed the problems of notifying the decision of the 
Court to international protection seekers, who cannot give a permanent address to the 
Court. Judge J2 and J3 described their experience in their interviews. They said, many 
refugees and asylum seekers are living in satellite cities but they have no permanent 
address because they are living in the street, parks or mosques. Also, some of them are 
changing their address frequently due to their fragile economic situation. We have so 
many files that we cannot notify the decision of the Court to the concerned individuals. 
J2 said,  
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Once a refugee tried to give a contact address to the Court that it was under construction 
where he was working as a labourer. One of them also gave the Court his mobile 
number, but the Court could not contact with him on the phone because he cannot speak 
Turkish. 
The Judges of Administrative Courts and the Council of State underlined that they have 
many files in their hands because the claimants have not been found in their contact 
address for one year. In these cases, the Court tried to contact the claimant twice. If the 
claimant cannot be found, the case will be suspended for one year. After one year of 
suspension, if the claimant does not attempt to reopen the case again, the Court will close 
the file without discussing its content.64 Judge J2 shared her concerns about these cases 
saying,  
If these people are deported to their country of origin without effectively challenging 
the decision of the administrative authorities, it will infringe the rights of many 
individuals and the principle of non-refoulement. These cases will certainly go to 
ECtHR and Turkey will face many compensations. 
5. Conclusion 
The main justification of the Turkey-EU Statement is based on the assumption that 
Turkey is a safe third country to which asylum seekers and refugees can be returned. The 
interviewees’ statement from the fieldwork reveals that Turkey has a huge reservoir of 
support and moral integrity amongst its NGOs, civil servants, experts and judges, who 
play a special role in promoting respect for human rights of refugees. This generosity of 
the Turkish community towards refugees could be boosted with meaningful and effective 
burden sharing by the EU but so far, the EU has not gone beyond giving financial 
assistance to Turkey to strengthen its borders. All the evidence drawn from the fieldwork 
indicates that despite Turkey's welcoming attitude and tremendous effort, refugees are 
struggling to access their basic fundamental human rights, especially civil and political 
rights. The interviewees’ observations and experience in the field point to three main 
problem areas that need to be resolved to ensure that Turkey is a safe third country for 
readmitted asylum seekers.  
The first important problem is related to Turkey’s geographical limitation to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Turkey only provides humanitarian protection to refugees but it 
                                                 
64  Article 26(3) of the Law on Procedure of Administrative Justice. 
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does not foresee any integration policies considering its increasing refugee protection 
responsibility. Asylum seekers cannot gain refugee status, long-term resident permission 
or citizenship status even though they live in Turkey for their lifetime. It is a fact that 
even newborn babies cannot obtain Turkish citizenship and so are de facto stateless. They 
are deprived of any “legal personhood”65 and this deprivation of legal status reduces them 
to “non-persons” or “legal ghosts”.66 Turkey’s President Erdoğan declared his 
government’s intention to give citizenship to Syrian refugees after six years of residence 
with temporary protection status in 2016 but this has not been popular within Turkish 
society. There is a growing concern amongst the opposition parties, secularist and 
Kurdish nationalist groups that the Turkish government will use refugees to transform 
identity, culture and political values in Turkey. Also, some Turkish citizens see refugees 
as an economic burden on the country’s resources and a threat to their livelihood. The 
increasing resentment amongst Turkish citizens towards refugees is an indication of the 
fragile social acceptance within Turkish community. If the integration of refugees into 
the Turkish community cannot be handled delicately and this hostility grows, it will 
jeopardise the EU-Turkey cooperation on the refugee issue. 
Second, although Turkish asylum law provides many safeguards to asylum seekers for 
their access to asylum procedures, Turkey is struggling to provide fair, efficient and 
accessible procedures due to its institutional deficiencies in legal assistance, translators 
and transparent administrative procedures. People who are readmitted to Turkey under 
the EU-Turkey refugee deal are not properly informed about their rights and subjected to 
a fast-track removal process without being given assistance with asylum applications. 
Non-Syrians, who are readmitted to Turkey, are facing more risk of deportation than 
Syrians due to the discriminative approach of both the EU and Turkey. Although the EU 
asked Turkey to guarantee support for Syrians after their readmission to Turkey, neither 
the EU nor Turkey considered non-Syrians and the consequences of their readmission to 
Turkey. It is evident that non-Syrian nationals have difficulty in claiming their 
fundamental right to seek asylum either in Greece or Turkey.  
Third, Turkey has changed its generous and open door policy towards refugees and 
                                                 
65  Arendt, 1966, p. 277. 
66  UNHCR, September 2006, “Refugees by Numbers 2006 Edition”, cited by Hayden, Patrick, From 
Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and Statelessness, Societies Without Borders, 
3(2), 2008, p. 249. 
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adopted more securitized and restrictive policies after the EU-Turkey Statement. 
Amended Turkish asylum law provides large discretion to administrative authorities to 
declare international protection seekers as undesirable persons on the basis of “public 
security” without any criminal proceedings. This security-based approach has victimised 
and labelled many international protection seekers as terrorists. The participant 
respondents, especially lawyer and judges, overwhelmingly agreed that widespread use 
of entry bans and deportation of international protection seekers constitutes a serious 
threat to the principle of non-refoulement. There is an appeal procedure against these acts 
of administrative authorities, but it has no suspension effect on deportation decisions. 
Administrative courts and the TCC examine the reasons for deportation orders rigorously 
and request substantial evidence for deportation of foreigner on the basis of public 
security but in a continuing state of emergency, lawyers’ restricted access to their clients 
at the removal centres, deficiencies in legal assistance and the 15 days time restriction on 
courts all have an effect on deportation decisions. 
Having looked in detail at the degree of respect, or otherwise, of the civil and political 
rights of readmitted refugees and asylum seekers, the next chapter critically investigates 
the extent to which readmitted refugees and asylum seekers can access their socio-
economic rights as envisioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention and other human rights 
instruments.  
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CHAPTER VII: Fieldwork Findings: The Impact of the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement on the Socio-Economic Rights of Refugees 
 
We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, 
which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, 
which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected 
expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish ghettos and our best friends 
have been killed in concentration camps, and that means the rupture of our private lives.1 
 
1. Introduction 
From the start of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the EU has always used the concept of 
Europeanization and, more recently, visa liberalisation as a lever to transform Turkey into 
a refugee hosting country and to push it towards taking responsibility for refugees and 
asylum seekers.2 The EU-Turkey Statement has been used to hold the refugee population 
in Turkey for over 18 months. That is time enough to see whether Turkey is providing 
equivalent protection to non-European refugees as for conventional refugees as alleged 
by the European Commission.3 Once again using Arendt’s theory in her book Human 
Condition in the section on “labour, work and action”, 4 this chapter exposes the 
difficulties refugees face in accessing their socio-economic rights in Turkey. The same 
18 key actors, including five representatives of NGOs, four judges, five lawyers and four 
senior officials and experts were interviewed to discover their views on Turkey’s record 
in ensuring the safety of refugees, and their access to socio-economic human rights 
including accommodation, healthcare, education services and the labour market in 
Turkey.  
                                                 
1  Arendt, Hannah, We Refugees, The Jewish Writings, Edited by Kohn, Jerome & Feldmen, H. Ron, 
Schocken Books: New York, 2007, p. 264. 
2  Tolay, Juliette, Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s Immigration Policies, 
Edited by Paçacı Elitok, Seçil & Straubhaar, Thomas, Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, 
Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg University Press: Hamburg, 2012, pp. 49-50; Tokuzlu, Lami 
Bertan, Burden-Sharing Games for Asylum Seekers between Turkey and the European Union, 
European University Institute, Florence Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS, May 2010, p. 1. 
3  European Commission, Report on Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of Its Visa 
Liberalization Roadmap, COM (2014) 646, 20.10.2014, p. 17.  
4  Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1958, p. 7.  
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The fieldwork findings indicate that although the interviewees come from different 
backgrounds, the common perception about the safety of Turkey for refugees is a negative 
one. The participants overwhelmingly thought Turkey cannot provide effective protection 
for refugees and asylum seekers as envisioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
human rights law. More specifically, Turkey cannot provide an adequate standard of 
living, such as access to housing, education, healthcare and labour market. In practice, 
the EU-Turkey Statement is leading to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 33 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus brings the responsibility of the EU Member 
States.  
As discussed in chapter III, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence states that refugees are entitled to 
their fundamental rights in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention beyond the 
principle of non-refoulement. As seen in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the 
transferring country should evaluate the accessibility to these basic human rights before 
transferring the responsibility for asylum seekers to third countries.5 The UNHCR’s 
consideration on the safe third country concept also shares the same perspective with the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. The UNHCR underlines that states should take into account 
third countries’ capacity to provide basic living standards, reception conditions and 
longer-term integration facilities, including their absorption capacity6 before starting to 
use the safe third country concept. In line with the UNHCR, Legomsky highlights that 
formal effectiveness is not enough to regard a country as safe for refugees. Actual practice 
should be the main indicator of whether a third country is safe for an asylum seeker or 
refugee.7 Considering these interpretations, current returns from Greece to Turkey are not 
consistent with this human rights perspective.  
                                                 
5  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, paras. 367-368; See 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application no. 29217/12, 4 November 2014, paras. 66-68. 
6  UNHCR, Considerations on the “Safe Third Country” Concept, Vienna, 8-11 July 1996, pp. 3-4; 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & McAdam, Jane, The Refugee in International Law, Third Edition, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2007, p. 393; Kneebone, Susan, The Pacific Plan: The Provision of 
“Effective Protection”? International Journal of Refugee Law, September 29, 2006, p. 696; ECRE, 
The Way Forward Europe’s Role in the Global Refugee Protection System, Guarding Refugee 
Protection Standards in Regions of Origin, European Council on Refugees and Exiles, December 
2005, p. 6.  
7  Legomsky, Stephen H, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, International Journal of Refugee Law, 15(4), 2003, 
pp. 630- 664.  
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2. Turkish Interviewees’ Views on the Safety of Turkey for Refugees 
The significant contribution of this section is to investigate what the participants think 
about the safety of Turkey for refugees. The researcher asked the participants what they 
think about the actual situation of refugees in Turkey today and whether the Turkish 
government provides effective protection for refugees in accordance with international 
and human rights law. The participants overwhelmingly agreed that the management of 
the refugee crisis is a very complex issue and involves more than simply providing 
humanitarian aid and respecting the principle of non-refoulement. Beyond the 
humanitarian aid, the most important challenge is to provide a decent quality of housing, 
health, education services and employment opportunities. Participants assessed Turkey’s 
safety from two different perspectives: First, whether Turkey respects the principle of 
non-refoulement and second, whether Turkey provides fundamental living conditions to 
refugees to facilitate their long-term integration into society.  
For NGO2,8 Turkey is a safe third country for refugees from the first perspective because 
Turkey respects the principle of non-refoulement. Even though this view has been refuted 
by Amnesty International and other NGOs arguing that Turkey do refoule both 
conditional and Syrian refugees to their country of origin, NGO2 thought that 
If you ask me, this was a bit exaggerated criticism. This campaign and reports aim at 
defamation of Turkey. We witnessed some specific refoulement cases in the past but 
Turkey always stays respectful to the principle of non-refoulement since its approval of 
the Convention…This campaign has aimed to create a false picture of Turkey going to 
totalitarianism in the political arena and using refugees as an instrument against Turkey. 
In fact, Turkey treated refugees more generously than many European countries and 
hosted 3 million Syrian refugees until now…I don’t believe that Turkey violates the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
NGO2 also evaluates Turkey’s safety for refugees in accordance with the second 
perspective more negatively,  
If you ask me whether Turkey is a safe third country or not, I will say ‘no' because 
refugees cannot find a life consistent with human dignity in Turkey. The LFIP has 
provided humanitarian assistance, but it did not provide long-term solutions. Thus 
                                                 
8  This was taken from the interview with the President of the NGO, Journalist and former spokesperson 
of the UNHCR.  
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refugees try to reach the EU territory to find durable solutions…I argue that 
international refugee protection should not only comply with the principle of non-
refoulement but also provide some fundamental human rights envisioned by the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Turkey, due to its geographical limitation, does not recognise the 
rights envisaged in the Convention. In that respect, Turkey’s asylum system does not 
provide a permanent status to refugees, so they cannot see their future in Turkey. Even 
if they establish their own workplace or go to university; they are not entitled to get 
long-term residence permits or citizenship at the end. How do we as ordinary people 
plan our life? Refugees should have a right to plan their lives or their children’s lives. 
If you do not have any status, you cannot know what there is at the end of the tunnel. 
For this reason, I do not think that Turkey is a safe third country for refugees. 
NGO49 emphasised the precarious legal position of refugees and found Turkey an unsafe 
country for refugees again from the second perspective; 
This temporary protection status leaves refugees to the mercy of Turkish authorities and 
constitutes a barrier to accessing their fundamental rights arising from the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and international law. If we see Syrians, Iraqis or Afghanis as equal 
individuals with rights stemming from the international human right law, this could 
change our approach towards them and help to develop recognition of those rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey. For example, when Syrian refugees first entered 
Turkey in 2011, public authorities did not even register them appropriately. Now 
Turkish authorities do not know how many refugees and asylum seekers live in Turkey 
and what their special needs are, such as health, education and qualifications to access 
to the labour market. If the Turkish government saw them as human beings and rights 
holders like citizens, it would want to know where they live and what their specific 
needs are to plan their access to education, welfare and health services at the beginning 
of their arrival.  
NGO310 also found Turkey as an unsafe country for refugees due to their struggle in 
accessing basic public services. He said,  
There is no plan how refugees and asylum seekers access public services, such as health, 
education or welfare services. The DGMM has also no action plan, budget or trained 
experts, who can manage migration issues. Today we have been exposed to the law 
                                                 
9  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Member of the Human Right 
Association and the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), Research Assistant at 
the University. 
10  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Coordinator of the NGO. 
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without any policy background. This is the essence of the issue…As a human right 
activist, I can say that the desired effects of the existing law cannot be seen in the field. 
L511 highlighted inadequate living conditions of refugees and he stated that Turkey is not 
a safe third country for refugees. 
The lack of adequate living conditions in Turkey constitutes a violation of Article 3 of 
the ECHR…Without burden sharing, readmission agreement will not be a solution to 
the refugee crisis because it makes the situation of refugees even worse. 
L312 found Turkey an unsafe country for refugees due to their poor living conditions.  
Safety of the country for refugees does not only include being free from persecution or 
non-refoulement but it also provides access to fundamental living conditions. If we look 
at the conditions of refugees in Turkey, we can easily see that they are struggling with 
accessing their fundamental rights…As an individual, I ask myself how many days I 
can survive in the street without any prospect of a better life or what happens to my 
children and me after 30 years.  
NGO513 also referred to Turkey’s institutional capacity during her evaluation of Turkey’s 
safety. She said,  
I cannot say that Turkey is not a safe third country for refugees considering its 
hospitality towards a large number of refugees for nearly five years. However, there are 
serious problems in practice. These problems are mainly related to Turkey's institutional 
capacity. Turkey has developed its legislative basis for refugees compatible with 
international standards but the increasing refugee flow and refugee deal put Turkey’s 
institutional capacity under pressure. We have to admit that Turkey has difficulty in 
ensuring that the fundamental rights of refugees and asylum seekers are met. 
It is very clear that the respondents do not see Turkey as a safe third country for refugees. 
The most important determinant factor in this perception is the deficiencies in accessing 
dignified living conditions.14 Considering the huge refugee protection responsibility of 
                                                 
11  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the lawyer and an expert in Migration 
and Human Rights Law and former rapporteur of the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey.  
12  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Lawyer, members of the Refugee 
Rights of Turkey. 
13  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is the Expert at the International 
Organisation for Migration-Turkey Office. 
14  Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge: Asylum Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection 
in Turkey, 2016, pp. 18-21.  
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Turkey, the institutional deficiencies and lack of resources are leading to some serious 
human rights violations in the field. Without fair refugee responsibility sharing between 
Turkey and the EU, it is unreasonable to expect Turkey to provide a dignified life for all 
refugees. 
3. The Struggles of Refugees in Accessing Dignified Living Conditions: Expulsion 
from Humanity? 
Most refugees in Turkey are living in dire conditions. Both the EU and Turkey have been 
avoiding responsibility regarding the long-term needs of refugees and are playing a 
“blame game”.15 Kılıç alleges that Turkish politicians have deliberately not improved the 
living conditions of refugees and keep it as basic as possible due to the fear of encouraging 
more refugees to come into Turkey. Thus, Turkey only provides humanitarian aid, such 
as providing temporary shelters and food in an emergency situation.16  
In accordance with the Turkish asylum law, the LFIP and TPR provide various provisions 
related to the social and economic rights of refugees but none of these are binding upon 
the Turkish government. Article 95(2) of the LFIP states that the DGMM may establish 
reception and accommodation centres to meet the housing, food, healthcare, social and 
other needs of applicants and international protection beneficiaries. However, these 
regulations give large discretion to the public authorities. Also, Article 26 of the 
Temporary Protection Directive also states that foreigners within the scope of this 
Directive may be provided with health, education, and access to the labour market, social 
services, and interpreting and similar services. Again, when we look at the articles, those 
services that are listed are not defined as the rights of foreigners but they can ask for them 
from Turkish state. They are assessed as the services of the Turkish State it gives large 
discretion to the public authorities. The support provided to refugees and asylum seekers 
is perceived as an act of charity as opposed to legal rights or obligation of the State.17 Due 
                                                 
15  Elman, Pinar, From Blame Game to Cooperation: EU-Turkey Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 
The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Policy Paper, No. 34(136), October 2015, pp. 3-4; 
Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia & Fratzke, Susan, Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and 
What Next? 24 September 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-
context-why-now-and-what-next. 
16  Kılıç, Taner, Türkiye’de Mülteci Hukuku Uygulamaları, Geri Kabul Süreci, (The Asylum Law 
Practice of Turkey: Readmission Process), Birikim Dergisi, Ağustos-Eylül, 2016, p. 67. 
17  Zetter, Roger & Ruaudel, Héloïse, Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets-An 
Assessment, KNOMAD Global Partnership on Migration and Development, Part II: Country Cases 
(Preliminary), September 2016, p. 118: Betts, Alexander & Ali, Ali & Memişoğlu, Fulya, Local 
Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, Oxford 
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to lack of concrete legal grounds when requesting the socio-economic rights of refugees, 
there are serious deficiencies in accessing these rights in practice. The general lack of 
awareness on the part of refugees and the delays in the registration process hinder 
refugees’ access to the limited or permitted socio-economic rights. Thus, many refugees 
are living in “abject poverty” and relying on external aid.18  
During the fieldwork, the participants have identified four major problems: no state-
funded accommodation, limited access to health services and education, and difficulties 
in accessing legal employment.  
3.1. Housing 
In accordance with Article 95(1) of the LFIP, “Applicants and international protection 
beneficiaries shall provide their own accommodation.” This means that asylum seekers 
and refugees are expected to secure their own self-financed accommodation in designated 
satellite cities and the DGMM has no legal duty to establish European style reception 
facilities. Turkey has actually established two reception centres in the provinces of 
Yozgat and Erzurum with a capacity to accommodate 850 refugees but it is certainly not 
enough considering the size of the refugee population.19 In fact, five reception centres 
had been built within the framework of the EU twinning project with the European 
Commission’s financial support but after the EU-Turkey Statement, they were 
transformed into removal centres.20 Apart from these two reception centres, there are 
temporary accommodation centres, which are strictly used for Syrian refugees and were 
constructed in 26 locations since the Syrian refugee crisis. However, their capacity is 
limited to around 300.000 Syrian refugees and only host 10% of the total Syrian refugee 
population.21 Thus, nearly 90 per cent of the Syrian refugee population is living outside 
the camp area. This has led to increasing rents of the houses and many refugee families 
are forced to live together. These difficulties in accessing reliable housing assistance have 
                                                 
Refugee Studies, 2017, p. 23.  
18  NOAS Report, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, Seeking Asylum in Turkey, A Critical 
Review of Turkey’s Asylum Law and Practices, 2016, pp. 10-11; Elman, 2015, p. 5.  
19  AIDA, Asylum Information Database, Types of Accommodation, Refugee Rights of Turkey, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/types-accommodation. Retrieved on 5th of 
November 2016. 
20  Asylum Information Database, Wrong Counts and Closing Doors, The Reception of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in Europe, ECRE, March 2016, pp. 25-26.  
21  UNHCR Turkey Report, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience 2016-2017 In Response to the Syria 
Crisis, p. 7.  
251 
 
  
driven many families to move from city to city without registering or sending their 
children to school. This poverty driven movement and bad housing conditions have 
caused many health problems, low enrolment rates in school and malnutrition problems 
as a domino effect.22 Most reports and research have focused on the Syrian refugee 
population but the non-Syrian refugee population is more vulnerable than Syrian 
refugees. Inside the Turkish refugee reception facilities, while Syrians have been hosted 
in the temporary accommodation centres, non-Syrian asylum seekers from countries such 
as Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Afghanistan are not accommodated in these temporary 
centres. Thus, non-Syrian refugees, especially women and children, are facing a high risk 
of destitution while waiting for their resettlement into another safe third country.23 
Considering the deficiencies in state-funded reception centres, nearly 90% of refugees 
and asylum seekers are living in satellite cities without any assistance of the Turkish 
government.24 However, they are not free to choose where to live. They have to stay in 
designated satellite cities and report to the provincial authorities on a regular basis.25 If 
conditional refugees or subsidiary protection beneficiaries fail to comply with the 
reporting obligation three consecutive times without an excuse or, leave the place of 
residence without permission, their asylum application will be considered withdrawn.26 
These compulsory residency obligations had not been applied to temporary protection 
beneficiaries until 2016 but after many irregular movements of Syrian refugees from 
Turkey into the EU territory, Turkey has brought compulsory accommodation for 
temporary protection holders in designated cities with the insistence of the EU after 18 
March 2016. The DGMM circulated a written instruction to the Governorates across 
Turkey, ordering provincial authorities to control the movement of Syrians.27 Now 
temporary protection holders are also subjected to compulsory residence in designated 
                                                 
22  Çorabatır, Metin, The Evolving Approach to Refugee Protection in Turkey, Assessing the Practical 
and the Political Needs, Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, September 
2016, pp. 12-13; Şimşek, Doğuş & Çorabatır, Metin, Challenges and Opportunities of Refugee 
Integration in Turkey, Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, December 2016, p. 83.  
23  Asylum Information Database, 2016, pp. 25-26.  
24  UNHCR Turkey Report, 2016-2017, p. 7.  
25  Article 71 of the LFIP states that “Administrative obligations may be imposed upon the applicants 
such as to reside in the designated reception and accommodation centres, a specific location or a 
province as well as to report to authorities in the form and intervals as requested”. 
26  Article 77(ç) of the LFIP.  
27  Zetter & Ruaudel, 2016, p. 114. 
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satellite cities, otherwise, they can lose their temporary protection status.  
It should be underlined that Turkey’s compulsory residence in satellite cities restricts the 
mobility of refugees and has a negative impact on their integration. Even though the 
satellite city system is more advantageous than refugee camps for refugees’ integration 
into Turkish community and gives an opportunity for them to earn their living expenses 
without any humanitarian assistance, some fundamental deficiencies in refugee 
protection system place them in “perilous conditions of living”.28 The fieldwork findings 
reaffirmed the problems of refugees in accessing reliable and healthy housing conditions. 
The respondents claimed that there is no opportunity of state-funded accommodation for 
asylum seekers and refugees even though they are vulnerable, especially women and 
children. This leads to the impoverishment of thousands of refugees in the satellite cities 
and leaves them in destitution. This has been exacerbated by the rapid rise in rents and 
exploitation by landlords. Turkish landlords abuse the vulnerability of refugees by 
charging too much or forcing them to live in very crowded conditions.29 
NGO3 illustrated the delicate situation of refugees during renting a house in Turkey: 
Refugees are totally left to the mercy of local community and NGOs. If they do not have 
any Turkish family friends, they might have real difficulty in finding accommodation 
or Turkish landlords might overcharge them.  
L130 also emphasized the deficiencies in the satellite city system in his interview. He said 
that there is no support system to assist refugees and asylum seekers on their arrival. Even 
the DGMM has no reception assistance to help refugees when they first arrive in their 
designated satellite cities. People have stayed in public parks for months if they have no 
money to rent a house. Some of them live in the garden of mosques or in streets with the 
help of the local community. NGO3 also complained about sending refugees to satellite 
cities without considering differences in the cultural and religious approaches of local 
community and refugees:  
                                                 
28  Baban, Feyzi & Ilcan, Suzan & Rygiel, Kim, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to Precarity, 
Differential Inclusion, and Negotiated Citizenship Rights, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 
43(1) 2016, pp. 1-2; Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge, 2016, pp. 23-25.  
29  Elman, 2015, p. 5.  
30  This was taken from the interview with the lawyer who is working as a Chairman of the NGO in 
Turkey. 
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The DGMM has settled LGBT refugees and asylum seekers into very conservative 
satellite cities like Konya or Kayseri without considering their sexual preferences. 
Recent research has reaffirmed the allegation of NGO3 that some of the refugees who are 
coming from different backgrounds are facing discrimination and prejudgment 
persecution in their residences. Sometimes they have to move to another city but it is very 
difficult to obtain permission from the DGMM. For instance, Dom and Abdal were 
reported very recently as facing discrimination by the host community due to their 
differences they were Syrian gypsies.31  
Because of these problems, some asylum seekers and refugees abstain from registering 
and they live as unregistered as long as they do not face any deportation decision. 
However, without registration, they cannot benefit from health services, enroll their 
children in state schools or get work permits. This situation of refugees was highlighted 
by L3: 
Some of the refugees do not want to go to satellite cities. To abstain from this obligatory 
residence in these cities I advise them to apply for humanitarian residence permits. 
There is no residence obligation for humanitarian residence holders and they do not 
have to notify the police once or twice a week in the satellite cities. 
L5 also underlined alluded to the same problem saying,  
Many of asylum seekers have preferred to stay unregistered in metropolitan cities 
because there is no difference between registered and unregistered refugees considering 
their living conditions. Even living as unregistered is more advantageous than registered 
ones. Because if you are registered, the State knows where you live and put a restriction 
on your mobility. As I observe from the field that many Syrians living in metropolitan 
cities are not registered officially. Therefore, I assume that the real number of refugees 
and asylum seeker living in Turkey is much more than official records. I have to accept 
that Turkey could not register all refugees living in its territory before debating how to 
deliver their fundamental rights. 
L1 gave an example of Congolese asylum seekers’ difficulties in satellite city, Kayseri. 
These Congolese asylum seekers were readmitted to Turkey from Greece under the 
refugee deal without being given an opportunity to ask for asylum in Greece. After their 
                                                 
31  Yıldız, Yeşim Yaprak, Nowhere to Turn: The Situation of Dom Refugees from Syria in Turkey, 
September 2015, p. 51. 
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readmission, they were subjected to administrative detention awaiting deportation to their 
country of origin. After the acknowledgment of the Amnesty International Office, they 
were given a legal advisor and applied for asylum in the removal centre. After their last-
minute asylum application, they were released from the removal centre approximately six 
months later. They were sent to a satellite city, Kayseri, but they faced many difficulties. 
L1, who was the lawyer in Amnesty International, shared their difficulties; 
After the release of the Congolese asylum seekers from the removal centre, they were 
sent to Kayseri to wait for their asylum application proceedings. They were free in the 
city, but they have to go to the police once or twice a week to sign a document. They 
had to arrange their own accommodations in Kayseri. However, after their stay in the 
removal centre for five months, some of them were not good mentally and one woman 
was in a deep depression. You just put yourself into Congolese asylum seekers’ position 
in Kayseri. You have to live in very traditional Turkish city, and you have no idea about 
their language, culture and where to live. You have only 1000 dollars in your pocket. 
You may feel as a fish living out of the sea…I desperately searched all alternatives to 
find them a solution using my network inside NGOs but they said, ‘We cannot find a 
place for even pregnant women.’ I asked my friend ‘Did I do the wrong thing in helping 
them to get release from the removal centre?’ At least they had a bed and free meal in 
the removal centre. They are free now, but they have no home to stay or meal to survive’. 
L1 also shared what happened to these Congolese asylum seekers after their settlement 
in the satellite city. He said, they decided to leave Kayseri after struggling to continue 
their daily life, even taking the risk of forfeiting their refugee status. They understood that 
they could not survive in Kayseri without any financial support. Although the new 
Regulation gives them the right to work as conditional refugee status holders but there is 
no opportunity for foreigners to work legally in satellite cities. Due to language barriers, 
the quota on foreign workers and difficulty in finding a job in the local area, foreigners 
prefer to go to metropolitan cities to work and find their own community and benefit from 
their support. Although we suggested they stay in Kayseri not to lose their refugee status 
and wait for their resettlement to another third country, they left to go to İstanbul. 
According to the LFIP, asylum applications cannot proceed anymore when asylum 
seekers leave their designated satellite cities. Thus they lost their chance of gaining 
refugee status. L1 underlined, 
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The procedural success we got with difficulty has become upside down again. In other 
words, they are in an illegal position again. When the police arrest them, they will be 
subjected to deportation order again. 
The recent report of the Mülteci-Der has confirmed the difficulties of refugees and asylum 
seekers in accessing accommodation and their desperate situation. They conducted 
interviews with 93 asylum seekers and refugees in six satellite cities. According to the 
report, refugees have difficulty in finding accommodation and may live on the streets or 
in parks or mosques at night. For example, one Sudanese refugee shared his experience 
saying, “I stayed eight months on the street. At nights I stayed in the garden of mosques”. 
Also, some of them stayed in one small rental room with their extended family without 
any bathroom or kitchen facilities and often without any heating.32 The findings of their 
fieldwork have shown that settlement of refugees into satellite cities without any housing 
assistance leaves them in a rightless position and makes their integration more difficult. 
Despite the Turkish government’s knowledge of these problems, it is not possible to give 
them accommodation assistance. As NGO133 stated,  
Turkish government cannot provide accommodation assistance to a large number of 
foreigners because there is no accommodation assistance for even the poorest Turkish 
citizens…Turkish nationals have never had housing or unemployment benefits so far. 
How can it be expected from the Turkish government to provide financial assistance to 
a foreigner? It would lead to resentment on the part of Turkish nationals. 
3.2. Healthcare  
Access to healthcare services was the biggest struggle for refugees and asylum seekers 
until 2013 when the Turkish government took an important step and provided free 
healthcare services to temporary protection beneficiaries. After this improvement, free 
healthcare services were also provided to individual international protection holders in 
2014. 
As NGO1 states,  
                                                 
32  Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği Uydu Kentler İzleme ve Raporlama Projesi, Türkiye’de 
Mültecilerin Kabul Koşulları, Hak ve Hizmetlere Erişimleri, (Satellite Cities: Monitoring and 
Reporting- Project: Reception Conditions of Refugees and their Access to Rights and Services), Egus 
Matbaacılık: İzmir, 2015, p. 43.  
33  This was taken from the interview with the President of the NGO, which provides legal assistance to 
refugees and asylum seekers. He is also working as a lawyer.  
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Even Turkish nationals could not benefit from free health care services until Syrian 
refugees come to Turkey. After that time, Turkish nationals, who cannot afford to pay 
social security payments, have started to benefit from free healthcare services. 
Despite these positive developments, there are still problems in accessing healthcare 
services. First, problems are generally related to delays in registration of international 
protection applications because refugees cannot benefit from free healthcare without 
registration. Although the DGMM has taken some precautions to reduce the numbers on 
the waiting list for registration, there are still many asylum seekers waiting or they have 
chosen to stay unregistered deliberately. Second, as described by NGO3, refugees and 
asylum seekers cannot access basic healthcare services due to language barriers: 
For example, some hospitals have no translator services in their emergency and other 
departments. Even in big metropolitan cities, such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, 
patients cannot explain their situation properly. This situation constitutes a serious 
problem for refugees in practice.  
Lastly, refugees and asylum seekers should pay some percentage of prescribed 
medications themselves but considering their economic conditions, and this has led to 
serious problems, especially with chronic diseases. Although some Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Foundations in the provinces have helped refugees to buy their prescribed 
medicines, there is no systematic assistance. This means that patients who have chronic 
diseases, such as heart, cancer, diabetes, high blood pressure etc. but cannot continue their 
treatment due to deficiencies in systemic financial support. 
3.3. Education 
Access to education is seen as another important avenue for the integration of refugees 
into the host community. Of the 3.1 million Syrian populations in Turkey, more than half 
are children. Providing education to these is a significant challenge for the Turkish 
Authorities. According to the latest statistics, Turkey is hosting 942,000 school-age 
refugee children (5-17) in 2017.34 Turkish asylum law provides refugees primary and 
secondary school education free of charge in the public schools.35 In addition to public 
                                                 
34  UNHCR Turkey Report, 2016-2017, p. 7; Achilli, Luigi & Yassin, Nasser & Erdoğan, Murat, 
Neighboring Host-Countries’ Policies for Syrian Refugees: The Cases of Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey, European Institute of Mediterranean, January 2017, p. 40.  
35  According to Article 89 of the LFIP and Article 8 of the Temporary Protection Directive, refugees 
and temporary protection status holders can access to elementary and secondary education free of 
charge in the public schools. 
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schools, Syrian refugees can also benefit from “temporary education centres” during their 
primary and secondary education. These centres are usually Syrian-run, teach a Syrian 
curriculum in Arabic and have been granted recognition by the Turkish authorities. Due 
to language problems, many Syrian families choose to send their children to temporary 
education centres. In accordance with the latest statistics, while 255,000 children (85, 000 
in the camps, 170,000 outside the camps) have accessed one of 400 temporary education 
centres, 75,000 Syrian children access Turkish state schools. In this sense, out of 942,000 
school age children, around 600,00 children have not attended school in the last six 
years.36 
Although there is no legal obstacle to refugee children accessing Turkish state schools, 
nearly two-thirds have been out of education for six years and risk become a “lost 
generation”. The continuation of low enrollment has led to child labour, child begging, 
early marriage and also creates the risk of marginalisation and radicalization.37 The 
important question is why the rate of schooling is so low even though the Turkish legal 
system is no obstacle. The report of the European Council reveals that the rate of 
schooling differs dramatically amongst refugees living in camps and satellite cities. While 
refugees in camps can access education services very easily and benefit from temporary 
education centres, non-camp refugees have many difficulties in accessing the temporary 
education centres and state schools. Thus, the rate of participation in education among 
refugee children living in satellite cities has been decreasing sharply compared to those 
who live in the camps.38  
The shortfalls in accessing education in the satellite cities can be explained in three ways. 
First, even though the right to education is available for all under Turkish law, refugee 
families cannot enroll their children in the state schools due to the lack of clear regulations 
explaining the formal procedures for the enrollment of students and the lack of space in 
classrooms. The majority of families believe that residency permits or passports are 
required for registration but many families still live unregistered due to abstaining from 
living in determined satellite cities. Also, the Turkish education system is not ready to 
                                                 
36  Achilli & Yassin & Erdoğan, 2017, p. 40. 
37  The International Crisis Group, Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, Europe 
Report no: 241, 30 November 2016, p. 5.  
38  Reports of the Council of Europe, Fact-finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration and Refugees, 30 May-4 June 2016, p. 
11.  
258 
 
  
cope with this huge increase in the number of school-age children. Approximately 40,000 
teachers and 30,000 new classrooms are required to integrate the rest of the refugee 
children into Turkish state schools.39 Second, Turkish state schools teach in Turkish and 
there is no preparatory or catch up classes for refugee children. This constitutes an 
important obstacle to refugee children in their access to state schools and they have a hard 
time following the Turkish curriculum.40 Furthermore, Syrian families think that they 
have no status in Turkey and finally they have to return to their country. In this sense, 
they prefer to send their children to the temporary education centres but these centres 
have the negative impact on the integration of refugees by failing to teach Turkish.41 
Third, refugee families cannot afford their children’s education. For example, many 
families cannot afford their children’s school uniform or other school materials. Also, 
many school-aged children have to work in the informal sector to support their families. 
Due to the low paid jobs, all family members have to work to pay their rents, foods and 
other basic necessities.42  
Against the shortfalls in accessing the right to education, the Turkish government and its 
international partners have commenced some significant initiatives to increase the rate of 
enrolment. In January 2016 at a conference in London, “Supporting Syria and the 
Region”, the Turkish government committed to enrolling all Syrian children in schools 
                                                 
39  Erdoğan, Murat & Kavukçuer, Yudum & Çetinkaya, Tuğçe, Development in Turkey: The Refugee 
Crisis & The Media, Freedom Research Association, Liberal Perspective Analysis, 5, April 2017, pp. 
8-9; Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016, pp. 83-84; Human Rights Watch, When I Picture My Future, I See 
Nothing, November 2015, pp. 23-24.  
39  Asylum Information Database, Wrong Counts and Closing Doors, The Reception of Refugees and 
Asylum Seekers in Europe, ECRE, March 2016, pp. 25-26.  
40  Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 39-40.  
41  Erdoğan & Kavukçuer & Çetinkaya, 2017, pp. 8-9; Biner, Özge & Soykan, Cavidan, Suriyeli 
Mültecilerin Perspektifinden Türkiye’de Yaşam (The Life in Turkey from the Perspective of Syrian 
Refugees), Mülteci-Der & Sivil Düşün, Nisan 2016, pp. 15-16; The International Crisis Group, 
2016, p. 5; Human Rights Watch, 2015, pp. 32-33.  
42  Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 2015, pp. 84-
85; Kirişçi, Kemal, Turkey’s Role in the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, 17(2), 2016, p. 81; Elman, 2015, p. 5; Reports of the Council of Europe, Fact-finding 
mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Migration and Refugees, 30 May-4 June 2016, p. 11; Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge, 2016, 
pp. 29-31; Aras, Bülent & Yasun, Salih, The Educational Opportunities and Challenges of Syrian 
Refugee Students in Turkey: Temporary Education Centres and Beyond, IPC-Mercator Policy Brief, 
July 2016, pp. 10-12; Ineli-Ciğer, Meltem, How Well Protected are Syrians in Turkey? Open 
Democracy, 17 January 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-
hope/meltem-ineli-ciger/how-well-protected-are-syrians-in-turkey 
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by the end of the 2016-2017 academic year.43 However, considering the lack of teachers, 
especially after the dismissal of 30,000 teaching personnel suspected of affiliation with 
terrorist groups, the Turkish government’s declared benchmarks will not be easy to reach. 
Considering Turkey’s institutional deficiencies, the UNICEF's Turkey representative 
emphasised the importance of much more investment into non-formal education. In the 
meanwhile, the Emergency-Social Safety Network Programme for basic needs has been 
started in 2017 as part of 3 billion Euros of aid under the EU-Turkey Statement. This 
Programme is expected to help families conditionally under “education cash grant”. 
Under this Programme, each low-income Syrian family will receive 35-60 TL (11-18 
dollar) monthly for each child attending school. Syrians welcome this financial help but 
they do not see it as the sustainable response to their precariousness.44  
During my fieldwork, I asked the participants whether Turkey allows refugees a dignified 
life during their stay but the majority of the participants linked the question with the right 
to access primary and secondary education free of charge. The participants highlighted 
the reason behind the low enrolment rate in satellite cities and shared their observations 
on the actual practice. 
L1 explained the low enrolment rate of refugee children in terms of economic difficulties 
of families,  
There is no legal barrier in front of Syrian children for their access to education but only 
one-third of the Syrian refugees are able to access education services. The problems are 
mainly economical and physiological. First, there are no supportive language courses 
in Turkish state schools. Secondly, families’ economic situation have forced children to 
start work at a very early age. Thus, unfortunately, there is a growing lost generation. 
NGO3 agreed: 
Some of the children have started Turkish state schools without being offered any 
Turkish lessons in advance. Language has created a serious barrier in front of their 
success at the state schools and after a while, they fall behind in class and their school 
friends and teachers excluded them…Unfortunately, Turkish government deliberately 
did not open Turkish courses and encourage families to send their children to Syrian 
community schools because Turkish authorities thought that if they were offered 
                                                 
43  The International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 5; Hürriyet Daily News, Only 30 per cent of Turkey’s 
Syrian Children have Access to Education: Disaster Agency Head, 31 March 2016. 
44  The International Crisis Group, 2016, pp. 5-7.  
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Turkish lessons and education in state schools, they would not return to their country 
when the war ends. 
He also mentioned that many refugees and asylum seekers send their children to work to 
supplement the family income, rather than enrolling them in schools. They are working 
in textile and shoe workshops in very exploitative conditions. Although Turkish law 
prohibits child labour, no preventive mechanism is available in practice. 
E145 also stated the same,  
Some of the children would like to learn the Turkish language when they first arrived, 
but authorities refused their requests. Since the administrative authorities are afraid of 
their integration into Turkish community. They thought if they integrated into Turkish 
community, they would not go back to their country of origin. It is a very deplorable 
picture. Why do they go to community schools teaching Arabic? It is nonsense…Turkey 
should have acted immediately to integrate these refugee children into its state education 
system but Turkey has some institutional deficiencies to sort out. Concerning the large 
numbers of refugee children, Turkey needs to employ 45,000 additional teachers and 
create many classes…If the EU and Turkey do not find a solution to this problem, 
unfortunately, refugee children will be open to any ideological and religious 
manipulations in the future. This growing population may darken both the future of 
Turkey and the EU. 
NGO1 underlined the differences between the rate of schooling in camps and satellite 
cities. He said,  
I do not want to say that Turkey is not a safe third country for refugees. However, there 
are many problems in the field…For instance approximately 600.000 of the Syrian 
children (equal to 65% of them) have not accessed education for five years. The 
government only report the schooling percentage of children living in the camps, but it 
ignores the others living outside the camps. This statistical data is misleading 
considering the number of people living outside of the camps, which constitute nearly 
90% of them. 
NGO5 emphasised the effects of family’s preferences in children’s school attendees. She 
stated,  
                                                 
45  This was taken from the interview with the participant who is Vice Director of…University Migration 
and Politics Research Centre.  
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We observed that some families do not want to send their children to Turkish state 
schools due to language barriers, cultural differences and deficiencies in integration 
motivation. Some families see Turkey only as a transit country to reach the EU rather 
than settling down. Last year approximately one million refugees entered the EU 
through Turkey. We saw that they only stayed in Turkey for one month. They did not 
have any motivation to continue their life or integrate into Turkish community. 
3.4. Economic Self-Sufficiency: Employment 
The current refugee protection system has been forcing refugees to choose from three 
impossible options: “encampment, urban destitution and dangerous journeys”. In 
accordance with the refugee protection system, states have mainly focused on 
humanitarian needs of refugees, such as dealing with their immediate safety and 
accommodation in the camp areas rather than focusing on empowering them to rebuild 
their lives in their host countries. It assumed that refugee protection is a “zero-sum game”. 
If we give some rights, such as the right to work to refugees, it will negatively affect the 
rights of citizens and their economic situation.46 In the case of the EU-Turkey Statement, 
the European Commission insistently claims that Turkey provides effective protection to 
refugees by showing that Turkey gives shelter to nearly 3 million refugees. However, it 
ignores the most significant part of the deal and does not look at whether refugees really 
find a dignified living condition in Turkey. Economic self-sufficiency is the most 
important part of a dignified life but states are not willing to give refugees a right to work. 
Even if they give this right to refugees legally, they put so many legal and bureaucratic 
obstacles in the way of refugees getting work.47 
 If we look at the Turkish asylum law practice, even though some positive steps were 
taken to provide access to the labour market, it is far from adequate and cannot be used 
effectively in practice. Article 89(4) of the LFIP allows conventional refugees access to 
the labour market as soon as they get their status. They are not subjected to any work 
permit. Their identity documents substitute for a work permit but there are very few 
people benefitting from this right. Conditional refugee status and subsidiary protection 
holders have to apply for a work permit six months after they lodged their claim for 
                                                 
46  Betts, Alexander, Our refugee system is failing. Here's how we can fix it, TED Talk, February 
2016.http://www.ted.com/talks/alexander_betts_our_refugee_system_is_failing_here_s_how_we_c
an_fix_it.  
47  Kılıç, 2016, p. 67. 
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international protection.48 The Turkish government adopted a Regulation on international 
protection applicants on 26 April 2016.49 This Regulation was adopted to determine how 
conditional refugees and subsidiary status holders can fulfil the administrative 
requirements for permission to work. However, temporary protection status holders did 
not have the right to work until January 2016 when the Turkish Council of Ministers 
adopted the Regulation Concerning Work permits for Temporary Protection 
Beneficiaries.50 This Regulation made it possible for Syrians to apply for work permits 
after being resident in Turkey for more than six months. It is a fact that this work 
permission was given with the insistence of the EU after the EU-Turkey Statement to 
reduce the secondary movements of Syrian refugees by giving them an opportunity to 
earn money and continue their life without help. This is the main indicator of “the shift 
of Turkish government’s approach from humanitarian aid to livelihoods support” and 
facilitates the integration of Syrians into the Turkish community.51 
Work permission for conditional, subsidiary protection and temporary protection holders 
is a significant development, but there are still obstacles in exercising their fundamental 
right to work. These include insufficient legislation, bureaucratic work procedures, 
language barriers and socio-cultural differences. In addition, the domestic economy is 
suffering from high unemployment rates and shortage of jobs. These obstacles are 
consistently preventing refugees from accessing the formal labour market.52 To increase 
formal employment, the first priority should be to lift all regulatory and bureaucratic 
restrictions. For instance, Article 8(1) of the Regulation on Work Permits for Temporary 
Protection Beneficiaries states that the number of temporary protection holders in a 
workplace cannot exceed 10 per cent of the total numbers of Turkish workers within the 
same workplace. This quota system is particularly problematic in border areas, where 
                                                 
48  Article 89(4) of the LFIP. 
49  OGT, 26.04.2016, No: 29695. 
50  OGT, 15.01.2016, No: 29594. Article 5 of the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under 
Temporary Protection states that temporary protection seekers may apply for work permission after 
six months of their registration.  
51  İçduygu, Ahmet & Diker, Eleni, Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: From 
Refugees to Settlers, Journal of Migration Studies, 3(1), 2017, p. 18. 
52  Zetter, Roger & Ruaudel, Héloïse, Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets-An 
Assessment, KNOMAD Global Partnership on Migration and Development, Part II: Country Cases 
(Preliminary), September 2016, p. 115; Kirişçi, 2016, p. 81; Şimşek & Çorabatır, 2016, pp. 100-
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Syrians may make up over 50% of the population.53 The other important obstacles in 
hiring refugees are related to the application procedure. For instance, refugees cannot 
make an application for the work permit by themselves, but they should go to the 
Employment Office with their employer who is willing to hire them. A yearly work 
permit fee is around 650 Turkish liras (equally to 130 pound).54 It is quite difficult to get 
employers to pay this amount of money because, in the low-skill sectors, such as textiles, 
construction and manufacturing, potential employers do not have enough incentive to 
take on the administrative and financial burden of hiring a foreign national.55 In addition, 
Turkey must facilitate refugees’ access to the formal market by recognizing their 
qualifications acquired abroad and provide special training schemes that would enable 
them to adapt their knowledge and acquire new skills.56 
Furthermore, even though there is a legal framework that facilitates formal employment, 
the informal market still remains more attractive both for refugees and employers. 
Refugees use competitive advantage over Turkish citizens by accepting lower payment 
without social security. If they demand formalization of their informal status, there is no 
possibility that Turkish employers will hire refugees instead of Turkish citizens. Also, if 
employers hire refugees formally, they must pay the minimum wage plus social security 
contributions and taxes. The majority of refugees are employed in the low-skilled sectors, 
such as agriculture, textiles, construction and manufacturing because these employers 
benefit from the low wages they pay. If they do not receive enough incentive to take over 
the additional financial and administrative burden of formally hiring a foreign national, 
they will refrain from hiring refugees and hire Turkish citizens.57 To tackle the increasing 
informal labour market, it is recommended that the Turkish government should give 
employers some incentives to encourage them to formally employ refugees. These could 
include between two and four years waiver of social security payments for women and 
                                                 
53  Reports of the Council of Europe, Ambassador Tomáš Boček, 2016, p. 10.  
54  Article 5(2) of the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection require 
temporary protection beneficiaries and conditional refugees to take work permission before starting 
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55  Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 2015, p. 84.  
56  The International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 8; İçduygu, Ahmet, Turkey: Labour Market Integration 
and Social Inclusion of Refugees, Directorate-General for International Policies Policy Department 
Economic and Scientific Policy, 2016, p. 33.  
57  Asylum Information Database, Country Report:, 2015, p. 84; İçduygu & Diker, 2017, p. 22.  
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young adults.58 Yet, the most important risk is that these incentives may increase growing 
resentment between local workers against refugees.59 Del Carpio and Wagner found that 
the informally employed refugees have a negative impact on the employment of Turkish 
citizens in low-skilled sectors and leads to large scale displacement of Turkish workers 
from the informal sector, around 6 natives for every 10 refugees.60 
Unfortunately, due to these significant problems and barriers in front of refugees in 
accessing formal employment opportunities, the number of work permits granted to 
refugees is unexpectedly low. According to the latest DGMM statistics, there are more 
than 1.7 million Syrians of working age between 15-65 years old in Turkey.61 Yet, only 
20, 981 have been granted work permits including Syrian entrepreneurs since 2011. This 
accounts for only 1% of the total working age population.62 As a result, most of them 
have continued to work without work permits, which subjects them to a different kind of 
abuse and exploitation. For instance, women are forced into prostitution by financial 
difficulties, while child labour is becoming a serious problem. Furthermore, refugees 
working in the informal sector have no social security or other benefits. They cannot sue 
if they are not paid or abused.63  
L1 described the reason for low rates of employment of refugees and asylum seekers in 
his interview arguing that the legal basis for international protection seekers to access the 
labour market is designed to obstruct rather than enable them. In accordance with the 
Employment Regulation, conditional refugees and temporary protection seekers should 
get the permission from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to work legally. L1 
says,  
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If Turkish legislation says that there is a need for permission, you must forget it. It is 
very difficult to get permission from administrative authorities in practice even if there 
is no barrier legally. 
Given the bureaucratic difficulties, the Employment Regulation does not produce any 
benefits for refugees in practice. Many asylum seekers and refugees are working illegally 
but the Ministry of Labour and Social Security inspectors do not enforce the Employment 
Regulation strictly because penalties are too high for both refugees and employers. For 
example, if one Syrian refugee is caught while working illegally, s/he has to pay 7.000 
Turkish Liras (equal to £1.750) as a fine. Also, they will be subjected to a deportation 
decision. So Turkey has to turn a blind eye to the ongoing illegal working situation of 
refugees. However, this is used as a trump card in the hands of abusive employers who 
sometimes do not give refugees their money or force them to work long hours against 
human rights.  
NGO1 offered some explanations for the increasing number of refugees working 
unofficially was:  
Nearly 35 per cent of the Turkish economy has been established in the informal sector. 
Some of the employers would like to take advantage of Syrians and other refugees. For 
example, if an employer hires a person officially, he has to pay 2.000 Turkish liras 
(equal to £400). But now refugees are working for 500 or 600 Turkish liras (equal to 
£100), …Turkish businessmen thought that if they have to pay insurance and the 
officially minimum wage in accordance with the Employment Directive, why would 
they hire foreigners instead of Turkish nationals? There is no advantage. 
He also highlighted some restricted sectors for foreigners that they cannot work in legally. 
For example, foreigners cannot work as judges, lawyers, pharmacists and even porters. 
Also, Turkey does not have a system for the recognition of the professional qualifications 
of refugees and asylum seekers. As a result, they cannot find appropriate employment for 
their education and previous occupation. Thus, many doctors, academics and architects 
have to work in unskilled jobs in very exploitative conditions. It mirrors Arendt’s 
description of refugees in her essay “We Refugees”:64 
If we are saved we feel humiliated, and if we are helped we feel degraded. We fight like 
madmen for private existences with individual destinies since we are afraid of becoming 
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part of that miserable lot of schnorrers whom we, many of us former philanthropists, 
remember only too well.  
L465 explained in his interview why refugees and temporary protection seekers have still 
been working in the informal market despite the employment regulations. He gave two 
reasons: First, there is not enough information given to refugees about their rights. 
Second, refugees can only apply for work permission from satellite cities, where they are 
living. These satellite cities are generally located in the eastern part of Turkey where there 
is less employment opportunity than in the metropolitan cities. Thus many prefer to live 
in metropolitan cities even though they are not permitted officially to do so and risk their 
conditional refugee status or temporary protection status. 
E1 also addressed the problems of refugees in accessing the labour market.66 He 
highlighted that Turkey's unemployment rate is very high. The system is forcing Syrians 
and other refugees to work in exploitative conditions informally. He describes their 
destitute situation:  
They need money to buy food and pay their rent. They are working in very serious 
conditions for long hours but they are paid very little and sometimes no payment is 
made. This has led to the accumulation of anger and resentment on the part of Syrian 
and non-Syrian refugees that will definitely affect the future of Turkey. 
The statements of the participants indicate that the barriers in accessing formal 
employment cannot be eliminated with the recent legislative changes. This has a negative 
impact on refugees’ integration and their future plans. The recent fieldwork conducted in 
four provinces of Turkey in 2016 with 1,120 Syrians highlighted that 90 per cent would 
like to return to Syria when the war ends.67 This research indicates that lack of legal status; 
limited opportunities in accessing education, accommodation and labour markets have 
made refugees more pessimistic about their future in Turkey. Also, contrary to the 
enormous anxiety of the European member states, only six per cent would like to go to 
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Europe.68 The EU's deterrent policies, especially inhuman reception conditions in Greece, 
detainment of all asylum seekers arriving on the Greek islands for long periods and 
readmission of asylum seekers to Turkey without accessing refugee status and the 
determination procedures have broken the hopes of getting to the EU. They have no 
option left but to wait in legal limbo in Turkey until the conflict ends. 
4. Conclusion 
Turkey is providing humanitarian assistance to nearly 3,2 million Syrian and non-Syrian 
nationals. But it is now facing the challenge that the majority of them require dignified 
living conditions and socio-economic rights as a human being. What should be Turkey’s 
responsibility towards temporary protection status holders? Is it fair to ask Turkey to 
provide long-term solutions, especially in upholding their socio-economic rights? The 
EU-Turkey Statement has been implemented for over 18 months but neither the EU nor 
Turkey has so far addressed those questions. The fieldwork findings show that the 
pressure of a vast number of refugees on Turkey’s immature refugee protection system, 
and limited resources have put refugees in a precarious position. In contrast to the 
argument of the EU Commission, Turkey’s asylum system lacks strong legal grounds to 
enable or empower refugees to integrate into Turkish communities and exercise their 
socio-economic rights. Asylum seeker and refugees are not seen as rights holders but as 
“passive beneficiary”69 at the discretion of the Turkish government. As Arendt observed 
refugees are denied the right to establish a relatively durable life with their own work and 
they become dependent on humanitarian aid. This situation gives rise to the fundamental 
condition of rightlessness and reduces them to “bare humanity”.70  
My fieldwork findings indicate that many refugees and asylum seekers are staying in 
Turkey without accessing their basic daily needs such as housing, health, education and 
employment opportunities. The participants all agreed that there is no opportunity of 
state-funded accommodation in Turkey for refugees even those that are vulnerable, such 
as women and children. This has led to the impoverishment of thousands of refugees 
especially in the satellite cities and leaves them in destitution and unhealthy conditions. 
Even though the EU has financially supported Turkey to increase its reception capacity, 
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after the EU-Turkey Statement, these reception centres have been converted into removal 
centres. Refugees and asylum seekers have to self-finance their accommodation in the 
satellite cities but considering the presence of large populations of refugees in the 
southern cities, this has led to increasing rents, overcrowding and unhealthy conditions. 
They have to work in exploitative conditions for long hours to pay their rents.  
The participants also highlighted that education is another right that is not being met and 
which is impeding integration. The Turkish government is not taking positive steps in this 
area in fear of facilitating the permanency of refugees in Turkey. The Government has 
established temporary education centres in the camps and satellite cities, which are 
teaching the Syrian curriculum in the Arabic language. Even though Syrian families have 
preferred these centres for teaching their own language, in the long term, these centres 
have become a barrier to the integration of young refugees into the Turkish community. 
Currently, a very small numbers of refugee children are going to Turkish state schools 
and nearly two-thirds of the children have been out of education for six years. This has 
led to child labour, child begging, early marriage and also creates the risk of 
marginalisation and radicalization. Furthermore, adult education has become important 
for the integration of refugees into the labour market. Many refugees suffer from the 
refusal to accept their qualifications or educational attainment. Loss of identity 
documentation and qualification certificates is often given as an excuse. There is an 
urgent need for some particular education programs, which are specifically designed for 
adult refugees to help their integration into the formal labour market.  
The recent adoption of the new Regulation, which facilitates refugees’ and asylum 
seekers’ access to the labour market has not changed the real situation. As underlined by 
NGO3, the legislative change without taking into account sociological and economic 
dimension of the problem have done nothing to change actual practice. Informal refugee 
employment remains the main characteristic of the Turkish labour market. This situation 
exposes the vulnerability of low skilled Turkish workers who are disproportionately 
bearing the cost. This has led to tension between local communities and the refugee 
population. If the Turkish government does not handle this situation delicately, it may 
trigger many hostile events towards refugees. It is clear that policy makers must better 
regulate and facilitate refugees’ access to the formal labour market by lifting restrictions 
on the issuing of work permits, recognizing their qualifications acquired abroad or 
allocating incentives to employers to increase formal employment of refugees.  
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To prevent the marginalization of refugees, the Turkish policy makers must ensure that 
both Turkish citizens and refugees enjoy dignified living conditions. To reach this aim, 
refugees should be given similar rights to those enjoyed by citizens, such as housing, 
educational and healthcare services and access to the formal labour market. There should 
not be a trade-off between the human rights for refugees and the social justice concerns 
for Turkish citizens. Turkey also needs solidarity and cooperation with other states, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to provide resources and services 
for a better social and economic inclusion of refugees and migrants. 
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CHAPTER VIII: Conclusions 
 
1. Reflections  
The thesis set out to evaluate how the implementation of the EU-Turkey Agreement on 
the refugee issue was affecting the rights of refugees and in particular the principle of 
non-refoulement. This concluding chapter begins with a summary of the study followed 
by a discussion of my research findings. The challenges of the study are identified and 
recommendations are made for further research. Finally, there are suggestions for any 
future readmission agreements.  
The researcher initially set out to analyse the EU-Turkey RA and its human rights impact 
on refugees but the Syrian refugee crisis added a different dimension to it. After the 
entrance of 850.000 irregular migrants and refugees into Greece transiting through 
Turkey, the EU desperately needed Turkey to stem the refugee flow and started 
negotiations with Turkey in 2015. The head of member states of the European Union and 
the Turkish government agreed on a Joint Action Plan1 to stem refugee flows into the EU 
territory and they signed the Statement on 18h of March 2016. This new refugee “deal” 
became an integral part of the EU-Turkey RA and changed the scope of the research 
project significantly. The Statement was included in the research plan and the main 
question of the thesis was amended to include both the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement and the Statement.  
The thesis aimed then to find out how the EU-Turkey Agreement on the refugee issue 
affects the rights of refugees. An examination of the literature revealed that it is a very 
controversial and disputed issue. There are two different approaches to the human rights 
impact of the issue. In the first approach,2 the readmission agreement is viewed as merely 
a tool for the effective removal of irregular migrants and is neutral in relation to all human 
rights concerns. It claims that the EU’s common asylum policy determines the criteria for 
rejection of asylum applications and the removal of irregular migrants to a third country. 
                                                 
1  The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 15 October 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5860_en.htm. 
2  Coleman, Nils, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden & Boston 2009, pp. 315-316; Giuffré, Mariagiulia, Readmission 
Agreements and Refugee Rights: From A Critique to a Proposal, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32(3), 
pp. 80-81.  
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On the other hand, the second approach3 focuses on the risks that readmission agreements 
create for refugees and asylum seekers. Although there is no special reference to asylum 
seekers and refugees in the provision of readmission agreements, states may use 
readmission agreements as an instrument to readmit both. It may, therefore, lead to 
refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees without accessing refugee status procedures. 
So, it is not possible to ignore the effects of the readmission agreement on the human 
rights of refugees and the different links in the chain, which lead to the return of irregular 
migrants and refugees.4 The researcher embraced the second approach and started the 
research by asking three simple questions.  
The first question was why do refugees and asylum seekers have such difficulties in 
accessing their human rights and does the implementation of the EU-Turkey RA 
guarantee “a right to have rights”. The first part of that question was addressed in chapter 
II, which constructs the theoretical basis of the thesis. Adopting Arendt's political theory, 
the researcher argued that the main reason for the rightless situation of refugees is mainly 
related to the international state system. Refugees and asylum seekers are always 
struggling to access their fundamental human rights due to the lack of enforceability of 
human rights and refugee law. Despite the claimed universality of human rights, any 
refugee protection regime is still bound up with nation states and this inherent link 
between human rights and state sovereignty is problematic when individuals lose their 
citizenship status. In this international state system, nation states are normally very keen 
to develop different mechanisms to obstruct the arrival of asylum seekers in their territory. 
Outsourcing the refugee responsibility through readmission agreements has become the 
main strategy of the Western states in recent years. The EU-Turkey RA is a symbolic 
case for understanding nation states' restrictive and exclusionary approaches towards 
refugees. The EU-Turkey Agreement is only part of a wider refugee protection problem 
in the contemporary world. Given the contradictory responses of states towards refugees, 
                                                 
3  The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at 
Europe’s Borders, Amnesty International, 2014, p. 20; Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights 
Network, An EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement Undermining the Rights of Migrants, Refugees 
and Asylum Seekers? European Parliament: Do not Vote in Favour of a EU/Turkey Readmission 
Agreement, Press Release; International Strategic Research Organization, Regarding the EU and 
Turkey Relations, What Conditions Apply the EU and Turkey Readmission Agreement?, (Türkiye-
EU İlişkilerinde Geri Kabul Hangi Şartlarda, USAK Raporları) No. 10(2) , 2010, p. 16. 
4  Strik, Tineke, Readmission Agreements: A Mechanism for Return Irregular Migrants, Council of 
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 12168, 17 March 2010, p. 7. 
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it is very difficult to claim universality, equality and inalienability of human rights. It is 
empirically evident that when human rights come into conflict with the sovereign power 
of nation states, international human rights acquire a “mythical status”. The approach of 
the European member states towards refugees during the Syrian refugee crisis can only 
be explainable in terms of this conflict between human rights and state sovereignty. 
When we look at the implementation of the EU-Turkey RA, it is evident that there is a 
shortfall in guaranteeing “a right to have rights”. Two main problem areas are identified 
in chapter III. First, readmission agreements do not provide any safeguards or 
independent monitoring systems during the implementation of the readmission 
agreements. This gap in the readmission agreement poses a threat to the principle of non-
refoulement and the right to seek asylum. States may reject asylum seekers and send them 
back to third countries without examining their asylum applications on the basis of the 
“safe third country concept,” “accelerated border procedures” or interception operations 
on the sea. Second, it was not difficult to predict that the increasing burden on third transit 
countries would lead to a downgrading of the refugee protection standards because of the 
financial, economic and institutional deficiencies of these countries. Effective protection 
encompasses both protections from refoulement and access to basic living standards with 
opportunities for longer-term integration. But the readmission agreement only aimed to 
contain refugees in the region of origin in neighbour countries, which have no capacity 
to provide even basic living standards. The deficiencies in the refugee protection system 
in transit countries leave refugees in a “rightless” situation without any durable solutions.  
The second question asked what kind of responsibilities did the EU-Turkey Agreement 
on the refugee issue bring for Turkey? This question was addressed in chapter IV. The 
detailed examination of the legal basis of the EU-Turkey RA revealed that Turkey has 
two main responsibilities. First, Turkey has to readmit Turkish nationals and third country 
nationals including asylum seekers and refugees if they have transited through Turkey 
before entering the European territory. It means that Turkey has become the first country 
of asylum or safe third country of asylum in accordance with the Asylum Procedures 
Directive. This requires Turkey to provide fair and effective asylum procedures, an 
effective remedy against unlawful deportations and other human rights infringements. 
Second, Turkey has to prevent the arrival of Syrian refugees and other irregular migrants 
into Europe through strengthening its border controls and continue to provide temporary 
protection to Syrian refugees on its own territory. The most significant consequence of 
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the EU-Turkey Statement is that Turkey has turned into a buffer zone for refugees and 
asylum seekers.  
The last question addressed whether Turkey provides efficient protection to asylum 
seekers and refugees in accessing their fundamental human rights. This question was 
addressed in chapter V with a critical analysis of Turkish asylum law and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the TCC. This chapter focused on the civil and political 
rights of refugees in Turkey. After a detailed analysis of the legal and institutional 
capacity of Turkey's refugee protection regime, the fieldwork findings, which were based 
on interviews with 18 professionals working with refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey, 
threw light on the lived experiences of refugees and asylum seekers corroborating and 
supporting the findings of other researchers exposed in the literature. These findings were 
categorised under two main headings: civil-political rights and socio-economic rights and 
analysed respectively in chapters VI and VII. The first category, civil and political rights, 
were analysed to find out whether readmitted asylum seekers and refugees can access fair 
and efficient asylum procedures. This requires translators and transparent administrative 
procedures at removal centres, borders and international zones. This chapter also assessed 
the physical condition of administrative detention and the availability of effective 
remedies and procedural safeguards against inhuman and prolonged detention and 
unlawful deportation decisions. The second category, socio-economic, analysed in 
chapter VII addressed the difficulties of refugees in accessing their basic living needs, 
such as housing, health, education services and employment opportunities. The fieldwork 
findings reaffirmed that refugees and asylum seekers are struggling to access all of these.  
To aid in answering the main research questions and other sub-questions given above, the 
researcher developed two main hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on the refugee issue falls short of guaranteeing refugees “a right to have right” 
and the second hypothesis was that Turkey is not a safe country for refugees. The right to 
have rights of refugees is defined as the right to seek asylum, respect for the principle of 
non-refoulement and access to dignified living conditions as envisioned in the 1951 
Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments. 
In light of the analyses carried out in this thesis, the first hypothesis has been confirmed 
and validated. There are many pieces of evidence that the EU-Turkey Agreement on the 
refugee issue fails to guarantee the fundamental rights of refugees. If we look at the 
implementation of the Statement in Greece, it can be seen that Greece fails to take return 
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decisions in accordance with the international refugee law and repeatedly violates the 
right to seek asylum while the principle of non-refoulement is not upheld. If we look at 
the accessibility to fair and effective asylum procedures, the recent practice of the Greek 
authorities reveals that Greece does not comply with its international responsibilities 
when examining asylum applications. During the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement since March 2016, the increasing refugee burden on Greek authorities has 
made it difficult to assess all asylum applications individually and has led to refoulement 
of asylum seekers without accessing asylum procedure. Since the date of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, around 2,000 persons, who have not applied for asylum or whose application 
has been assessed as unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, have been returned from Greece to Turkey5 but there is no 
satisfactory answer whether all these readmitted migrants were given the chance to apply 
for asylum and benefitted from legal assistance before returning to Turkey. Human rights 
organisations and NGOs and scholars have heavily criticised these returns for breaching 
the fundamental principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsion.6 
These allegations of the NGOs were reaffirmed by many unlawful returns of genuine 
asylum seekers to Turkey. The director of UNHCR’s Europe Bureau, Cochetel, confirmed 
these allegations saying that 13 Afghan and Congolese asylum seekers, who reached the 
Greek island after 20 March 2016, were deported back to Turkey and had not been 
allowed to apply for asylum due to administrative chaos on the Greek island.7 It was 
reported that following their readmission to Turkey, all 13 asylum seekers were placed in 
detention and the Turkish Government refused to allow the UNHCR Commissioner to 
                                                 
5  Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-turkey Statement, COM 
(2017) 470 final, 6 September 2017, p. 5. 
6  Amnesty International, Turkey: Illegal Mass Return of Syrian Refuges Expose Fatal Flaws in the 
EU-Turkey Deal, 1 April 2016; Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Syrians Pushed Back at the Border, 
23 November 2015; Marx, Reinhard, Legal Opinion on the Admissibility under Union Law of the 
European Council’s Plan to Treat Turkey like a “Safe Third Country” Commissioned by Pro Asyl, 
14 March 2016, p. 10; Mülteci-Der and Pro-Asyl, Observation on the Situation of Refugees in 
Turkey, 22 April 2016, p. 6; Labayle, Henri & de Bruyker, Philippe, The EU-Turkey Agreement on 
Migration and Asylum: False Pretences or a Fool’s Bargain?, 1 April 2016, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy. http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-eu-turkey-agreement-on-migration-and-
asylum-false-pretences-or-a-fools-bargain/.  
7  Guardian, Greece May Have Deported Asylum Seekers by Mistake, Says UN, 5 April 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/greece-deport-migrants-turkey-united-nations-
european-union.  
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visit them.8  
In addition to poor Greek asylum practice, Greece adopted fast-track border procedures 
in April 20169 and set a very short time limit for asylum applications and appeals against 
administrative removal decisions. This new Law has made it extremely difficult for 
asylum seekers to access asylum determination procedure and it triggers deportation of 
genuine asylum seekers.10 Article 60(4) of the LFIP gives asylum seekers only one day 
for preparation for their interview.11 The fast-track border procedures have also reduced 
appeal procedures against removal decisions. According to the new Law, there are only 
three days in which to appeal. Furthermore, there is no automatic suspension effect in 
appeals against a removal decision, which means that the applicants must apply to a judge 
in order to remain in Greece during their appeal.12 The new law’s provisions are not 
compatible with Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive, which requires an 
automatic suspensive effect on appeals against inadmissibility decisions based on the 
“safe third country” concept. This means that if Greece decides to deport refugees and 
asylum seekers to Turkey on the basis of safe third country concept, Greece should give 
refugees the right to seek remedy with automatic suspensive effect in accordance with 
Article 46 of the Asylum Procedures Directive but in practice, it does not. 
Furthermore, research into the implementation of the Statement revealed that nearly 
60,000 asylum seekers who reached Greece after the EU-Turkey Statement, have been 
stranded in Greece, including children and vulnerable persons. The relocation scheme 
between the EU Member States does not work very well because some of the member 
                                                 
8  Guardian, Refuges in Greece Warn of Suicides Over EU-Turkey Deal, 7 April 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/07/refugees-in-greece-warn-of-suicides-over-eu-
turkey-deal; Letter from the UNHCR, Response to query related to UNHCR’s observation of 
Syrians readmitted in Turkey’, 23/12/2016, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jan/unhcr-letter-
access-syrians-returned-turkey-to-greece-23-12-16.pdf. 
9  Law 4375/2016 on the Transposition of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, OG. 
A’51/03.04.2016.  
10  Strik, Tineke, The Situation of Refugees and Migrants under the EU-Turkey Agreement of 18 March 
2016, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc, 14028, 19 April 2016, p. 8; Greek Council for Refugees, Fast-
Track Border Procedure (Eastern Aegean Islands), Available at Asylum Information Database 
(AIDA) http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/procedures/fast-
track-border-procedure-eastern-aegean.  
11  Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Greece: Asylum Reform in the Wake of the EU-Turkey 
Deal, 4 April 2016, http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-04-2016/greece-asylum-reform-wake-
eu-turkey-deal.  
12  ECRE, Greece Urgently Adopts Controversial Law to Implement EU-Turkey Deal, 8 April 2016, 
http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1439-greece-urgently-
adopts-controversial-law-to-implement-eu-turkey-deal-.html.  
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states have refused to share the burden of Greece and Italy.13 As of June 2017, less than 
15,000 refugees have been relocated from Greece to other EU countries.14 Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have sabotaged the refugee resettlement program of the 
European Council and refused to take any refugee from these two countries. Against this 
unlawful act of these countries, the European Commission launched a legal action.15 In a 
response to the legal action, Slovakia and Hungary asked the CJEU to annul the decision 
of the European Council. It is very promising that the Court dismissed the argument put 
by Slovakia and Hungary and stated that  
The contested decision is not provisional since it will have long-term effects because 
many applicants for international protection will remain in the Member State of 
relocation well beyond the 24-month period of application of the contested decision.16 
Given the lack of solidarity amongst European member states and very poor living 
condition on the Greek islands, it is hard to say that we are far from Arendt’s interpretation 
on the rightlessness of refugees. Today refugees and asylum seekers cannot claim their 
fundamental human rights and are left to the generocity of nation states. Unfortunately, 
European member states use the dire reception conditions as a deterrent mechanism to 
prevent further arrivals of asylum seekers and irregular migrants from Turkey.17 The poor 
protection system in Greece leaves asylum seekers vulnerable to human traffickers and 
has increased human suffering.18 
                                                 
13  Lovertt, Asleigh & Whelan, Claire & Rendón, Renata, The Reality of the EU-Turkey Statement: 
How Greece has Become a Testing Ground for Policies that Erode Protection for Refugees, 
Publishers: International Rescue Committee & Norwegian Refugee Council and Oxfam Joint Agency, 
Briefing Note, 17 March 2017, p. 8; Amnesty International, A Blueprint for Despair: Human Rights 
Impact of the EU-Turkey Deal, January 2017, http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/Reports/EU 
Turkey_Deal_Briefing_Formatted_Final_P4840-3.pdf 
14  Member State’s Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism, 21 June 2017, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf.  
15  Khan, Shehab, EU Launches Legal Proceedings Against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
Over Handling of the Refugee Crisis, Independent, 14 June 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-poland-hungary-czech-republic-refugee-
crisis-handle-legal-proceeding-lawsuit-european-commission-a7789161.html.  
16  Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), Judgment in Joined Cases C-643/15 and 
C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council, Luxemburg, 6 September 2017, para. 98.  
17  Christopoulos, Dimitris, Refugees are the Bogeyman: the Real Threat is the Far Right, Open 
Democracy, 9 November 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/dimitris-christopoulos/refugees-
are-bogeyman-real-threat-is-far-right.  
18  Guild, Elspeth & Costello, Cathryn & Moreno-Lax, Violeta, Implementation of the 2015 Council 
Decisions Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit 
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If we turn to Turkey, the evidence strongly suggests that the EU-Turkey RA has brought 
many challenges to Turkey’s delivery of human rights. First, people who were readmitted 
to Turkey under the refugee deal cannot access asylum procedures due to lack of 
procedural safeguards and are subjected to fast-track removals.19 Even though Turkey 
provided an assurance to the EU that readmitted refugees would not be sent back to their 
country of origin, the literature review, fieldwork findings and human rights organisations 
reports indicate that the actual practice contradicts Turkey’s claims. Particularly, non-
Syrians, who are forcibly returned to Turkey, are facing more risk of deportation than 
Syrians. Applying for asylum in the removal centres is practically impossible for non-
Syrians. They are not being given the opportunity to ask for asylum in Turkey. They are 
not allowed to communicate with their family members, lawyers or the UNHCR 
representatives. Faced with a lack of legal information and translators they are in a very 
weak position.20 This increasing risk of refoulement of non-Syrians is related to the 
discriminatory approach of the EU and Turkey. Although the EU asked Turkey for 
guarantees for Syrians after their readmission to Turkey, neither the EU nor Turkey 
considered non-Syrians and no guarantees were agreed for them.  
Second, Turkey's increasing security concern after the failed coup attempt in 2016 has 
increased the risk of refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees. In accordance with a 
new amendment to the LFIP, made during the state of emergency, refugees and asylum 
seekers can be subjected to deportation if they are considered to be related to a terrorist 
organisation.21 This increasing security-oriented approach has also increased the risk of 
deportation for asylum seekers and refugees on the grounds of public security and public 
order. Many deportation decisions are taken without any effective remedy against them. 
                                                 
of Italy and of Greece, European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department Cıtizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2017, pp. 40-41.  
19  Tunaboylu, Sevda & Alpes, Jill, The EU-Turkey Deal: What Happens to People Who Return to 
Turkey? Forced Migration Review, 54, February 2017, 
http://www.fmreview.org/resettlement/tunaboylu-alpes.html.  
20  Report from GUE/NGL Delegation to Turkey, What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans Should Seen 
During Their Visit to Turkey, May 2-4 2016, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/ep-
GUENGL-report-refugees-Turkey-deal.pdf.; Ulusoy, Orçun & Battjes, Hemme, Situation of 
Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement, Vrije 
University Migration Law Series, No. 15, 2017. 
21  In accordance with Article 54(1)(b)(d) and new added paragraph (k) of the LFIP, foreigners who are  
“leaders, members or supporters of a terrorist organisation or a benefit-oriented criminal 
organization”; “pose a public order or public security or public health threat”, and “are assessed by 
international institutions and organisation as being related to the terrorist organization” will be 
subjected to deportation.  
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Turkey’s increasing security-oriented policies towards foreigners may trigger deportation 
of genuine asylum seekers back to their country of origin without balancing public 
security and the right to life of individuals. There are many examples where 
administrative authorities have failed to investigate the special situation of individuals 
and ordered the deportation of registered refugees for posing a threat to public order, 
public security or public health.22 
Third, readmitted asylum seekers and refugees have been struggling to access durable 
solutions in Turkey. The LFIP does not provide permanent residence status to refugees 
while foreigners who have continuously resided in Turkey for at least eight years are 
eligible for permanent residence permits. Those with conditional refugee status and 
temporary protection holders cannot apply for Turkish citizenship even if they fulfil the 
eight-year residency requirement that applies to foreigners. This provision of Turkish law 
conflicts with Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which requires States to 
facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. This extreme uncertainty puts 
asylum seekers and refugees in a precarious situation, and it is seen as a major push-factor 
contributing to many of them making dangerous journeys to Europe.23 
Fourth, Turkey has started to increasingly detain asylum seekers and irregular migrants 
on the grounds of loosely defined reasons such as “public order and public security” or 
“breaching the rules of entry into or exit from Turkey”. Recent experiences in Turkey 
have also shown that almost all readmitted refugees and asylum seekers are subjected to 
administrative detention and sent to removal centres where living conditions do not meet 
international standards. Turkey has systematically violated Article 3, 5 and 13 of the 
ECHR due to prolonged detention in inhuman living conditions. Furthermore, the recent 
judgments of the ECtHR and TCC have underlined that there is still no effective 
administrative or judicial remedy against poor living conditions in the removal centres.  
Lastly, interception operations with the help of NATO and Frontex in the Aegean Sea 
have caused refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees in the international sea or 
                                                 
22  Soykan, Cavidan, The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: The Rise of Walls of Shame, ECRE, 17 March 
2017, https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-by-cavidan-soykan-the-eu-turkey-deal-one-year-on-the-rise-of-
walls-of-shame/. 
23  Skribeland, Özlem Gürakar, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices, Seeking 
Asylum in Turkey, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, 2016, p. 21. 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/noas-rapport-tyrkia-april-2016_0.pdf.  
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Turkish waters without accessing asylum procedure.24 As Moreno-Lax highlights 
although these interception operations have been presented as rescuing individuals from 
dying at sea they actually return all survivors to Turkey without considering the principle 
of non-refoulement.25 The NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, affirmed this in 
his talk to the European Parliament stating that  
When we rescue those people, what we agreed with Turkey at a ministerial level, we 
agreed that if those people came from Turkey then we could return them to Turkey.26  
This again constitutes a violation of the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition 
of collective expulsion even if it takes place within the territorial water of Turkey. As 
explained in chapter III, Article 3 of the ECHR provides extraterritorial protection for 
refugees and asylum seekers in the lights of the developing jurisprudence of ECtHR. This 
means that while state power is basically bound to its territory, exercising its power 
outside national territory does not release the state from its commitment to human rights. 
Therefore, the place where the person is intercepted by state authorities is not decisive. 
Non-refoulement applies in a comprehensive manner, either within its territory or beyond 
it.27  
Nevertheless, regardless of this increasing scope of the principle of non-refoulement and 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the EU has developed a new mechanism to avoid taking 
responsibility in such kinds of interception operations. There is evidence that the EU 
financially supports Turkey to set up its own border security mechanism and interception 
operations alongside its own border. In this regard, Turkey has introduced penalties for 
irregular exit from its territory and established patrols to prevent exit. While the EU has 
been supporting Turkey’s interception operations with donations of assets and financial 
support, it actually stays away itself from responsibility for intercepted refugees as 
demonstrated in Hirsi Jamaa case by the ECtHR. As Peers argues, the actions of Turkey 
using assets donated by the European Member States would not bring Member States’ 
                                                 
24  Peers, Steve, The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment, 18 March 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html?m=1.  
25  Moreno-Lax, Violeta, The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal) practice in Europe 
and Australia, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, Policy Brief 4, May 2017, p. 3.  
26  Rettman, Andrew, NATO to Take Migrants Back to Turkey, If Rescued, 23 February 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/foreign/132418.  
27  Marx, 2016, pp. 7-8. 
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responsibility within the scope of the ECHR.28 So far, Turkey has blocked the exit of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers since 18 March 2016 and this has resulted in a 
huge drop in daily crossings from 2,500 to just 43.29  
The second hypothesis claims that Turkey is not a safe third country for refugees. In the 
light of the analysis of Turkish asylum law and the fieldwork findings, the second 
hypothesis has also been validated. Although the European Commission argues that 
Turkey offers equivalent protection to European and non-European refugees, the 
Commission’s interpretation of “safe third country” concept regarding Turkey is not 
convincing on several counts. First, it is very difficult to demonstrate that Turkey provides 
effective protection to refugees. Asylum seekers and refugees are not allowed to access 
their socio-economic rights in law or practice. Nearly three million refugees are 
struggling to access housing, health, education services and access to employment 
opportunities. There is no opportunity to get state-funded accommodation for asylum 
seekers and refugees even though they are vulnerable, especially women and children. 
This has resulted in the impoverishment of thousands of refugees in the satellite cities and 
leaves them living in unhealthy conditions. In addition, even though the Turkish 
government took some positive steps, nearly two-thirds of the children have been out of 
education for six years and risk becoming a “lost generation”. The continuation of low 
enrollment in schools has led to child labour, child begging, early marriage and also 
creates the risk of marginalisation and radicalization.  
If we look at getting work, a recent adoption of new Regulations, which facilitate access 
of conditional refugees and temporary protection holders to the labour market, it has not 
changed the real situation. One participant, NGO3, pointed to the fact that the legislative 
change without taking into account sociological and economic dimensions of the problem 
have done nothing in actual practice. The quota system, bureaucratic procedures during 
requesting work permission and lack of recognition of academic or professional 
qualifications have led to an increase in informal employment. So far only 1% of 
registered refugees in Turkey have been granted work permits. Thus, a large number of 
refugees and asylum seekers, including children have been working in exploitative 
                                                 
28  Peers, Steve, The Future of the Schengen System, Swedish Institute for European Studies, report no. 
6, November 2013, p. 106.  
29  Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 3. 
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conditions.  
As seen above, the EU-Turkey Statement has led to entrapment of asylum seekers and 
refugees without any prospects of durable solutions in Turkey. Without an effective 
protection mechanism, increasing numbers of deportees from Greece into Turkey are 
facing a “readmission trap” in the long term30 and this constitutes a violation of Article 3 
of the ECHR.31 As seen in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,32 Greece has failed 
to comply with its obligation to ensure that a return carries no risk of refoulement and 
returnees can activate their rights in Turkey as guaranteed by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and international law. The fieldwork findings and human rights reports cited 
indicate that despite some positive steps taken by the Turkish government, Turkey cannot 
be considered a safe third country. Turkey’s asylum system has flaws in its temporary 
protection structure due to the maintenance of a geographical limitation to the 1951 
Refugee Convention. Further, the lack of a registration system; no procedural safeguards 
during the asylum procedures; denial of access to socio-economic and civil-political 
rights refute any claim to be a “safe third country”.  
2. Challenges 
After discussing the findings of the study, it is important to acknowledge its challenges. 
There are four major challenges that affect the findings of the thesis. The first is related 
to the contested nature of my research. The context is constantly evolving as the legal 
status of the EU-Turkey Statement and RA are being challenged in the courts. So far, the 
legal grounds of the Statement and its compatibility with international and human rights 
law has been challenged before the CJEU33, Greek Appeal Committees,34 the Greek 
                                                 
30  Return and Readmission to Albania, The Experience of Selected EU Member States, International 
Organization for Migration: Tirana, August 2006, p. 30. 
31  Carrera, Sergio & Guild, Elspeth, EU-Turkey Plan for Handling Refugees is Fraught with Legal and 
Procedural Challenges, 10 March 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-
refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges. 
32  See another example M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 306960/9, 21 January 2011, 
paras. 161-162.  
33  Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber, Extended Composition), Judgment in Case 
T-192/16, NF v European Council, 28 February 2017, paras. 26-32: Court of Justice of the 
European Union (First Chamber, Extended Composition), Judgment in Case T-193/16, NG v 
European Council 28 February 2017, paras. 70-75; Court of Justice of the European Union (First 
Chamber, Extended Composition), Judgment in Case T-257/16, NM v European Council 28 February 
2017, paras. 68-73.  
34  Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Fifth Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-turkey Statement, COM (2017) 
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Council of State.35 Even though the CJEU, Greek Appeal Committees and Greek Council 
of State have given decisions on the legal nature of the Statement, one appeal case before 
the CJEU36 is still pending. This case may affect the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement and stop the removal of refugees and asylum seekers to Turkey on the ground 
of safe third country or first country of asylum concepts. So far, the living nature of the 
research subject has required the researcher to update her study continuously.  
The second challenge is the changing political environment and tense relationship 
between the EU and Turkey. This increasing tension and deteriorating relations has put 
the Agreement in jeopardy on many occasions. For instance, the tension between the EU 
and Turkey led to the suspension of the EU-Turkey RA for third country nationals even 
though it was planned to come into force in June 2016. Now the EU-Turkey Statement 
has been in operation for over one and half years with the help of the Turkey and Greece 
Readmission Protocol. If the EU-Turkey RA had come into force on the planned date, 
every member state could have a chance to send irregular migrants and asylum seekers to 
Turkey on the basis of the safe third country or first country of asylum concepts but now 
it is only applicable between Turkey and Greece. This has affected the scope of the 
research project.  
The third challenge is related to the difficulty of doing fieldwork in Turkey after the failed 
coup attempt in 2016. After this, the Turkish Government dismissed or arrested at least 
100,000 public servants, judges and bureaucrats due to their alleged link with terrorist 
                                                 
2014 final, 2 March 2017, p. 6. The Greek Appeal Committee has reversed 415 first-instance 
inadmissibility decisions, while it only confirmed 24 first instance inadmissibility decisions. 
35 Amnesty International, Greece: Court Decisions Pave Way for First Forcible Returns of Asylum 
Seekers under EU-Turkey Deal, 22 September 2017, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/greece-court-decisions-pave-way-for-first-
forcible-returns-of-asylum-seekers-under-eu-turkey-deal/; Refugee Law Clinics Abroad, Greek 
Council of State Approves Forced Returns to Turkey-RLCA Fears Massive Removals to Turkey, 25 
September 2017, https://refugeelawclinicsabroad.org/2017/09/25/rlca-fears-massive-removals-to-
turkey/; Asylum Information Database, Greece: The Ruling of the Council of State on the Asylum 
Procedure Post EU-Turkey Deal, 4 October 2017, http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-10-
2017/greece-ruling-council-state-asylum-procedure-post-eu-turkey-deal.  
36  Court of Justice of the European Union, C-208/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 by NF 
against the Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 28 
February 2017 in Case T-192/16: NF v European Council; Court of Justice of the European Union, 
C-209/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 by NG against the Order of the General Court (First 
Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 28 February 2017 in Case T-193/16: NG v European 
Council; Court of Justice of the European Union, C-210/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 
by NM against the Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 
28 February 2017 in Case T-257/16: NM v European Council.  
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activities. This large number of dismissals from the public services has increased the 
feeling of insecurity amongst public servants. Thus the researcher experienced great 
difficulty in accessing the participants. Due to the sensitivity of the subject and security 
concerns, two participants, one judge and one senior official, declined to participate even 
though they had agreed to meet the researcher before the coup attempt. This reduced the 
number of respondents from 20 to 18. This also affected the willingness of people to 
answer questions in the interviews or permit the interviews to be recorded.  
Lastly, Turkish society is quite closed and individuals do not normally criticize the 
government’s policies openly. Due to the cultural characteristics and the insecure 
environment, it was very difficult to get direct and honest answers from the interviewees, 
particularly judges and senior officials. They refused to answer some questions, which 
asked about the safety of Turkey from the perspective of refugees and whether refugees 
were afraid of detention and being deported back to their country if they complained.  
3. Future Prospects 
In spite of the challenges, the research has contributed to knowledge and produced some 
significant findings that harbor implications for future research projects. The EU-Turkey 
refugee deal in its implementation demonstrates that it does not provide protection in the 
region of origin and is not therefore a solution to the refugee protection crisis although it 
contributes to some burden sharing between states. There is a need for further research to 
determine how protection in the region of origin could be facilitated without infringing 
the rights of refugees. Considering the continuing conflict between state sovereignty and 
human rights and the reluctance of some countries to take responsibility for refugees, the 
protection in the region of origin may be the only solution to refugee protection crisis. 
What is needed is to decide how readmission agreements could facilitate protection in the 
region of origin complemented with further burden sharing instruments.  
When we look at the rhetoric of the European institutions, they frequently underline the 
importance of protection in the region of origin and preventing asylum seekers from dying 
in the sea during their dangerous crossings. The European Commission in its last report 
defended the EU-Turkey Statement and insisted that the EU aimed to stop irregular 
migration and refugee flows from Turkey to the EU “replacing it with organised, safe, 
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legal channels to Europe”.37 When we look at the implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement, we can see two important mechanisms for promoting protection in the region 
of origin: The first is resettlement, and the second is to provide financial assistance to 
Turkey.  
Concerning the first mechanism, the EU established a very controversial resettlement 
scheme with Turkey. According to the EU-Turkey Statement, 
For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will 
be resettled from Turkey to the EU.  
As seen in the letter of the refuge deal, the exact scale of the resettlement would depend 
on how many Syrian refugees continued to reach the Greek islands. The swapping of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers for resettlement of Syrian refugees was found 
“deeply ‘inimical’ to established European traditions”38 and “morally dubious”.39 In fact, 
only 9,000 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to the European member 
states out of 3 million refugees hosted by Turkey, according to the 7th Report of the 
European Commission published in September of 2017.40 The resettlement plan provides 
a very symbolic resettlement opportunity for Syrians under the one-to-one mechanism 
and fails to offer a sustainable solution to the ongoing refugee crisis. Due to very low 
resettlement numbers, restricted border controls and no available humanitarian visas, 
there is no safe passage for asylum seekers. Contrary to the claims of the EU institutions, 
the refugee deal fails to provide a significant alternative safe way for asylum seekers.41 
The deal ends up violating the principle of the right to leave in accordance with Article 2 
of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR. The restrictive border controls and limited opportunity to 
access asylum leaves asylum seekers with the option of starting a dangerous journey to 
access international protection or staying in legal limbo in refugee camps or satellite cities 
                                                 
37  European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement One Year On, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-
information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf.  
38  Carrera, Sergio & Guild, Elspeth, EU-Turkey Plan for Handling Refugees is Fraught with Legal and 
Procedural Challenges, 10 March 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-
refugees-fraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges.  
39  Peers, Steve, The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment, 18 March 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-legal.html?m=1.  
40  Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Seventh Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, COM 
(2017) 470 final, 6 September 2017, p. 2.  
41  Labayle & de Bruyker, 2016.  
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indefinitely.42 
The second mechanism for promoting protection in the region of origin is financial 
assistance. This is intended to provide humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, who 
are living in Turkey. However, the EU’s financial assistance is conditional on reducing 
the number of arrivals on Greek territory. In accordance with the refugee deal, in return 
for Turkey's cooperation on the refugee issue, the EU decided to provide an initial 3 
billion euros to improve the reception conditions of Syrians in Turkey under the Facility 
for Refugees until the end of 2018. The money would support refugees’ access to 
education, health, food and accommodation but the total amount disbursed so far has only 
reached 838 million euros according to 7th Report of the European Commission in 
September 2017. This represents only 25% of the total amount for 2016-2017. This low 
level of financial assistance was condemned by Turkish President Erdoğan who accused 
the EU of being the untrusted partner.43  
This low level of financial assistance has caused resentment both in the Turkish 
community and amongst refugees most of whom are largely living in a precarious 
economic condition. The increasing refugee burden on Turkish communities is quite 
alarming. As Chimni44 foresaw if the EU fails to alleviate refugee protection 
responsibility of Turkey, it will end up downgrading the core principles of refugee 
protection, especially the principle of non-refoulement. There are evidences that Turkey 
has started to undermine its international refugee protection responsibility through 
closing its borders to newcomers from Syria and introducing a visa requirement for 
Syrians45 and building a wall between Syria and Turkey.46 The wall, which was recently 
                                                 
42  Frelick, Bill & Kysel, Ian M. & Podkul, Jennifer, The Impact of Externalisation of Migration 
Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, Journal on Migration and Human 
Security, 4(4), 2016, p. 208. 
43  Daily Sabah Politics, Germany Admits EU Falling Far Short on 3 Billion Euro Refugee Deal with 
Turkey, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/11/29/germany-admits-eu-falling-far-short-on-3-
billion-euro-refugee-deal-with-turkey. : Daily Sabah, EU has not Kept Promises on Supporting 
Refugees, Erdoğan Says, 21 September 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2017/09/21/eu-
has-not-kept-promises-on-supporting-refugees-erdogan-says/amp.  
44  Chimni, B.S. The Principle of Burden Sharing: Some Reflections, Presentation to the Summer School 
in Forced Migration, University of Oxford, July 1999, p. 7.  
45  Amnesty International, Turkey: Illegal Mass Return of Syrian Refuges Expose Fatal Flaws in the 
EU-Turkey Deal, 1 April 2016: Betts, Alexander& Ali, Ali& Memişoğlu, Fulya, Local Politics and 
the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, Oxford Refugee 
Studies, 2017, p. 22.  
46  Soykan, Cavidan, The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: The Rise of Walls of Shame, ECRE, 17 March 
2017, https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-by-cavidan-soykan-the-eu-turkey-deal-one-year-on-the-rise-of-
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completed, is the most important evidence that Turkey is abstaining from taking further 
refugee protection responsibility. This is a result of the lack of burden sharing between 
the EU and Turkey and the ripple effect of the EU’s restrictive and contradictory refugee 
protection policies on Turkey.  
4. Suggestions 
The EU-Turkey Agreement on the refugee issue is not a good example of the provision 
of effective refugee protection in the region of origin. As a transit country on the routes 
of irregular migration and asylum seekers, Turkey is left alone with millions of refugees 
and irregular migrants since the Syrian crisis. Without ending the war in Syria, there is 
no hope that refugees can access dignified living conditions in Turkey. Given the legal 
nature and the content of the EU-Turkey Statement, it only aims to hold refugees in 
Turkey but does not foresee any long-term solution to the refugee protection problem. 
Regarding increasing refugee protection responsibility on Turkey’s social, economic and 
institutional capacities, it is not possible to ask Turkey to upgrade its refugee protection 
system and provide refugees with rights equal to its citizens, particularly in the area of 
socio-economic rights. Turkey only provides the minimum of humanitarian assistance to 
refugees to discourage more from coming. The implementation of the EU-Turkey 
Statement has not improved the situation of refugees in Turkey and has even made it 
worse because of the unbalanced weight of refugee protection responsibility.  
Reform is therefore necessary. The researcher suggests three important amendments to 
the EU-Turkey Agreement to reduce human rights violations. The first and most 
important is that the EU should drop the conditionality element of its migration policy 
and direct its attention towards improving the actual conditions of refugees in Turkey. It 
is very clear that the readmission agreement cannot solve the refugee protection issue 
alone but it should be complemented with other burden sharing mechanisms to improve 
the condition of refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey. The Member States and Turkey 
should create long-term solutions for refugees and share the refugee protection 
responsibility according to their economic status, population and capacity, rather than 
laying the whole burden on Turkey.  
                                                 
walls-of-shame/. 
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Second, the EU and Turkey have deliberately focused on providing humanitarian 
assistance and safety of refugees without a meaningful commitment to durable solutions. 
The fieldwork data revealed that socio-economic and civil-political rights are equally 
important for establishing a dignified life. It is time to move away from containment of 
refugees in Turkey in dire conditions. There is an urgent need to encourage self-reliance 
of refugees by creating more formal job opportunities. To do this, financial assistance 
should be given to Turkey to boost job opportunities. Also, education, housing and health 
services should be provided to refugees. These services need more investment and it 
cannot be handled without the cooperation of the international community.  
Third, the lack of an independent monitoring system is putting the lives of vulnerable 
peoples at risk and exposing them to the arbitrary power of state agents. Independent 
monitoring bodies should be established to assess what happens to people who are 
subjected to forced and assisted returns. It is also very important to define whether 
forcible return policies are an effective mechanism for halting increasing irregular 
migration and refugee flow. An independent monitoring system with the participation of 
NGOs and Parliamentary delegations should be established to monitor human rights’ 
impact of RA over readmitted refugees and asylum seekers. Also, contracting states’ 
ombudsman officers should participate in the Committee of Monitoring experts. 
In conclusion, my research strongly suggests that the EU is presenting the refugee deal 
as a humanitarian action and success story in reducing deadly journeys of refugees to the 
EU territory but the agreement forms an invisible violence on refugees. It means that even 
though asylum seekers have a right to seek asylum in any country, they have been forced 
to seek asylum in Turkey instead of Europe even though there is no available dignified 
living conditions and safeguards against unlawful deportation.  The restriction on the right 
to seek asylum hinders the ability of refugees and asylum seekers to claim and exercise 
their rights. Contrary to the claim of the EU, Turkey is not a safe third country for 
refugees. The Turkish asylum system only provides humanitarian protection but it does 
not enable or empower refugees to integrate into Turkish society. As Arendt pointed out 
even though refugees are endowed with natural human rights, they have no means of 
using or enforcing their rights. This situation gives rise to the fundamental condition of 
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“rightlessness” and reduced them to “bare humanity.”47 Today we are experiencing once 
again what one famous, English philosopher observed many years ago: that human rights 
are “nonsense on stilts”. The only rights we have are the ones we can claim and enforce48 
and this require citizenship of a sovereign state.  
 
                                                 
47  Arendt, Hannah, We Refugees, The Jewish Writings, Edited by Kohn, Jerome & Feldmen, H. Ron, 
Schocken Books: New York, 2007, p. 264. 
48  Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During 
the French Revolution, cited by Gündoğdu, Ayten, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2014, p. 27. 
289 
 
  
REFERENCES 
 
Books and Articles 
 
Abell, Nazaré Albuquerque, The Compatibility of Readmission Agreements with the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 11(1), 1999, 60-83.  
Achilli, Luigi & Yassin, Nasser & Erdoğan, Murat, Neighbouring Host-Countries’ 
Policies for Syrian Refugees: The Cases of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, European 
Institute of Mediterranean, January 2017. 
 Achermann, Alberto & Gattiker, Mario, Safe Third Countries: European 
Developments, International Journal of Refugee Law, 7(1), 1995, 19-38.  
Adelman, Jeremy, Pariah. Can Hannah Arendt Help Us Rethink Out Global Refugee 
Crisis? Wilson Quarterly, June 2016, http://wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/looking-
back-moving-forward/pariah-can-hannah-arendt-help-us-rethink-our-global-
refugee-crisis/.  
Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Translated by Heller-
Roazen, Daniel, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1998. 
Agamben, Giorgio, Means Without End: Notes on Politics. Translated by Binetti, 
Vincenzo & Casarino, Cesare, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2000. 
Agier, Micheal, On the Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today, 
Translated by D. Fernbach, MA Polity Press: MA, 2011. 
Aktan, Irfan, Afgan Çocuğun Ölümü (The Death of Afghan Child), Gazete Duvar 
(Journal of Duvar), 20 Kasım 2017, 
https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/yazarlar/2017/11/20/afgan-cocugun-olumu/. 
Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, State-Centred Refugee Law: From Resettlement to 
Containment, Michigan Journal of International Law, 14 (120), Fall, 1992, 120-138.  
Allain, Jean, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 13(4), 2002, 533-558.  
Al-Omar, Saleem, Turkey is Missing Out on an Opportunity to Integrate Syrian Refugees 
and Revive Its Economy, Atlantic Council, 19 May 2017, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/turkey-is-missing-out-on-an-
opportunity-to-integrate-syrian-refugees-and-revive-its-economy.  
Anker, Deborah & Fitzpatrick, John & Shacknove, Andrew, Crisis and Cure: A Reply 
to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 11, 1998, 295-310.  
Aras, Bülent & Yasun, Salih, The Educational Opportunities and Challenges of Syrian 
Refugee Students in Turkey: Temporary Education Centres and Beyond, IPC-
Mercator Policy Brief, July 2016. 
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 
1958. 
Arendt, Hannah, We Refugees, Edited by Robinson, Marc, Altogether Elsewhere, 
Writers on Exile, Faber and Faber: Boston, 1943. 
Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Third Edition, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd: London, 1966. 
Arendt, Hannah, We Refugees, The Jewish Writings, Edited by Kohn, Jerome & 
Feldmen, H. Ron, Schocken Books: New York, 2007. 
290 
 
  
Atak, İdil, A Look at the EU-Turkey Action Plan, 17 October 2015, François Crépeau 
Chaire Oppenheimer en Droit International Public, http://francoiscrepeau.com/fr/a-
look-at-the-eu-turkey-action-plan/.  
Ay, Kadir, Bugünkü Yasal Düzenlemeler Çerçevesinde Yürütülen Uygulamalar ve 
Karşılaşılan Güçlükler (Conducted Practices and Encountering Problems within the 
Framework of Today’s Legislative Arrangements), Türk Mülteci Hukuku ve 
Uygulamadaki Gelişmeler (Turkish Migration Law and Developments in the 
Practice), İstanbul Barosu Yayınları (Publication of Istanbul Bar Association), 
İstanbul 2004. 
Aygün, Mesut & Kaya, Cansu, Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Hukukunda Kalıcı 
Bir Çözüm Olarak Yerel Entegrasyon (Integration as a Permanent Solution in the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection), İnönü Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 
Dergisi (İnönü University Law Faculty Journal), 7(1), 2016, 135-136. 
Baban, Feyzi & Ilcan, Suzan & Rygiel, Kim, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Pathways to 
Precarity, Differential Inclusion, and Negotiated Citizenship Rights, Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43(1), 2016, 41-57.  
Babickâ, Karolina, EU-Turkey Deal Seems to be Schizophrenic, 22 March 2016, 
http://www.migrationonline.cz/en/eu-turkey-deal-seems-to-be-schizophrenic.  
Baklavacıoğlu, Nurcan Ozgur, Building Fortress Turkey: Europeanization of Asylum 
Policy in Turkey, The Romanian Journal of European Studies, no. 7-8, special issue, 
2009, 103-119.  
Baldaccini, Annaliese, The EU Directive on Return: Principles and Protests, Refugee 
Survey Quarterly, 28(4), 2010, 114-138.  
Balfe, Lord Richard, Administrative Detention in Council of Europe Member States-
Legal Limits and Possible Alternative Measures, Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights, AS/Jur, 2016. 
Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia & Fratzke, Susan, Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: 
Why Now and What Next? 24 September 2015, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-context-why-now-
and-what-next. 
Barbeler, Veronique, How the FAİLED coup Affects Syrian Refugees in Turkey, 25 July 
2016, https://www.odi.org/comment/10427-how-failed-coup-affects-syrian-
refugees-turkey. 
Barbulescu, Roxana, Still a Beacon of Human Rights? Considerations on the EU 
Response to the Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Politics, 22(2), 
2017. 
Battjes, Hemme, European Asylum Law and Its Relation to International Law, 
Amsterdam: Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, 2006. 
Bayraktaroğlu Özçelik, Gülüm, Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanun Hükümleri 
Uyarınca Yabancıların Türkiye’den Sınır Dışı Edilmesi, (The Deportation of 
Foreigners from Turkey in the Provisions of the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection), Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, (The Journal of the Union of Turkish 
Bar Associations), September-October 2013, No. 108. 
Benhabib, Seyla, The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2004. 
Benhabib (a), Seyla, Borders, Boundaries and Citizenship, Democratic Citizenship and 
the Crisis of Territory, Political Science and Politics, 38(4), 2005, 673-677.  
291 
 
  
Benhabib (b), Seyla, Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press: New York, 
2005.  
Betts, Alexander, International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, Edited by Betts, 
Alexander & Gil, Loescher, Refugees in International Relations, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2004. 
Betts, Alexander, The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime, 7 October 2015, 
Ethics International Affairs, Ethics& International Affairs, Carnegie Council, 
https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2015/the-normative-terrain-of-the-
global-refugee-regime/. 
Betts, Alexander, Our refugee system is failing. Here's how we can fix it, TED Talk, 
February 2016, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/alexander_betts_our_refugee_system_is_failing_here_s_
how_we_can_fix_it. 
Betts, Alexander& Ali, Ali& Memişoğlu, Fulya, Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, Oxford Refugee 
Studies, 2017.  
Betts, Alexander & Collier, Paul, Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System, 
Penguin Alien Lane: Oxford, 2017. 
Betts, Alexander & Milner, James, The Externalisation of EU Asylum Policy: The 
Position of African States, Working Paper No. 36, University of Oxford, 2006. 
Billet, Carole, EC Readmission Agreements: A Prime Instrument of the External 
Dimension of the EU’s Fight against Irregular Immigration. An Assessment After 
Ten Years of Practice, European Journal of Migration and Law, 12(1), 2010, 45-79.  
Biner, Özge & Soykan, Cavidan, Suriyeli Mültecilerin Perspektifinden Türkiye’de 
Yaşam (The Life in Turkey from the Perspective of Syrian Refugees), Mülteci-Der 
& Sivil Düşün, Nisan 2016. 
Biondi, Paolo, The Case for Italy’s Complicity in Libya Push-Backs, Refugees Deeply, 
24 November 2017, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/11/24/the-case-for-italys-
complicity-in-libya-push-backs.  
Borchelt, Gretchen, The Safe Third Country Practice In the European Union: A 
Misguided Approach to Asylum Law and A Violation of the International Human 
Rights Standards, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 33, 2001-2002, 473-526.  
Boswell, Cristina, The “External Dimension” of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy, 
International Affairs, 79(3), 2003, 619-638.  
Bouteillet-Paquet, Daphné, Passing the Buck: A Critical Analysis of the Readmission 
Policy Implemented by the European Union and Its Member States, European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 5(3) 2003, 359-377.  
Börzel, Tanja & Risse, Thomas, When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and 
Domestic Change, European Integration Online Paper, 4(15), 2000, 1-24.  
Bradshaw, Alan, Sense and Sensibility: Debates and Developments in Socio-Legal 
Research Methods, Edited by Thomas, A. Philip, Socio-Legal Studies, Dartmouth: 
Aldershot, 1997. 
Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, 1992. 
292 
 
  
Brubaker, Rogers, Are Immigration Control Efforts Really Failing? Edited by W. 
Cornelius, P.L. Martin & J.F. Hollifield, Controlling Immigration, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994. 
Bryman, Alan, Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 5th Edition, 
2016. 
Bürgin, Alexander & Aşıkoğlu, Derya, Turkey’s New Asylum Law: a Case of EU 
Influence, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13 November 2015. 
Bürgin, Alexander, European Commission Agency Meets Ankara’s Agenda: Why 
Turkey is Ready for a Readmission Agreement, Journal of European Public Policy, 
19(6), August 2012, 883-899.  
Buzan, Barry, People, States and Fear, Harvester Wheatsheaf: London, 2nd edition, 
1991. 
Bozdağ, Çiğdem & Smets, Kevin, Understanding the Images of Alan Kurdi with “Small 
Data”: A Qualitative, Comparative Analysis of Tweets About Refugees in Turkey 
and Flanders (Belgium), International Journal of Communication, 11, 2017, 4046-
4069.  
Byrne, Rosemary & Noll, Gregor & Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, Western European Asylum 
Policies for Export: The Transfer of Protection and Deflection Formulas to Central 
Europe and the Baltics, Edited by Byrne, Rosemary & Noll, Gregor & Vedsted-
Hansen, Jens, New Asylum Countries?, Migration Control and Refugee Protection 
in an Enlarged European Union, Kluwer Law International: London, 2002, 5-28.  
Byrne, Rosemary & Shacknove, Andrew, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum 
Law, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 9, 1999. 
Cagaptay, Soner & Menekse, Bilge, The Impact of Syria’s Refugees on Southern 
Turkey, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 130, July 2014, 1-
32.  
Campbell, Zach, Europe’s Plan to Close Its Borders Relies on Libya’s Coast Guard 
Doing Its Dirty Work, Abusing Migrants, The Intercept, 25 November 2017, 
https://theintercept.com/2017/11/25/libya-coast-guard-europe-refugees/.  
Carens, H. Joseph, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, The Review of 
Politics, 49(2), 1987, 251-273.  
Carrera, Sergio & Cassarino, Jean-Pierre & El Qadim, Nora & Lahlou, Mehdi & Den 
Hertog, Leonhard, EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and 
Protection: A Model to Follow?, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, No, 
87, January 2016. 
Carrera, Sergio & de Hertog, Leonhard & Stefan, Marco, It Wasn’t Me! The 
Luxembourg Court Orders on the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, CEPS Policy Insights, 
5 April 2017. 
Carrera, Sergio & Guild, Elspeth, EU-Turkey Plan for Handling Refugees is Fraught 
with Legal and Procedural Challenges, 10 March 2016, 
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-refugees-fraught-legal-
and-procedural-challenges. 
Cassarino, Jean-Pierre, Readmission Policy in the European Union, European 
Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ 
Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2010. 
Cassarino, Jean-Pierre, Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the 
Euro-Mediterranean Area, The Middle East Institute, Special Edition, Viewpoints, 
293 
 
  
Washington D.C., 2010, p. 29, Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1730633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1730633. 
Cherti, Myriam & Grant, Peter, The Myths of Transit: Sub-Saharan Migration in 
Morocco, Institute for Public Policy Research, London, June 2013. 
Chetail, Vincent, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of 
the Relations Between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, Edited by Ruhubio-
Marin, Ruth, Human Rights and İmmigration, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2014, 19-72.  
Chetail, Vincent, Will the EU-Turkey Migrant Deal Work in Practice? 29 March 2016, 
The Graduate Institute Geneva, http://graduateinstitute.ch/home/relations-
publiques/news-at-the-institute/news-archives.html/_/news/research/2016/will-the-
eu-turkey-migrant-deal. 
Chimni, B.S. The Principle of Burden Sharing: Some Reflections, Presentation to the 
Summer School in Forced Migration, University of Oxford, July 1999. 
Christopoulos, Dimitris, Refugees are the Bogeyman: the Real Threat is the Far Right, 
Open Democracy, 9 November 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/dimitris-
christopoulos/refugees-are-bogeyman-real-threat-is-far-right.  
Christopoulos, Dimitris, EU Deal with Turkey Legitimises Far Right in Europe: 
Refugees Deeply, 17 March 2017, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/03/17/e-u-deal-with-
turkey-legitimizes-far-right-in-europe-christopoulos.  
Coleman, Nils, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee 
Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden & Boston 2009. 
Collet, Elizabeth, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, Migration Policy 
Institute, March 2016, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-
refugee-deal. 
Collinson, Sarah, Visa Requirements, Carrier Sanctions, ‘Safe Third Countries’ and 
‘Readmission’: The Development of an Asylum ‘Buffer Zone’ in Europe, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 21(1), 1996, 76-90.  
Çorabatır, Metin, The Evolving Approach to Refugee Protection in Turkey, Assessing 
the Practical and the Political Needs, Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration 
Policy Institute, September 2016. 
Cornelisse, Galina, Immigration Detention and Human Rights: Rethinking Territorial 
Sovereignty, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden, 2010.  
Costello, Cathryn & Hancox, Emily, The Recast Asylum Procedures Directive 
2013/32/EU: Caught Between the Stereotypes of the Abusive Asylum Seeker and 
the Vulnerable Refugee, Draft Paper, 5 February 2015, forthcoming in Reforming 
the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law, Edited 
by Chetail, V & De Bruycker, P & Maiani, F., Martinus Nijhoff, 2015. 
Costello, Cathryn & Mouzourakis, Minos, EU Law and the Detainability of Asylum-
Seekers, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 35, 2016. 
Costello, Cathryn, The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe 
Country Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International 
Protection? European Journal of Migration and Law, 7(1), 2005, 35-69.  
Costillo, M. Angel & Hathaway, James. C. Temporary Protection, Refuge: Canada’s 
Journal on Refugees, 15(1), 1996, 10-11.  
294 
 
  
Cotter, Bridget, Hannah Arendt and “The Right to Have Rights”, Edited by Lang, F. 
Anthony & Williams, John, Hannah Arendt and International Relations, Palgrave 
Macmillan: US, 2005, 95-112.  
Crépeau, François, United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council Report, 
Twenty–third Session, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, 
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development, Report of he Special Rapporteur On the Human Rights of Migrants, 
Agenda Item 3, Mission to Turkey, 22-29 June 2012. 
Crépeau, Français, United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council Report, 
Twenty–third Session, Report on the Human Rights of Migrants, Agenda Item 3, 
Mission to Turkey, 17 April 2013, A/HRC/23/46/Add.2. 
Crépeau, François, United Nations General Assembly Report on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, Human Rights Council Twenty-third Session, 24 April 2013, 
A/HRC/23/46. 
Crépeau, François, United Nations General Assembly Report on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, Human Rights Council Twenty-nineth Session, 8 May 2015, 
A/HRC/29/36. 
Crisp, Jeff, Refugee Protection in Regions of Origin: Potential and Challenges, 
December 2003, Migration Policy Institute, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-protection-regions-origin-potential-
and-challenges. 
Csicsmann, Lâszló, The Syrian Refugee Crisis Reconsidered: The Role of the EU-
Turkey Agreement, Corvinus Journal of International Affairs, 1(1), 2016, 83-98.  
Da Lomba, Sylvie, The Right to Seek Refugee Status in the European Union. Intersentia 
Publishers: London, 2004. 
Danisi, Carmelo, Taking the ‘Union’ out of ‘EU’: The EU-Turkey Statement on the 
Syrian Refugee Crisis as an Agreement Between States under International Law, 20 
April 2017, https://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-the-union-out-of-eu-the-eu-turkey-
statement-on-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-as-an-agreement-between-states-under-
international-law/#more-15173 
De Heijer, Maarten & Spijkerboer, Thomas, Is the EU-Turkey Refugee and Migration 
Deal a Treaty? EU Law Analysis, 7 April 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/04/is-eu-turkey-refugee-and-migration-
deal.html?m=1.  
Den Heijer, Maarten & Rijpma, Jorrit & Spijkerboer, Thomas, Coercion, Prohibition, 
and Great Expectations: The Continuing Failure of the Common European Asylum 
System, Common Market Law Review, 53, 2016, 607-642. 
Den Heijer, Maarteen, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Bloomsbury Publishing: 
Oxford, 2012. 
Dedja, Sokol, Human rights in the EU Return Policy?: The Case of the EU-Albania 
Relations, European Journal of Migration Law, 14, 2001, 95-114.  
Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the 
European Convention, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006. 
Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte & Tobias, Kelly, Are Human Rights for Migrants? Critical 
Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United States, 
Routledge Taylor & Francis: New York, 2011. 
295 
 
  
Dimitriadi, Angeliki, Deals Without Borders: Europe’s Foreign Policy on Migration, 
Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2016. 
Del Carpio, V. Ximena & Wagner, Mathis, The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the 
Turkish Labor Market, World Bank Group Social Protection and Labor Global 
Practice Group, Policy Research Working Paper, August 2015.  
Donnelly, Jack, The Social Construction of International Human Rights, Edited by 
Dunne, Tim, Dunne & Wheeler, J. Nicholas, Human Rights in Global Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1999. 
Düvell, Franck, Turkey’s Transition to an Immigration Country: A Paradigm Shift, 
Insight Turkey, 16(4), 2014, 87-103.  
Edwards, Adrian, Global Forced Displacement Hits Record High, UNHCR, 20 June 
2016, http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-
displacement-hits-record-high.html. 
Edwards, Alice, Human Rights, Refugees, and the Right ‘to Enjoy’ Asylum, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 17(2), 2005, 293-330.  
Einarsen, Terje, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an 
Implied Right to de Facto Asylum, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2(3), 1999, 
361-389.  
Ekşi, Nuray, 6458 sayılı Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu’nda İdari Gözetim 
(The Administrative Detention in Law on Foreigners and International Protection), 
Beta Kitabevi, İstanbul 2014. 
Ekşi, Nuray, Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Hukuku (Foreigners and International 
Protection Law), Beta Kitabevi, İstanbul 2014. 
Ekşi, Nuray, Türkiye Avrupa Birliği Geri Kabul Anlaşması, (Turkey and EU 
Readmission Agreement) Beta: İstanbul, 2016.  
Elçin, Doğa, The Principle of Non-refoulement: A Comparative Analysis between 
Turkish National Law and International Refugee Law, Edited by Sirkeci, İbrahim & 
Elçin, Doğa & Şeker, Güven, Politics and Law in Turkish Migration, 2015, 39- 50.  
El-Enany, Nadine, Who Remembers Aylan Kurdi now? Media Diversified, 4 January 
2016, https://mediadiversified.org/2016/01/04/who-remembers-aylan-kurdi-now/. 
El-Enany, Nadine, Asylum in the Context of Immigration Control: Exclusion by Default 
or Design? Edited by O’Sullivan, Maria & Stevens, Dallal, States, the Law and 
Access to Refugee Protection: Fortresses and Fairness, Hart Publishing: Oxford, 
2017, 29-46.  
Elman, Pinar, From Blame Game to Cooperation: EU-Turkey Response to the Syrian 
Refugee Crisis, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Policy Paper, No. 
34(136), October 2015. 
Emiliani, Tommaso, ‘Refugee Crisis’ –‘EU Crisis’? The Response to the Inflows of 
Asylum Seekers as a Battle for the European Soul, College of Europe Policy Brief, 
March 2016. 
Erdoğan, Murat & Kavukçuer, Yudum & Çetinkaya, Tuğçe, Development in Turkey: 
The Refugee Crisis& The Media, Freedom Research Association, Liberal 
Perspective Analysis, 5, April 2017. 
Erdoğan, Murat, Perceptions of Syrians in Turkey, Commentary, Insight Turkey, 16(4), 
2014, 65-75.  
Erdogan, Murat, Turkiye’de Suriyeliler: Toplumsal Kabul ve Uyum Arastirmasi 
(Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research), Istanbul Bilgi 
296 
 
  
Universitesi Yayinlari, 2015. 
Erkem, Nalan, Abdolkhani ve Karimnia/Türkiye Kararının Uygulanması İzlenme 
Raporu (Monitoring Report of Turkey on the Implementation of Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey Case), İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu & Almanya Federal 
Cumhuriyeti, (Human Rights Joint Platform & German Federal Republic), Mart 
2013, p. 11. 
http://www.aihmiz.org.tr/files/03_Abdolkhani_Karimnia_Rapor_TR.pdf. 
Erten, Rıfat, Yabancılar ve Uluslarararsı Koruma Kanunu Hakkında Genel 
Değerlendirme (A General Overview of Foreigners and International Protection 
Act), Gazi Universitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi (Gazi University Law Faculty 
Journal), 19(1), 2015, 3-51.  
Fabbe, Kristen & Hazlett, Chad & Sinmazdemir, Tolga, What Do Syrians Want Their 
Future to be?, A Survey of Refugees in Turkey, 1 May 2017, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-05-01/what-do-syrians-want-
their-future-be. 
Farcy, Jean-Baptiste, EU-Turkey Agreement: Solving the EU Asylum Crisis or Creating 
a New Calais in Bodrum?, 07 Monday 2015, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/eu-
turkey-agreement-solving-the-eu-asylum-crisis-or-creating-a-new-calais-in-
bodrum/. 
Feller, Erika, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection Regime, Washington 
University Journal of Law & Policy, 5, 2001, 129-140.  
Feller, Erika, International Refugee Protection 50 Years on: The Protection Challenges 
of the Past, Present and Future, International Law Review of the Red Cross, 83, 
September, 2001, 581-606.  
Feller, Erika, Refugees are not Migrants, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 24(4), 2005, 27-35.  
Field, Ophelia & Edwards, Alice, Alternatives to Detention of asylum Seekers and 
Refugees, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, POLAS/2006, 3 
April 2006. 
Fordham, Michael, Immigration Detention and the Rule of Law, Safeguarding 
Principles, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2013. 
Fortîn, Antonio, The “Safe Third Country” Policy in the Lights of the International 
Obligations of Countries vis â vis Refugees and Asylum Seekers, UNHCR, London 
1993. 
Foster, Peter, The Rise of the Far-Right in Europe is not a False Alarm, 19 May 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/the-rise-of-the-far-right-in-europe-is-
not-a-false-alarm/. 
Frelick, Bill & Kysel, Ian M. & Podkul, Jennifer, The Impact of Externalisation of 
Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, Journal 
on Migration and Human Security, 4(4), 2016, 190-220.  
Frelick, Bill, Barriers to Protection: Turkey’s Asylum Regulations, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, Vol. 9(1), 1997, 8-34.  
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas & Gammeltoft-Hansen, Hans, The Right to Seek- 
Revisited. On the UN Human Rights Declaration Article 14 and Access to Asylum 
Procedures in the EU, European Journal of Migration and Law, 10(4), 2008, 439-
459.  
297 
 
  
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas & Guild, Elspeth & Moreno-Lax, Violeta & Panizzon, 
Marion and Roele, Isobel, What is a Compact? Migrants’ Rights and State 
Responsibilities Regarding the Design of the UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly 
and Regular Migration, Raoul Wallenberg Institute, 2017. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas & Hathaway, James, C., Non-Refoulement in a World 
of Cooperative Deterrence, Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, 53, 2014. 235-
284.  
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas & Tan, Nikolas. T. The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? 
Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy, Journal on Migration and Human 
Security, 5, 2017, 28-56.  
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Outsourcing Migration Management, EU, Power, and 
the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy, DIIS Working Paper no. 
2006/1. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Access to Asylum, PhD Thesis, Aarhus University, May 
2009. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Outsourcing Asylum: The Advent of Protection Lite, 
Edited by Bialasiewicz, Luiza, Critical Geopolitics: Europe in the World: EU 
Geopolitics and the Making of European Space, Routledge: London, 2011, 129-140.  
Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas, Access to Asylum, International Refugee Law and the 
Globalization of Migration Control, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Gatti, Mauro, The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty that Violates Democracy (Part 1 of 
2), Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 18 April 2016, 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-eu-turkey-statement-a-treaty-that-violates-democracy-
part-1-of-2/.  
Gibney, Matthew J., Liberal Democratic States and Responsibilities to Refugees, 
American Political Science Review, 93(1), 1999, 169-181.  
Gibney, Matthew J., The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the 
Response to Refugees, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004. 
Gibney, Mark, International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: New York, 2008. 
Gilbert, Geoff, Is Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Refugees, European Journal of 
International Law, 15(5), 2004, 963-987.  
Gil-Bazo, Maria-Teresa, The Practice of Mediterranean States in the Context of the 
European Union’s Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension: The Safe Third 
country Concept Revisited, International Journal of Refugee Law, 18(3-4), 2006, 
571-600.  
Giuffré, Mariagiulia, Watered-Down Rights on the High Seas: Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 61(3), 2012, 728-750.  
Giuffré, Mariagiulia, Readmission Agreements and Refugee Rights: From A Critique to 
a Proposal, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32(3), 2013, 79-111.  
Giuffré, G. Maria, ‘From Turkey to Libya: The EU Migration Partnership from Bad to 
Worse’, Eurojus 2017, http://rivista.eurojus.it/from-turkey-to-libya-the-eu-
migration-partnership-from-bad-to-worse/. 
Gkliati, Mariana, The Application of the EU-Turkey Agreement: A Critical Analysis of 
the Decisions of the Greek Appeals Committees, European Journal of Legal Studies, 
1(1), 2017, 80-123.  
298 
 
  
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, Virginia 
Journal of International Law, 26(4), 1986, 103-121.  
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Its Standing and Scope in 
International Law, A Study Prepared for the Division of International Protection 
Office of the UNHCR, July 1993. 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., Asylum: The Law and Politics of Change, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 7(1), 1995, 1-18.  
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection, Edited by Feller, Erika & 
Türk, Volker & Nicholson, Frances, Refugee Protection in International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. & McAdam, Jane, The Refugee in International Law, Third 
Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007. 
Görendağ, Volkan, 676 Sayılı KHK İle Mülteci Hukukun Temel İlkeleri Askıya Alınıyor 
(The Fundamental Principles of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
is Suspended with the Decree-Law numbered 676) 3 Kasım 2016, 
http://www.multeci.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=378%3
A676-sayl-khk-ile-muelteci-hukukunun-temel-ilkeleri-askya-
alnyor&catid=31%3Agenel&Itemid=1&lang=tr. Retrieved on 10 November 2016. 
Görendağ, Volkan, Yabancıların Temsil Sorununun Cezasızlık Kültürüne Katkısı: 
Lütfillah Tacik Davası Örneği (The Contribution of the Problem of Representation 
of Foreigners to the Impunity Cultural Model: Lütfillah Tajik Case), Amnesty 
International, 02 Haziran 2017, https://amnesty.org.tr/icerik/yabancilarin-temsil-
sorununun-cezasizlik-kulturune-katkisilutfillah-tacik-davasi-ornegi.  
Grant, Stefanie, The Recognition of Migrants’ Rights Within the UN Human Rights 
System, Edited by Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte & Kelly, Tobias, Are Human Rights 
for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and 
the United States, Routledge Taylor & Francis: New York, 2011, 25-47.  
Greenhill, Kelly, Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy 
Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis, European Law Journal, 22 (3), May 
2016, 317-332.  
Guild, Elspeth & Costello, Cathryn & Moreno-Lax, Violeta, Implementation of the 
2015 Council Decisions Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of 
International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and of Greece, European Parliament 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Cıtizens’ Rights and 
Constitutional Affairs, March 2017, pp. 40-41. 
Guild, Elspeth & Costello, Cathryn & Garlick, Madeline & Moreno-Lax, Violeta & 
Mouzourakis, Minos, New Approaches, Alternative Avenues and Means of Access 
to Asylum Procedures for Persons Seeking International Protection, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, No. 77, January 2015. 
Guild, Elspeth & Moreno-Lax, Violeta, Current Challenges for International Refugee 
Law, With A Focus On EU Policies and EU Co-Operation with the UNHCR, 
Briefing Paper, Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, 
EXPO/B/DROI/2012/15, December 2013. 
Guild, Elspeth, Seeking Asylum: Storm Clouds between International Commitments and 
EU Legislative Measures, European Law Review, 29(2), 2004, 198-218.  
299 
 
  
Guild, Elspeth, Who is Irregular Migrant?, Edited by Bogusz, Barbara & Cholewinski, 
Ryszard & Cygan, Adam & Szysczak, Erika, Irregular Migration and Human Rights: 
Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Leiden, 2004, 3-28.  
Gündoğdu, Ayten, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2014. 
Gündoğdu, Ayten, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights, Edited by Hayden, 
Patrick, Hannah Arendt: Key Concepts, Routledge: London, 2014, 108-123.  
Gogou, Kondylia, The EU-Turkey Deal: Europe’s Year of Shame, Amnesty 
International, 20 March 2017, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-
eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/. 
Habermas, Jürgen, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republican 
Versions, Ratio Juris, 7(1), 1994, 1-13.  
Habermas, Jürgen, The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty 
and Citizenship, Edited by Cronin, Ciaran & De Greiff, Pablo, The Inclusion of the 
Other: Studies in Political Theory, The MIT Press: Cambridge, 1999. 
Habermas, Jürgen, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, Translated 
by Ciaran, Cronin, Polity Press: Cambridge, 2008. 
Haddad, Emma, The Refugee: The Individual Between Sovereigns, Global Study, 17(3), 
July 2003, 297-322.  
Haddad, Emma, The External Dimension of EU Refugee Policy: A New Approach to 
Asylum? Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 190-205.  
Haddad, Emma, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2008. 
Haddad, Emma, Refugee Protection: A Clash of Values, The International Journal of 
Human Rights, 7(3), 2010, 1-26.  
Hafelach, Lisa & Kurban, Dilek, Lessons Learnt from the EU-Turkey Refugee 
Agreement in Guiding EU Migration Partnership with Origins and Transit Countries, 
Global Policy, 8(4), June 2017, 85-93.  
Hailbronner, Kay, Legal Requirements for the EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement: A Reply 
to J. Hathaway, 11 June 2016,VerfBlog, http://verfassungsblog.de/legal-
requirements-for-the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-reply-to-j-hathaway/. 
Hammarberg, Thomas, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
Human E-Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, Com DH(2009)31, Original 
version, Strasbourg, 1 October 2009. 
Hargrave, Karen & Pontuliano, Sara & Idris, Ahmed, Closing Borders, The Ripple 
Effects of Australian and European Refugee Policy: Case Studies from Indonesia, 
Kenya and Jordan, Humanitarian Policy Group, Working Paper, September 2016. 
Harvey, Colin, Dissident Voices: Refugees, Human Rights and Asylum in Europe, Social 
& Legal Studies, 9(3), 2000, 367-396.  
Hathaway, James C., A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 
Harvard Journal of International Law, 31(1), 1990, 129-184.  
Hathaway, James C. & Neve, R. Alexander, Making International Refugee Law 
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal, 10, 1997, 115-212.  
Hathaway, James C., What is a Label?, European Journal of Migration and Law, 5(1), 
300 
 
  
2003, 1-21.  
Hathaway, James C., The Rights of Refugees under International Law, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2005. 
Hathaway, James C., Why Refugee Law Still Matters, Melbourne International Law, 
8(1), 2007, 89-103.  
Hathaway, James. C., Three Legal Requirement for the EU-Turkey Deal: An Interview 
with James Hathaway, 9 June 2016, VerfBlog, http://verfassungsblog.de/three-legal-
requirements-for-the-eu-turkey-deal-an-interview-with-james-hathaway/.  
Hathaway, C. James, Taking Refugee Rights Seriously: A Reply to Professor 
Hailbronner, 12 June 2016, VerfBlog, http://verfassungsblog.de/taking-refugee-
rights-seriously-a-reply-to-professor-hailbronner/. 
Hayden, Patrick, From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and 
Statelessness, Societies Without Borders, 3(2), 2008, 248-269.  
Hayden, Patrick, Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory, 
Routledge: New York, 2010. 
Hirsch, Asher Lazarus & Bell, Nathan, The Right to Have Rights as a Right to Enter: 
Addressing a Lacuna in the International Refugee Protection Regime, Human Rights 
Review, September 2017, 1-21.  
Holiday, Yewa, Penalising Refugees: When Should the CJEU have Jurisdiction to 
Interpret Article 31 of the Refugee Convention?, Saturday, 19 July 2014, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.tr/2014/07/penalising-refugees-when-should-
cjeu.html. 
Hunt, Matthew, The Safe Country of Origin Concept in European Asylum Law: Past, 
Present, and Future, International Journal of Refugee Law, 26(4), 2014, 500-535.  
Hurwitz, Agnes, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Huymans, Jef, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 38(5), 2000, 751-777.  
Hyndman, Jenifer, Conflict, Citizenship and Human Security: Geographies of 
Protection, Edited by Cowen, Deborah & Gilbert, Emily, War, Citizenship, 
Territory, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: London, 2008, 241-257.  
Hyndman, Jennifer & Mountz, Alison, Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement 
and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe, Government and 
Opposition, 43(2), 2008, 249-269.  
Hyndman, Patricia, Asylum and Non-Refoulement – Are These Obligations Owed to 
Refugees Under International Law, Philippine Law Journal, 57, 1982, 43-77.  
Hyndman, Patricia, The 1951 Convention and Its Implications for Procedural Questions, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 6, 1994, 245-252.  
İçduygu, Ahmet, Syrian Refugees in Turkey, The Long Road Ahead, Transatlantic 
Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, April 2015. 
İçduygu, Ahmet, Turkey: Labour Market Integration and Social Inclusion of Refugees, 
Directorate-General for International Policies Policy Department Economic and 
Scientific Policy, 2016.  
İçduygu, Ahmet & Diker, Eleni, Labor Market Integration of Syrian Refugees in Turkey: 
From Refugees to Settlers, Journal of Migration Studies, 3(1), 2017, 12-35.  
301 
 
  
Ignatieff, Micheal, The Rights to Have Rights: Migrants, Refugees and the Duties of 
States, Lecture delivered at Central European University in Budapest, uploaded 
YouTube on 7 March 2016. It is available online 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PMD1onFIvc.  
Imke, Kruse, The EU’s Policy on Readmission of Illegal Migrants, PhD. Candidate, Max 
Planck Institute fro the Study of Societies, Cologne/Germany. 
http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kruse.Imke.pdf. 
Ineli-Ciğer, Meltem, How Well Protected are Syrians in Turkey? Open Democracy, 17 
January 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/mediterranean-journeys-in-
hope/meltem-ineli-ciger/how-well-protected-are-syrians-in-turkey.  
John-Hopkins, Michael, The Emperor’s New Safe Country Concepts: A UK Perspective 
on Sacrificing Fairness on the Altar of Efficiency, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 2009, 21(2), 218-255.  
Joppke, Christian, Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, 
Germany, and Britain, Comparative Political Studies, 30(3), 1997, 259-298.  
Joppke, Christian, Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and 
Great Britain, Oxford University Press: New York, 1999. 
Kâlin, Walter & Coroni, Martina, Heim, Lukas, Article 33, Para.1 (Prohibition of 
Expulsion or Return (Refoulement), Edited by Zimmermann, Andreas & Jonas, 
Dörschner & Felix, Machts, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and Its 1967 Protocol, A Commentary, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011. 
Kaya, Ayhan, Syrian Refugee and Cultural Intimacy in İstanbul: “I Feel Safe Here”, 
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
RSCAS 2016/59, 2016. 
Kaya, İbrahim & Eren, Esra Yılmaz, Türkiye’de Suriyelilerin Hukuki Durumu Arada 
Kalanların Hakları ve Yükümlülükleri (The Legal Situation of Syrians in Turkey: 
The Rights and Responsibilities of Stranded Refugees), SETA Report, 55, 2015. 
Kaya, İbrahim, Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: Adopting the EU Acquis? European 
University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, CARIM-RR 
2009/16. 
Kaytaz, Esra S., At the Border of “Fortress Europe” Immigration Detention in Turkey, 
Edited by Nethery, Amy & Silverman, Stephanie, J. Immigration Detention, The 
Migration of a Policy and Its Human Impact, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: 
London, 2015, 59- 68.  
Kengerlinsky, Marat, Restrictions in the EU Immigration and Asylum Policies in the 
Light of International Human Rights Standards, Essex Human Rights Review, 4(2), 
2007, 1-19.  
Kesby, Alison, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2012. 
Khan, Shehab, EU Launches Legal Proceedings Against Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic Over Handling of the Refugee Crisis, Independent, 14 June 2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-poland-hungary-czech-
republic-refugee-crisis-handle-legal-proceeding-lawsuit-european-commission-
a7789161.html. 
Kibar, Esra Dardağan, Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu Tasarısında ve 
Başlıca Avrupa Birliği Düzenlemelerinde Yabancıların Sınır Dışı Edilmelerine 
İlişkin Kurallar: Bir Karşılaştırma Denemesi (The Comparison Between the Draft 
302 
 
  
Law on Foreigners and International Protection and Other European Countries on 
Deportation Regulations) Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi, 11(2), 2012.  
Kibar, Esra Dardağan, An Overview and Discussion of the New Turkish Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection, Perceptions, Autumn, 18(3), 2013, 109-128.  
Kılıç, Taner, Batı Sınırından Doğu Sınırına: Geri Kabul Anlaşması, “Push Back” ve 
Özbek Multeciler (From West to East Borders: Readmission Agreement, “Push 
Back” and Uzbek Refugees), 
http://multeci.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=370%3Abat-
snrndan-dou-snrna-geri-kabul-anlamas-push-back-ve-oezbek-
muelteciler&catid=3%3Aav-taner-klc&lang=en.  
Kılıç, Taner, Türkiye’de Mülteci Hukuku Uygulamaları: Geri Kabul Süreci, (The Asylum 
Law Practice of Turkey: Readmission Process), Birikim Dergisi, Ağustos-Eylül, 
2016. 
Kingsley, Patrick, The Deaths of Alan Kurdi: One Year On, Compassion Towards 
Refugees Fades, The Guardian, 2 September 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/01/alan-kurdi-death-one-year-on-
compassion-towards-refugees-fades.  
Kirisci, Kemal, The Legal Status of Asylum Seekers in Turkey: Problems and Prospects, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 3 (3), 1991, 510-528.  
Kirişçi, Kemal, UNHCR and Turkey: Cooperating for Improved Implementation of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, Vol. 13, No. 1/2, 2001, 71-97.  
Kirisci, Kirişçi, The Question of Asylum and Illegal Migration in European Union-
Turkish Relations, Journal of Turkish Studies, 4(1) 2003, 79-106.  
Kirişçi, Kemal, Reconciling Refugee Protection with Combating Irregular Migration: 
Turkey and the EU, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 9, Summer 
2004, 5-20.  
Kirişçi, Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 36(3), 2006, 1-22.  
Kirişçi, Kemal, Border Management and EU-Turkish Relations: Convergence or 
Deadlock, Cooperation Project on the Social Integration of Immigrants, migration 
and the Movement of Persons, Robert Schuman Centre, No. 3, 2007. 
Kirişçi, Kemal, Managing Irregular Migration in Turkey: A political-Bureaucratic 
Perspective, CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes, Irregular Migration Series: 
Socio-Political Module, 61, 2008. 
Kirişçi, Kemal, Turkey’s New Draft Law on Asylum: What to Make of It? Edited by 
Paçacı Elitok, Seçil & Straubhaar, Thomas, Turkey, Migration and the EU: 
Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 
2012.  
Kirişçi, Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality, 
Brookings, May 2014. 
Kirişçi, Kemal, Turkey’s Role in the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Georgetown Journal of 
International Affairs, 17(2), 2016, 80-85.  
Kirişçi, Kemal & Ferris, Elizabeth, Not Likely to Go Home, Syrian Refugees and the 
Challenges to Turkey and the International Community, Turkey Project Paper, 7, 
September 2015. 
303 
 
  
Kjaerum, Morten, The Concept of Country of First Asylum, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 4(4), 1992, 514-530.  
Kjaerum, Morten, Refugee Protection between State Interests and Human Rights: Where 
is Europe Heading? Human Rights Quarterly, 24(2), 2002, 513-536.  
Kneebone, Susan, The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective Protection”? 
International Journal of Refugee Law, September 29, 2006.  
Knaus, Gerald, Realism Over Migrant Returns Can Break Deadly Cycle in 
Mediterranean, Refugees Deeply, 11 July 2017, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/07/11/realism-over-
migrant-returns-can-break-deadly-cycle-in-mediterranean.  
Krause, Monika, Undocumented Migrants, An Arendtian Perspective, European Journal 
of Political Theory, 7(3), 2008, 331-348.  
Kritzman-Amir, Tally, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing 
in Refugee Law, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 34(2), 2008, 355-394.  
Labayle, Henri & de Bruyker, Philippe, The EU-Turkey Agreement on Migration and 
Asylum: False Pretences or a Fool’s Bargain? 1 April 2016, EU Immigration and 
Asylum Law and Policy, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-eu-turkey-agreement-on-
migration-and-asylum-false-pretences-or-a-fools-bargain/.  
Lambert, Hélène, Seeking Asylum, Comparative Law and Practice in Selected European 
Countries. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995. 
Lambert, Hélène, Protection against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Law 
Comes to the Rescue, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48(3), 1999, 
515-544.  
Lambert, Hélène, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of 
Refugees: Limits and Opportunities, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 24(2), 2005, 39-55.  
Landgren, Karin, Comments on the UNHCR position on detention of refugees and 
asylum seekers, 1998. 
Landgren, Karin, Deflecting International Protection by Treaty: Bilateral and 
Multilateral Accords on Extradition, Readmission and the Inadmissibility of Asylum 
Requests, UNHCR Working Paper No. 10, June 1999. 
Larking, Emma, Human Rights, the Rights to Have Rights, and Life Beyond the Pale of 
the Law, Australian Journal of Human Rights, 18(1), 2012.  
Larking, Emma, Refugees and the Myth of Human Rights, Life Outside the Pale of the 
Law, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group: London, 2014.  
Lauterpacht, Sir Elihu & Bethlehem, Daniel, The Scope and Content of the Principle of 
non-refoulement: Opinion. Edited by Feller, Erika & Türk, Volker & Nicholson, 
Frances, Refugee Protection in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, 87-177.  
Lavenex, Sandra, Passing the Buck: European Union Refugee Policies towards Central 
and Eastern Europe, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(2), 1998, 126-145.  
Lavenex, Sandra, Safe Third Countries: Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration 
Policies to Central and Eastern Europe, Central European University Press: New 
York, 1999. 
Lavenex, Sandra, The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies, Between Human Rights and 
Internal Security, Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2001. 
304 
 
  
Lavenex, Sandra, Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration 
Control, West European Politics, 29(2), 2006, 329-350.  
Legomsky, Stephen H, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum 
Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 15(4), 2003, 567-677.  
Legomsky, Stephen H., Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum 
Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, UNHCR, 
Department of International Protection, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 
February 2003. 
Leiserson, Elizabeth, Securing the Borders Against Syrian Refugees: When Non-
Admission Means Return, Yale Journal of International Law, 42, 2017, 185-216.  
Levitan, Rachel & Kaytaz, Esra & Durukan, Oktay, Unwelcome Guests: The Detention 
of Refugees in Turkey’s “Foreigners’ Guesthouses”, Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 
vol. 26, no. 1, 2009. 
Loescher, Gil & Milner, James, The Missing Link: The Need for Comprehensive 
Engagement in Regions of Refugee Origin, International Affairs, 79(3), 2003, 595-
617.  
Loescher, Gil, Beyond Charity, International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993. 
Lovertt, Asleigh & Whelan, Claire & Rendón, Renata, The Reality of the EU-Turkey 
Statement: How Greece has Become a Testing Ground for Policies that Erode 
Protection for Refugees, Publishers: International Rescue Committee & Norwegian 
Refugee Council and Oxfam Joint Agency, Briefing Note, 17 March 2017.  
Malik, Kenan, The Dark Side of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal: If the Refugees are a 
Cause of Crisis, How Does the EU Imagine that Offloading Them to Turkey is Any 
Less of a Crisis?, Aljazeera, 9 March 2016, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/dark-side-eu-turkey-refugee-
deal-160309080433064.html. 
Mackereth, Kerry, “Nothing is More Dangerous for Human Beings than to be forgotten”: 
Seyla Benhabib on Donald Trump, Hannah Arendt, and the Refugee Crisis, 10 
March 2017, http://inthelongrun.org/articles/article/nothing-is-more-dangerous-for-
human-beings-than-to-be-forgotten-seyla-benha. 
Marchetti, Chiara, Expanded Borders: Policies and Practices of Preventive Refoulement 
in Italy, Edited by Geiger, Martin & Pécoud, Antoine, The Politics of International 
Migration Management, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2010, 160-183.  
Marx, Reinhard, Non-Refoulement, Access to Procedures, and Responsibility for 
Determining Refugee Claims, International Journal of Refugee Law, 7(3), 1995, 
383-406.  
Marx, Reinhard, Legal Opinion on the Admissibility under Union Law of the European 
Council’s Plan to Treat Turkey like a “Safe Third Country” Commissioned by Pro 
Asyl, 14 March 2016. https://www.proasyl.de/en/material/legal-opinion-on-the-
admissibility-under-union-law-of-the-european-councils-plan-to-treat-turkey-like-
a-safe-third-state/.  
McConnachie, Kirsten, Refugee Protection and the Art of the Deal, Journal of Human 
Rights Practice, 2017, 1-7.  
Mole, Nuala & Meredith, Catherine, Asylum and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Council of Europe Publishing; Strasbourg, no. 9, 2010. 
305 
 
  
Moreno Lax, Violeta, Must EU Borders Have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility 
of Schengen Visas with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide International 
Protection to Refugees, CRIDHO Working Paper 2008/03. 
Moreno-Lax, Violeta, The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal) practice 
in Europe and Australia, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, Policy Brief 
4, May 2017. 
Morgades, Silvia, The Externalization of the Asylum Function in the European Union, 
GRITIM Working Paper Series, Number 4, Spring 2010. 
Morrison, John & Crosland, Beth, The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: the End 
Game in European Asylum Policy?, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working 
Paper No. 39, April 2001. 
Mouzourakis, Minos, The Reception of Asylum Seekers in Europe: Failing Common 
Standards, ECRE, 20 April 2016. 
Mutlu, Can, The Status of Syrian Nationals Residing in Turkey, September 3, 2015. 
http://thedisorderofthings.com/2015/09/03/the-status-of-syrian-nationals-residing-
in-turkey/.  
Nash, Kate, Between Citizenship and Human Rights, Sociology, 43(6), 2009, 1067-1083.  
Nash, Kate, Cultural Politics of Human Rights, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2009. 
Nielsen, Nikolaj, EU Observer, Turkish PM ıssues EU Visa Ultimatum, 19 April 2016, 
https://euobserver.com/migration/133113.  
Nielsen, Nikolaj, Greece Paying Asylum Seekers to Reject Appeals, EU Observer, 3 May 
2017, https://euobserver.com/migration/137762.  
Noll, Gregor, Negotiating Asylum, The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the 
Common Market of Deflection, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: London, 2000. 
Oltean, Priscilla & Iov, Claudia Anamaria, EU-Turkey Negotiations in the Context of 
Securitizing Migration After the 2015 Refugee Crisis: Joint Action Plan and the 
Readmission Agreement, Research and Science Today, September No. 1, 2017, 101-
115.  
O’niens, Helen, No Right to Liberty: The Detention of Asylum Seekers for 
Administrative Convenience, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2008, 149-
185.  
O’niens, Helen, Asylum: A Right Denied, A Critical Analysis of European Asylum 
Policy, Ashgate Publishing Limited: London, 2014. 
Owens, Patricia, ‘Beyond Bare Life’: Refugees and the ‘Right to Have Rights’, In 
Refugees in International Relations, Edited by Betts, Alexander & Gil, Loescher, 
Refugees in International Relations, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004. 
Owens, Patricia, Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’? Against Agamben on Refugees, International 
Relations, 23(4), 2009, 567-582.  
Özbek, Nimet, AİHM Kararları Işığında YUKK’nda İdari Gözetimin Uygulandığı 
Mekanlar Hakkında Ortak Sorunlar (Common Problems on Removal Centres in the 
LFIP in the Light of the ECtHR Jurisprudence), Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, (The 
Journal of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations), 118, 2015. 
Özel, İsmet see the following video recorded on 16 December 2016 
https://twitter.com/fazzare/status/677191012738011140.  
Özkök, Ertuğrul, “Friend Know Your Place If You Are A Guest” (Arkadaş Misafirsen 
306 
 
  
Misafirliğini Bil), Hürrriyet Gazetesi, 27 Temmuz 2012, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/arkadas-misafirsen-misafirligini-bil-21077508. 
Paçacı Elitok, Seçil, Turkish Migration Policy Over the Last Decade: A Gradual Shift 
Towards Better Management and Good Governance, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Spring, 12(1), 2013, 161-172. 
Parekh, Serena, Beyond the Ethics of Admission: Stateless People, Refugee Camps and 
Moral Obligations, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40(7), 2014, 645-663.  
Parekh, Serena, Refugees and the Ethics of Forced Displacement, Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group: New York, 2017. 
Peers, Steve & Roman, Emanuela, The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What Could 
Possibly Go Wrong? 5 February 2016, EU Law Analysis, Expert Insight into EU 
Law Developments.  
Peers, Steve, Readmission Agreements and EC External Migration Law, (Statewatch 
Analysis, No. 17), 2003, pp. 1-2. 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/may/12readmission.htm (27.10.2015). 
Peers, Steve, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006. 
Peers, Steve, The Future of the Schengen System, Swedish Institute for European 
Studies, report no. 6, November 2013. 
Peers, Steve, The Refugee Crisis: What Should the EU Do Next? EU Law Analysis, 
Expert Insight into EU Law Developments, 8 September 2015, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/the-refugee-crisis-what-should-eu-
do.html.  
Peers, Steve, The Draft EU/Turkey deal on migration and refugees: Is It Legal? EU Law 
Analysis, 16 March 2016, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-draft-
euturkey-deal-on-migration.html.  
Peers, Steve, The Final EU/Turkey Refugee Deal: A Legal Assessment, 18 March 2016, 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/03/the-final-euturkey-refugee-deal-
legal.html?m=1. 
Peers, Steve, The Orbanisation of EU Asylum Law: The Latest EU Asylum Proposals, 
Statewatch, 6 May 2016. 
Phuong, Catherine, The Concept of “Effective Protection” in the Context of Irregular 
Secondary Movements and Protection in the Regions of Origin, Global Migration 
Perspectives, No. 26, April 2005. 
Plender, Richard & Mole, Nuala, “Beyond the Geneva Convention: Constructing a de 
facto Right of Asylum from International Human Rights Instruments”, Edited by 
Nicholson, Frances & Twomey, Patrick M., Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving 
International Concepts and Regimes, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
1999, 81-105.  
Powell, Sara. R, EU-Turkey Refugee Agreement Benefits EU, Not Stranded Refugees, 
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June/July 2016, 32-33.  
Rettman, Andrew, NATO to Take Migrants Back to Turkey, If Rescued, 23 February 
2016, https://euobserver.com/foreign/132418.  
Rohl, Katharina, Fleeing Violence and Poverty: Non-refoulement obligations under the 
European Convention of Human Rights, UNHCR, Working Paper No. 111, January 
2005. 
307 
 
  
Roland-Gosselin, Louise & Fotiadis, Apostolis, Cynicism Masquerading as Realism: A 
Response to Gerald Knaus, Refugees Deeply, 27 July 2017, 
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/07/27/cynicism-
masquerading-as-realism-a-response-to-gerald-knaus.  
Roig, Annabella & Huddleston, Thomas, EC Readmission Agreements: A Re-evaluation 
of the Political Impasse, European Journal of Migration and Law, 9(3), 2007, 363-
387.  
Roman, Emanuela & Baird, Theodore & Radcliffe, Talia, Statewatch Analysis, Why 
Turkey is not a “Safe Country”, February 2016. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank & Sedelmeir, Ulrich, Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 11(4), 2004, 661-679.  
Sciurba, Alessandra & Furri, Filippo, Human Rights Beyond Humanitarianism: The 
Radical Challenge to the Right to Asylum in the Mediterranean Zone, Antipode, 
2017.  
Shacknove, Andrew, From Asylum to Containments, International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 5(4), 1993, 516-533.  
Siderenko, Olga Ferguson, The Common European Asylum System: Background, 
Current State Affairs, Future Direction. London: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Singer, Peter & Singer, Reneta, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, Edited by Gibney, Mark, 
Open Borders? Closed Societies? Greenwood Press: London, 1988. 
Sklerapis, Dimitris, The Greek Response to the Migration Challenge: 2015-2017, 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 16 March 2017. 
Skribeland, Özlem-Gürakar, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Laws and Practices, 
Seeking Asylum in Turkey, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, 2016. 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/noas-rapport-tyrkia-
april-2016_0.pdf.  
Snyder, Jack, Realism, Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism, Edited by Betts, 
Alexander & Gil, Loescher, Refugees in International Relations, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2004. 
Spijkerboer, Thomas, The NATO Pushbacks in the Aegean and International Law, 
February 2016, http://thomasspijkerboer.eu/thomas-blogs/the-nato-pushbacks-in-
the-aegean-and-international-law/. 
Spijkerboer, Thomas, Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of 
Migrants and of Border Deaths? 28 September 2016, 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu. 
Spijkerboer, Thomas, Changing Paradigms in Migration Law Research, Edited by 
Carolus, Grütters & Sandra, Mantu & Paul, E. Minderhoud in Migration on the 
Move: Essays on the Dynamics of Migration, Brill Nijhoff: Leiden, 2017, 13-26.  
Spijkerboer, Thomas, Bifurcation of Mobility, Bifurcation of Law. Externalization of 
Migration Policy Before the EU Court of Justice, Journal of Refugee Studies 
forthcoming, 2017, 1-23.  
Somers, R. Margaret, Genealogies of Citizenship: Markets, Statelessness, and the Right 
to Have Rights, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008. 
Soğuk, Nevzat, States and Strangers, Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft, Volume 
11 University of Minnesota Press: London, 1999. 
308 
 
  
Soykan, Cavidan, The New Draft Law on Foreigners and International Protection in 
Turkey, Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 2(2), 2012, 38-47.  
Soykan, Cavidan, The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: The Rise of Walls of Shame, 
ECRE, 17 March 2017, https://www.ecre.org/op-ed-by-cavidan-soykan-the-eu-
turkey-deal-one-year-on-the-rise-of-walls-of-shame/. 
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoğlu, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership 
in Europe, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1994. 
Squires, Nick, A Year on from EU-Turkey Deal, Refugees and Migrants in Limbo 
Commit Suicide and Suffer From Trauma, The Telegraph, 14 March 2017. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/14/year-eu-turkey-deal-refugees-
migrants-limbo-commit-suicide-suffer/. 
Starr, David, From Bombs to Books, James Lorimer & Company Ltd. Publishers: 
Toronto, Second Edition, 2016, pp. 11-12.  
Strik, Tineke, Procedures Directive: An Overview, Edited by Zwaan, Karin, The 
Procedures Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues, and Implementation in the 
Selected Member States, Wolf Legal Publishers: Netherlands, 2010. 
Strik, Tineke, Readmission Agreements: A Mechanism for Return Irregular Migrants, 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 12168, 17 March 2010. 
Strik, Tineke, Countries of Transit: Meeting New Migration and Asylum Challenges, 
Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Doc. 13867, 11 September 2015. 
Strik, Tineke, The Situation of Refugees and Migrants under the EU-Turkey Agreement 
of 18 March 2016, Parliamentary Assembly, Doc, 14028, 19 April 2016. 
Suhrke, Astri, Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective 
Versus National Action, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(4), 1998, 396-415.  
Şenyuva, Özgehan & Üstün, Çiğdem, A Deal to End “the” Deal: Why the Refugee 
Agreement is a Threat to Turkey-EU Relations, The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, no. 132, July 2016. http://www.gmfus.org/publications/deal-end-
“the”-deal-why-refugee-agreement-threat-turkey-eu-relations.  
Şimşek, Doğuş & Çorabatır, Metin, Challenges and Opportunities of Refugee 
Integration in Turkey, Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, December 2016. 
Taylor, J. Steven & Bogdan, Robert, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: A 
Guide Book and Resource, John Wiley& Sons, Inc.: New York, Third Edition, 1998. 
Thielemann, Eiko & El-Enany, Nadine, Refugee Protection as Collective Action 
Problems: Is the EU Shirking Its Responsibilities?, European Security, 19(2), June 
2010, 209-229.  
Thym, Daniel, Why the EU-Turkey Deal Can be Legal and a Step in the Right Direction, 
EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 11 March 2016, 
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/why-the-eu-turkey-deal-can-be-legal-and-a-step-in-
the-right-direction/.  
Tokuzlu, Lami Bertan, Burden-Sharing Games for Asylum Seekers between Turkey and 
the European Union, European University Institute, Florence Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Paper RSCAS, May 2010. 
Tolay, Juliette, Turkey’s “Critical Europeanization”: Evidence from Turkey’s 
Immigration Policies”, Edited by Paçacı Elitok, Seçil & Straubhaar, Thomas, 
Turkey, Migration and the EU: Potentials, Challenges and Opportunities, Hamburg: 
Hamburg University Press, 2012, 39-61.  
Toygür, İlke & Benvenute, Bianca, One Year on: An Assessment of the EU-Turkey 
309 
 
  
Statement on Refugees, Elcano Royal Institute, 21 March 2017. 
Trauner, Florian & Kruse, Imke & Zeilinger, Bernhard, Values Versus Security in the 
External Dimension of EU Migration Policy: A Case Study on the EC Readmission 
Agreement with Russia, Edited by Noutcheva, Gergana & Pomorska, Karolina & 
Bosse, Giselle, The EU and Its Neighbours: values vs. Security in European Foreign 
Policy, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012. 
Trauner, Florian & Kruse, Imke, EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: 
Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighborhood, CEPS Working 
Document No. 290/April 2008. 
Troutman, Emily, If Settling Refugees Beyond Camps is Best for Them, Why are They 
Still Struggling? The Guardian, 9 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2016/may/09/refugees-settling-beyond-camps-struggling-emily-
troutman 
Tunaboylu, Sevda & Alpes, Jill, The EU-Turkey Deal: What Happens to People Who 
Return to Turkey? Forced Migration Review, 54, February 2017, 84-87.  
Tuitt, Patricia, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee, Pluto Press: 
London, 1996. 
Uçarer, M. Emek, Burden Shirking, Burden Shifting, and Burden Sharing in the 
Emergent European Asylum Regime, International Politics, 43, 2006, 219-240.  
Ulusoy, Orçun & Battjes, Hemme, Situation of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from 
Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement, Vrije University Migration Law 
Series, No. 15, 2017.  
Van Der Klaauw, Johannes, Irregular Migration and Asylum-Seeking: Forced Mariage 
or Reason For Divorce, Edited by Bogusz, Barbara & Cholewinski, Ryszard & 
Cygan, Adam & Szysczak, Erika, Irregular Migration and Human Rights: 
Theoretical, European and International Perspectives, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: 
Leiden, 2004, 115-135.  
Van Der Klaauw, Johannes, Refugee Rights in Times of Mixed Migration: Evolving 
Status and Protection Issues, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28(4), 2009, 59-86.  
Van Selm, Joanne, Access to Procedures “Safe Third Countries”, “Safe Countries of 
Origin” and “Time Limits”, Background Paper Global Consultations, Geneva, 2001. 
Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, Europe’s Response to the Arrival of Asylum Seekers: Refugee 
Protection and Immigration Control, New Issues in Refugee Research, Working 
Paper No. 6, 1999. 
Vedsted-Hansen, Jens, Current Protection Dilemmas in the European Union, Edited by 
Grütters, Carolus & Mantu, Sandra & Minderhoud, E. Paul in Migration on the 
Move: Essays on the Dynamics of Migration, Brill Nijhoff: Leiden, 2017, 95-117.  
Virolainen, Anne-Mari, Monitoring the Return of Irregular Migrants and Failed Asylum 
Seekers by Land, Sea and Air, Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Doc. 
13351, 07 November 2013. 
Walzer, Michael Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, Blackwell: 
Oxford, 1983. 
Wilczek, Maria, When the EU is No Longer Able to Bribe Turkey, The Blackmail will 
Begin’, The Spectator, March 2016, available at 
http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2016/03/when-the-eu-is-no-longer-able-to-bribe turkey-
theblackmail- will-begin/.  
Wilsher, Daniel, The Administrative Detention of Non-Nationals Pursuant to 
310 
 
  
Immigration Control: International and Constitutional Law Perspectives, 
International & Law Quarterly, 53(4), October 2004. 
Wolcher, E. Louis, Law’s Task: The Tragic Circle of Law, Justice and human Suffering, 
Ashgate: Aldershot, 2008. 
Yayboke, Erol, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Beyond Burden, Centre for Strategic& 
International Studies, August 31, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/syrian-
refugees-turkey-beyond-burden.  
Yazan, Yeliz, European Union’s Irregular Migration “Paradox”: The Case of EU-Turkey 
Readmission Agreement, Chapter IV, Edited by Eroğlu, Deniz & Cohen, Jeffrey H 
& Sirkeci, Ibrahim. Turkish Migration 2016, Selected Papers, Transnational Press 
London: London, 2016, 31-39.  
Yıldız, Yeşim Yaprak, Nowhere to Turn: The Situation of Dom Refugees from Syria in 
Turkey, September 2015. 
Yılmazoğlu, Esat Caner, Judicial Review of Deportation Decisions on Foreigners before 
the Constitutional Court, (Yabancıların Sınırdışı Edilmesinin Anayasa 
Mahkemesinde Yargısal Denetimi), The Journal of Conflict Court (Uyuşmazlık 
Mahkemesi Dergisi), 5, 2015, 905-928.  
Zetter, Roger & Ruaudel, Héloïse, Refugees’ Right to Work and Access to Labor 
Markets-An Assessment, KNOMAD Global Partnership on Migration and 
Development, Part II: Country Cases (Preliminary), September 2016. 
Zimmermann, Andreas & Mahler, Claudia, Article 1 A, Edited by Zimmermann, 
Andreas & Andreas & Jonas, Dörschner & Machts, Felix, The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2011. 
Zoeteweij, Helena Margarite & Turhan, Ozan, Above the Law-Beneath Contempt: The 
End of the EU-Turkey Deal?, Swiss Review of International and European Law, 
27(2), 2017, 151-166.  
 
 
Other Sources 
 
AB Haber Brussels, EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement: Turkey Suspended 
Readmission Agreement, 5 June 2016, http://www.abhaber.com/turkiye-geri-kabul-
anlasmasini-askiya-aldi/. 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the Readmission 
of Persons Residing without Authorisation. OJ L 134/3-27, 07.05.2014. 
AIDA, Asylum Information Database, Types of Accommodation, Refugee Rights of 
Turkey, http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkey/types-
accommodation. Retrieved on 5th of November 2016. 
AIDA, Asylum Information Database, Greece: The Ruling of the Council of State on the 
Asylum Procedure Post EU-Turkey Deal, 4 October 2017, 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-10-2017/greece-ruling-council-state-
asylum-procedure-post-eu-turkey-deal.  
Amnesty International, Stranded Refugees in Turkey Denied Protection, April 2009. 
Amnesty International, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, Human Rights Violations 
Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders, 2014. 
311 
 
  
Amnesty International, Europe’s Gatekeeper: Unlawful Detention and Deportation of 
Refugees from Turkey, December 2015. 
Amnesty International, Fear and Fences: Europe’s Approach to Keeping Refugees at 
Bay, November 2015. 
Amnesty International, Unlawful Detention and Deportation of Refugees From Turkey, 
December 2015. 
Amnesty International, Greece: Refugees Detained in Dire Conditions Amis Rush to 
Implement EU-Turkey Deal, 7 April 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/greece-refugees-detained-in-dire-
conditions-amid-rush-to-implement-eu-turkey-deal/. 
Amnesty International, No Safe Refuge: Asylum Seekers and Refugees Denied 
Effective Protection in Turkey, 2016. 
Amnesty International, EU Turkey Summit: EU and Turkey Leaders Deal Death Blow 
to the Rights to Seek Asylum, 8 March 2016, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/eu-turkey-summit-reaction/.  
Amnesty International, Turkey: Illegal Mass Return of Syrian Refuges Expose Fatal 
Flaws in the EU-Turkey Deal, 1 April 2016. 
Amnesty International, A Blue Print for Despair, human Rights Impact of the EU-
Turkey Deal, 2017. 
Amnesty International, Greece: Court Decisions Pave Way for First Forcible Returns 
of Asylum Seekers under EU-Turkey Deal, 22 September 2017, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/09/greece-court-decisions-pave-way-
for-first-forcible-returns-of-asylum-seekers-under-eu-turkey-deal/. 
Annexe to the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, Tenth Report on Relocation and Resettlement, COM 
(2017) 202 final, 2.3.2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20170302_tenth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_annex_3_en.pd
f. 
ASGI, Legal Analysis, Migrants in Greece are denied the rights to international 
protection and family unity. The visit to the camps in Idomeni and government-run 
camps, and a legal analysis of the situation we observed. No. 293. Observation was 
made on 26 and 27 march 2016. http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-293-asgi-
greece.pdf.  
Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Turkey, Edited by ECRE, December 
2015. 
Asylum Information Database (AIDA), Greece: Asylum Reform in the Wake of the 
EU-Turkey Deal, 4 April 2016, http://www.asylumineurope.org/news/04-04-
2016/greece-asylum-reform-wake-eu-turkey-deal.  
Asylum Information Database, Wrong Counts and Closing Doors, The Reception of 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Europe, ECRE, March 2016. 
BBC News, Alan Kurdi Death: A Syrian Kurdish Family Forced to Flee, 4 September 
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34141716.  
BBC News, Turks Hit Back at Erdogan Plan to Give Syrians Citizenship, 5 July 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36704791. 
Bianet, http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/170800-1-80-boyundaki-dervis-kendini-
atkiyla-ranzaya-nasil-asar. Retrieved on 1st of November 2016. 
312 
 
  
Blackwell’s Mark, 20 April 2017, http://blackwellsmark.blogspot.co.uk.  
COM (2003) 315 Final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, Towards More Accessible, Equitable and Managed Asylum 
Systems. 
COM (2010), Commission Report on the Application of Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 
December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for 
Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 465. 
COM (2015) 452, Safe Countries of Origin Proposed Common EU List, Briefing Paper. 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia have been proposed as a safe country of origin. 
Commission Recommendation of addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the Urgent 
Measures to be Taken by Greece in view of the Resumption of Transfers under 
Regulation (EU), No. 604/2013, C (2016) 871 final, 10 February 2016. 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Evaluation of Readmission Agreements, COM (2011) 76 final, 23.02.2011. 
Council of Ministers Decree No: 2014/6652 on Ratification of the Agreement between 
the Republic of Turkey and the European Union on the Readmission of Persons 
Residing Without Authorization. Official Gazette, 02.08.2014, No: 29076. 
Council of the European Union Information Note, 7 June 2016, Brussels, 9897/16, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jun/eu-council-turkey-agreement-
challenges-9897-16.pdf. 
Council of Europe, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomas 
Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees, 
30 May-4 June 2016, SG/Inf(2016)29, 10 August 2016. 
https://rm.coe.int/168069aa7f.  
Daily Sabah EU Affairs, Ankara Halts Readmission Agreement with EU, Disagrees on 
Anti-Terrorism Laws, 6 June 2016, https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-
affairs/2016/06/06/ankara-halts-readmission-agreement-with-eu-disagrees-on-anti-
terrorism-laws.  
Daily Sabah Politics, Germany Admits EU Falling Far Short on 3 Billion Euro Refugee 
Deal with Turkey, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2016/11/29/germany-
admits-eu-falling-far-short-on-3-billion-euro-refugee-deal-with-turkey. 
Daily Sabah, EU has not Kept Promises on Supporting Refugees, Erdoğan Says, 21 
September 2017, https://www.dailysabah.com/eu-affairs/2017/09/21/eu-has-not-
kept-promises-on-supporting-refugees-erdogan-says/amp.  
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning 
Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, OJ L 348/98-107, 24.12.2008.  
Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection 
(Recast), OJ L 180/60-95, 29.06.2013. 
ECRE, The Way Forward Europe’s Role in the Global Refugee Protection System, 
Guarding Refugee Protection Standards in Regions of Origin, European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles, December 2005. 
ECRE, Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe, December 2007. 
313 
 
  
ECRE, Mind the Gap: An NGO Perspective on Challenges to Accessing Protection in 
the Common European Asylum System-Second AIDA Annual Report, November 
2014. 
ECRE, Greece Urgently Adopts Controversial Law to Implement EU-Turkey Deal, 8 
April 2016, http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-
articles/1439-greece-urgently-adopts-controversial-law-to-implement-eu-turkey-
deal-.html. 
ECRE, AIDA Update: Greece 2016, 28 March 2017, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/eugreece-hearing-deal-turkey. 
ECRE, The Implementation of the Hotspots in Italy and Greece, 2017, 
http://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-
5.12.2016..pdf. 
Ekathimerini, In Greece, Europe’s New Rules Strip Refugee of Their Right to Seek 
Protection, http://linkis.com/www.ekathimerini.com/A8Pmp. 
EU Commission First Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-
Turkey Statement, COM (2016) 231 final, Brussels, 20.04.2016. 
EU Commission Second Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-
Turkey Statement, COM (2016) 349, Brussels, 15.06.2016. 
European Commission Third Report on Relocation and Resettlement, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, Third Report 18.05.2016, 360 (final). 
European Commission Fifth Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of 
the EU-Turkey Statement, COM (2017) 204, 2.3.2017. 
European Commission Press Release, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement- 
Questions and Answers. 
European Commission, An Open and Secure Europe: Making It Happen, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, SWD, 
2014, 63 Final. 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority 
Actions Under the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2016) 85 final, Brussels, 
10.2.2016. 
European Commission, Green Paper on a Community Return Policy on Illegal 
Residents, Brussels, COM (2002), 175, Final. 
European Commission, Report on Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirements of 
Its Visa Liberalization Roadmap, COM (2014) 646, 20.10.2014. 
European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Document on 
Progress by Turkey in Fulfilling the Requirement of Its Visa Liberalisation 
Roadmap, SWD 2016 161 Final, 4.5.2016. 
European Commission, Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement-Questions and 
Answers, 4 April 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-
1221_en.htm. 
European Commission, EU-Turkey Statement One Year On, https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf. 
314 
 
  
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the European Council, and the Council, Next Operational Steps in EU-
Turkey Cooperation in the Field of Migration. COM (2016) 166 final, 16 March 
2016. 
European Commission Report, Annex to the Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Tenth Report on 
Relocation and Resettlement, COM (2017) 202 final, 2.3.2017. 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20170302_tenth_report_on_relocation_and_resettlement_annex_3_en.pd
f. 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment. Visit reports: Poland CPT/ınf (2006) 11, para. 59; Greece CPT/Inf 
(2006) 41; Ireland CPT/Inf (2006). 
EU Observer, UN Struggles to Monitor Fate of Readmitted Syrians in Turkey., 18 
January 2017, https://euobserver.com/migration/136591. Accessed online on 18 
March 2017.  
Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, An EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement Undermining the Rights of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers?; 
European Parliament: Do not Vote in Favour of a EU/Turkey Readmission 
Agreement, Press Release. 
Europe Report, Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, International 
Crisis Group, Report No: 241, 30 November 2016. 
European Parliament News, No Blank Cheque for Turkey, say MEPs in Debate on EU-
Turkey Deal, 28.04.2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20160426IPR24798/No-blank-cheque-for-Turkey-say-MEPs-in-debate-on-
EU-Turkey-deal. 
European Stability Initiative, Background Document, Turkey As Safe A “safe Third 
Country” for Greece, 17 October 2015. 
EU-Turkey Deal Could See Syrian Refugees Back in War Zones, says UN, Guardian, 8 
March 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/un-refugee-agency-
criticises-quick-fix-eu-turkey-deal.  
General Court of the European Union Press Release, No: 19/17, Luxembourg, 28 
February 2017, Orders of the General Court in Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 and T-
257/16 NF, NG and NM v European Council, 
http://statewatch.org/news/2017/mar/eu-ecj-eu-turkey-deal-legality-competence-
judgment-pr-1-3-17.pdf.  
Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Committee Report on the 
Investigation of Problems of the Refugees and Illegal Migrants in Turkey, 2008. 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights, European Union Harmonization 
and Affairs Investigation Committees’ Report on the Draft Law of the Foreigners 
and International Protection, 1/619, Term 24, Legislation Year 2, 2012. 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Committee Report, 
Term 24, 23 October 2012-2013. 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Investigation Committee Report 
on Illegal Migration in Edirne, Term 24, Legislation Year 5, 2014. 
Greece Overhauls Appeals to Speed Up Returns to Turkey, 20 June 2016, 
315 
 
  
https://newsthatmoves.org/en/greece-overhauls-appeals-to-speed-up-returns-to-
turkey/.  
Greece: NGOs Decry New Policy Limiting Asylum Seekers in Exercising Their Right to 
Appeal, 9 March 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/09/greece-ngos-decry-
policy-limiting-asylum-appeal-rights. 
Greek Council for Refugees, Fast-Track Border Procedure (Eastern Aegean Islands), 
Available at Asylum Information Database (AIDA). 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-
procedure/procedures/fast-track-border-procedure-eastern-aegean.  
Guardian, EU-Turkey Deal Could See Syrian Refugees Back in War Zones says UN, 8 
March 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/un-refugee-agency-
criticises-quick-fix-eu-turkey-deal. 
Guardian, Greece May Have Deported Asylum Seekers by Mistake, Says UN, 5 April 
2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/greece-deport-migrants-
turkey-united-nations-european-union.  
Guardian, Refuges in Greece Warn of Suicides Over EU-Turkey Deal, 7 April 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/07/refugees-in-greece-warn-of-
suicides-over-eu-turkey-deal.  
Haber Turk, The Minister of Interior M. Ala: Entry Ban on 47.000 Foreigners, 5 
February 2016, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/1191518-icisleri-bakani-
ala-37-bin-kisiye-giris-yasagi. Retrieved on 22 March 2017.  
Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Refugee and Advocacy and Support Program, Unwelcome 
Guest: The Detention of Refugees in Turkey’s ‘Foreigners’ Guesthouses, November 
2007. 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Handling EU Asylum 
Claims: New Approaches Examined 11th Report 30 April 2004. 
Human Rights Centre for Turkish Bar Association Report on Asylum Seekers and 
Migrants, Prepared by Altun, Uğur & Görel, Özge, 311, February 2016. 
Human Rights Watch, Ukraine on the Margins: Background Migration Trends in 
Ukraine, Research Paper, New York, HRW, 29 November 2005. 
Human Rights Watch, European Union Managing Migration Means Potential EU 
Complicity in Neighbouring States’ Abuse of Migrants and Refugees, Number: 2, 
October 2006. 
Human Rights Watch, Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers, 19 
September, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/19/hungary-new-border-
regime-threatens-asylum-seekers. 
Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Syrians Pushed Back at the Border, 23 November 2015.  
Human Rights Watch, When I picture My Future, I See Nothing, November 2015. 
Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum Seekers Locked Up- Wretched Conditions for 
People in Need, 14 April 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/14/greece-
asylum-seekers-locked. 
Hürriyet Daily News, Only 30 per cent of Turkey’s Syrian Children have Access to 
Education: Disaster Agency Head, 31 March 2016. 
İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumder İçin Dayanışma Derneği (The Association on Human 
Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma 
Kanunu Tasarısı Hakkında Değişiklik Önerileri (Suggestions on the Draft Law on 
Foreigners and International Protection), 23.05.2012, p. 5. 
316 
 
  
İzmir Barosu, (İzmir Bar Association) İzmir Geri Gönderme Merkezlerinde Adalete 
Erişim Hakkı Çerçevesinde Yaşanan Sorunlar, (İzmir Bar Association’s Report on 
Problems in Access to Legal Assistance in İzmir Removal Centres), 2017. 
http://www.izmirbarosu.org.tr/Yayin/752/izmir-geri-gonderme-merkezlerinde-
adalete-erisim-hakki-cercevesinde-yasanan-sorunlar.aspx.  
ILO, Workshop on Problems Faced by Syrian Workers, Employers and Entrepreneurs in 
Labour Market and Suggestions for Solution Overall Evaluation, 13 June 2016.  
International Strategic Research Organization, Regarding the EU and Turkey 
Relations, What Conditions Apply the EU and Turkey Readmission Agreement?, 
(Türkiye-EU İlişkilerinde Geri Kabul Hangi Şartlarda, USAK Raporları) No. 10(2), 
2010. 
IOM Press Release, IOM Counts 3,771 Migrant Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015, 01 
May 2016, http://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-
mediterranean-2015.  
Jesuit Refugee Service, Administrative Detention of Asylum Seekers and Illegally 
Staying Third Country Nationals in the 10 New Member States of the EU, October 
2007. http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed755c92.html. 
Law 4375/2016 on the Transposition of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive, OG, 
A’51/03.04.2016. 
Legal Centre Lesbos, State Council Hearing on Turkey as Safe Third Country, 12 March 
2017, http://www.legalcentrelesbos.org/2017/03/12/state-council-hearing-on-
turkey-as-safe-third-country/. 
Letter from the UNHCR, Response to query related to UNHCR’s observation of Syrians 
readmitted in Turkey’, 23/12/2016, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2017/jan/unhcr-letter-access-syrians-returned-
turkey-to-greece-23-12-16.pdf. 
Lisbon Expert Roundtable, Organized by the UNHCR and the Migration Policy 
Institute, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of “Effective Protection” in the 
Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, Lisbon Expert 
Roundtable, 9-10 December 2002. 
Migration and Asylum, European Union Newsroom, 
http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/migration-and-asylum_en.  
Mülteci-Der and Pro-Asyl, Observation on the Situation of Refugees in Turkey, 22 April 
2016. 
Mülteci-Der’s Observations on Refugee Situation in Turkey, 
http://www.multeci.org.tr/haberdetay.aspx?Id=141. 
Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği Uydu Kentler İzleme ve Raporlama Projesi, 
Türkiye’de Mültecilerin Kabul Koşulları, Hak ve Hizmetlere Erişimleri, (Satellite 
Cities: Monitoring and Reporting- Project: Reception Conditions of Refugees and 
their Access to Rights and Services, Egus Matbaacılık: İzmir, 2015. 
New Europe, EU Council: Why Greece Should Consider Turkey Safe for Syrian 
Refugees, 16 June 2016, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-council-greece-
consider-turkey-safe-syrian-refugees/.  
NOAS Report, Norwegian Organization for Asylum Seekers, Seeking Asylum in 
Turkey, A Critical Review of Turkey’s Asylum Law and Practices, 2016. 
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Hungary (KÚRIA) on Certain Questions Related to 
the Application of the Safe Third Country Concept, Opinion No. 2/2012 (XII.10) 
317 
 
  
KMK. 10 December 2012, http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/HU-
Supreme-Court-on-S3C-Dec-2012.pdf.  
Proposed Common EU List, EU Legislation in Progress, Safe Countries of Origin, 8 
October 2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-569008-Safe-
countries-of-origin-FINAL.pdf. 
Protocol for the Implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Hellenic Republic 
on Combating Crime, Especially Terrorism, Organized Crime, Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Illegal Migration, OJ, 24.04.2003, No. 24735. 
Refugee Law Clinics Abroad, Greek Council of State Approves Forced Returns to 
Turkey-RLCA Fears Massive Removals to Turkey, 25 September 2017, 
https://refugeelawclinicsabroad.org/2017/09/25/rlca-fears-massive-removals-to-
turkey/:  
Refugee Rights Turkey, Barriers to the Right to Effective Legal Remedy: The Problem 
Faced by Refugees in Turkey in Granting Power of Attorney, February 2016. 
Refugee Support Aegean, Serious Gaps in the Care of Refugees in Greek Hotspots; 
Vulnerability Assessment System in Breaking Down, 17 July 2017, 
http://rsaegean.org/serious-gaps-in-the-care-of-refugees-in-greek-hotspots-
vulnerability-assessment-system-is-breaking-down/. 
Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanism for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in 
One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person 
(Recast), OJ, L 180/31-59, 29.06.2013. 
Reliefweb, EU/Greece: Hearing on Deal with Turkey, 9 Mach 2017, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/eugreece-hearing-deal-turkey.; ECRE, AIDA 
Update: Greece 2016, 28 March 2017, http://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/eugreece-
hearing-deal-turkey. 
Report from GUE/NGL Delegation to Turkey, What Merkel, Tusk and Timmermans 
Should Seen During Their Visit to Turkey, May 2-4 2016, 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/ep-GUENGL-report-refugees-Turkey-
deal.pdf. 
Report from The Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and 
the Council, Fifth Report on the Progress Made in the Implementation of the EU-
turkey Statement, COM (2017) 2014 final, 2 March 2017. 
Report to the Turkish Government on the Visit to Turkey Carried Out by the CPT 
Committee from 4 to 17 June 2009, CPT/Inf (2011) 13. 
Report to the Turkish Government on the Visit to Turkey Carried Out by the CPT 
Committee from 9 to 21 June 2013, CPT/Inf . (2015) 6. 
Report to the Turkish Government on the Visit to Turkey Carried Out by the CPT 
Committee from 16 to 23 June 2015, CPT/ Inf (2017) 32.  
Reports of the Council of Europe, Fact-finding mission to Turkey by Ambassador 
Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration and 
Refugees, 30 May-4 June 2016. 
Return and Readmission to Albania, The Experience of Selected EU Member States, 
International Organization for Migration: Tirana, August 2006. 
318 
 
  
Spain’s Sanchez Wants EU-Turkey ‘Pact of Shame’ Altered, Politico, 31, 11. 2016, 
http://www.politico.eu/article/sanchez-rajoy-turkey-eu-deal-refugees-migration-
crisis-illegal-pact-of-shame/. 
Statement by Cecilia Malmström on the ratification of the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement by the Turkish Parliament, European Commission, 26 June 2014. 
Statement to the Press by İzmir Governor Mustafa Toprak, Dikili, April 4, 2016, 
published on the official web page of İzmir Governorship on 6 April 2016, 
http://www.izmir.gov.tr/0096. 
Statewatch, 300 Organizations and 11.000 individuals denounce the EU-Turkey 
Agreement, 04.05.2016, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/may/cear-eu-turkey-
complaints.htm. 
Statewatch, Refugee Crisis: EU-Turkey “dodgy deal”: Legal Concerns Met? 28 April 
2016. http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/apr/eu-med-crisis-news-dodgy-
deal.htm. 
Temporary Protection Regulation no 2014/6883 and the Regulation no 2016/8722 
Amending the Temporary Protection Regulation. 
The EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, European Commission Fact Sheet, 15 October 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm. 
The EU-Turkey Statement, European Council of European Union, Press Release, 18 
March 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-
eu-turkey-statement/.  
The Guardian, EU-Turkey Visa Deal on Brink as Erdoğan Refuses to Change Terror 
Laws, 6 May 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/06/erdogan-
turkey-not-alter-anti-terror-laws-visa-free-travel-eu.  
The Guardian, Fewer than 0.1 of Syrians in Turkey in Line for Work Permits, 11 April 
2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/11/fewer-than-01-of-syrians-in-
turkey-in-line-for-work-permits.  
The Guardian, Syrian Refugee Wins Appeal Against Forced Return to Turkey, 20 May 
2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/20/syrian-refugee-wins-
appeal-against-forced-return-to-turkey. 
The Guardian, Turkey MPs Approve State of Emergency bill Allowing Rule by Decree, 
21 July 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/21/turkey-parliament-
expected-to-pass-erdogan-emergency-measures. 
The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and 
Refugees at Europe’s Borders, Amnesty International, 2014. 
The International Crisis Group, Turkey’s Refugee Crisis: The Politics of Permanence, 
Europe Report no: 241, 30 November 2016. 
The National Human Rights Institution of Turkey, Report on the Death of the 
Lütfullah Tacik and Van Removal Centre, 18.12.2014. 
The National Human Rights Institutions of Turkey, Report on İstanbul Removal 
Centre, 06.11.2015. 
The Republic of Turkey, Ministry for EU Affairs, EU-Turkey Visa Liberalisation 
Dialogue, December 2015, p. 5. http://www.ab.gov.tr/files/stib/TR-
ABVizeSerbestisi.pdf  
The Telegraph, Turkey Plans to Offer Citizenship to Syrian Refugees, 3 July 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/03/turkey-plans-to-offer-citizenship-to-
syrian-refugees/. 
319 
 
  
The UNHCR, Since Alan Kurdi Drowned, Mediterranean Death Have Soared, 2 
September 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2016/9/57c9549e4/since-
alan-kurdi-drowned-mediterranean-deaths-soared.html. 
TRT, Turkey Says Greece Violated EU Readmission Deal By Returning Refugees. 18 
March 2017, http://www.trtworld.com/turkey/turkey-says-greece-violated-eu-
readmission-deal-by-returning-refugees-318932. Retrieved online on 19 March 
2017. 
Turkey's Notification to the United Nations about its Derogation from ICCPR on 21 
July 2016. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.580.2016-Eng.pdf. 
The decision was published in the Official Gazette and approved by the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly on 21 July 2016. 
Twitter, ‘CouldBeMyChild’ (Hastag, Twitter) 
https://twitter.com/hashtag/CouldBeMyChild?src=hash.  
UNHCR, EXCOM Conclusions, No. 6 (XXVIII), Non-Refoulement, 1977. 
UNHCR EXCOM Conclusions, No. 15 (XXX), Refugees without an Asylum Country, 
16 October 1979. 
UNHCR EXCOM Conclusions, No. 58 (XL), Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already 
Found Protection, 13 October 1989. 
UNHCR Comments on the European Commission’s Amended Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common Procedures for granting 
and Withdrawing International Protection Status. (Recast) COM (2011) 319 final.  
UNHCR in Turkey: Facts & Figures, January 2011, issue 3. 
UNHCR Press Release, 26 July 2007, UNHCR Deplores Forced Return of 135 Iraqis by 
Turkey.  
UNHCR Press Releases, Statement by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo 
Grandi on World Refugee Day 2016, June 20, 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/6/5767ad104/statement-un-high-
commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-world-refugee-day.html.  
UNHCR Turkey Report, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience 2016-2017 In Response 
to the Syria Crisis. 
UNHCR, Note on Determination of Refugee Status under International Instruments, 
EC/SCP/5, 24 August 1977. 
UNHCR, Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status, 
EC/SCP/68, 26 July 1991. 
UNHCR, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Forty-fourth 
session, Note on International Protection, 31 August 1993, (A/AC.96/815). 
UNHCR, Considerations on the “Safe Third Country” Concept, Vienna, 8-11 July 1996. 
UNHCR, Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/20. The Right to Seek and 
Enjoy Asylum, 18 August 2000, 27th Meeting. 
UNHCR, Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Turkey, Geneva, 
September, 2001. 
UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Asylum Processes (Fair and 
Efficient Asylum Procedures), 2nd Meeting EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001. 
UNHCR, UNHCR’s Three-Pronged Proposal, Working Paper, 26 June 2003. United 
Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council Report. 
320 
 
  
UNHCR, ‘Protracted Refugee Situations’, Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 30th Meeting, UN Doc. 
EC/54/SC/CRP.14, 10 June 2004. 
UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures Comparative Analysis and Recommendations 
for Law and Practice, March 2010. 
UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 2011, UN Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, Geneva, December 2011. 
UNHCR, Serbia as a Country of Asylum. Observations on the Situation of Asylum-
Seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection in Serbia, August 2012, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/50471f7e2.html. 
UNHCR, Crossing of Mediterranean Sea exceed 300.000, including 200.000 to Greece. 
28 August 2015. http://www.unhcr.org/55e06a5b6.html. 
UNHCR, Legal Considerations on the Return of Asylum Seekers and refugees from 
Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in tackling the migration 
Crisis Under the Safe Third Country and First Country of Asylum Concept, 23 March 
2016. 
UNHCR, Refugee Resettlement Facts, http://www.unhcr.org/us-refugee-resettlement-
facts.html.  
UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response-Mediterranean, 
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83. 
UNHCR, Resettlement and Other Forms of Legal Admission for Syrian Refugees, 10 
February 2016. http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.html. 
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Human Rights 
Chief: Suffering of Migrants in Libya Outrage to Conscience of Humanity, 14 
November 2017, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22393
&LangID=E.  
UNICEF, New Note, Over the 40 percent of Syrian refugee children in Turkey missing 
out on education, despite massive increase in enrolment rates, 19 January 2017, 
https://www.unicef.org/media/media_94417.html.  
 
 
Case List 
 
European Court of Human Rights  
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, Application no. 30471/08, 22 September 2009. 
Ahmadpour v. Turkey, Application no. 12717/08, 15 June 2010. 
Al Hanchi v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application no. 48205/09, 15 November 2011. 
A.S. and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 22681/09, 22 July 2014. 
Aliev v. Turkey, Application no. 30518/11, 21 October 2014. 
Alipour and Hosseinzadgan v. Turkey, Applications nos. 6909/08, 12792/08, 
28960/08, 13 July 2010. 
Asalya v. Turkey, Application No. 43875/09, 15 April 2014. 
Athary v. Turkey, Applications no. 50372/09, 11 December 2012. 
321 
 
  
Chahal v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 22414/93, 15 November 1996. 
Charahili v. Turkey, Application no. 46605/07, 13 April 2010. 
D.B. v. Turkey, Application no. 33526/08, 13 July 2010. 
Dbouba v. Turkey, Application no. 15916/09, 13 July 2010. 
Ghorbanov and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 28127/09, 03 December 2013. 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, 23 February 2012. 
Keshmiri v. Turkey, Application no. 22426/10, 17 January 2012. 
Khlaifia and Others v Italy, Application no. 16483/12, 1 September 2015.  
Khaldarov v. Turkey, Application no. 23619/11, 5 September 2017.  
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Application No. 46827/99 and 46951/99, 4 
February 2005. 
Moghaddas v. Turkey, Application no. 46134/08, 15 February 2011. 
Musaev v. Turkey, Application no. 72754/11, 21 October 2014. 
Ranjbar and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 37040/07, 13 April 2010. 
Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
T. and A. v. Turkey, Application no. 47146/11, 21 October 2014. 
T.I. v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 43844/98, 7 March 2000. 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application no. 29217/12, 4 November 2014. 
Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, Applications nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08, 13 
April 2010. 
Yarashonen v. Turkey, Application no. 72710/11, 24 June 2014. 
Z.N.S. v. Turkey, Application no. 21896/08, 19 January 2010. 
 
 
European Court of Justice 
Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), Judgment in Joined Cases 
C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council, Luxemburg, 6 
September 2017, OJ C 374, 06/11/2017.  
Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber, Extended Composition), 
Judgment in Case T-192/16, NF v The European Council, 28 February 2017, OJ C 
121, 18/04/2017.  
Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber, Extended Composition), 
Judgment in Case T-193/16, NG v The European Council, 28 February 2017, OJ C 
121, 18/04/2017.  
Court of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber, Extended Composition), 
Judgment in Case T-257/16, NM v The European Council, 28 February 2017, OJ 
121, 18/04/2017.  
Court of Justice of the European Union C-208/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 
by NF against the Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended 
Composition) delivered on 28 February 2017 in Case T-192/16: NF v European 
Council, OJ C 231, 17/07/2017.  
322 
 
  
Court of Justice of the European Union C-209/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 
by NG against the Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended 
Composition) delivered on 28 February 2017 in Case T-193/16: NG v European 
Council, OJ C 231, 17/07/2017. 
Court of Justice of the European Union C-210/17 P, Appeal Brought on 21 April 2017 
by NM against the Order of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended 
Composition) delivered on 28 February 2017 in Case T-257/16: NM v European 
Council, OJ C 231, 17/07/2017. 
 
 
Turkish Constitutional Court 
A.A.A.A. and J.A.A.A., the TCC, Application no. 2015/3941, 27 March 2015.  
A.A.K., the TCC, Application no. 2015/17761, 02 December 2015.  
Abdolghafoor Rezaei, the TCC, Application No. 2015/17762, 01 December 2015.  
A.D., the TCC, Application no. 2014/19506, 25 December 2014.  
Albina Kıyamova, the TCC, Application No. 2013/3187, 14 April 2016. 
A.S. the TCC, Application No. 2014/2841, 09 June 2016.  
Azizjon Hikmatov, the TCC, Application no. 2015/18582, 15 December 2015.  
D.M., the TCC, Application no. 2015/4176, 17 March 2015.  
Enedjan Narmetova, the TCC, Application no. 2013/6782, 06 September 2013.  
I.M. and Z.M., the TCC, Application no. 2015/2037, 19 February 2015.  
Julia Anikeeva, the TCC, Application no. 2015/4459, 17 March 2015. 
K.A., the TCC, Application No. 2014/13044, 11 November 2015.  
M.A., the TCC, Application no. 2016/220, 20 January 2016. 
Mahira Karaja, the TCC, Application No. 2015/18203, 01 December 2015.  
Mir Ahmed, the TCC, Application no. 2015/8021, 20 May 2015.  
M.S.S., the TCC, Application no. 2014/19690, 31 December 2014.  
Mohammad Abdul Khaliq, the TCC, Application no. 2015/6721, 14 May 2015.  
Olga Dogot, the TCC, Application No. 2015/11252, 10 July 2015.  
Oksana Chicheishvili, the TCC, Application no. 2014/19023, 05 December 2014.  
Pidram Haydari, the TCC, Application no. 2015/8096, 21 May 2015.  
Rida Boudraa, the TCC, Application No. 2013/9673, 21 January 2015.  
R.M., the TCC, Application No. 2015/19133, 16 December 2015. 
R.N., the TCC, Application no. 2015/9291, 04 June 2015.  
Solmaz Mamedova, the TCC, Application no. 2015/6724, 20 May 2015.  
Uthman Deya Ud Deen Eberle, the TCC, Application No. 2015/16437, 10 November 
2015. 
 
 
Turkish Council of State  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 1993/3535, JN: 1995/4616, Date: 19.10.1995.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 1997/6513, JN: 2000/128, Date: 20.01.2000.  
323 
 
  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 1999/154, JN: 2000/2756, Date: 25.05.2000.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 1999/5050, JN: 2001/823, Date: 14.03.2001. 
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2003/111, JN: 2006/6142, Date: 30.10.2006. 
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2004/1387, JN: 2007/3925, Date: 09.07.2007. 
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2005/3660, JN: 2007/6541, Date: 28.12.2007. 
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2009/645, JN: 2009/10284, Date: 09.12.2009.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2010/8380, JN: 2010/11501, Date: 31.12.2010.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2008/7915, JN: 2012/3083, Date: 25.06.2012.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2012/2243, JN: 2013/1296, Date: 18.02.2013.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2010/9468, JN: 2014/7772, Date: 16.12.2014.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2009/3924, JN: 2013/9506, Date: 30.12.2013.  
The TCS, Tenth Division, RN: 2009/13445, JN: 2013/9513, Date: 30.12.2013. 
 
 
 
  
324 
 
  
APPENDIX I 
List of the Interviewees and Codes 
I. NGOs 
1. NGO1 is the President of an NGO, which provides legal assistance to refugees 
and asylum seekers. NGO1 is also working as a lawyer. 
2. NGO2 is the President of a Research Centre on Asylum and Migration, 
journalist and former spokesperson of the UNHCR.  
3. NGO3 is the coordinator of an NGO.  
4. NGO4 is a member of a Human Rights Association, a member of the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) and a research assistant at 
the University.  
5. NGO5 is an expert at the International Organisation for Migration-Turkey 
Office.  
II. Lawyers  
1. L1 is a lawyer and Chairman of an NGO in Turkey.  
2. L2 is a lawyer and Vice President of an NGO.  
3. L3 is a lawyer and a member of Refugee Rights of Turkey. 
4. L4 is a lawyer at the UNHCR Turkey Office.  
5. L5 is a lawyer and an expert in Migration and Human rights Law and a former 
rapporteur of the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey.  
III. Judges  
1. J1 is a rapporteur Judge at the Turkish Constitutional Court 
2. J2 is a head Judge of an Administrative Court. 
3. J3 is a rapporteur Judge at the Turkish Council of State. (The Council of the 
State is the highest administrative court in Turkey) 
4. J4 is a member of the Turkish Council of State.  
IV. Senior Officials and Experts 
1. E1 is a Vice Director of a Migration Research Centre of a prominent 
University.  
2. E2 is a university lecturer who specializes in the EU-Turkey RA. 
3.  E3 is the General Director of Migration Management  
4. E4 is a deputy governor in a city, which hosts more refugees than its 
population.  
 
